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Life on earth is currently approaching or undergoing what has been called the sixth mass 
extinction, also known as the Holocene or anthropocene extinction. Unlike the previous five, this 
extinction is due to the destructive practices of a single species, our own. Along with the up to 
50% of plant and animal species facing extinction by the year 2100, as many as 90% of the 
world’s languages are expected to meet the same fate by this time. Biocultural diversity is a 
recent appellation for thinking together the earth’s biological, cultural and linguistic diversity, 
the related causes of their extinctions and the related steps needing to be taken to ensure their 
sustainability. In this dissertation, I turn to the work of Jacques Derrida to propose a notion of 
‘general ecology’ as a way to respond to this loss, to think the ethics, ontology and epistemology 
at stake in biocultural sustainability and the life and death we differentially share on earth with 
its others. Through readings of a variety of contemporary continental philosophers, I develop the 
interdisciplinary applicability of general ecology in the areas of translation studies, biopolitics, 
science and technology studies and ecolinguistics. My hope is to give readers not only an 
appreciation of the ecological and biocultural stakes of deconstruction, but to provoke in them 
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Introduction: Life Death on Earth with Others 
We are currently approaching (or undergoing, depending who you ask) what many have referred 
to as the sixth mass extinction, also known as the Holocene or Anthropocene extinction. While 
species extinction is certainly a fact of life (scientists estimate that 95% of all species that have 
ever lived are now extinct), it has been argued that species are dying out at a rate 1000 to 10,000 
times faster than the normal or ‘background’ rate, with up to 50% of all species facing extinction 
by the year 2050.1 Unlike the previous five extinctions, this is the first due to the effects of the 
actions of a single species: our own, human beings. 99% of species currently threatened are said 
to be so because of anthropogenic climate change, habitat destruction and the introduction of 
foreign species into their balanced ecosystems. 2  The journal Nature currently lists 41% of 
amphibians, 26% of mammals and 13% of birds as currently under threat of extinction. 3 
However, it is impossible to accurately know the extent at which this extinction is undergoing, 
since of the estimated 8.7 million species on earth today, only less than 20% have been 
‘discovered’ (or catalogued in the annals of biology).4 Another study in Nature lists as many as 
21.4 million possible species of animals, fungi and plants with only 1.8 million described, while 
yet another recent study includes microbial life in positing a possible one trillion species on 
Earth, with only one thousandth of a percent identified.5 
 A related challenge is currently facing the world’s languages, the most widely cited study 
from 1992 proposing the loss of as many as 90% of languages by the year 2100, with more 
recent estimates placing this figure somewhat more optimistically at 50%.6 National Geographic 
calculates that a language dies every fourteen days.7 Like biological species, it is difficult to say 
how many languages exist, with an average figure of around 6 to 7000 (and as many as 10, 000) 
usually proposed, with perhaps as many sign languages. Ethnologue currently lists 6,809 
languages, 95% of which have fewer than 1 million speakers.8 Another study claims that of all 
the world’s languages, some 5,000 have less than 100,000 speakers, 3,000 less than 10,000 
speakers, 1,500 less than 1,000 speakers, and 500 less than 100 speakers.9 4 to 5,000 of all 
languages are indigenous and endemic to a single country and ecosystem, spoken by a very small 
number of people, and their loss thereby also entails that of an entire culture and of a wholly 
singular manner of relating to the world. As a report jointly released by UNESCO (The United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), the WWF (The World Wide Fund for 
Nature) and Terralingua, an organization committed to biocultural diversity puts it, “languages 
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have been called ‘the DNA of cultures’ – they have encoded the cultural knowledge that people 
have inherited from their ancestors, and each generation continues to add to this heritage.”10 And 
while a certain amount of language extinction and evolution has also always occurred, one can 
read the intensification of this process as bound up with the causes responsible for species loss: 
environmental degradation and climate change, which operate alongside the displacement of 
indigenous communities and the hegemony of Anglo-American popular culture in the 
globalization of capitalism. Global capitalism requires unencumbered translation and thus fosters 
the increasing spread of English and other ‘mega-languages’ whereby traditional languages and 
knowledge systems are abandoned, either willingly as a means of survival or as a result of 
violent coercion. (Mandarin Chinese, Hindi, Spanish, Bengali, Portuguese, Arabic, Russian, 
Japanese and German constitute less than 1% of all world languages, but are spoken by 95% of 
its population, 50% of which as a mother tongue). Donna Haraway in fact suggests we substitute 
the term Capitalocene for anthropocene, and it is precisely in an attempt to break with the oikos 
of the ‘restricted economy’ of the capitalocene that I propose general ecology as the framework 
for what I will call biocultural sustainability.  
 It is surprising, given the increasing amount of interest in what can be called 
posthumanist discourses in responding to the anthropocene – highlighting the necessity to go 
beyond the classical metaphysical oppositions of culture and nature, the human and its others, the 
inorganic and the organic – that more attention has not been given to thinking biological, cultural 
and linguistic diversity as mutually and inextricably threatened. Biocultural diversity is defined 
as “the diversity of life in all its manifestations – biological, cultural, and linguistic – which are 
interrelated within a complex socio-ecological adaptive system.”11 Throughout these chapters, I 
will argue that the loss of this diversity is something to be grieved and mourned, as much for its 
own sake as for the fact that the ecosystems most capable of enduring and living-on are those 
characterized by difference and diversity.12 Ethics and ontology are thus inextricably bound up 
one with the other when it comes to thinking life and death on earth with its others. Preserving 
biocultural diversity is both the right thing to do and what we must do if we want to keep on 
living together well.  
 Deconstruction, at least as it is usually understood by the layperson or non-philosophers 
in general, will perhaps seem a strange way to think biocultural sustainability since its name 
evokes something like taking something apart or breaking it down. This is, however, quite 
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misleading. An even cursory reading of the work of Jacques Derrida reveals that questions of 
life, death, ‘nature,’ the earth and ethics have been present from his earliest texts and have 
remained at the forefront of his thought throughout his career. Derrida has always been a thinker 
of life, and particularly of life-supporting contexts, and so always a thinker of life on earth for 
me. A growing interest in deconstruction and environmental ethics or philosophy has sprung up 
since David Wood’s landmark paper “Spectres of Derrida: On the Way to Econstruction.”13 
Three special issues of the Oxford Literary Review edited by Timothy Clark, “Deconstruction, 
Environmentalism, and Climate Change,” (2010) “Deconstruction in the Anthropocene” (2012) 
and more recently “Overpopulation” (2016) have also contributed to this scholarship.14 In 2015, 
following an eponymous conference at Vanderbilt in Nashville, Tennessee, Matthias Fritsch, 
David Wood and myself edited Eco-Deconstruction: Derrida and Environmental Philosophy, 
which is currently under review by Fordham University Press. Eco-deconstruction closely 
follows on the tradition of eco-phenomenology, and both approximate certain reflections on the 
human’s place in nature present in European thought since German romanticism. The tradition of 
(more continental) environmental philosophy has itself long been recognized as a worthwhile 
alternative to the (more analytic) approach of environmental ethics, although to argue for its 
preferability over the latter is not my primary concern here.15 
 Why, then, do we need to think ecology philosophically or theoretically? The very idea 
could seem at best a futile piece of academic navel-gazing by sustainability activists, 
conservation biologists or those militating for linguistic human rights, at worst something wholly 
complicit with the mechanisms responsible for biocultural degradation in its privileged position 
within the institution of higher academia, its drawing largely from white, European men and its 
use of almost 400 pages of paper really to say (in English) that what is happening is bad and we 
should try to do something differently. I don’t refuse this possible contamination, which makes 
the stakes of this project all the more difficult, risky and vexing. However, I don’t believe the 
oppositions between theory and practice, activity and passivity are as stable as such arguments 
might allow, nor do I see the lines between philosophy, linguistics, science, ethics and politics as 
clearly drawn as others believe them to be. Actually, I think such oppositions and distinctions in 
fact prevent an adequate epistemological, ontological and ethical apprehension of what it means 
to live and die on earth with others. My thought, then, is that we’re for the most part quite bad at 
thinking what ecology is and means, given that despite the harrowing statistics I’ve listed above, 
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the worst-case scenario no longer seems one we’ll be able to avoid even if we straighten up and 
fly right. Furthermore, it seems to me that much in current theoretical thinking about life on earth 
and ecology reiterates many of the mechanisms responsible for biocultural degradation, namely a 
humanist subjectivism and a fetishizing of techno-capitalism, often despite (and perhaps due to) 
affirming its purity from these. Conversely, I intend to work through this contamination to flesh 
out its traps. As perilous as such a journey may be, it is one I see as absolutely worthwhile.  
Relatedly, it will further seem problematic to some that a study concerned with 
biocultural sustainability will place such an emphasis in its analyses on death. But this isn’t a 
very rigorous criticism, since the only reason we can care about the loss of species, languages 
and cultures is that they can die out; an immortal life is not grievable. Ecological relationality 
exposes all life to others and to a vulnerability before death, and species and non-human 
languages or semiotic systems will continue to live and die out long after we have gone (barring 
of course an apocalypse of such cataclysmic proportions that all life on earth would be 
immediately wiped out, but even cockroaches, tardigrades, fruit flies and scorpions have been 
said to be capable of surviving a nuclear war). But if death is so constitutive of life, why bother 
with sustainability? For the same reason that one tends to mourn less, or at least very differently, 
an elderly relative having lived a full and happy life than, I’d imagine, they would their four-
year-old run over by a drunk driver in a gas-guzzling hummer. We have a profound sense of 
injustice faced with a death that comes before its time, occurring for nothing other than indirectly 
satisfying the desires of the world’s wealthiest 1% more quickly and cost-effectively, at the cost 
of an incalculable number of living beings, languages, cultures, singularities, places and 
ecosystems. And while one may still certainly grieve the elderly relative in this hypothetical 
example, these deaths can also be sources of tremendous personal growth, an apprehension of 
one’s own mortality and an appreciation for our time on earth with them, for what we inherit 
from them and pass on to others that, we hope, will be so lucky to live and die at their own 
rhythms. 
General ecology is for me a manner of thinking life on earth by radically relating to this 
death as co-constitutive of survival and sustainability.16 It is an epistemological, ontological and 
ethical framework that exposes any manner of being in the world – from the amoeba to the 
human in their relations to organic and inorganic matter – to untranslatability, non-knowledge, 
non-sense, interruption and impossibility. But these seemingly negative exposures do not 
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contradict the values of communication and relationality one might imagine as being more 
conducive to thinking ecology and sustainability. Rather, they make these relations possible in 
their affirmation not only of difference and diversity, but of processes of differentiation and 
diversification. To affirm biocultural diversity must thus in a sense renounce the attempt to 
control and master these processes and instead let them live-on, and ultimately die, in leaving 
them the time that is most proper to them. The Others in my title are not only other philosophers 
thinking about life and death, they are the incalculable singularities of every living being, every 
indigenous culture or minority language that must defend their time against that of global techno-
capitalism, and whose time, as inappropriable as it may be, and perhaps precisely because of this 
inappropriability, we must give – or return – to them. 
I include here brief summaries of the six chapters in this dissertation to give my reader an 
overview of its argument and hopefully facilitate its navigation. 
One: Survivance and General Ecology. In this chapter, I argue that Derrida’s thought of 
life in différance as survivance or life death allows us to think an ethics attuned both to the 
sustainability of organic life and species, as well as to the survival of minority languages, 
worldviews, texts and other forms of inorganic life. Through Georges Bataille’s notion of 
general economy, I refigure the logic through which the living being structures and is structured 
by its environment to include epistemological, ontological, ethical, biopolitical and linguistic 
considerations. Derrida’s notion of life in translation, I conclude, provides a way to think through 
the ethical aporias entailed in biocultural sustainability, and to think this latter notion by way of 
what he calls the promise of the earth.   
Two: Transcendence and the Surviving Present. The argument of this chapter is that 
Edmund Husserl's concept of the Living Present, one at stake from the very beginning through to 
the very end of Derrida's philosophy, is an essential point of entry to understanding the 
deconstructive notion of life as living-on, in its structural transcendences or exteriorizations in 
time, alterity, death and matter. This 'trace-structure' of the Living Present operates at the level of 
organic life, just as it does in the inorganic structures through which the organism and its 
environment relate to one another, of particular importance here being linguistically, 
epistemologically, scientifically and historically. However, Derrida's reading of the Living 
Present, arguably by way of an encounter with Emmanuel Levinas, enjoins one to consider these 
structures beyond the sole purview of the human, and thus provides an important grounding for 
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thinking the aporetics of translation at stake in differentially sharing a world with its other living 
beings, along with the environmental ethics required to address these difficulties.  
Three: Resistance and Ex-appropriation: Letting Life Live-on. This chapter attempts a 
radicalization of Martin Heidegger’s concept of auto-affective transcendence as being-in-the-
world in order to stage the ex-appropriation of its exclusive conferment upon the human. In 
doing so, I attempt to disclose a thought of the living in its arche-material remaining, restance but 
also resistance, anterior to the question of Being and to what Derrida calls ontological violence. 
In Derrida's deconstruction of Heidegger's ontology, I argue, the notions of Gelassenheit 
(releasement) and the Zusage (acquiescence) reveal not only the sharing of a radical passivity 
and vulnerability before death shared by all living beings, but also a thought of responsibility as 
letting beings be, indeed of ethics as letting life live-on, resisting the biopolitical, technoscientific 
and indeed linguistic objectification of beings complicit with environmental degradation. 
Four: Animmanence: Life Death & the Passion and Perpetual Detour of Difference: In 
this chapter, I being by taking seriously Heidegger's argument that Friedrich Nietzsche's 
philosophy has potentially destructive consequences for the earth, consequences that, I argue, are 
shared by many contemporary philosophies of immanence. However, I identify in Gilles 
Deleuze, Bataille, Maurice Blanchot and Derrida's readings of Nietzsche both a thought of the 
Will to Power as the passion of the Outside or of difference, as well as of the Eternal Return as 
the perpetual detour of difference. These readings, I argue, reveal a certain doubling in life death 
(where death is refigured both as inside and outside, personal and impersonal, possible and 
impossible), a powerlessness at the heart of the living, as well as the ex-appropriation of 
temporality necessary in thinking a selective affirmation of life, one more amenable to resisting 
the techno-biopolitical enframing of the earth and all its beings.  
Five: Biopolitics and Double Affirmation: Step/nots Beyond an Ecology of the Commons: 
This chapter stakes its argument on distinguishing between an affirmative biopolitics that, I 
suggest, maintains important similarities to the ecological dangers highlighted in Heidegger's 
reading of Nietzsche, and a deconstruction of biopolitics by way of Derrida’s notion of double 
affirmation. I argue that the reconceptualization of the living in its relation to death and its 
environment (scientifically, epistemologically, linguistically and politically) suggested in Michel 
Foucault’s readings of Georges Cuvier, Xavier Bichat, Nietzsche, Bataille and Blanchot points to 
a more complex and, I argue, preferable framework in responding to these dangers. I illustrate 
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this by distinguishing two approaches to 'affirmative biopolitics,' that of Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri which, I argue, remains at the level of a restricted ecology of power and 
resistance, of making and letting live and die, and that of Roberto Esposito which, particularly 
through his readings of Bataille and Blanchot, suggests a logic more akin to general ecology, one 
more in tune with letting life live-on and sharing the earth with its other living beings.  
Six: Translation as a Material-Semiotic In(ter)vention: In this chapter, I suggest that the 
notion of the material-semiotic developed by Donna Haraway and Karen Barad allows one to 
jointly address important ethico-political aporetics shared by Science and Technology Studies, 
Ecolinguistics and Translation Studies. As I argue, non-representationalist accounts of words and 
things, as well as the organism-environment relationships developed in complementarity and 
systems theory allow for a thought of translation within which the ecologically destructive blind-
spots of our own epistemological, ontological and linguistic frameworks may be addressed more 
directly. To think translation as both a necessary and impossible sharing of the world with its 
others allows us to articulate two concerns in ecolinguistics: the language of ecology (the 
recurring patterns through which languages differentially encode relationships to the 
environment) and the ecology of language (the 'ecological' relationships between languages) 
within what I call ecosystemic translation. This latter notion, I conclude, brings together the 
deconstructive, biopolitical and epistemological-ontological-ethical concerns of this dissertation 
towards the invention of other responses to biocultural sustainability. I conclude, in In-
conclusion, with suggesting some avenues for possible further research and imagine certain 
novel articulations within which general ecology may find itself operating in the interest of 
biocultural sustainability in the future.  
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Each man is called upon to take up again the mission of Noah. He must become the intimate and 
pure ark of all things, the refuge in which they take shelter, where they are not content to be kept 
as they are, as they imagine themselves to be – narrow, outworn, so many traps for life – but are 
transformed, lose their form, lose themselves in the intimacy of their reserve, where they are as if 
preserved from themselves, untouched, intact, in the pure point of the undetermined. Yes, every 
man is Noah, but on closer inspection, he is Noah in a strange way, and his mission consists less 
in saving everything from the flood than, on the contrary, in plunging all things into a deeper 
flood where they disappear prematurely and radically. That, in fact, is what the human vocation 
amounts to. If it is necessary that everything visible become invisible, if this metamorphosis is 
the goal, our intervention is apparently quite superficial: the metamorphosis is accomplished 
perfectly of itself, for everything is perishable, for, says Rilke... ‘the perishable is everywhere  
engulfed in a deep being.’ What have we then to do, we who are the least durable, the most 
prompt to disappear? What have we to offer in this task of salvation? Precisely that: our 
promptness at disappearing, our aptitude for perishing, our fragility, our exhaustion, our gift for 
death. 
Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature, 143-4/139. 
 
Landscape without land, opened onto the absence of the fatherland, seascape, space without 
territory, without reserved path, without locality. Not that these are lacking but if it takes place, 
and it must, it will first have to open itself to a thought of the earth [terre] as the fraying of a 
path. 
Jacques Derrida, Parages, 15/7t. 
 
Deconstruction is when something deconstructs itself. All of a sudden, there is no longer any 
foundation, any certain axioms, even any assured terrain, die Welt ist fort, the world itself, the 
world as earth, as founding ground, is no longer assured. I think one only begins to think at the 
heart of this tremor. All of a sudden, there is no longer anything guaranteed, anything solid. But 
I’d say that this experience is always an experience of responsibility.  
Jacques Derrida, “La Mélancolie d’Abraham,” 48. 
 
 
One: Survivance and General Ecology 
In this chapter, I’ll attempt to develop Derrida’s notion of survivance or life death, along with 
rethinking his and Bataille’s concept of general economy as general ecology, in order to stake 
out the theoretical grounds for thinking an ethics of sustainability towards living organisms, 
species, ecosystems and also languages, texts and cultures: an ethics of biocultural sustainability. 
These reflections, however, will no more attempt to vitalize inorganic processes such as 
languages than it will deploy life as a metaphor for thinking these. I intend to differentiate my 
approach from one grounded in the immanence, power and force of life, subtending what has 
been called the ‘affirmative turn to life,’ particularly in affirmative biopolitics.1 I do this as much 
to circumnavigate the dark history of vitalism as to suggest that the mourning and compassion 
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for mortal life and finitude ultimately at stake in any thought of sustainability is better 
apprehended through a recognition of life in its passivity, powerlessness and originary 
contamination by death, as is the affirmation of life itself.2 An ethics of sustainability oriented 
around this shared finitude will be concerned with the survival of species and languages as much 
for their own sake as for the interest of pluralizing the interruptive possibilities they pose to the 
dominant ethico-politico-juridical frameworks responsible for environmental degradation, let’s 
call these subjective humanism and techno-capitalism. As suggested in my epigraph from 
Blanchot, the concern of such a sustainability will less be one of actively preserving its objects as 
self-identical than thinking the relations of differentiation, transcendence, impossibility and 
unknowability we share with them, along with the ethics of letting live-on these relations seem to 
demand. 
The originarity of living-on suggests we are always already engaged in such a process. 
But deconstruction allows us to think both biological and cultural heredity and inheritance 
otherwise, allowing for a certain freedom in the selection and filtration of what one receives, 
epistemologically, ontologically and ethically, and the possibility of letting what one inherits live 
on otherwise and more justly, but indeed, and because of this freedom, also for the worse. 
Below, I will analyze living inheritance as caught in an unavoidable double bind in 
responsibility: both to the deployment of rules, norms and programs in thinking biocultural 
sustainability, and to what in life and death exceeds all calculation and programmability, unless 
the notion of the pro-gramme is itself rethought in its material inscription, beyond the classical 
oppositions of nature and culture, the human and its others, physis and technè, activity and 
passivity. 
While I will be covering a variety of authors in this chapter, at times rather quickly, my 
intention is not to offer a comprehensive overview of their work, nor to offer anything to their 
particular scholarship. Rather, I wish to situate the contexts within which Derrida’s notions of 
life, death, economy and ecology develop, and how I see these to contribute to the development 
of what I’m calling general ecology. These readings should be approached with this in mind. I 
begin in §1.1 by introducing Derrida’s thought of life in différance, which I then illustrate 
through his readings of Freud and Jacob, revealing an originary technicity, alterity and relation to 
death at the heart of any living process. Through Derrida’s work on Blanchot, I then develop this 
as a certain doubling at the heart of survivance and life death that opens onto the possibility of a 
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shared apprehension of this mortality. I proceed in §1.2 to examine Bataille’s notion of 
impossibility in relation to his thought of economy and show, through Derrida’s reading, the 
necessity of elaborating general economy as general ecology. In §1.3, I turn to the 
epistemological, ontological and ethical questions of how a living being structures its world and 
its others in Derrida’s reading of Canguilhem. Against the dialectical, immanentist account 
proposed by the latter, I argue that Levinas’s ethics better allows for the thought of 
transcendence required to maintain the unknowability and alterity of the other. I conclude in §1.4 
by examining Benjamin’s thought of translation as sur-vival, and its messianic promise of a 
reconciliation between languages. I then read Blanchot and Bataille’s inquiries on community 
through Derrida’s notion of the promise of the earth to imagine a promise of biocultural 
sustainability, and close in asking how one might inherit this promise justly.  
 
§1.1: Survivance: Life and Death in Différance 
§1.1.1: The Economy of Repetition and the Impossible: Freud and Jacob 
This section will attempt to think together two important claims of Derrida’s: that an originary 
dimension of survivance informs the entirety of his work, and that deconstruction is an 
experience of the impossible.3 I will argue that there is a connection between Derrida’s thoughts 
of life and the impossible that would be the key not only to understanding deconstruction itself 
but an appreciation of its epistemological, ontological and ethical stakes in thinking the life and 
death we share with others on earth. I’ll attempt to develop this through an examination of life as 
an originary dimension of repetition, and show how Derrida’s différance allows one to enter this 
into relation with what he calls the impossible. As he defines différance in For What Tomorrow, 
différance means at once the same (the living being, only deferred, relayed, replaced by a 
substitutive supplement, by a prosthesis, by a supplementation in which ‘technology’ 
emerges) and the other (absolutely heterogeneous, radically different, irreducible and 
untranslatable, the aneconomic, the wholly other or death). The differantial interruption is 
both reinscribed into the economy of the same and opened to an excess of the wholly 
other. (DQ 74/40t) 
 
General economy, I will show, is another name for différance since it allows us to think both the 
same, an economic delay and deferral, mechanical and machinelike repetition, also the mastery, 
sovereignty and reappropriative power over the stakes of this economy in its calculability (this is 
what I will call ‘restricted’ economy) and the other, an excessive and aneconomic expenditure 
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without reserve, death, the impossible, the unknowability and incalculability of the event, the 
wholly other and the promise.4 This section and the next will not so much attempt to extend 
general economy to the ecological, but to show that, if survivance and life death are indeed 
originary, general economy has been general ecology all along.  
 Différance situates every identity as relationally constituted by a network of differences, 
both in temporal deferral and spatial difference. If difference is prior to identity, then one cannot 
postulate identity as an origin that would subsequently repeat or reiterate itself in its survival. 
One has the idea that repetition usually comes after some event as a translation follows an 
original. Différance by contrast situates repetition as originary; the origin begins by repeating and 
propagating itself without limit, engaging, Derrida writes, a general deconstruction of all 
philosophical oppositions.5 This thoroughly complicates the purity of any putative origin, any 
complete self-presence to one’s activity and any notion of essence. An identity that can only be 
repeated is originarily related to others in a differential field and thus subjected to conflict, 
particularly in its passive exposure to vulnerability, suffering and death. A dimension of 
passivity is thus present within originary repetition. To say that that this passivity is anterior to 
the opposition of activity and passivity is to extract it from a notion whereby it would still be the 
result of a choice; ‘I could be active, but I’m not.’ Rather, this passivity is constitutive, always 
operational and actualized, and not the converse of a will, choice or potentiality. This entails for 
Derrida a profound reconfiguration of our most deeply held anthropocentric beliefs. While the 
renewed interest in the vitality of matter, processes, objects and so on must also certainly be 
understood as a challenge to this anthropocentrism, much of their arguments rest on a very 
Spinozist line of inquiry: what can a body do? Derrida invites us to ask a different question: not 
to confer recognizability on nonhumans on the basis of some shared power or capacity, but rather 
to follow Jeremy Bentham in asking ‘can they suffer?’ To ask this question interrogates a shared 
passivity, passion and what he calls a non-power at the heart of power before death between all 
living beings, explaining that  
being able to suffer is no longer a power; it is a possibility without power, a possibility of 
the impossible. Mortality resides there, as the most radical means of thinking the finitude 
that we share with animals, the mortality that belongs to the very finitude of life, to the 
experience of compassion, to the possibility of sharing the possibility of this nonpower, 
the possibility of this nonpower, the possibility of this impossibility, the anguish of this 
vulnerability, and the vulnerability of anguish. (AS 49/28) 
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Anthropocentric thought for Derrida has always opposed a human freedom of active response to 
the mechanical reaction of other living beings. With originary repetition, one is called upon to 
think a certain mechanical reactivity at the heart of the human that not only casts doubt on the 
alleged being-ethical of any ethical decision or responsibility (such a doubt being in fact 
coextensive with ethics itself for Derrida) but allows ethics to take into account the vastly 
differentiated fields of experience within which all living beings structure and are structured by 
their environments. The distinction between active responsibility and passive reaction, and the 
entire history of ethical, political and juridical responsibility thus becomes reinscribed in a new 
thinking of the relations between life, the living, the mechanical, technology and death, beyond 
the opposition of nature and culture.6 Originary repetition means that there is a machinic element 
of repetitiveness at the heart of any identity, since an identity can only be what it is by returning 
to itself, but this return originarily passes through the detour of the other. The identity it returns 
to is not the one it was, and this process of differentiation in repetition is always ongoing. What 
Derrida calls ‘iterability’ designates the element of alterity in repetition.7 One is thus invited to 
think an originary technicity at the heart of the living organism: any living being, Derrida writes, 
“undoes the opposition between physis and technè. As a self-relation, as activity and reactivity, 
as differantial force, as repetition, life is always already inhabited by technicization.” (NII 244) 
This technicization is the condition for anything at all to happen to a living being; a techno-
biological prosthesis constitutes every organic synthesis. It is itself the condition of living 
together with others and, he adds, “it is death in life as the condition of life.”8 (DJ 62t) This death 
is not only that which the living being economically defers, postpones and evades but that which 
it draws upon as the very possibility of this deferral. In other words, life has as its economic 
condition of possibility its aneconomic condition of im-possibility, an im-possibility irreducible 
to the opposition of possibility and impossibility.  
It is in Derrida’s reading of Freud in “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” that I will begin 
my analysis of what Derrida calls life death [la vie la mort].9 Derrida’s later treatment of Freud 
in “To Speculate: On ‘Freud’” itself corresponds to the final four sessions of his 1974-5 seminar 
La Vie la mort, which also engages the work of biologist François Jacob’s Logic of Life [La 
Logique du vivant] and Heidegger’s critique of Nietzsche’s alleged biologism in his Nietzsche 
lectures.10 Derrida’s point throughout is that all the oppositions developed by Freud, notably that 
between the life and death drives must be understood in terms of différance, or of an originary 
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repetition or detour at the heart of life. But this detour, I will show, opens onto an impossibly 
exterior alterity, irrecuperable within its economy, an element of non-knowledge as death, the 
wholly other and the anachrony of a time without present or presence. Differently from the 
classical concept of supplementation, within which something comes to economically 
supplement a self-present totality from the outside, whether to complete an internal lack or as an 
addition, Derrida’s concept of supplementarity will consist in inscribing this beyond within. This 
will be the key, I will show, to thinking life death and survivance as relations with an exteriority 
beyond the opposition of possibility and impossibility.  
For Freud, an organism’s primary aim is to seek pleasure, but when this imprudently puts 
the organism in danger, a reality or conservation principle comes to defer the pleasure 
principle. 11  The difference between the two principles for Derrida constitutes the originary 
possibility of a detour and différance as the economic deferment of death within life, which 
protects itself by constituting a reserve to defer a dangerous investment.12 But this self-protection 
of life does not posit a life that would later come to protect itself in repetition and différance. 
The very concept of a ‘first time’ yields to an originary dimension of repetition, “death at the 
origin of life which can defend itself against death only through an economy of death, through 
deferment, repetition, reserve.” (ED 300-1/202) To think the originary repetition of life as 
différance is indeed to say that life is death, but even this is will find itself problematized in life 
death.13 If life is death, it can only survive in its différance from itself. In “To Speculate...,” the 
detour through the reality principle allows the pleasure principle to return to itself within the 
same economy, in the sovereign mastery of its detour, in order to reappropriate itself and the 
other within the proper circulation of its oikos.14 However – and importantly not opposed to this 
economy, since as I will show, the logic of opposition would dialectically recuperate this process 
– Freud also postulates a death drive which would seem to exceed this economy of life. As 
Derrida asks in “Différance,”  
How are we to think simultaneously, on the one hand, différance as the economic detour 
that, in the element of the same, always aims at coming back to the pleasure or the 
presence that have been deferred by (conscious or unconscious) calculation, [this is what 
I would call restricted economy/ecology] and, on the other hand, différance as the 
relation to an impossible presence, an expenditure without reserve, as the irreparable loss 
of presence, the irreversible usage of energy, indeed, as the death drive, and as the 
relation to the wholly other apparently interrupting every economy? It is evident – and 
this is the evident itself – that the economical and the non-economical, the same and the 
wholly other, etc. cannot be thought together. (MP 20/19t) 
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Différance is this unthinkable relation between the mechanical repetition of a restricted economy 
and the impossible, the wholly other and death. With respect to general ecology, it will be 
important to see how différance inscribes the living within the transcendence of a material space, 
an Outside originarily beyond the restricted and circular detour of its immanence, whether, to 
paraphrase Derrida, one calls this space the earth or the world of life death.15 It’s therefore 
essential to show how Derrida’s thought of death goes beyond that he reads in Freud, for whom 
even the aneconomy of the death drive becomes reappropriated within an economy. While the 
death drive pushes the organism to return to an anterior state of inanimate and inorganic matter, 
indeed to ‘nature,’ the conservation drive protects it from any external forces that would disrupt 
the immanence of its return-to-self. Life itself is inscribed in this differantial relay with the 
transcendence of nature or the material world, which Derrida calls “the ‘external’ force which 
disrupts the immanent tendency, and which in a way produces the entire history of a life which 
does nothing other than repeat itself and regress, … what is usually called nature, the system of 
the earth and the sun.” (CP 377/354) For Derrida, that the organism seeks to die its own, proper 
death constitutes the law of la-vie-la-mort for Freud: the law of the proper, of restricted economy 
and ecology. Derrida writes: 
it is indeed a question of an economy of death, of a law of the proper (oikos, oikonomia) 
which governs the detour and indefatigably seeks the proper event, its own, proper 
propriation (Ereignis) rather than life and death, life or death. The prolongation or 
abbreviation of the detour would be in the service of this properly economic or ecological 
law of oneself as proper, of the auto-mobile auto-affection of the fort:da. (CP 381-
2/359e)  
 
To anticipate the stakes of my next two chapters, Derrida suggests that (what I may be beginning 
to be justified in calling) the restricted ecology of the living, reappropriating every material 
transcendence within the immanence of its own detour, ought to be thought together with the 
temporalizations discussed by Husserl and Heidegger.16 Derrida will allow me to productively 
complicate the relation between the organism and its outside, environment, others, space, time 
and ecology in relation to phenomenology and ontology more broadly in chapters 2 and 3.  
 To further differentiate Derrida’s thought of life death on these questions, allow me to 
examine his engagement of Jacob in La Vie la mort.17 As Derrida explains, Jacob attempts to 
distinguish ‘the living being’ (le vivant) or the organism as the proper object of biology from the 
metaphysical concept of Life that has preoccupied the debates between vitalism and materialism, 
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teleology and mechanism: a metaphysical essence immanent to the living being.18 Derrida seems 
sympathetic to this move, but faults Jacob for immediately himself deciding on an essence of 
life, indeed Hegel’s, to flesh this out: the capacity of life to re-produce itself. Reproduction 
moreover constitutes a quite Aristotelian concept of causality in Jacob’s logic of the living, 
where a cause x always explains its reproduced effect y from within.19 Jacob in fact rediscovers 
there the essentiality of essence in this definition, not only the essence of its being (ousia) and 
cause (aitia) but also its essence as energeia.20  All classical theories of essence ensure the 
possession of one’s principle of being, one’s production and reproduction, from within, and not 
as an accident from outside. Although I can’t show this in detail here, arguably the major 
theories of being and life in Western thought (Derrida lists here Aristotle, Hegel, Spinoza’s 
conatus and Leibniz’s appetitus) postulate production and reproduction thusly. Rather than 
uncritically lumping all these definitions together, Derrida intends here to demonstrate a 
powerful code at work in each, particularly as concerns the question of death and its exteriority. 
As the essence of life is the capacity to reproduce itself, the bacterium (and Derrida will 
eventually gloss this across the entire field of the living) does not experience death or sexuality 
in an ‘essential’ sense for Jacob; both the death drive and eros, to paraphrase Freud’s dualism of 
instinctual life, arrive as a classical supplementation from the outside. The ‘death’ thus resulting 
would be its simple disappearance, along with the exhaustion of its reproductive capacity.21 The 
bacterium would simply receive a contingent death from its environment, or its culture as Jacob 
puts it, and not death in the proper sense. The only death worthy of the name “is a death that does 
not limit itself to a non-life, a death that is not contingent... ‘coming from the outside,’ affecting 
from the outside.” (L5, 14-5t) The non-life that the bacterium encounters from the outside is a 
non-death; it never encounters real death and therefore, recalling the connection between 
economy, propriety, mastery and power, “this life is invulnerable, a pure life inaccessible to the 
slightest negativity. Death does not meet it, it passes over it as its outside.” (L5, 15t) The proper, 
non-external, non-exterior, non-transcendent death must rather “be regulated by an internal law 
of being, essence, reproducibility, therefore of life, livingness, it must not have the status of an 
addition or a supplement.” (L5, 16t) One thus has in Freud and Jacob a split between on the one 
hand a proper, immanent death and a non-proper, transcendent death, but only the former being 
of any importance. I’ll discuss this doubling of death in the next subsection. 
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 If différance is the counterpoint to any notion of identity as given, however, one cannot 
think life as essence. Accordingly, the structure of originary repetition precisely forbids Derrida 
from proposing différance as the essence of life, “as différance is not an essence, as it is not 
anything, it is not life, if Being is determined as ousia, presence, essence/existence, substance, or 
subject.” (ED 302/255) The deconstruction of supplementarity entails that anything any economy 
would want to keep out from the propriety of the human or life comes to originarily contaminate 
it from within, whether this is its relation to other living beings (human or otherwise), the 
inorganic, death or the techno-machinic. Originary technicity expropriates the proper from both 
the human and life itself, and death is also this material, indeed technological supplement, 
“technè as the relation between life and death.”22 (ED 337/287) Against the notion of life as 
something within the organism, to think life in différance is to think it in its technical iterability, 
its vulnerable exposure to death. As Derrida writes almost 40 years later, this machinality alone 
assures sur-vival, beyond any opposition between life and death. “That’s also finitude, the 
chance and the threat of finitude, this alliance of the dead and the living. I shall say that this 
finitude is survivance.” (BS2 193/130)  
 In his definition of life as the capacity to re-produce itself, Jacob distinguishes on the one 
hand between the living organism, capable of re-producing itself, and the machine, capable only 
of production. However, reproduction is never for Derrida simply the effect of an already 
existing being.23 The auto-reproduction of the living being is not that of an ego, consciousness or 
a self-identical and self-same identity; the living being is its own reproducibility, but this 
reproducibility must be thought in its originary contamination with the inorganic. The opposition 
between the organic and the inorganic, reproduction and production would itself be derivative 
with respect to différance. Just as the machine can only produce in receiving energy from its 
outside, for example by way of human use, the living being depends on its structural outside for 
its reproduction in taking in food, energy and matter.24 Any self-relation in re-production must 
thus already be understood in its différance-from-itself, in its relation to the other and the 
outside, and this “just as much in the living as in the non-living.” (L6, 17t) As against the 
classical logic of supplementarity within which Jacob reads death and sexuality, thanatos and 
eros,  
these two ‘inventions’ arising from outside, quasi-accidentally, consist in placing inside, 
in inscribing as an internal law the very thing that comes from outside. What the 
supplement brings from outside is an internal supplement, such that all the oppositions 
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that Jacob confidently operates (necessary/contingent, internal/external, 
organism/environment, etc.) and consequently non-sexuality/sexuality, life/non-life fall 
apart. (L5, 16t) 
 
As I will show throughout these chapters, no process intending to appropriate or reappropriate 
the transcendences of alterity, materiality, time or death within the economy or ecology of its 
immanence can ever be assured of the permanence or completeness of this attempt. In the law of 
the oikos, Derrida writes, “in the guarding of the proper, beyond the opposition life/death, its 
privilege is also its vulnerability, one can even say its essential impropriety, the expropriation 
(Enteignis) which constitutes it.” 25  (CP 382/359e) But one can also read this logic as 
fundamentally structuring the anthropocentric presuppositions deconstructing themselves here, 
along with the propriety of the oikos of any restricted economy or ecology. 26  Any rigid 
distinction between inside and outside, life and death, is exceeded in this structural openness, and 
along with it any possibility of calculating or fully mastering life in différance. To think the 
living in its originary repetition, arche-technicity and machinality and the exteriority these 
inscribe within it opens onto nothing less than the experience of the impossible, the incalculable 
and what Derrida calls the event. This dimension of incalculability instils a dimension of 
freedom, but also a responsibility overflowing the opposition between machinic production and 
organic re-production, reaction and response, activity and passivity. And here, Derrida writes, 
one must still distinguish between on the one hand a (restricted) incalculable that still belongs to 
the order of calculation and the subject, and a non-calculable that would exceed this order. “The 
event – which in essence should remain unforeseeable and therefore not programmable – would 
be that which exceeds the machine. What it would be necessary to try to think, and this is 
extremely difficult, is the event with the machine.” (DQ 86-7) General ecology will allow us to 
think this ‘monstrous’ necessity and impossibility of the event-machine, necessary machinic 
repetition and impossible organic spontaneity, but not without its doubling into death.27  
 
§1.1.2: Doublings of Life Death: Blanchot 
Let me recall that my stakes in §1.1 entailed thinking together two remarks of Derrida’s as the 
grounds for a more compassionate thought of ecological relationality: that deconstruction is an 
experience of the impossible and that an originary dimension of survivance informs the entirety 
of his work. Survivance owes a far greater debt to Blanchot than is usually acknowledged, and 
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while I cannot engage the latter’s work in much detail here, I wish to flag how his reflections on 
the experience of the impossible, the Outside, vulnerability, passivity and a non-power at the 
heart of power in the relation to death structure for Derrida both an affirmative thought of life 
and a shared compassion with other living beings in an (ultimately ethical) co-passion before 
suffering and death. In his recent Inanimation, David Wills outlines two possible contaminations 
between life and death; an enlivening of the inanimate or a vitalization of matter, and an 
originary technicity or inorganicity of the living he follows Derrida in calling lifedeath. The 
former notion is ascribed by Wills to Deleuze and Guattari, and also has its adherents in 
Foucault’s readings of Bichat and Cuvier. I’d argue it is also visible in affirmative biopolitics, 
the ‘affirmative turn to life’ and certain forms of new materialism, new vitalism and process 
philosophy. For Wills, both trends are really two sides of the same coin, and both are affirmative 
philosophies of life.28 I follow Wills in preferring life death, but feel the need to add that I see 
any vitalization of matter or the inorganic as an effect of life death, finding the sole possibility of 
its dialectical coinage in the aneconomy of Blanchot’s double death, which I’ll show also 
structures Deleuze, Foucault and Esposito’s accounts of life in chapters 4 and 5. 
As Derrida points out in his final interview, the idea of survivance as a complication of 
life death occurs in its earliest form in “Pas,” where he cites Blanchot’s The Work of Fire (1949) 
on a  “survival which is not a survival/one [survie qui n’en est pas une],” but does not include the 
next phrase, “a death that does not put an end to anything.” 29 (BPF 327/340t) This death that is 
impossible to die, I argue, can be read as the doubling implied by a ‘survival that is not one.’ In 
his final interview, Derrida brings up a similar doubling highlighted by Benjamin’s “The Task of 
the Translator,” überleben, something rising above life, a post-mortem life surviving death, and 
fortleben, living on, prolonging life and continuing to live.30 In this section, I’ll discuss a notion 
of double death: on the one hand that which life can individually or personally delay, defer and 
postpone, and on the other an im-possible death that is impersonal in that it cannot be personally 
died, although it structures the possibility of its economic delay and deferral. Survivance or life 
death are structured in this doubling of death; the living being must economically appropriate and 
make its own a death that it ultimately cannot, and the living being precisely is this trying, until it 
no longer can, and no longer is.  
Derrida highlights a contamination and equivocity at stake in any discourse of life or 
death that issues from what he calls an originary, structural dimension of surviving, irreducible to 
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their opposition. In his “Living-On: Borderlines,” he proposes that one reads the title of Shelley’s 
The Triumph of Life both as the triumph of life over death and as the triumph of death over life. 
Similarly, Blanchot’s L’Arrêt de mort [Death Sentence] can be heard both as a death sentence 
and as that which arrests death. The sur- of survival itself oscillates between a thought of 
something that is still life and something more and better than life. It engages the undecidability 
of what Derrida calls a ‘plus-de-vie,’ both more-than-life and no-more-life, one with which one 
is never finished. “Surviving overruns both living and dying, supplementing each with a sudden 
surge and reprieve, deciding [arrêtant] life and death at once.” (P 153/134) Despite appearances, 
survivance is not above life, neither in the sense of a beyond nor in the sense of some superiority, 
sovereignty or power of life. 31  It can never be determined, finally, if the unconditional 
affirmation of life triumphs over death, or is merely a phase in what he calls the work of 
mourning.32 Survivance is bound to an originary condition of mourning. Every surviving is one 
in reprieve, and one does not survive without mourning those they survive, a mourning that does 
not even await an actual, I’d say even a possible death.33  
Death thus makes possible any affirmation of life, since life cannot affirm its continuation 
without deferring death. The possibility of the affirmation of life is the impossibility of life’s 
indefinite survival, its radical finitude both as something it surmounts and defers and as 
something impersonal, anonymous and impossible that tarries along beside it as its structural 
condition of possibility. Conversely, as Derrida puts it in Sur Parole, survival is also the 
ineluctable structuring dimension of any death, both of death itself and of any anticipation, 
awaiting of or anxiety before death. Survivance thus conditions a dual movement, “an attention 
to the imminence of death at every moment that is not necessarily sad, negative or morbid 
[mortifière], but on the contrary... life itself, the greatest intensity of life.” (SP 52t) My intention 
here then is less to offer a gloomy rejoinder to the affirmative turn to life in contemporary 
thought than to provide a critical reflection on the conditions of possibility and impossibility of 
such affirmations in order to think sharing life death on earth with its others more justly.  
Death for Blanchot puts an end to nothing because death is impossible to die, and not 
only because it is impossible for a living being to experience its death in the present. Death must 
thus be thought otherwise than as a power or as an internal possibility for some subject or ego. 
To say that death is impossible for Derrida is precisely not a jubilant victory over death, but 
rather an acquiescence limiting all power, returning all power, mastery and possibility towards 
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an unpower and impossibility. 34  Blanchot also borrows the notion of an experience of the 
impossible – which I mentioned would later lend its name to deconstruction itself – from 
Bataille. As he puts it, one must understand for Bataille that “possibility is not the sole dimension 
of our existence, and that it is perhaps given to us to ‘live’ each of the events that is ours by way 
of a double relation.” (BEI 307/207) On the one hand, to (restrictedly) live each event in terms of 
what can be mastered, grasped and related to some value, and on the other as the inescapable 
trial of an impossibility without use or end, a non-power subtending everything we experience, 
live, think or say.35 In the experience of the impossible, the impossible is not the negative 
reversal of the possible but an excessive affirmation beyond its power.36 The affirmation of the 
impossible is itself a nonpower since it affirms more than can possibly be affirmed, it is a passion 
irreducible to modifications of power, appropriation and activity: “the passion of the Outside 
itself.” (BEI 65/46) Any affirmation of life is doubled since it must affirm both its restricted 
possibility (the death it survives) and its aneconomic im-possibility (the one it cannot) as co-
constitutive possibilities of its living-on.  
For Blanchot, philosophy will have always operated in the movement of a ‘grand refus’ 
against the Outside and death. Hegel, I will show in the next section, makes of death a pure 
negation through which life can be reborn as the life of Spirit. Derrida calls this the ‘phoenix 
motif,’ reborn from its ashes.37 Heidegger, for his part, attempts to make of death a power; death 
is my ownmost possibility, no one can die in my place, the power to die authentically is precisely 
what separates the human Dasein from all other living things.38 Dialectics and ontology both 
think death as possibility, as power and reappropriation, and I showed a similar logic operating 
in Freud’s account of the death drive for Derrida. However, Blanchot imagines a double death in 
The Space of Literature,  
one which circulates in the language of possibility, of liberty, which has for its furthest 
horizon the freedom to die and the capacity to take mortal risks [it is this limited risk, I 
will show below, that is at stake for Bataille in distinguishing his thought from restricted 
economy] – and there is its double, which is ungraspable. It is what I cannot grasp, what 
is not linked to me by any relation of any sort. It is that which never comes and toward 
which I do not direct myself. (BEL 104/103)  
 
The dialectics, ontology and speculative psychoanalysis that would name death as a personal 
project for Blanchot find consolation before the anonymity of a ‘One dies’ [On meurt]. It is this 
impersonal, anonymous death that doubles the restricted economy of a death grounded in 
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possibility, it is the Outside preventing, preceding and dissolving any personal relation.39 The 
Outside is precisely not a death that would come from the exterior to supervene upon a self-
present life. Impersonal death is for Blanchot something other than the worldly reality of my 
death; it is the inevitable but inaccessible abyss of a time without present within which “I do not 
die, I have fallen from the power to die. In it one dies; one does not cease, and one does not 
finish dying.” (BEL 160/154t)  
By extracting death from its relation to power and the possible, for the reasons outlined 
above, one is thus better able to think the vulnerability we share with all living beings and its 
relevance in an ethics of ecological relationality. In the thought of the impossible, I mentioned, 
death announces itself along an-other modality than that of power, what Derrida would later echo 
from Blanchot as “this non-power that would not be the simple limitation of power.” (BEI 
62/44t) As for Derrida, the experience of this non-power lies in the suffering we share with 
nonhuman living beings, and is thus the grounds of a compassion in co-passion.40 Like death, 
this non-power is itself the condition of an affirmation of life. However, one must be careful to 
distinguish Blanchot and Derrida’s thought of affirmation here as proceeding from one which 
has gone through the trial and suffering of an experience of death only to dialectically overcome 
and supersede this death in the Hegelian Aufhebung, as I will show in §1.2. This affirmation 
must be understood beyond all dialectical negation, since the experience of the impossible is 
never overcome. Because impersonal death is impossible to die, its affirmation can only be 
excessive, beyond its own power.41  
 In Demeure: Fiction and Testimony, Derrida pursues this notion of the passivity of a 
passion anterior to the opposition of activity and passivity, without mastery, subjective activity 
or essence. Passion “implies the endurance of an indeterminate or undecidable limit where 
something, some X... must bear and tolerate everything, suffer everything precisely because it is 
not itself, because it has no essence but only functions.” (DB 28/28) The impossibility of 
crossing this threshold operates along the logic of the pas au-delà, the step/not beyond that will 
prove immensely important below. Death is in this case the necessary impossible, with no and or 
but between these: the experience of the impossible, what Blanchot calls an “unexperienced 
experience.”42 (DB 57/47) In suffering, Blanchot writes, “we are delivered over to another time – 
to time as other, as absence and neutrality.”43 (BEI 63/44) This absence at the heart of time 
(which I will later call the disjunction at the heart of the Living Present) is precisely what 
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Derrida will identify as the condition of possibility of justice as, I believe, a co-passion within 
the non-power of mortal finitude. Death is always futurally imminent but its imminence always 
already carries life away from an immemorial past that has never been present, from a future to-
come that cannot be anticipated or calculated. While the death drive finds consolation in 
referring death to the propriety of a present, death for Blanchot does not take place within the 
temporality of time. There are three certitudes in life: “a death that is always imminent, an 
impossible death, and the death that has already happened.” (CU 328/n.a.) A double death, both 
inside, possible and calculable, and outside, im-possible and incalculable relates to itself across 
what I will soon call the differantial economy of a double bind, and structures the survival of any 
living being.44 Every living being shares this impossible relation to death.45 But what remains in 
the impossibility of dying is anything but the immortal permanence of eternity or plenitude. 
Derrida rather points to a non-philosophical and non-religious experience of immortality as 
death, a passion of death, as he borrows from Bataille, a passion of difference and a compassion 
in suffering. This immortal death, in its infinite finitude, to recall an expression concerning 
différance,  
gives compassion for all mortals, for all humans who suffer; and the happiness, this time, 
of not being immortal – or eternal. At this instant there can only be elation, lightness in 
the immortality of death, happiness in compassion, a sharing of finitude, friendship with 
finite beings, in the happiness of not being immortal – or eternal.46 (DB 89/69) 
 
The lightness and gaiety of the affirmation of life in survivance, I noted, cannot occur without 
the bereaved apprehension of death. Death is the very condition of a social bond in a compassion 
for mortal finitude, a passion for death, Derrida writes, a bond without bond one might call a 
relationality without relationality, binding in unbinding on the condition of death and mortal 
being.47 Any affirmation of life must be committed to both the restricted economy of death it 
defers and the aneconomic excess of death that makes this deferral possible. The deconstructive 
logic of this double bind will be shown in §1.4 to structure all community and indeed all 
ecology. Far from being gloomy, the co-affirmation of life in this bond is “the affirmation of a 
living being who prefers living and thus surviving to death, because survival is not simply that 
which remains but the most intense life possible.” (AVE 55/52) Similarly, as Derrida writes in 
his eulogy to Blanchot, what passes by way of a constant attention to death in the latter’s work 
solely issues from an affirmation of life and living, and the singular gaiety and affirmation of the 
‘yes.’48 
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§1.2: From General Economy to General Ecology 
§1.2.1: Bataille’s Ecology of the Impossible 
Bataille’s concept of experience is another often unacknowledged but profound influence 
operating in Derrida’s understanding of deconstruction as an experience of the impossible. 
Again, my primary concern here is not to propose a thorough reading of Bataille’s works but to 
mark the salient points therein with respect to impossibility and economy both for Derrida and 
my development of general ecology. In Inner Experience, Bataille wishes to distinguish 
experience from any sort of project, action or any science whose values would rest on the known 
and the possible. Experience for Bataille is “a voyage to the end of the possible of man,” one 
which in a quite Nietzschean sense negates all other value and authority to become authority 
itself.49 (OC5 19/i 7) Here, however, Bataille recalls a conversation with Blanchot in clarifying 
this concept: “experience itself is authority (but that authority expiates itself),” its authority is 
nothing but a contestation.50 (OC5 19/i 7) This is how one ought to understand Bataille’s concept 
of sovereignty, perhaps more as the expiration of sovereignty; at the extremity of the possible, as 
he puts it in Method of Meditation, “the sovereign operation, whose authority results only from 
itself – expiates this authority at the same time.” (OC5 223/u 98) Sovereignty is thus precisely 
the experience of the impossible for Bataille, and must be understood completely otherwise than 
the restricted economy of sovereignty Derrida targets in The Beast and the Sovereign, for 
example.   
Experience for Bataille consists in rendering everything suspect, in questioning 
everything, and is coextensive with a certain pain and suffering. The desire to avoid this 
suffering can be read alongside the oceanic dissolution of the death drive, “anyone wanting slyly 
to avoid suffering identifies with the entirety of the universe, judges each thing as if he were it. In 
the same way, he imagines, at bottom, that he will never die.” (OC5 10/i xxxii) All of humanity 
is caught in a struggle wanting to be everything and relate everything to the knowable and 
possible, but it can only do this in dying. Conversely, experience consists in renouncing this 
desire to be everything; it not only questions everything but relates everything to a non-
knowledge and impossibility. Bataille’s move here is quite deconstructive, playing out an 
analogous structure to what I will show as the ‘beyond within’ in Derrida. 51  While inner 
experience is said to be the contrary of action and the project, Bataille aphoristically proposes the 
principle of experience as an exit from the domain of the project through a project.52 With 
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respect to Hegel, it consists in miming absolute knowledge and its circularity to open not unto an 
unknown that would then be dialectically reappropriated into the known, but onto something 
unknowable. In this exit, as he puts it, “I go through the bitter test of the impossible. All 
profound life is heavy with the impossible.” (OC5 73/i 58t) 
 Hegel’s dialectic can be understood as two circular movements for Bataille: the 
accomplishment of self-consciousness in the human ipse, and its becoming everything, the 
whole, its negation of human particularity within absolute knowledge. In and because of its self-
enclosure in autonomy, the human wants to become the whole. However, the Being of ipseity is 
really nowhere, just as the by-definition indivisible atom is composed of subatomic particles. 
While certain animals such as the sponge or the siphonophore survive their division into smaller 
pieces or their aggregation into colonies, ‘linear’ or non-colonial animals lose this ability to 
compose a larger single animal in being grouped together. But while bees and humans have 
autonomous bodies and come together in societies, Bataille is not convinced that these are 
autonomous beings. The thought a human as a self-identical entity is a fiction; the elements 
composing us incessantly die off such that we are not comprised of the same elements we once 
were after a few years.53 A living being is never simple, but always externally constituted by 
relations and worked through by an internal division. What you are, Bataille writes, is  
the activity which links the innumerable elements which constitute you to the intense 
communication of these elements among themselves. These are contagions of energy, of 
movement, of warmth, or transfers of elements, which internally constitute the life of 
your organic being. Life is never situated at a particular point: it passes rapidly from one 
point to another (or from multiple points to other points), like a current or like a sort of 
streaming of electricity (...) Further on, your life is not limited to that ungraspable inner 
streaming; it streams to the outside as well and opens itself incessantly to what flows out 
or surges forth towards it. (OC5 111/i 94) 
 
Life on this reading seems to dissolve ipseity both from within and without, extending beyond 
the limits of the organism. It bears a certain resemblance to Deleuze’s reading of life in The 
Logic of Sense taken up by Esposito in Bios in expressing the dimension of the impersonal, a 
“free, anonymous, and nomadic singularity which traverses men as well as plants and animals 
independently of the matter of their individuation and the forms of their personality.” (LS 
131/107) Only by relating to others can a living being establish itself, but if this relationality 
were to become absolute, the living being would dissipate into nothingness. Life must restrict 
economy in response to this relationality in the detour of its return to self. And, like Deleuze and 
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Esposito’s accounts, this relational life must be grounded in a thought of death in the experience 
of the impossible. The loss of knowledge and sense to which everything is exposed within 
experience must risk nothing less than death itself, this risk being the very condition of chance. 
The chance faced in the horror before death, however, is otherwise than that bound to the 
subjective will that would attempt to calculate its risk with certainty. Approaching death in this 
sense requires a double movement for Bataille, between action and loss, power and 
powerlessness. As he writes in Guilty, “in alteration, you have to act first of all (loss presupposes 
action and a previous charge), then lose.” (OC5 338/g 93) In other words, in a restricted 
economy, the loss presupposing the calculative action of restitution must engage the expenditure 
without return. Our subjection to this excess is itself constitutive of our living activity; life must 
affirm both restriction and expenditure, and both are co-constitutive of the living being. In a 
Hegelian sense, the negativity that reappropriates death within the life of spirit is originarily 
related to negativity without use, the movement of growth, possibility and accumulation being a 
necessary condition to that of loss, impossibility and death, and the latter movement itself 
constitutive of the former.54  
 General economy, as Bataille defines it in Method of Meditation, is a 
science relating objects of thought to sovereign moments... considering the meaning of 
these objects in relation to others, finally in relation to the loss of meaning... General 
economy makes evident in the first place that a surplus of energy is produced that, by 
definition, cannot be used. Excess energy can only be lost without the slightest goal, in 
consequence without any meaning. It is this useless, senseless loss that is sovereignty. 
(OC5 215-16/u 284) 
 
General economy for me attempts to relate any system, whether epistemological, ontological or 
ethico-political to a loss of sense, an impossibility and an Outside for which the system cannot 
account. My reason for approaching general economy as general ecology is quite simple; I’ve 
shown how the economy of différance is often explained in terms of organic and even inorganic 
life and death. The economy of life death or survivance necessarily and originarily inscribes 
itself within matter and also ‘nature’ (albeit a ‘nature’ always in différance with itself).55 As 
Derrida claims in Positions, everything he writes can be called materialist if such matter is 
designated as radical alterity, heterogeneity or the absolute outside. “Rigorously reinscribed 
within general economy (Bataille) and in double writing... the insistence on matter as the 
absolute outside of oppositions, the materialist insistence (in contact with what ‘materialism’ has 
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represented as a force of resistance in the history of philosophy) seems necessary to me.”56 (PE 
89/66t) Derrida’s acknowledgement of his interest in ‘mechanistic materialism’ might thus be 
thought alongside his ‘materiality without matter.’57 In Dissemination, one sees the same thought 
of matter as the absolute exteriority and Outside of philosophical concepts. On the one hand, in 
what one might call restricted ecology, life’s repetition is tautological, only exiting itself to 
return to itself. General ecology thinks this repetition with another aiming towards a non-ideality, 
a non-Concept, an exit without return of life outside itself, the repetition of death, an expenditure 
without reserve and an irreducible excess.58  
It is then not much of a stretch to read a notion of ecology into Bataille when he, in a 
section title of The Accursed Share, explains the sense of general economy as “the dependence of 
economy with respect to the circulation of energy on the terrestrial globe.” (OC7 27/a 19) 
General economy goes beyond restricted economy in considering the general question of nature, 
the excess of energy for living matter on the earth.59 The organism, whether plant or animal, is 
itself animated by a general movement of the ‘exudation’ and ‘dilapidation’ of living matter in 
the ‘exhausting detours of exuberance’ in eating, death and sexual reproduction, as one will 
recall from my discussions of Freud and Jacob. It is an elementary fact for Bataille that an 
organism receives more energy than is necessary to maintain itself alive, and if this excess of 
energy cannot be productively spent towards the organism’s growth or possibilities, it must be 
unproductively wasted without any profit, lost, he writes, “like a river into the sea,” (OC7 31/a 
23) recalling a longer quote from Inner Experience: “life will lose itself in death, rivers into the 
sea, and the known into the unknown. Knowledge is access to the unknown. Non-sense is the 
outcome of every possible sense.”60 (OC5 119/i 101t)  
This certainly brings together the ‘ontological’ stakes of life death and survivance with an 
epistemological question of knowledge, or a relation in the form of a non-relation, as Derrida 
puts it, with nonknowledge. The ecological-ethical stakes of this co-passion in mortality and 
unknowing will be developed in more detail in the next section, but Bataille has a few interesting 
ideas on this front as well. As early as Inner Experience, Bataille seems to mourn as a tragedy 
the fact than the human only lives in destroying, killing and absorbing plants, animals and other 
humans. The human exploitation of any appropriable resource is not limited to living organisms 
for Bataille but also its merciless exploitation of natural resources.61 He thus hints at the strange 
rethinking of sustainability outlined in my epigraph from Blanchot since, as he puts it, the great 
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errors of humanity result from this disregard for the material conditions of its life.62 General 
economy suggests an impossibly difficult ethics that, rather than preserving something or 
keeping something alive as self-identical through a process of calculation, communicates with it 
otherwise in the experience of the impossible.63 What Bataille calls communication I could call 
translation since, I will show, this idea is intimately bound to the logic of survivance. 
Communication for Bataille is different than that between two beings, it communicates, he writes 
in Guilty, “through death, with a beyond of being... not with nothingness, even less with a 
supernatural entity, but with an indefinite reality (which I sometimes call the impossible, and that 
is: what cannot be grasped (begreift) in any way), what we cannot reach without dissolving 
ourselves.” (OC5 388/g 139) This indefinite reality, however, is only indefinite insofar as it 
surpasses the humanly definable, it is not, he recalls, supernatural. It is in this sense of an 
otherwise than being, as an experience of the impossible, that I believe one must think the 
transcendence at work in survivance: as Derrida puts it, the inscription of a relation of 
transcendence, going beyond the world, within the presence, proximity and immanence of 
experience, the ‘beyond within.’64 General ecology then, may be what allows us to think this 
inscription in its materiality, in what I’ll later explore as the general text of ecological 
relationality.  
 
§1.2.2 From General to Strictural Ecology 
In the Positions interview noted above, Derrida refers to general economy as a general strategy 
of deconstruction.65 However, it is in his 1966 essay “From Restricted to General Economy: A 
Hegelian Without Reserve” that he develops this reading through Bataille’s critique of Hegel’s 
Aufhebung, a difficult word to translate meaning the dialectical sublation of differences. This 
concept (the Concept itself) comes to stand as the very definition of restricted economy, and “if 
there were a definition of différance, it would be precisely the limit, interruption, destruction of 
the Hegelian relève wherever it operates.”66 (PE 55/40-1) Restricted economy takes expenditure 
without reserve, death and the exposure to non-sense into account, but in an attempt to 
reappropriate them. General economy by contrast shows an excess over reappropriability, and 
relates these excesses to restricted economy. Derrida thus intends to enter into relation (without 
relation) both senses of différance: “a différance that can make a profit on its investment and a 
différance that misses its profit, the investiture of a presence that is pure and without loss here 
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being confused with absolute loss, with death.” (MP 20-1/19) This move would consist in 
writing the Aufhebung otherwise; indeed, suggests the inscription of the Concept itself within the 
radical alterity of materiality. 67  General ecology, if I am now confident in using the term, 
designates the stricture of a double bind at the heart of life death and survivance, since any 
living-on must affirm both restricted economy and an expenditure without reserve, a risk of 
death beyond calculability.68  
In Hegel’s dialectic of mastery or lordship, the master must risk its life in a passage 
through death, a death which is thus negated, overcome, reappropriated, conserved and survived 
without remainder. The Aufhebung, Derrida writes in Glas, 
is the dying away, the amortization, of death. That is the concept of economy in general 
in speculative dialectics. Economy: the law of the family, of the family home, of 
possession. The economic act makes familiar, proper, one’s own, intimate, private. The 
sense of property, of propriety, in general, is collected in the oikeios. The Aufhebung, the 
economic law of absolute reappropriation of the absolute loss, is a family concept. (G 
187/133) 
 
For Hegel, it is necessary for the master to keep the life he exposes to death. The Aufhebung 
restricts the economy of life to conservation, circulation and self-reproduction, mastering and 
conserving what it puts into play.69 Bataille, one might say, critiques Hegel and the dialectic for 
proposing a restricted thought of life; “through a ruse of life... life has thus stayed alive. Another 
concept of life has been surreptitiously put in its place, to remain there, never to be exceeded.” 
(ED 376/323) For Bataille, however, the risk of death, non-sense and impossibility must be 
absolute and without return. No one denies that life exists in its difference from death. However, 
the movement of différance as temporal deferral prevents this difference from stabilizing itself; 
death is thus always beyond the horizon of calculability, even though life must attempt to 
calculate its stakes. 70  In miming absolute knowledge, general economy engages both this 
absolute risk of death and the ruse or feint allowing this risk to be lived. In other words, it allows 
for a certain experience (the feint) of the impossible (the risk), but it is more precisely not an 
experience, since it is related only to the trial of the impossible, no more than it is ‘interior’ or 
related to a presence or plenitude; it is wholly exposed to the outside in the form of a non-
relation. This non-logic of the impossible that transcends the logos through its very concepts, 
through the same words, is in a sense that of the beyond-within I mentioned above. 
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Transcendence, transgression, translation, all these movements I will show serve to interrupt 
economy for Derrida.71  
As the impossible, sovereignty in Bataille’s sense is nothing other than its loss. Its 
lightness and gaiety does not belong to the restricted economy of life, but rather constitutes the 
blind spot of Hegelianism, a death so irreversible and radical its negativity would exceed that of 
the Aufhebung, discovering the limit of discourse and the beyond of absolute knowledge.72 I will 
have much to say about how general economy enters one into relation with the blind spot of a 
system, the impossible Outside of the visible dialectical, transcendental or ontological form, of 
the frame, violence, power and force.73 Importantly, the sovereignty at play in general economy 
is not a counter-mastery, but both more and less than mastery as well as wholly other from it. It 
governs neither itself, others, things, discourses nor does it govern in general. It in fact 
corresponds more to powerlessness since it refuses the exercise of power.74 General ecology thus 
relates any restricted ecological configuration, organic or inorganic, to a materiality, 
powerlessness, passivity, mortal finitude and impossibility (all of these may perhaps be non-
synonymous substitutions of one another) that resists reappropriation into any oikos, whose 
exteriority is different from that which circles back towards interiority.  
This resistance, remainder or what Derrida will call restance will be at play in every 
chapter to follow, resisting recovery into any metaphysical system, whether dialectical, 
transcendental, phenomenological or ontological. As an exteriority other than the opposition of 
interiority and exteriority, the remainder is bound to any restricted economy in what Derrida 
calls a stricture or striction. 75  While the striction allows the dialectical, transcendental or 
ontological to be thought, it “constrains the discourse to place the nontranscendental, the outside 
of the transcendental field, the excluded, in the structuring position. The matrix in question 
constitutes the excluded as transcendental of the transcendental.” (G 340/244) The stricture thus 
corresponds to what Derrida calls here a ‘contre-bande,’ binding the transcendental, ontological 
and dialectical to their impossible Outside. With respect to my chapter on Husserl, the remainder 
cannot be thought as remaining from a past which would be a modification of presence, its 
remaining must be thought as an always already.76 In anticipation of my chapter on Heidegger, 
the remainder can never co-respond to ontological questioning. Being is itself the dialectical 
Aufhebung for Derrida.77 The materiality of this remainder also overflows the restricted economy 
of ideality and of the Concept that produces the Aufhebung, and Derrida draws a strong 
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connection between eidos (form) and oikos here.78 I will discuss the dialectical ‘Concept’ and 
life in Canguilhem with respect to how the living being comes to know its world, and the ethico-
political implications of form, eidos and visibility in my next section, implications I will also 
take up through Husserl, Heidegger, Levinas, Blanchot and Foucault throughout these pages.  
The stricture of the double bind, however, insists that one cannot think a pure exit from 
the dialectical, transcendental or ontological towards a pure, transcendent beyond, since this 
would come down to a pure death, pure nothingness, would itself then find itself recuperated 
within a restricted economy. Derrida cautions against this in “To Speculate...” General economy 
is not simply an economy open to absolute expenditure, but is rather ‘strictural,’ designating a 
stricture between absolute expenditure and restricted economy.79 The undecidability one reads in 
the sur- of survivance is also echoed in strictural economy. As Derrida puts it in Glas, 
this at-once constitutes an economy of the undecidable: not that the undecidable 
interrupts there the efficacy of the economic principle. The at-once puts itself in the 
service of a general economy whose field must then be opened. There is an economic 
speculation on the undecidable. This speculation is not dialectical, but it plays with the 
dialectical. (G 294/210)  
 
One can see here Bataille’s mimicry of absolute knowledge: the restricted economy corresponds 
to a ‘feinte,’ a ruse that pretends to lose everything or to give itself death in order to cut death off, 
to arrest it. But, Derrida adds, “the feint does not cut it off. One loses on both sides, on both 
registers, in knowing how to play all sides [sur les deux tableaux] On this condition does the 
economy become general.” (G 294/210) As he writes in “Living On,” economy is a stricture, a 
bind and not a cut, arresting the authenticity, propriety and purity of any reappropriation of 
death. “It is always an external constraint that arrests a text in general, i.e. anything, for example 
life death... Think exteriority from the angle of this economy of the arrêt. Arrêt, the greatest 
‘bound’ energy.” (P 214/187) 
Allow me to pursue these questions of survivance and life death to flesh out this stricture 
of the double bind in further detail. Any absolute exit out of the purity of self-present life would 
constitute a pure death, while the restricted economy of pure life itself is also pure death; both 
restricted economy and the expenditure without reserve taken on their own come down to 
death.80 Pure life is pure death and pure death is pure death; this is why survivance is originary 
and what it means to lose on both fronts. The stricture of différance between, on the one hand, 
the restricted economy of life and death, inside and outside and all other such oppositions and, on 
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the other, the absolutely radical and impossible expenditure without reserve of death, this system 
of double death, as I showed in my reading of Derrida and Blanchot, is alone what gives both the 
chance and the threat for life to live-on and to affirm itself.81 This stricture, inscribed within 
matter and ‘nature’ and differentially shared with all living beings, is what I am calling general 
ecology. Unlike dialectics, the identity of identity and difference, a dialectics of dialectics and 
antidialectics, the stricture binding general ecology must be understood as a relation without 
relation. The without, I will show in a moment, is what allows for a passive transgression of 
economy to open onto the wholly other, the unknowable and the impossible. More specifically, 
the without engages a life death that overflows the dialectical co-implication of these two terms.  
In the first session of La Vie la mort, Derrida attempts to develop the sense of life death 
in relation to dialectical economy and what he calls the positional logic of juxtaposition or 
opposition. For Hegel, life itself is the position (Setzung) of the Idea posing itself through its 
three oppositions: the living individual, the processes of life and the species, and reappropriating 
its life in being reborn as the life of Spirit through its natural death. Derrida’s hypothesis is that 
positional logic is perhaps itself a ruse or feint set forth by life death, the opposition or 
juxtaposition of life and death, life or death being effects or ruses of life death. His attempt here 
is not to oppose another logic to that of the opposition of life and death but rather to inquire into 
another alterity. But this other alterity would also not come down to saying that life is death; to 
do so would be precisely to repeat the logic of the Aufhebung whereby life risks death only to 
reappropriate it, “where death defines essence as the dialectical process of life keeping itself 
alive, as life, producing and reproducing itself.” (L1, 6t) Both the logic of opposition, la vie et la 
mort, and the logic of identification, la vie est la mort, come down to one another. Both 
opposition and identification operate in the interest of life’s reappropriation.82 
Concepts, whether in science or in philosophy, and metaphors, particularly the biological 
metaphor which will prove important to my discussions of translation, would also be effects of 
life death, ruses “to dissimulate, keep, house, shelter or forget – something. What? A what in any 
case that would no longer pose or oppose itself and would no longer be something in this sense 
of the position.” (L1, 2t) The stricture of life death produces dialectical effects, but does not itself 
know negativity or opposition, it rather engages the ‘without’ of the relation without relation.83 
This without, he writes in “Pas,” operates without operating, “it lets return what has already been 
dissimulated as the wholly other and can only be dissimulated... The without auto-affects itself 
 32 
by the wholly other (without without without...). It is then infinitely other with regard to the 
wholly other that affects or approaches [aborde] it.” (P 92/79t) 
Derrida expresses early on an intention to conclude La Vie La mort with Blanchot’s pas 
au-delà, and although this text is never taken up, the intention to do so is recalled in “To 
Speculate...” where the step/not beyond opens onto precisely a relation without relation to the 
logic of the position.84 The pas for Derrida is not a dialectical negation but an affirmative 
transgression, a negation of negation that does not come down to a double negation but rather 
marks an excess over any economic reserve.85 It is in the pas au-delà that one can bring together 
the notions of the passivity I outlined above and the transgression of economy: as Derrida cites 
Blanchot, “transgression transgresses by passion, patience, passivity.” (P 53/41) Transgression, 
for Blanchot, allows one to name transcendence beyond its theological sense, alluding to “what 
remains sacred both in the thought of the limit and in this demarcation, impossible to think, 
which would introduce the never and always accomplished crossing of the limit into every 
thought.” (BPA 41/27) All movements in trans-, Derrida writes, violate the principle of 
equivalence within economy, expose all sense to a sliding, a ‘pas de sens’ I will show, “and 
along with it everything that can insure a payment, a reimbursement, an amortization, an 
‘acquittal’: coins, signs, and their telos, the adequation of the signified to the signifier.” (CP 
415/389) Most of all death: as Blanchot writes, “transgression: the inevitable accomplishment of 
what is impossible to accomplish – and this would be dying itself.” (BPA 147/107) Derrida adds, 
“trépas [death: trans + passus]. Trespassing. To be related, without translation, to all the trans-‘s 
that are at work here.” (P 215/288)  
This impossible logic being irresolvable, the double bind within what he now calls a 
‘bindinal economy’ opens onto an infinite debt that can never be repaid, as impossible as 
Derrida’s figures of the gift, promise and event.86 “The gift, insofar as it exceeds economic 
exchange, must not have any sense.” (FSC 65) All these figures, I could follow him in saying in 
Given Time, are related to economy as they aneconomically interrupt it, their exteriority sets the 
circle of economy in motion. But the impossibility of the gift, or promise, Derrida might add, 
does not mean that only the dead can give or promise. “No, only a ‘life’ can give, but a life in 
which this economy of death presents itself and lets itself be exceeded. Neither death nor 
immortal life can ever give anything, only a singular surviving [survivance] can give.” (DT 
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132/102) Whatever peace or reconciliation is promised in the promise of the earth, the promise 
of ecology, finds in survivance its im-possible condition of possibility. 
 
§1.3: How the Living Structures its World: Immanence and Transcendence 
§1.3.1: Immanence: Concept, Metaphor and Norm in Canguilhem’s Knowledge of Life 
Having now elaborated the ‘ontological’ stakes of general ecology, I’d like to turn to its 
epistemological and ethico-political implications in more detail. I mentioned in §1.1 that most 
biological theories and philosophies of life from Aristotle to Jacob tend to think of reproduction 
as proceeding from the inside of an organism. The same is true, I’ll illustrate here via 
Canguilhem, of how an organism structures its environment and its relations with others. For 
Canguilhem, an organism’s ontology and its normativity stand in a relation of dialectical 
immanence to one another. While a threatened or diseased organism attempts to protect and 
conserve its life, a healthy organism realizes itself in the invention of new norms. In science and 
knowledge, this occurs through the dialectical overcoming of error. But what kinds of ethico-
political consequences proceed from such an account of life? Canguilhem would prove 
immensely influential on Foucault and Esposito, and important biopolitical difficulties can be 
addressed by way of situating his arguments within the claims of general ecology. I’ll examine 
these in much more detail in chapter 5, but for now wish to situate how general ecology breaks 
from this immanentism towards another ethics of life death on earth with its others. 
In “The Concept and Life,” Canguilhem begins by distinguishing two ways to understand 
the relation between these two terms: it can be understood as simply the way that organic life 
organizes matter, or it can refer to how the human comes to know life. This distinction is 
articulated upon that between le vivant (the living being), the ‘form’ and ‘power’ of life, and le 
vécu (lived experience), the former for Canguilhem grounding the latter. If the Concept has an 
apparently Hegelian ring, this is no accident; contemporary biology finds itself quite close to 
Aristotle and Hegel for Canguilhem.87 Citing Hegel, “life is the immediate unity of the concept to 
its reality without this concept being distinct from it.” (CE 345t, e) In the triple positional logic I 
showed Derrida reference above, “auto-conservation is the activity of the producing product. 
‘The only thing that is produced,’ Hegel’s Propédeutique claims, ‘is what is already there.’ An 
Aristotelian formulation if there ever was one.” (CE 345t) The organism is itself what it seeks 
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and attains, and Life is thus totally immanent to the living, its beginning and end, producing and 
produced, singular and universal, and dialectical through and through.  
 If this coincidence between the Concept and life is so immediate, Canguilhem asks, how 
is it that science comes to know life by way of concepts? Thought and knowledge must espouse 
the dialectical structure of life, and a dialectical interpretation of biological phenomena is 
justified by what in life resists its mechanization: its spontaneity and creation.88 These aspects of 
life distinguish the proper, scientific Concept from the improper, non-scientific metaphor, the 
difference being the operational value of the Concept: the progress and development it offers to 
knowledge, a relation dialectically inscribed in life itself. 89 The Concept in life proceeds in the 
dissatisfaction of the sense it finds and moves forward seeking a greater quantity and variety of 
information. “Subjectivity is therefore only dissatisfaction. But that is perhaps life itself. 
Contemporary biology, read in a certain manner is, in some way, a philosophy of life.” (CE 364) 
The Conceptual understanding of biological heredity as the communication of information, 
message or coding returns us to an Aristotelian and Hegelian relation between the concept and 
life since it admits a logos that is inscribed, conserved and transmitted within the living, a sense 
inscribed within matter. It recognizes an objective, material and no longer formal a priori to 
organic life that proceeds in the production, transmission and reception of information in a dual 
movement of conservation and novelty, producing mutations and at times monstrosities. As he 
adds, “if life has a sense, one must admit that there can be a loss of sense, a risk of an aberration 
or misdeal. But life surmounts its errors by other attempts, an error of life simply being an 
impasse.” (CE 364t) While the possibility of error and monstrosity is very real, it in no way 
engages an absolute loss of sense or knowledge, and this would seem to be a direct consequence 
of the dialectical relation between the concept and life.  
 As Canguilhem puts it, vitalism simply consists in recognizing something original in the 
facts of vitality, such as when Bichat, for example, defines life as the sum of functions resisting 
death.90 Vitalism is to have faith in life; it is more of a morality and a demand than it is a 
scientific methodology. Canguilhem is not inattentive to the reactionary and fascist 
appropriations of vitalism, but argues that a biological theory shares as much responsibility for 
fascism as a mathematical one does for capitalism.91 But the dark history of vitalism looms large 
in Derrida’s biopolitical thought, as it does in his reading of Heidegger’s Nietzsche in the La Vie 
la mort seminar. 92  Unlike classical vitalism, the living organism for Canguilhem does not 
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constitute an exception to the physical laws of its environment; to recognize the originality of life 
means to “‘comprehend’ matter within life, and the sciences of matter – which is science itself – 
within the activity of the living.” (CC 122/70) What contemporary physics recognizes as the 
immanence of observer and observed, measuring and measured agencies is not only an 
epistemological relation for Canguilhem; every living being ontologically coordinates their 
environment, and only living beings can do so. The proper of the organism is to build and 
compose its own environment according to its own internal rules and norms.93  
 Every living organism has its own proper vital norms that are immanently present to its 
functioning: “presented without being represented, acting with neither deliberation nor 
calculation. Here there is no divergence [écart], no distance, no delay between rule and 
regulation.”94 (CN 186/250) The norms of the living organism are lived without any problems 
for Canguilhem.95 In understanding the relation between the organism and the environment as a 
biological fact, one sees the environment not as a physical fact within which the organism is 
thrown, but one it structures and adapts through its own ‘normativity,’ defined as “the biological 
capacity to challenge the usual norms in case of critical situations.” (CN 215/284) In this sense, 
the conservation instinct is not the general law of the living but rather that of the threatened or 
diseased organism; it depicts an organism in a state of struggle, dominated by external forces. By 
contrast, the healthy organism’s interest consists in realizing its immanent nature.96 Health is a 
feeling of more than normalcy, not just that of an organism adapted to its environment, but in a 
normative state, capable of following and inventing new norms of life. 97  I think there’s 
something quite beautiful in this thought; a Nietzscheanism of which one can certainly see 
echoes in Deleuze, distinguishing between reactive and active forces. 98  Derrida notes that 
Nietzsche himself draws from the biology of his time in The Will to Power in arguing that health 
and disease are not essentially different.99  
For Derrida, however, Canguilhem’s account of life as communication, information and 
writing remains bound to a humanist and teleological account of science. For my part, I’ll show 
that this vitalist immanentism is not only insufficient for the ethics of general ecology, but 
maintains important conceptual overlaps with some of the darkest biopolitical paradigms in 
history, overlaps I will take up in more detail in chapters 4 and 5. Conversely, to understand the 
dialectical Concept as a mechanical effect of life death would force us to think the 
epistemological, ontological and ethico-political implications of immanence wholly otherwise.100 
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Of course, the invention of new norms of life occurs only in breaking with previous ones, in 
inheriting them and in translating them otherwise. Recusing any assured distinction between the 
human and its others on this front, I argue that these norms can be epistemological, ontological, 
ethical, juridical, political; indeed bio-political, scientific, linguistic, literary and aesthetic. 
Inscribing Canguilhem’s understanding of how the organism structures its world within general 
ecology, I will argue in §1.3.2 that the interruption in the norm, Form or frame does not come 
from the immanent action of the organism; it comes from the transcendence of the wholly other 
before which the organism is infinitely passive. It thus also calls for another thought of le vivant, 
but interprets genetico-biological laws by way of différance. “At certain ‘moments,’ this 
différance can interrupt these laws; at other moments, it can introduce the economy of a new 
configuration into the immanence of the living being.” (DQ 73/40) The invention of the other, I 
will show in chapter 5, is precisely deconstruction as an experience of the impossible.101 In this 
sense, I argue that general ecology finds its true ethical programme in the questions Derrida puts 
to Levinas (and of course the ways in which Derrida goes beyond Levinas’s humanism).102 The 
excess that life must affirm in its dialectical reappropriation of itself is refigured here as the 
infinite alterity and transcendence of the other, where every other (one) is every (bit) other, 
before and beyond its determination as human.  
 
§1.3.2: Transcendence: Levinas and the Ethics of the Beyond-Within 
As mentioned above, Derrida remains suspicious of a humanistic and logocentric teleology in 
both Jacob and Canguilhem’s understanding of the ‘program’ or ‘writing’ of life, coming down 
to a quite classical ‘philosophy of life’ for the latter: one that understands the living being’s life, 
its relations with others and the world and its epistemological frameworks as essentially 
proceeding from the immanence of the living being. This semiotics or graphics of life remains 
bound to the Platonic, Aristotelian and Hegelian logos, while Derrida wishes to problematize this 
writing of life otherwise. After recalling, in the Life Death seminar, his remark in Of 
Grammatology that the notions of non-phonetic writing and pro-gramme now extend to the most 
elementary processes of information in the living cell, Derrida adds that this is precisely not to 
reintroduce the logos and its semantics into the notion of the program, or to return to Aristotle, 
but rather to provoke the deconstruction of the entire logocentric machine.103 Canguilhem’s rigid 
distinction between the scientific objectivity of the Concept and the metaphor presupposes what 
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one might call a restricted economy of science; the Concept corresponds to notions of propriety, 
adequacy and proper knowledge. But in defining the Concept in terms of its practical and 
operational use for science, Canguilhem neglects the fact that both metaphors and concepts can 
provide just as much an obstacle to knowledge than they can contribute to the progress of 
science.104 Again in a very Nietzschean sense, Derrida remarks, the distinction between the 
useful and the detrimental would be more accurately representative of science for Canguilhem. 
Both concept and metaphor are two sides of the same dialectical coin, economically referring 
back to one another.105 But if both the Concept and the metaphor are effects of life death, the 
discovery of the living in terms of writing or programme is neither an epistemological break in 
science nor an illustration of its continuous teleology.106 If metaphor and Concept are more 
indissociable than one thought, “one must perhaps, like life death, save or lose them at once, in 
one blow. It’s impossible, of course.” (L3, 24t)  
What Derrida calls the general text breaks with the immanent teleology of the dialectical 
relation between the concept and life, since no epistemology or scientific objectivity occurs 
without a relation to an alterity, I’d say the transcendence of the other. 
It is because alterity is irreducible therein that there is nothing but text, it’s because no 
term, no element is sufficient or even has an effect if it does not refer to the other and 
never to itself that there is text, and it’s because the text-set cannot close in on itself that 
there is only text, and that the so-called ‘general’ text (an evidently dangerous and only 
polemical expression) is neither a set nor a totality: it can neither comprehend itself nor 
be comprehended [il ne peut ni se comprendre ni être compris]. But it can write and read 
itself, which is something else. (L6, 4t) 
 
I’d noted in my first definition of différance that it involves an economic and an aneconomic 
movement, the latter corresponding to an absolute heterogeneity, radical difference and the 
wholly other, just as iterability always involves a difference within every repetition. Iterability 
and différance thus also involve, I will show through Derrida’s readings of Levinas in this 
section, the ethical inscription of the transcendence of the other within any relation of 
immanence. This alterity at the heart of epistemology and any organic relation to its environment 
seems perhaps a roundabout way to introduce Derrida’s adoption of Levinasian ethics. But let 
me retain from these discussions the dialectical Concept and the notion of Form. This double 
bind I just spoke of, as Derrida writes in “Form and Fashion,” would constitute an inexorable 
fatality at the heart of all language, including that of science and philosophy. It would, however, 
command one to know how to choose, but without assured knowledge, norm or any other means 
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of calculation, rather, this decision would be delivered to the Nietzschean ‘perhaps,’ to the 
incalculable, infinite transcendence of the other.107 As Derrida adapts Alain David’s difficult 
thesis, the philosophical notion of Form, one that would have survived through Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenology and Heideggerian ontology, would strangely be the unique 
source of racism and anti-Semitism, and one could add sexism, homophobia, transphobia here, 
and specifically for my purposes anthropocentrism: “form itself, the fascination for the form, that 
is to say for the visibility of a certain organic or organizing contour, an eidos, if you will, and 
therefore an idealization, an idealism even as it institutes philosophy itself, philosophy or 
metaphysics as such.”108 (FF 10t) To delimit by giving form or by believing to see a form would 
be the source of the worst oppressions, the worst itself, the monstrosities of genocides, slavery 
and ecological destruction. But it would also produce a monstrosity that defies the norm and 
deforms the form.109 Along with Canguilhem’s discussions of monstrosity, let me recall that 
Derrida’s figure of the event-machine, both organic spontaneity and mechanical iterability, 
would itself bear some monstrosity in its im-possibility.110 In the double bind between these two 
monstrosities, the worst and the best, the question becomes an epistemological-ontological-
ethical one of knowing how to choose, of selectively filtering what one inherits.  
 Derrida distinguishes two responses to this enframing by form.111 The first would be that 
of a material phenomenology such as proposed by Michel Henry, one I think bears much 
resemblance to Canguilhem’s. Derrida, however, expresses some serious reservations before 
what he calls a transcendental vitalism and its emphases on “pure ‘transcendental life,’ absolute 
immanence, (...) the pure life of the ‘living,’ (...) the immanence of ‘feeling oneself alive,’” 
noting its grave political complicities and dark historical connotations. (FF 16-17t) The other 
response is that of an interruptive transcendence inspired by Levinas, which would discover the 
underside of Concepts, the latter bearing a direct connection to Form. To go to the underside or 
the beyond of the concept would discover “the transcendence of the other that the concept, as it 
traditionally gives itself to science and philosophy, tends to fix within the objectivity of a form.” 
(FF 12t) It’s essential, I believe, to think of this underside in terms of the beyond, but also in the 
interruptive transcendence and transgression of the pas au-delà and the beyond-within I 
mentioned above, since these intersect with what Derrida calls “the concept (without concept) of 
the Im-possible, and especially of the unlimited affirmation of the Im-possible.” (FF 20t) This 
affirmation, which is itself already a response to the other, one of an infinite responsibility, is 
 39 
certainly Levinasian.112 But it is also necessary to engage this affirmation in a thought of the Im-
possible, perhaps more distant from Levinas’s work and closer to Heidegger and Bataille.113 If 
deconstruction is an experience of the impossible, what is impossible “is to inscribe this 
transcendence (the ‘relation that goes beyond the world’) within immanence, to wit the presence, 
proximity, immediacy one necessarily associates with the word ‘experience.’”114 (FF 26t) An 
interruption thus occurs within experience itself and, in this break of the Form/Concept with 
itself, the oikos is opened up and a space is prepared for the coming of the other in its infinite 
transcendence. As Derrida asks in “Living On,” does the space to let the other come not always 
occur from the propriety of one’s economy or ecology? Indeed, but the anonymous interruption 
of the oikos by the other had always already dwelled therein.115 
 How I read general ecology will thus necessarily require a passage through what one 
might call the restricted economies of transcendental phenomenology in the Living Present and 
the ontological question of Being.116 Levinas, as I will show in my next two chapters, identifies 
both phenomenology and ontology with philosophies of violence. Ethics, for Levinas, is beyond 
ontology, and it constitutes phenomenology’s interruption of itself by itself as the other.117 But it 
is as much a mistake, I believe, to suggest that deconstruction can only manage an economy of 
violence, a differantial of force and power, as it is to suggest that an absolute break with such 
differantials would even be desirable; in both cases – the pure immanence of force and power 
and the purity of the relation transcending these – an uncontaminated purity comes down to the 
worst; a pure life that is pure death. It is then through the logic pas au-delà that one must situate 
Derrida’s ethics and the immense, perhaps irresolvable debt it owes to Levinas. 
 The open door of the oikos, to return to “Living On,” calls forth an infinite exteriority and 
transcendence. But this opening is irreducible to a simple passivity, or a passivity that would be 
opposed to activity. Again, one rediscovers the logic of the relation without relation I noted in 
§1.2.2.118 One must read the politics of everything Derrida says about an economy of violence, 
and everything Nietzsche, Deleuze and Foucault write about a immanent differantial of forces 
and power in terms of this beyond-within, “transcendence within immanence,” structuring force 
with a vulnerability and weakness.119 It is necessary, Derrida writes, to invent a new relation to 
every concept, to the Concept itself, “the non-dialectical enclosure of its own transcendence, its 
‘beyond within.’” (AEL 152/85) Let me recall that différance involves both the economic same 
and the other, “absolutely heterogeneous, radically different, irreducible and untranslatable, the 
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aneconomic, the wholly other or death” (DQ 74/40t) General ecology can be thought as this 
strange logic that non-dialectically inscribes what exceeds it as a transcendence within the 
immanence of any restricted ecology.120  
The concept exceeds itself, goes beyond its own borders, which amounts to saying that it 
interrupts itself or deconstructs itself so as to form a sort of enclave inside and outside of 
itself: ‘beyond within’ once again... each time this topological enclave affects a concept, a 
process of deconstruction is in progress, which is no longer a teleological process or even 
a simple event in the course of history. (AEL 146/80t) 
 
This is how survivance and life death break with the teleological, logocentric and politically 
nefarious metaphysics of form, all the while differently from a move that would counter such 
discourses through the vitalization, empowerment and reinforcement of what was thus 
oppressed. Survivance and life death require a profound reorganization of our understanding of 
philosophy, epistemology, ontology and ethics and in our thinking of how living beings 
differentially structure and are structured by their environments. In contrast to the immediacy of 
immanence, the relation to the other, the outside, time and death are to be understood as a 
relationality without relationality, as much the relation as its constitutive interruptibility by way 
of the other’s alterity and transcendence which makes the relation impossible. To comprehend 
the other in its incomprehensibility and non-knowledge is not to relapse into ignorance or 
obscurantism; precisely with respect to the concept of loss or expense in Bataille, Derrida writes, 
“what I propose is not at all a praise of the loss, it is a thought of affirmation that does not stop at 
the loss, or does not dialecticize something like the loss or the expense.” (ALT 68) The relation 
with the other is that which interrupts economy, suspends the dialectic of the concept in a 
radically aneconomic difference which resists its reappropriation. To think the economic and the 
aneconomic together in différance is thus to think a relation of mediation without opposition 
which, Derrida adds, cannot sit easily with Hegelianism. 
The Im-possible obliquely points beyond any discourse of originary violence, or of an 
allegedly irreducible drive for mastery, power, sovereignty and cruelty, as Nietzsche and Freud 
might put it, all the while affirming their necessity. The relation that goes beyond the world, the 
transcendence within immanence that discovers the underside of concepts, prepares a place to let 
the other come is, as Derrida puts it, an indirect way of challenging force, power, violence and 
sovereignty. It takes into account, “in the mediation of the detour, a radical discontinuity, a 
heterogeneity, a leap into the ethical (thus also the juridical and political).” (WA 273) Beyond 
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the economy of the appropriable and the possible, the Im-possible affirmation of life is without 
violence, force, power, sovereignty or cruelty. It comes “from a beyond the beyond, and thus 
from beyond the economy of the possible. It is attached to a life, certainly, but to a life other than 
that of the economy of the possible, an im-possible life, so doubt, a sur-vival... which owes 
nothing to the alibi of some mytho-theological beyond.” (WA 276) We then need, Derrida writes 
in Adieu, a new relation to the concept of peace, a peace of the living, as Kant and Levinas put it, 
a metaphorico-conceptual effect or ruse of life death that remains to be invented.121 And here, 
one can pick the thread of a ‘metaphor’ that has woven its way through all these texts on life 
death and survivance, that of translation. The peace of the living would be, Derrida suggests, an 
event of translation, an other translation, or rather, as he closes Adieu, “a thought of translation to 
be invented, a bit like politics itself.” (AEL 210/123)  
 
§1.4: Posthumanist Translation and the Biocultural Promise of the Earth 
§1.4.1: The Ammetaphorics of Life in Benjamin’s Translation-to-come 
The stakes of translation have been at play in everything I’ve been discussing so far. Not only 
did I show Derrida discuss survivance through Benjamin’s terms fortleben and überleben in his 
final interview, the first definition of différance I covered includes the untranslatable alongside 
the aneconomic, the wholly other, and the expenditure without reserve of death. Translation, as 
one might guess, is itself structured according to the double bind of life death. As Derrida writes 
in “Living On,”  
A text lives only if it lives on [sur-vit], and it lives on only if it is at once translatable and 
untranslatable... Totally translatable, it disappears as text, as writing, as a body of 
language [langue]. Totally untranslatable, even within what is believed to be one 
language, it dies immediately. This triumphant translation is neither the life nor the death 
of the text, only or already its living on, its life after life, its life after death. The same 
thing will be said of what I call writing, mark, trace, and so on. It [Ça] neither lives nor 
dies; it lives on. And it ‘starts’ only with living on. (P 147-9/128-9) 
 
A text, like a living being, only survives in the stricture between a restricted ecology of total 
translatability, the total reappropriation of meaning without any material remainder, and the 
anecologically untranslatable.122 As Derrida explains, Benjamin intends his vitalist conception of 
the survival of languages and texts in translation to be understood completely unmetaphorically. 
Its gesture does not consist in the extension of what we understand as organic, biological or 
zoological life, which would, Derrida notes, in fact be metaphorical. Rather, Benjamin invites us 
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to think life starting from history and spirit rather than nature. To understand life on the basis of 
a life that elevates itself beyond nature, a life that is in essence its survival is for Derrida a 
fundamentally Hegelian gesture, but one that requires the work of general ecology I’ve 
developed above.123 In a 1976 seminar on Benjamin, Derrida complicates the former’s notion of 
translation with respect to the opposition of (mechanical) production and (organic) reproduction I 
discussed in Jacob. Translation, he writes, is not sterile, it produces something living, “it does not 
relate two dead (beings) [morts] but two living (beings) [vivants], two living languages, like two 
living bodies whose copulation is not an equalization of two deaths but the production of a living 
being.” (B3, 3t) Life in Benjamin’s sense must thus be understood as both production and re-
production, “life as the unity of origin and repetition, of pro and reproduction.” 124  (B3, 4t) 
Translation can thus be said to structure organic experience, precisely in the general economy of 
an experience of the impossible; “let us say that translation is experience, which one can translate 
or experience also: experience is translation.” (P1 234/223) But this impossibility, as I just 
explained, is also an ethics; the task of translation is necessary and impossible for Derrida, 
necessary as impossible. Translation is ethically bound to the sur-vival of the work to ensure that 
it not only live longer, but more and better, and it assures not only the survival of a corpus, text 
or author, but of languages themselves.125 
 The notion of translation at stake in these chapters is neither a metaphor for thinking how 
living beings, texts and languages relate to one another and their environments, nor is it a 
dialectical Concept permitting the overcoming of error and misunderstanding. Rather, I read the 
aporetics of translation precisely as an originary effect of life death, a general text that begins by 
repeating and translating itself. Translation would thus be another name for différance and 
iterability. If the metaphor is the proper of the human, as Derrida suggests in “White 
Mythology,” and indeed dialectically complicit with the Concept, the notion of translation I’m 
interested here would exceed the oppositions between the human and its other, physis and 
technè.126 To think translation as an originary ruse of life death would immediately relate its 
operations to non-sense and error. It would problematize the ‘proper’ sense of translation as one 
between two self-identical and self-enclosed languages, since no relation between these could 
ever be stabilized once and for all. This will be of fundamental importance to a non-metaphorical 
ecological conception of language, as I will show in my discussion of ecolinguistics in chapter 6.  
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 Translation for Derrida operates according to two trajectories, first of all according to the 
restricted economy of the Aufhebung, in the aim of the economic reappropriation of sense into 
univocity, whereby, following Plato and Leibniz, plurivocity can be mastered in view of sense 
and truth.127 This is a situation in which the translator could economically absolve himself of his 
indebted position before the text: a translation without remainder, a pure economic equivalence 
between two languages. But such a translation would not ensure the sur-vival of the text, but 
rather sign its death sentence. To say that a text only lives-on if it is both totally translatable and 
totally untranslatable is also to say, for Derrida, that nothing is untranslatable while nothing is 
translatable.128 Any language or text, so long as it lives-on, dwells in the double bind between 
these two possibilities. What is impossible to translate, what resists this dialectic, is the 
materiality of the letter. Derrida notes this in “Freud and the Scene of Writing;” “the materiality 
of a word [un corps verbal] does not let itself be translated or transported into another language. 
Materiality is precisely that which translation lets go. To let materiality go, such is the essential 
energy of translation. When it reinstitutes materiality, translation becomes poetry.” 129  (ED 
312/264) Benjamin’s interest is the sacred text in translation, which makes translation necessary 
and impossible because literality, materiality and meaning are inseparable within it; an 
irreplaceable and untransferable event, as Derrida puts it.130 But this articulation of the material 
and the semiotic is no more limited to sacred texts than poetry; its role in contemporary science 
and technology studies (in the work of Donna Haraway and Karen Barad) is something I will 
examine closely in chapter 6.131 The materiality of the letter calls for translation, but it is also 
that by which any economy of translation interrupts itself, vows itself to an absolute 
dissemination and non-reappropriability. The inextricable bind between the material and the 
semiotic must be thought in a ‘pas de sens,’ the material-semiotic would be nothing without 
translation, and translation nothing without the material-semiotic.132 As Derrida puts in “Fidelity 
to (no) More than One,” returning us to Bataille and Blanchot’s concept of experience,  
this pas-de-sens is not only negative. It is not a loss, it is also the chance of a word 
[parole], an irruption of sense, it is the chance in the pas-de-sens, through it; and the 
bordering between of this ‘through’ is experience, the experience that is authority, but an 
authority that expiates itself, as Blanchot and Bataille say, more or less. (FP 28t) 
 
The material-semiotic communicates nothing outside of its own event, and one is thus placed in a 
dual fidelity before it: on the one hand to its untranslatability, but on the other to think this 
untranslatability otherwise, in an engagement to translate within the experience of the 
 44 
untranslatable, where its alterity exposes translation to an ineluctable movement of ex-
appropriation.133 The transgression of translation discovers the material underside of the Concept 
or Form, and thus ensures the double survivance of the original both as fortleben and überleben, 
but only “by losing the flesh during a process of conversion... all the while preserving the 
mournful and debt-laden memory of the singular materiality [corps].” (TR 574/199) The triumph 
of translation is thus double, equivocally its success and a phase of mourning. As a work of 
mourning, translation is haunted by the memory of the materiality it must relinquish, this 
material restance that commands both its necessity and impossibility. One does not survive, and 
nor does the text live-on in translation, without mourning. Indeed, this impossible necessity 
structures a transcendence beyond human language; it is an experience of the passage beyond the 
human, its power and the sovereignty of its ‘I can,’ in the rupture of its economy. Translation 
engages something that “passes beyond humanity even as it passes through humanity, just as 
language does,” something “above human language in human language, beyond the human order 
in the human order,” an ethics and a responsibility “beyond human rights and duties in human 
law.” (TR 568/188) It is itself the impossible experience of the beyond-within I spoke of in my 
previous section on Levinas, a passion of translation, as Derrida puts it, in which one ought to 
hear again the passivity of the pas, the transgression, transcendence, transfer, transformation, 
travail, he adds, as in the work of mourning, but also trouvaille; invention in all senses of the 
word.134  
 What Derrida calls the axial thesis of Benjamin’s “Task of the Translator” is that 
communication is an inessential aspect of the work. Bad translations communicate too much. 
The translator’s task is rather to make visible the hidden kinship between all languages, one 
which is not reducible to the simple lineage of language families, but something more enigmatic, 
Derrida writes, “perhaps even this kinship, this affinity (Verwandschaft), is like an alliance 
sealed by the contract of translation, to the extent that the sur-vivals that it associates are not 
natural lives, blood ties, or empirical symbioses.” (P1 220/209) This intimate kinship is not to be 
sought in the domain of life, for Benjamin, but at a higher level; not in terms of kinship or the 
family in general, “on the contrary, it is on the basis of languages and relations among languages 
that one must begin to understand what ‘life’ and ‘kinship’ mean.” (OA 162-3/123) As I will 
show in §1.4.2, the same is true of what Derrida calls the promise of the earth. It is only on the 
basis of relations between living beings in the material space of their inscription that we can 
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begin to think what ecology and relationality mean. Therein lies for Derrida the impossible 
possibility of the promissory and messianic character of translation; translation promises a 
reconciliation between languages that no translation itself could never succeed in accomplishing. 
It promises the being-language of language, I argue, in and as its materiality, as the arche-writing 
of ecological relationality. Materiality is both what makes the promise necessarily excessive and 
impossible to keep; in resisting translation, it both makes and lets the event come in what Derrida 
calls a language to come (langue à venir).135 This making and letting the event come, he adds 
elsewhere, involves “a possible or impossible responsibility regarding sense and ab-sense (the 
absence of sense),” the sense of a responsibility to come. (FPC 58)   
 The structural and originary impossibility of translation, the interruption the material 
remainder poses to its economy, is itself the condition of this promise. It is also, Derrida writes, 
the condition of the social bond, because the social bond requires interruption, its binding only 
affirms itself in the stricture of an unbinding because the differences it binds together are never 
static or stabilized. The contradiction therein, however, is wholly other than that of the dialectical 
Concept, “it founds and overflows every dialectic. It removes itself from every dialectical 
horizon at the very moment where it seems to deploy or arrest it.” (FP 5t) One can then suggest 
that the material remainder might be correlated to that of the impersonal, impossible death that 
doubles the restricted economy of personal death, the one that life simply delays and defers. The 
matter of my living being survives my personal death, and the impersonal death of its 
decomposition proceeds long after I die, and even then it allows other forms of life to live-on. 
This passion of death, as I showed Derrida draw from Blanchot, entails a shared co-passion 
before this inexperienceable experience as the very condition of the social bond, an ecological 
bond; indeed an ecological bind understood in the stricture of general ecology. I mentioned 
above that the passion of translation ought be understood beyond the opposition of the human to 
its others, the natural to the cultural. Like the task of the translator, what one might still call 
environmental ethics entails letting life live-on, and not only the life of individual organisms, but 
the life of species, ecosystems, languages, cultures, all of these given to be thought in the 
imperative of biocultural sustainability; each an irreducible and singular form of alterity, “one 
other or some other persons, but also places, animals, languages.” (DM 101/71)  
In a discussion of Husserl and Heidegger’s concept of world, which I will amply develop 
in my next two chapters, Derrida suggests that the unity without unity of the world is one I share 
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with every living being which has the ‘same’ experience as I do. This experience is that by which 
I know that my singular world is both absolutely untranslatable and heterogeneous, and yet there 
is some translatable ‘world’ of which the infinity of untranslatable worlds is the very condition; 
“I am bound, in this social un-binding, to anyone whosoever and the hospitality unconditionally 
opened to the arrivant should open me onto the arrivant whatever it may be, but also to what one 
so easily calls an animal or a god. Good or evil, life or death.” (FP 28t) And it is this unity 
without unity of the world within which one can think life death (not ‘life and death’ or ‘life is 
death’) on earth or in the world, as Derrida puts it in La Vie la mort, “if we call world this unity 
without totality, without homogeneity, which nonetheless allows one to think together, according 
to a logic which is neither that of the is nor of the and, neither that of identity or opposition, 
différance.” (L5, 11t) 
 
§1.4.2: Avowing: The Impossible Promise of Ecology 
Blanchot, in his Unavowable Community, follows Bataille in thinking the experience of the 
impossible as the logic binding all community, as he cites the latter, “the Community of those 
who do not have a community.” (BCI 9/1) Community is both a sharing and partitioning, a 
partage, as will be essential in Esposito’s readings of Communitas, of an experience whose sole 
content is “to be untransmittable, which can be completed thus: the only thing worthwhile is the 
transmission of the untransmittable.” (BCI 35/18) Blanchot’s thought of community further 
stakes itself against communion, fusion and immanence, emphasizing instead the finitude of the 
beings composing it at its principle. As he cites Bataille, it is the death of the other that structures 
the impossible separation that opens any living being outside itself, onto the expropriation and 
dispossession of community. I will have much to say about this originary mourning structuring 
the general ecology of community in a moment, community simply being another word for what 
I would call ecology in general, structured by what Blanchot and Bataille call the excess of a 
lack, transcendence, the impossibility of its immanence, an exteriority that excludes even 
sovereignty.136 This exteriority that thought cannot master has many names, “death, the relation 
to the other, or speech when the latter is not folded up in ways of speaking and does not permit 
any relation (of identity or alterity) with itself.” (BCI 25/12) All of these, it seems, weave 
together the unknowable and incalculable singularities to which biocultural sustainability owes 
its infinite responsibility, to the deaths of others, to words, texts and languages, before and 
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beyond any determination as human. An unknowability that is not the dialectical counterpart of 
the known structures every community, friendship and hospitality for Derrida, in respecting the 
transcendence and infinite distance of the other. The interruption of death, however, makes the 
all these other interruptions possible, and all finite beings “know that life does not go without 
death, and that death is not beyond, outside of life, unless one inscribes the beyond in the inside, 
in the essence of the living.” 137  (SM 224/176-7) The beyond-within, again, as the possible 
knowledge of the im-possible is, as Derrida draws from Levinas, the site of an absolute 
responsibility: “a passivity that is not only the possibility of death in being, the possibility of an 
impossibility, but an impossibility that is prior to this possibility, the impossibility of slipping 
away. Our impossibility, in short, before or prior to death, standing before death, before the dead, 
beyond death.” (AEL 150/83) The impersonal death that is impossible to die and of which I 
make the impossible experience is what is shared and partitioned out in what I’m calling general 
ecology.  
If Blanchot speaks of the unavowable community, Derrida picks up on this notion in 
“Avowing: the Impossible” to further elaborate on the experience of the impossible as 
structuring the community of any living-together on earth. Any ensemble of living together 
[vivre ensemble] only does itself justice, he writes, where it exceeds the ‘ensemble’ of any living 
being, system or totality that would simply be the sum of its parts. The justice of living together 
well must interrupt both the sense of an organic or natural totality and that of a politico-juridical 
contract, it would thus be beyond any opposition between physis/nomos, physis/thesis, 
nature/convention, biological life/law, any opposition between nature and culture.138 It must do 
so because the differences between its members (and these members from themselves) are never 
fixed, but are structured in on-going processes of differentiation. Living together well, Derrida 
writes 
supposes an interruptive excess both with respect to the statuary convention of law and 
with respect to symbiosis, of the symbiotic, gregarious, or fusional living-together... Any 
living-together that would limit itself to the symbiotic or would regulate itself on a figure 
of the symbiotic or the organic is the first mistake in the sense and of the ‘il faut’ of the 
‘vivre ensemble.’ (DJ 33-4t) 
 
All these seemingly economic aporias, those of the law of the oikos, the home and the proper 
ought to be connected to the question of ecology, Derrida adds; “this great and new dimension of 
‘living together.’” (DJ 61t) Since the ecology of life death on earth must be thought beyond the 
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opposition of nature to culture, it articulates a space for thinking an ethics of biocultural 
sustainability, one of originary mourning for the countless species and languages threatened with 
extinction today; an impossible mourning, no doubt, but one that originarily institutes an infinite 
responsibility.  
The idea of ‘life’ in the ecology of living together, however, is by no means simple; it 
cannot simply concern itself with those presently living. It is also one of living together with 
those no longer and those not yet living in the present. It thus structures an anachrony at the heart 
of the present; indeed, Derrida adds, of the Living Present, posing an irreducible complication to 
the concept at the heart Husserlian phenomenology. 139  This interruption within the Living 
Present structures community as a partage, “it is a sharing out without fusion, a community 
without community, a language without communication, a being-with without confusion.” (LT 
221/195) As he writes in Aporias,  
Survivance structures each instant in a kind of irreducible torsion, that of a retrospective 
anticipation introducing contretemps and the posthumous in the most living of the living 
present, the rearview mirror of a waiting-for-death [s’attendre-à-la-mort] at every 
moment, the future-anterior that precedes even the present it appears only to modify.140 
(A 102/55t) 
 
This structure of arche-mourning does not so much oppose an ontology of life so much as 
provide a complication of life death as the basis from which one can speak of any living 
subjectivity, he adds. That one will survive the other originarily installs the relation between any 
two finite singularities; it is neither the death of the other which is primary and instigates my 
responsibility as it is for Levinas, nor the Jemeinigkeit of my death as my ownmost proper 
possibility as I’ve shown in Freud and will explore in Heidegger in chapter 3.141 To carve out a 
position between Heidegger and Levinas would require thinking both my death and that of the 
other as intimately bound up the one with the other, and thus in a shared apprehension of life’s 
precariousness and grievability.142 Death is the ex-propriation of any ipseity, of anything proper 
to the human. ‘We’ are never ‘ourselves’ in the anachrony of ecological relationality, and this is 
due not only to the irreducibly relational condition of any living singularity, but to the fact that 
we are structurally haunted by the ghosts of environmental and biocultural degradation, perhaps 
even retroactively haunted by the incalculable deaths of indeterminable species, cultures, 
languages and other irreplaceable singularities to come, each one, each time, as the end of the 
world. Ethics itself, Derrida’s thought seems to suggest, necessitates learning to live with these 
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revenants more justly, more faithfully, perhaps in a promise that can only be in excess of itself, 
since it must indeed give the world, given to us from even beyond an evolutionary history.  
The self [soi-même] has that relation to itself only through the other, through the promise 
(for the future, as trace of the future) made to the other as an absolute past, and thus 
through this absolute past, by the grace of the other whose sur-vival – that is, whose 
being-mortal – will have always exceeded the ‘we’ of a common present. (MPD 77-8/6t) 
 
 I’ve shown that différance structures everything in a network of differential relationality, 
and that every identity in order to live-on must both economically affirm itself in returning to 
itself as it affirms its aneconomic exposure to others and to death. This strange ecological bond 
across the anachrony and contratemporality at the heart of the living present allows us to 
conclude with the promise of survivance and general ecology, just as I’d shown the “Task of the 
Translator” promise a kingdom of reconciliation between languages, a kingdom also forbidden. 
The structure of différance on the one hand deploys a thought of the promise as one that can be 
kept and calculated, while on the other one that exceeds all horizon of expectation and 
calculability. In a little-read preface to Serge Margel’s Le Tombeau du dieu artisan, Derrida 
introduces what he calls the promise of the earth. Anterior to any I, you, he she or it promises, 
Derrida writes, “nous nous promettons,” we promise one another, we promise ourselves. General 
ecology, to paraphrase, must be understood as “a ‘we’ without assured gathering, without 
intersubjectivity, without community or reciprocity, a strange dissymmetrical ‘we,’ anterior to 
every social bond,” requiring “dispersion or distraction, the absolute interruption of absolutes, 
the ab-solute or ab-solved [l’ab-solu] in a certain being-in-the-world which will have preceded 
everything.” (AV 40t) This element of the incalculable, the wholly other and the untranslatable 
punctures through any horizon of expectation for the promise. Without it, what is promised in the 
promise would come down to a simple calculation of the future. What Derrida calls ethical 
responsibility, indeed ethical passion, is to promise more than what can be kept; the promise 
must be excessive. But responsibility is thus aporetic, one must both be responsible for keeping 
what one promises, and before the singular event of the promise as unforeseeable, without 
concept or sense. Everything involved in the promise involves a negotiation between these two 
differantial senses of responsibility, both to the economic and the aneconomic, or better, Derrida 
writes, a transaction.143 The temporality of the promise is thus one of an originary excess, the 
time of the loss, of an expenditure without possible restitution, but also of an absolute gift; the 
‘contretemps’ of an unkeepable promise.144 To anticipate the stakes of my next two chapters, 
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Derrida writes that this pre-chronological or anachronical time of the promise would be 
irreducible to and ‘older’ than the time of Husserl (chapter 2) and Heidegger (chapter 3).145 It 
will also require, as my discussion on the untranslatable in “Fidélité à plus d’un” suggested, a 
total reorganization of the concept of being-in-the-world at stake in phenomenology and 
ontology, as the promise “is not in the world, for the world ‘is’ (promised) within the promise, 
according to the promise.” (AV 39t) 
Finite promise of the world, as world: it is up to ‘us’ to make the world survive; and we 
cannot say that this question is not urgently important today; it always is and always will 
have been, each time it can be a matter – or not – of giving oneself death, that is to say 
the end of the world; it is thus up to ‘us’ to make what ‘we’ inadequately call the human 
earth survive, an earth ‘we’ know is finite, that it can and must exhaust itself in an end. 
But ‘we’ will have to change all these names, beginning with ours... life itself will no 
longer be what we thought it was. (AV 39t) 
 
§1.5: Pre-Concluding Re-Marks and Re-Pro-gramme 
What then, to do? “What to do? What are we going to do with the earth, on the earth? And the 
question... is not only an ecological question, even if it remains on the horizon of what ecology 
could have as its most ambitious and radical today.” (QF 48-9t) The ethics of biocultural 
sustainability comes down to taking on, as Derrida puts it in “Avances,” the inheritance of an 
unkeepable promise. The program of arche-writing discovers a logic of heredity and inheritance 
in a way that completely overflows the limits between the human and its others, the natural and 
the technical, the organic and the inorganic, life and death. Both genetic and cultural/linguistic 
heredity operate according to a dual movement of reproduction and selection. One cannot, in this 
framework, put forth anything like a program of rules or norms in the interest of biocultural 
sustainability, since even the decision at stake in inheriting ultimately comes from the other, in 
its alterity and transcendence, and before which I am infinitely, indeed mechanically passive. 
And yet, precisely because of this necessary excess and failure, responsibility also consists in 
attempting to put forward such a program by way of rules and norms. But this responsibility is 
taken in the name of the other, as another, “that in short takes on the survival of the cosmos, or 
our world in any case... What are we going to do, what must we do with the earth?” (AV 27t) To 
inherit this promise from a time even beyond evolutionary history is itself no longer reducible to 
a simple question, perhaps even less one of ‘what to do?’ and especially ‘what must I do?,’ 
although it must of course calculate its debt through these. To inherit justly would perhaps not 
only come down to restituting the originary an-economy of the promise of the earth, but to 
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maintain this disjunction in the passivity of a certain letting, a certain deferral of its fulfillment, 
“deferring not what it affirms but deferring just so as to affirm, to affirm justly, so as to have the 
power (a power without power) to affirm the coming of the event, its future-to-come itself.” (SM 
41/19) As Derrida puts it in For What Tomorrow, “one must do everything to appropriate a past 
even though we know that it remains fundamentally inappropriable.” (DQ 15/3t) To reaffirm the 
inheritance of a promise before time is not only accepting this heritage, “but relaunching it 
otherwise and keeping it alive.” (DQ 15/3) Life itself, Derrida writes, must be thought on the 
basis of inheritance and the double injunction to both passively receive and to affirm, to say yes 
to, and to choose to make what one inherits live on otherwise, perhaps even more and better, but 
always with the risk of the worst. It thus requires, Derrida writes,  
two gestures at once: both to leave life in life and to make it live again, to save life and to 
‘let live’ in the most poetic sense of this phrase... To know how to ‘leave’ and to ‘let’ 
[laisser], and to know the meaning of ‘leaving’ and ‘letting’ – that is one of the most 
beautiful, most hazardous, most necessary things I know of... The experience of a 




Justice is above life, beyond life or the life drive, in a sur-viving of which the sur, the 
transcendence of the ‘sur’ – if it is a transcendence – remains to be interpreted. 
Jacques Derrida, The Death Penalty: Volume 1, 366/271. 
 
Two: Transcendence and the Surviving Present 
In justifying the necessity of a detailed investigation of Derrida’s earliest engagements with 
phenomenology, three references to Husserl’s Living Present in Derrida’s later work seem 
indispensible. The first in The Animal that Therefore I Am, where in reflecting on the relation of 
livingness [vivance] to death across the thresholds separating the human and its others, Derrida 
writes that “at the heart of all these difficulties, there is always the unthought side of a thinking 
of life (and it is by means of that, through the question of life and of the ‘living present,’ (...) that 
my deconstructive reading of Husserl began, as well, in fact, as everything that followed from 
that.)” (AS 153/111) Second, one reads in Spectres of Marx that the very possibility of justice, 
ethics and responsibility lies “beyond all living present, within that which disjoins the living 
present,” or rather in the “non-contemporaneity with itself of the living present.”1 (SM 16/xviii) 
Justice carries life beyond present life and its actual being there, its empirical or 
ontological actuality: not towards death but towards a living-on, [sur-vie] namely, a trace 
of which life and death would themselves be but traces and traces of traces, a survival 
whose possibility in advance comes to disjoin or disadjust the identity to itself of the 
living present as well as of any effectivity. (SM 17-18/xx)  
 
Third, one finds in “Eating Well” one of the clearest conjunctions of Derrida’s problematization 
of the Husserlian Living Present and the ecological ethics I am pursuing here. For Derrida, the 
concept of transcendental passive genesis resisted, bracketed and avoided not only in Husserl’s 
static analyses but in all subsequent so-called ‘genetic’ analyses (as the central thesis of 
Derrida’s 1954 The Problem of Genesis claims) comes to join together the questions of 
temporality and alterity and leads back to a “pre-egological or pre-subjective zone” within which 
the subject appears as passively constituted by its relations to time and the other rather than 
actively constituting these. (PDS 277/263) The notion of a pre-egological transcendental field, 
also of huge importance to Deleuze, actually has its origins in Sartre’s The Transcendence of the 
Ego, and does not appear in these words in Husserl, as far as I know.2 But Derrida also notes a 
need, very early on, to move beyond the phenomenologies of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty towards 
one more attuned to the question of scientific objectivity.3 Perhaps, to use Canguilhem’s terms, a 
shift from ‘le vécu,’ transcendental lived experience, to ‘le vivant,’ the living being.4 It is along 
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two axes, what one might call the ‘organic,’ ontological account of how the Living Present 
structures the life of the living being, and the ‘teleological,’ the questions of scientific ideality, 
translatability, objectivity and of how living beings share a world in the Living Present that my 
study will situate itself.  
As I will show, Husserl and Derrida invariably tie both axes of Living Present to the 
materiality of ‘nature’ (albeit, I note, always a de-natured one) and of the earth (albeit not 
without some relation to ‘world’), which authorizes, indeed necessitates the task of thinking 
these questions in terms of general ecology. At stake then will be a complication of what I’ll call 
the restricted ecology of the Living Present through the interruptions posed by what Nicolas 
Abraham might call its ‘transphenomenological’ relations, those of intersubjectivity, the 
originary hylè or matter, time, death and all the other movements in tr-, transcendence, 
translation, and so on.5 What all these have in common is not only their irreducibility to a 
monadic ego, but their intimate entanglement with one another in how the living being 
differentially shares the earth it lives and dies on with its others. The beyond-within of the Living 
Present, its sur-vivance, inscribes a transcendence and a spacing within the mutual immanence 
and self-presence of empirical and transcendental life, of le vécu, one with important 
epistemological, ontological, ethical and indeed ecological implications. Ethics, as I showed in 
my last chapter, is precisely phenomenology’s auto-interruption, the interruption of itself from 
within by itself, an interruption that will engage a thorough deconstruction of its notions of life, 
history and teleology.6 However, Derrida remarks that what he calls the trace (another non-
synonymous substitution for différance) can no more break from transcendental phenomenology 
than be reduced to it.7 General ecology will thus think both a ‘dialectical’ ecology of the Living 
Present and the survivance made possible by its interruption in order to deepen our 
understanding of sharing life death on earth with its others more justly. 
As Derrida argues, the relation to time and the other within the Living Present resists 
phenomenology in its very principle of principles: the absolute evidence and self-givenness of 
intuition.8 But these relations will also come to designate the very possibility of ecological 
relationality. As Derrida puts it, 
How do I connect the question of the constitution of time (and the alterity within the 
living present) and the question of the other (of the ‘alter ego’ as Husserl would say)? 
Well my quick answer would be that the two alterities are indissociable... A living being 
– whether a human being or an animal being – could not have any relation to another 
 54 
being as such without this alterity in time, without, that is, memory, anticipation, this 
strange sense (I hesitate to call it knowledge) that every now, every instant is radically 
other and nevertheless in the same form of the now. Equally there is no ‘I’ without the 
sense as well that everyone other than me is radically other and yet able to say ‘I,’ that 
there is nothing more heterogeneous than every ‘I’ and nevertheless there is nothing more 
universal than the ‘I.’ (AWD 104e) 
 
Derrida’s accounts of the pre-subjective transcendental field and passive genesis, I’ll show, not 
only take us beyond the alterity and transcendence of the human other in Levinas’s ethics, but 
also beyond the almost exclusive focus on the question of ‘the animal’ which has preoccupied 
recent Derrida scholarship, allowing us to think ecological responsibility more broadly, across 
“what one calls the ‘nonliving,’ the ‘vegetal,’ the ‘animal,’ ‘man,’ or ‘God.’’ The question also 
comes back to the difference between the living and the nonliving.”9 (PDS 284/269) Beyond the 
idea of an unconditional obligation to every living being in general,  
it is not enough to say that this unconditional ethical obligation, if there is one, binds me 
to the life of any living being in general. It also binds me twice over to something 
nonliving, namely to the present nonlife or the nonpresent life of those who are not yet 
living, present living beings, living beings in the present, contemporaries – i.e. dead 
living beings and living beings not yet born, nonpresent-living-beings or living beings 
that are not present. One must therefore inscribe death in the concept of life. And you can 
imagine all the consequences this would have. (BS1 157/110) 
  
This is precisely why the non-contemporaneity with itself of the Living Present structures the 
possibility of justice, community, indeed ecology as I remarked in my last chapter.10  
Along with the intertwinement of temporality and alterity at the heart of the Living 
Present, it is also essential to appreciate in what way, for Derrida, phenomenology constitutes a 
philosophy of life, where time and the other also express “a way of questioning the concept of 
life in phenomenology – why living present?” 11  (DS 63) Phenomenology proposes a dual 
privileging of presence and life, within which the exteriorities, I’ll say transcendences of alterity, 
temporality, materiality and death merely affect the Living Present as external accidental 
modifications. The Living Present will eventually for Derrida become coextensive with 
metaphysics itself and a volitional account of the subject. I noted in chapter 1 Derrida’s 
comparison of the Living Present with the immanent propriation of the death drive, its adherence 
to metaphysical concepts of form, eidos, oikos, its incompatibility with the anachronic 
contretemps of mourning, or the promise of the earth, while I also discussed the necessity of 
thinking a non-dialectical restance that would not be a modification of presence, but would issue 
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from the transcendence of a past that has never been present, that would structure the 
transcendental field from its outside. 
As I will show in this chapter, the passive geneses by which transcendental subjectivity is 
passively constituted rather than actively constituting designate an originary complication of the 
activity of the monadic ego, closely tying into a question to which Derrida would return in The 
Animal...; the ethical question concerning other living beings is not whether they can do this or 
that, nor one of extending transcendental activity to what was once denied it, but of interrogating 
the radical passivity shared across the living; the passive genesis of every Living Present as its 
relation to finitude, as a vulnerability and sufferability at the heart of the Living Present itself. 
This radical dispossession of the monadic ego thus counters even the phenomenological ethical 
thought of empathy as the recognition of an other ego as a centre of ‘I can’s.’ In other words, the 
necessity of an interrogation of a radical passivity beyond the opposition of activity and 
subjectivity is as old as Derrida’s philosophical project itself.12 
The difficulties involved in the reconstruction of these philosophical footholds for the 
young Derrida, however, are not negligible, not only owing to the lack of a clear systematization 
of the concept of the Living Present in Husserl, but in Derrida as well. To put it all too quickly, 
Derrida reads the Living Present favourably in his early works on Husserl as seemingly 
representative of his own project and then later as a structure to be complicated and 
problematized.13 In his 1954 thesis The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy, Derrida 
acknowledges a clear debt to Tran Duc Thao’s exposition of the Living Present in the latter’s 
Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism.14 The Living Present thus receives a thoroughly 
dialectical formulation in Derrida’s first book, one persisting in his 1962 introduction to 
Husserl’s The Origin of Geometry. Through his development of the logic of the trace, however, 
Derrida comes to articulate this dialectics of the Living Present (its restricted ecology) with a 
Levinasian relation to an an-archic, immemorial, pre-historical past that has never been present, 
that would not constitute a modification of presence in retention and protention as past-present or 
future-present.  
While continuing to appear sporadically in Derrida’s work following the publication of 
his final book length study on Husserl, 1967’s Voice and Phenomenon, indeed through to the 
questions of survivance and affirmation we will explore in later chapters, Derrida openly 
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acknowledges the Living Present as the very touchstone of the philosophical projects of the other 
two great figures looming within his own, Heidegger and Levinas.15  
Husserl’s major works on time recognize an absolutely privileged form for what is called 
the ‘living present.’ This is sense, good sense even, at its most indisputable, in 
appearance: the originary form of experience is the self-presentation of the present; we 
never leave the present, which never leaves itself, and which no living thing ever leaves. 
This absolute phenomenological science, this undeniable authority of now in the living 
present – in different styles and with different strategies, it is this that has been the point 
to which all the major questionings of this kind of time, especially those of Heidegger and 
Levinas, have been directed. In a different move, with other aims, what I tried to 
elaborate using the word trace (that is, an experience of the temporal difference of a past 
without a present past or a to-come that is not a present future) is also a deconstruction, 
without critique, of that absolute and straightforward evidence of the living present, of 
consciousness as living present, of the originary form (Urform) of the time we call the 
living present (lebendige Gegenwart), or of everything that assumes the presence of the 
present. (PM 376/143-144) 
 
Clearly, the philosophical stakes of the Living Present are high for deconstruction and its 
genealogy within contemporary continental philosophy. One the one hand, it is impossible for 
Derrida for a living being to exit the Living Present, to live an experience outside of the Living 
Present. This restricted ecological account of the Living Present is one Derrida will never 
renounce or cease to wrestle with although, particularly through his reading of Levinas, and 
recalling my remarks on im-possibility in my previous chapter, his later work will give us the 
opportunity to think this impossibility otherwise, as itself a condition of possibility: the Living 
Present can only maintain itself by exiting itself, by transcending itself, as the experience of its 
own impossibility. This experience of the impossible in the stricture of general ecology is the 
condition of possibility of sur-vivance and indeed of justice.  
The first part of this chapter will attempt to historically reconstruct the logic of the Living 
Present in Derrida’s earlier work. I’ll begin in §2.1 by developing the dialectical account of the 
Living Present Derrida reads in Tran Duc Thao and show how this plays itself out on both 
proposed axes of my study, what I called the ‘organic’ (§2.1.1) and the ‘teleological’ (§2.1.2) 
with respect to the problem of genesis. In the latter, I’ll examine various deployments of the Idea 
in the Kantian sense in Husserl, and show how these engage the questions of how living beings 
differentially share a world, one certainly attentive to their nonhuman origins and complications, 
but which ultimately decide in favour a subjectivist, metaphysical, Eurocentric, humanist, indeed 
anthropological teleology of life. In §2.2, I’ll turn to the ethical problematizations posed to the 
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Living Present by Levinas, suggesting that this philosopher provokes a profound reorientation of 
Derrida’s own relation to this notion, particularly alongside the former’s notion of the trace: the 
enigma of the absolute alterity of the other issued from a past which has never been present.16 
But I’ll also show that Derrida’s reading of Levinas suggests the necessity of going beyond the 
ethical transcendence of the human other towards a more robust appreciation of ecological 
relationality, disclosing an underside and alterity to this anthropocentrism and Eurocentrism 
attentive to questions of death and finitude. Finally, in §2.3, I’ll show how this reorientation 
plays out with respect to the questions of time, materiality and death in Derrida’s concepts of 
trace, différance and arche-writing in section §2.3.1, and in §2.3.2 develop the implications 
therein concerning sharing the world with its others more justly, particularly with reference to 
Derrida’s notion of democracy-to-come, of which David Wood has already proposed an eco-
deconstructive reading as the ‘parliament of the living,’ irreducible to the Living Present and the 
Idea in the Kantian sense.17  
 
 §2.1: The Restricted Ecology of the Living Present in Husserl and Derrida 
Before getting into Derrida’s readings of Husserl, let me examine the long note from Tran Duc 
Thao Derrida credits for his understanding of the Living Present. The Living Present for the 
former is “the movement of primordial consciousness which is not in time but constitutes time: it 
is the temporalizing temporality always present to itself and which always is renewed in an 
eternity of life.”18 Husserl distinguishes between three temporalities c) objective, transcendent 
time, the time of nature and clocks, which is constituted within b) the immanent, transcendental, 
phenomenological time of subjective lived experience, both of which are constituted within a) 
the time of pre-immanence, a primordial and supratemporal temporality, “‘the absolute 
subjectivity of ‘time-consciousness,’ or ‘the consciousness which constitutes time,’ in the 
primordial flux of the Living Present.”19 As absolute subjectivity, the Living Present is always 
and forever mine, belongs to the originary monad of my ego, and implies the entire universe of 
all other monads, the birth and death of the world and of all other egos: it is the condition of all 
being and all existence.20 As would prove quite important for Derrida, the properties of absolute 
subjectivity cannot be named.21 Tran Duc Thao’s account of the Living Present is undeniably 
dialectical, evoking the movement of the Aufhebung I examined in chapter 1: “the movement of 
the Living Present consists in repeatedly going beyond itself by retaining within itself its past in 
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terms of its annulled, preserved, and elevated moment.”22 Its flow necessitates a permanent and 
primordial ‘Now’ that eternally holds together the retention of past moments and the protention 
of future ones, a dialectic of what is no longer and of what is not yet. The Living Present is thus 
“a preservation and perpetual conquest of self... the self remains identical to itself, while 
renewing itself constantly; it remains precisely the same only by always becoming another, in 
that absolute flux of an eternal Present.”23 Derrida’s project in The Problem of Genesis can then 
be seen, as Leonard Lawlor argues, as a ‘surenchère dialectique,’ an upping the ante on this 
dialectics of the Living Present.24 In other words, Derrida will show that the dialectical structure 
of the Living Present phenomenology necessitates and yet is originarily contaminated and 
compromised by the very transcendences of time, alterity and materiality Husserl wishes to 
bracket.  
Derrida targets this originary complication of the Living Present through the concept of 
genesis in phenomenology. The Problem of Genesis begins by outlining an irreducible dialectic 
between two contradictory meanings of this term in Husserl; origin and becoming. On the one 
hand, genetic production occurs as absolute origin, as both an ontological and temporal 
originarity, its appearance and sense only occurring in “transcending what it is not.” (PG 
7/xxi) On the other hand, genesis only takes place within a context, within an ontological and 
temporal totality, in relation to a past and a future, “genesis is also an inclusion, an immanence.” 
(PG 8/xxi) In fact, Derrida characterizes the very problem of genesis as a tension between 
transcendence and immanence.25 While the dialectical nature of this text could seem to suggest 
that the two poles could be aufgehoben, Derrida seems to already be arguing for the necessity of 
going beyond dialectics in a dialectics of dialectics and non-dialectics, a “continuity of continuity 
and discontinuity, an identity of identity and alterity.”26 (PG 8/xxt) Reflecting on this “highly 
dialectizing first book” almost 40 years later, Derrida recalls that the most dialectical 
formulations of the dialectic in Hegel maintain themselves in a certain relation to the non-
dialectical.27 What Derrida sought to uncover in this logic was the element of a non-dialectical 
difference foreign to any dialectical system which “transcends a group of categories... more 
originary than the dialectic... a non-oppositional difference that transcends the dialectic, which is 
itself always oppositional.” (TS 32) At once the conditions of possibility of the dialectical 
synthesis of the Living Present and the impossibility of its closure, Derrida recalls the logic of 
the ‘without’ I discussed earlier, a ‘synthesizing without synthesis’ inscribing a weakness within 
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the dialectical invulnerability of the Living Present as the condition of possibility of justice.28 
Derrida’s argument throughout The Problem of Genesis and really everything that follows will 
always show that whatever Husserl attempts to bracket and reduce as inauthentic or inadmissible 
within phenomenology, most notably the transcendences and geneses of temporality and alterity, 
not only constitute the very possibility of phenomenology but the impossibility of the purity of 
its analyses, their originary contamination.  
In “Form and Meaning,” Derrida suggests that the concept of form can serve as a guiding 
thread for thinking Husserlian phenomenology as this movement of purification. Nowhere is this 
more evident, he adds, than in the fact that “Husserl determines the living present (lebendige 
Gegenwart) as the ultimate, universal, absolute form of transcendental experience in general.” 
(MP 188/158) As Form itself, the Living Present will have determined all concepts of eidos and 
morphe to be thought in terms of presence in general.29 Its dialectic, I’ll show, structures not only 
a certain organic individualism, grounded in the domain of action and possibility, but 
corresponds to what Derrida critiques in Michel Henry’s ‘material phenomenology,’ the two 
being dialectical mirror images of one another in their emphases on pure ‘transcendental life,’ 
the pure life of the living, absolute immanence, the immanence of ‘feeling one-self alive,’ 
transcendental vitalism, the mutual immanence of the transcendental and the empirical, of the 
‘form’ and norm of life.30 This section, to proceed in two parts, will begin by elaborating the 
auto-affection at play in every organism, a certain (restricted) autopoiesis if you will, in its self-
transcendence in and as originary temporalization, transcendental intersubjectivity and the 
material hylè, dialectically relating openness and closure, identity and alterity, form and matter, 
passing through Spinoza, Hans Jonas, Merleau-Ponty and Evan Thompson’s phenomenologies of 
the organism. In §2.1.2, I will show how this dialectic comes to structure scientific and historical 
investigation and the problematics of communication and translation in sharing the world with its 
others. The teleological orientation of the dialectic of the Living Present, however, comes to 
structure a thought of science and history with important anthropocentric and Eurocentric 
overtones. The necessity of its deconstruction in an ethics of biocultural sustainability therefore 





§2.1.1: The Dialectical Form of the Living Present in Organic Life:  
Time, the Other, Hylè 
In the C-Manuscripts, Husserl writes of the future-oriented movement of protention as a purely 
auto-affective instinct and drive (Trieb) for self-preservation, of an “instinctual striving as a 
moment of affect... is originary affect not instinct?” (Hua M 8 326) Thompson’s account of 
biological autopoiesis is a great place to develop this since it ties together by name questions of 
phenomenology, self-transcendence, Form and the Living Present, drawing on Jonas.31 In The 
Phenomenon of Life, the latter notes that even the most primitive forms of life are endowed with 
what he calls an internal horizon of transcendence. At the heart of the most elementary forms of 
organic irritability and affectivity lies an experience of otherness, world and object: life is always 
precariously balanced between being and nonbeing, life and death, self and world, form and 
matter, freedom and necessity. All of these, he writes, “are forms of relation: life is essentially 
relationship, and relation as such implies ‘transcendence,’ a going-beyond-itself on the part of 
that which entertains the relations.”32  
As the basis of life, transcendence for Jonas is grounded on a certain emancipation, an 
indeed ‘dialectical’ freedom of form from the self-identity and fixity of matter. Similar to my 
discussion of Bataille, metabolism – the exchange of matter with its environment – constitutes 
the self-transcendence of the living being, which maintains the identity of its living form despite 
its constantly changing materiality, problematizing the very boundaries between interior and 
exterior. This fundamental ‘sovereignty’ of Form with respect to matter grounds both life’s 
spatial and temporal self-transcendence beyond its own immediacy, both outward towards its 
environment or world and forward towards the future.33 This dimension of futurity, or protention 
for Husserl, is more fundamental than the retention of past moments for organic life for Jonas; 
life’s concerns and appetitions are all futurally determined. This is what Jonas calls the immanent 
teleology of life. Life survives precisely by not being identical with its matter; if organic form 
were to become identical with its material content, it would cease to live.34 Jonas therefore finds 
what he calls the ‘survival standard’ inadequate in the evaluation of life; “if mere assurance of 
permanence were the part that mattered, life should never have started out in the first place. It is 
essentially precarious and corruptible being, an adventure in mortality.”35 Jonas’ ethics of nature 
intends to think together, as many environmental philosophers do, a conjunction of ethics and 
ontology, one sidestepping the naturalistic fallacy in thinking together an ‘ought’ with the nature 
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of being in general. But again, how this articulation gives itself to be thought is really a question 
of all the difference in the world. 
For Jonas, any epistemology, ontology or ethics must be thought on the basis of life. One 
can read a similar account in Thompson’s account of biological autopoiesis (or self-production) 
as self-transcendence, drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s dialectical concept of form as the co-
emergence of inside and outside in any organism, where every autonomous being “meets the 
environment on its own sensorimotor terms.” 36  Drawing from the latter’s The Structure of 
Behaviour, and closely paralleling Canguilhem, the organism actively structures how external 
stimuli are received by way of its internal norms. The dual process by which an organism is 
structurally closed with respect to its norms and open to its environment corresponds to Merleau-
Ponty’s concept of form for Thompson.37 Thompson’s account of autopoiesis also draws on 
Jonas’ notion of self-transcendence, even if it seems to ignore much of what the latter writes 
about death, citing Jonas’ description of “the effort and power of life to preserve itself, to stay in 
existence” in the Spinozist conatus as the immanent purposiveness and teleology of life. But 
what Spinoza did not realize, Jonas writes, is that “the conatus to persevere in being can only 
operate as a movement that goes constantly beyond the given state of things.”38   
What Jonas for his part did not realize, Thompson suggests, is that the self-transcendence 
of the Living Present in protention and retention and its dialectic of openness and closure are 
themselves natural conditions of the autopoietic structure of every organism. Thompson’s 
account of autopoiesis thus corresponds to what I’d call the restricted ecology of the Living 
Present; a life that transcends itself towards its exteriorities in time, the material world, alterity 
and even death, but only to survive these, strive, persevere and persist in existence. For 
Thompson, the Living Present itself can be understood as a pre-reflexive self awareness, a 
feeling of being alive, drawing from Maine de Biran’s ‘feeling of existence,’ as the form 
constituting life’s immanent purposiveness.39 He thus understands the living being in its concern 
to keep going, oriented towards the future, describing its consciousness precisely according to 
the Living Present: “Consciousness is a self-constituting flow inexorably directed toward the 
future and pulled by the affective valence of the world.”40 Again, it’s not my intention to suggest 
all these thinkers say the same thing, but to show a powerful dialectical code at work in each 
concerning form, organic life and purposiveness at the heart of the Living Present, one which 
Derrida gives us good ethico-political, even ecological reasons to interrogate. 41  Let’s now 
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examine this logic as it plays out in Derrida’s reading of Husserl with respect to the problem of 
genesis. 
 What Derrida calls the problem of genesis in Husserl is more precisely one of passive 
genesis: the structures by which transcendental subjectivity is passively constituted leading back 
to a space where the active mastery of the subject is held in check; the pre-egological, pre-
subjective transcendental field. For the young Derrida, Husserl will invariably attempt to bracket 
these movements in his descriptions; the transcendences of temporalization, alterity and the 
material hylè always appear post-genetically, that is to say as already constituted by a subject, 
since these problematize the very principle of all principles of phenomenology. In Husserl’s 
words, this principle is “that every primordial dator Intuition is a source of authority 
(Rechtsquelle) for knowledge, that whatever presents itself in ‘intuition’ in primordial form (as it 
were in its bodily reality), is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out to be, though only within 
the limits in which it presents itself.” (Hua 3 §24) As Derrida explains, time and the other 
radically complicate the principle of principles since they cannot be thought within the 
metaphysics of subjective presence.42 Husserl could have avoided these difficulties, however, in 
allowing a space for genesis as a dialectics between phenomenology and what Derrida then calls 
ontology or existence.43 If Husserl would continue to mix and treat together the passive genetic 
transcendences of originary temporalization, transcendental intersubjectivity and the hylè, (time, 
the other and matter) as late as the C-Manuscripts, it is because, Derrida writes, “at bottom, their 
meaning from the point of view of a transcendental idealism is the same: a simple explicitation of 
the transcendental ego as such, in its monadicity, cannot account for their existence and for the 
constitution of their sense.” (PG 239/148e) To posit ‘existence’ as temporalization or alterity at 
the heart of the transcendental ego would mark the impossibility of any pure and simple 
phenomenological origin, an originary contamination between the worldly and the 
transcendental, and thus would signal both the collapse of phenomenology and a necessary shift 
to Heideggerian ontology.44 In a sense, the problems Derrida poses to phenomenology are its 
own. It is because Husserl brackets the self-constituting and originary dialectic of the Living 
Present that the problems of temporalization and alterity cause its analyses to founder.  
 Husserl first gestures at the Living Present in a series of lectures published as 
Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, where the study of immanent time 
consciousness requires the bracketing of the ‘transcendences’ of objective time, objective space 
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and the material world.45 However, the intentional structure of consciousness as consciousness-
of requires an originary impression of time that is material or ‘hyletic,’ which is then unified 
with other impressions by means of protention and retention, allowing for the constitution of a 
temporal object. 46  What is the difference, Derrida asks, between the transcendence of an 
originary impression within immanent time consciousness and its transcendence within 
objective time? For Husserl, the retained moment is reell, belongs to transcendental 
consciousness, but is not real, is not an empirical object of the world.47 The hylè, for its part, is 
a real [réelle] but non-intentional component of lived experience. It is the sensate (lived 
and non-real [réale]) material of affect before any animation by intentional form. It is the 
pole of pure passivity, of the non-intentionality without which consciousness would never 
receive anything other to itself, nor exercise its intentional activity. This receptiveness is 
also an essential opening. (ED 243/205)  
 
Elsewhere, he adds, “the hylè is the sensible material of lived experience.” (PCM 79/114) It is 
not a thing in the world, not the reality of a natural, physiological or psychological sensation, 
but its appearing as pure sensible quality.48 Hyletic matter is neither the transcendent matter of 
the perceived thing nor the materiality of the subjective perceiving body. Once animated by an 
intentional morphe, the originary impression becomes a temporal, noematic object, protended 
and retained in time consciousness. But the noema, correlate of an intending noesis, does not 
belong to consciousness in a reell way. The distinction between the reality of the material 
impression and its phenomenological appearing is extremely subtle, and the source of much 
debate between phenomenologists.49 If Husserl settles for a constituted hylè-morphè correlation, 
however, and does not wish to engage discussions on “formless materials and immaterial 
forms,” it is because the pure passivity of the formless hylè would compromise phenomenology 
in its principle of principles. (Hua 3 §85)  
 Let me now examine what one might call a dual transcendence of the Living Present, on 
the one hand the necessity of its material impression, and on the other its unnameable movement 
of temporalization. As is well known, Husserl defines the structure of consciousness as 
intentional because all consciousness is consciousness of something, always intends towards 
something. 50  The structure of intentionality requires that immanent time consciousness 
constitute itself through the appearing of a material impression prior to its animation by the 
activity of a transcendental subject. With this, Derrida argues, Husserl announces the theme of 
passive genesis the latter would return to fifteen years later. If an impression must precede any 
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retention, the passive reception of the hyletic datum thus reintroduces a transcendent object 
within internal time consciousness.51 The originary passivity of the hylè is in fact a passivity 
before real, factical nature that can only be dialectically reconciled with phenomenological, 
noematic temporality, an originary synthesis of constituting and constituted, present and non-
present, originary and objective temporality.  
 On the one hand, then, the consciousness of internal time is constituted by this originary 
hyletic impression. On the other hand, Husserl writes that transcendental subjectivity is itself 
constituted by something else: a pre-immanent, pre-objective flux uniting the originary 
impression in the retention of a past-present and the protention of a future-present: the 
constituting flux of the Living Present as absolute subjectivity. As Husserl writes in the lectures, 
this flux is nothing objective, and can only be understood as flux by way of metaphor, we lack 
all names for its absolute properties.52 For Derrida, however, even the descriptions in the C-
manuscripts describing the originary synthesis between absolute subjectivity and the 
constituting flux of time will fail to adequately address the problem of genesis, since an 
originary dialectics between time and subjectivity would be irreducible to a monadic ego.53 
Temporal dialectics constitutes alterity a priori in the absolute identity of the subject with 
itself. The subject originarily appears to itself as a tension of Same and Other. The theme 
of a transcendental intersubjectivity instituting transcendence at the heart of the absolute 
immanence of the ‘ego’ has already been called for. The last foundation of the objectivity 
of intentional consciousness is not the intimacy of the ‘I’ to itself but [is] Time or the 
Other.” (PG 126/66t) 
 
The absolutely unique and universal form of the Living Present is thus nothing other than the 
maintaining of the dialectic of protention and retention, identity and alterity. “It is in the 
movement of a protention that the present retains and surpasses itself as past present, in order to 
constitute another originary and original Absolute, another Living Present... this extraordinary 
absolute alteration of what always remains in the concrete and lived form of an absolute 
Present.” (IOG 46/58t) This constitution of an other here and now within the unique and 
irreducible form of the Living Present, of another monad in my own, is the very root of 
intersubjectivity, and I think of ecological relationality. Beyond a simple analogical relation 
between intersubjectivity and temporalization, Derrida writes, the C-manuscripts define the 
originary hylè or urhylè both as temporal hyle and as Ichfremde Kern, the ‘kernel of the other-to-
I.’54 The hylè is not only first and foremost temporal matter, but “the possibility of genesis itself,” 
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a genesis that Husserl will always defer “and within which the themes of the other and of Time 
were to have permitted their irreducible complicity to appear.” (ED 244/205)  
Dialectics here being originary, the constituted constitutes the constituting and inversely; 
the absolute monad originarily welcomes ‘the other’; whether that ‘other’ be the 
antepredicative existence of the sensuous thing, or time or of an ‘alter ego,’ ...So the pure 
‘I’ must constitute itself temporally, in a dialectical genesis composing passivity and 
activity.” (PG 166/96t,e)   
 
The other, whether as time, the alter ego or matter are all revealed to dialectically be constituted 
by transcendental subjectivity, as they constitute it in turn, in the Form of the Living Present. 
These reflections will lead Derrida to conclude his introduction to Husserl’s Origin of Geometry 
with a thought of transcendental difference, “originary Difference of the absolute Origin.” (IOG 
171/153t) At the end of the most radical phenomenological reduction, Derrida writes, we find  
 absolute transcendental subjectivity as pure passive-active temporality, as pure auto-
temporalization of the Living Present – i.e. as we already saw, as intersubjectivity. 
Discursive and dialectical intersubjectivity of Time with itself in the infinite multiplicity 
and infinite implication of its absolute origins. (IOG 170/152t)  
 
But this dialectics would also, as I will show, require the inscription of the transcendental ego 
within a world, the transcendence of which remains to be interpreted.  
In fact, it is starting from the originary impression of time (and, on its foundation, of that 
of space) that, in the experience of the Living Present, there appears to me, the theoretical 
transcendental subject, the irreducible alterity of the moments of past and future time, 
retained and anticipated, from the surrounding [envionnant] world, from history, from 
‘egos.’  (PG 240/148) 
 
I wrote a moment ago that the hylè, as primarily temporal matter, operates as the possibility of 
genesis itself. In the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl presents time as “the universal form of all 
egological genesis.” (Hua 1 §37) In Experience and Judgment, he posits time as the universal 
form of sensibility, or affection. (EU §38) The hylè, as the sensible matter of temporal affection, 
as the ichfremde Kern, for Husserl, designates “the intrinsically first other (the first ‘non-Ego’) 
[as] the other Ego. And the other Ego makes constitutionally possible a new infinite domain of 
what is ‘other’: an Objective Nature and a whole Objective world, to which all other Egos and I 
myself belong.” (Hua 1 §49)  
 While static phenomenology had attempted the absolute bracketing of the objective world 
itself in what Husserl calls the Epokhè, genetic phenomenology inscribes the ego in time, with 
others and in the world. Neither the transcendental geneses of pre-predicative existence, the 
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Lebenswelt or lifeworld, primitive time nor those of transcendental intersubjectivity receive 
their sense from the action of an ego.55 The possibility of the constitution of the other ego as 
such within consciousness permits consciousness to transcend itself towards the world and 
objectivity in general; the world must give itself “in its foreignness, in its alterity and its 
transcendence to consciousness.” (PG 27/xxxviit) Transcendental intersubjectivity, however, is 
only possible on the basis of a “single and common world.” (PG 240/148t) The monadic ego is 
thus revealed as a secondary moment of a more originary, indeed for Derrida ontological 
constitution. For Husserl, the objective world is no longer transcendent to the sphere of 
intersubjectivity “but rather inheres in it as an ‘immanent’ transcendency.” (Hua 1 §49) This 
common world brings together all monadic egos in the universal form of sensibility that is time. 
“From the intersubjective point of view, if another describes their past experiences to me, what 
is recalled in them belongs to the objective world of our common present. All the moments 
which we remember are moments of one and the same world: ‘our earth.’” (PG 201/120t) Or, as 
Derrida puts it elsewhere, “the unity of the Earth is grounded in the unity and unicity of 
temporality, the ‘fundamental form,’ (Grundform) ‘form of all forms.’” (IOG 79n1/83n86e) 
 
§2.1.2: Teleology: Science, Translation, Earth and World in the Living Present 
Having now studied the dialectic of the Living Present as it structures life in its relation to time, 
matter, others and now a world, ‘nature,’ the earth, let me pursue these latter questions with 
respect to those of scientific objectivity, history, teleology and translation. Derrida summarizes 
the problem of genesis as follows: “why must we always start from what is natural, constituted, 
derived, etc. to discover pure originarity only in the end?” (PG 139/75t) Or, relatedly, “how do 
‘transcendences’ announce themselves in immanent lived experience?” (PG 143/78t) For 
Derrida, Husserl’s genetic responses to these questions take three forms: the genesis of the ego in 
the Cartesian Meditations, the genesis of logic and science in Experience and Judgement and 
Formal and Transcendental Logic and finally, the genesis of teleology and history in the Krisis 
writings.56  Of course, these are all interrelated; the common world, which functions as the 
possibility of intersubjectivity, also functions as the possibility of objectivity. Intersubjectivity 
and worldly objectivity concerning nature, space, time and causality also allow us to understand 
geometry, mathematics and physics in their exactness, as well as science and logic in general.57 
The crisis faced by the sciences for Husserl, however, is one of forgetting their origins in 
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subjective experience and the processes of their traditionalization, their becoming universally 
intelligible for everyone across history. The phenomenologist, as a functionary for humanity, is 
charged with the task of returning to these origins of science to explicate its infinite task and 
project. 58  This shift from a passive retention to an active reactivation, Derrida notes, 
foreshadowing the anthropocentrism I noted above, “is also that from inferior forms of nature 
and life to consciousness.” (IOG 82n1/86n89t) From a mechanical reaction to a human response, 
one could say. The problem of genesis thus rephrased: how do the subjective experiences of the 
first geometer, scientist, philosopher, translator, become universally intelligible and eternal 
truths? How does the singular, finite, empirical, de facto, material and transcendent datum 
become a universal, infinite, transcendental, de jure, ideal and immanent truth?  
 It is in the Form of the Living Present that Derrida will formulate Husserl’s responses to 
these questions with respect to the structure of ideal objects. Derrida explains that science, for 
Husserl, operates on two planes simultaneously. On the one hand, the truths of science are 
transmitted just as any other cultural truths in a movement analogous to the finite processes of 
protention and retention: their sedimentation in the communal world allows their transmission 
beyond their retention in finite, individual consciousnesses.59 The Living Present thus functions 
as the foundation of the historical present. On the other hand, the truths of science are infinite, 
ideal and supratemporal. Regarding these two planes, “no doubt, the latter would in fact be 
impossible without the former. But on the one hand, the culture of truth is the highest and most 
irreducible possibility of empirical culture; on the other hand, the culture of truth is itself only 
the possibility of a reduction of empirical culture.” (IOG 47-8/59) Later, Husserl distinguishes 
between real and ideal objects as follows: a real object exists in the objective time of the world, 
the transcendent time reduced in the Lectures, its truths bound to factical contingence. The ideal 
object, however, including the truths of geometry and mathematics, are intemporal or 
supratemporal; eternally and universally true. However, “‘supratemporality’ (Überzeitlichkeit) or 
‘intemporality’ (Zeitlosigkeit) are defined in their transcendence or their negativity only in 
relation to worldly and factical temporality.” (IOG 70n1/77n75t) The necessity of beginning 
with the natural, constituted and subjective experience of the discovery of mathematical truths is 
precisely so that it may be reduced, so that its truths may be freed from their factical 
contingency. After the reduction of worldly temporality, Derrida writes, supratemporality and 
 68 
intemporality “appear as omnitemporality (Allzeitlichkeit), the concrete mode of temporality in 
general.” (IOG 70n1/77n75) In other words, as the temporality of the Living Present:  
are not supratemporality and omnitemporality also the characteristics of Time itself? 
Those of the Living Present that is the absolute concrete Form of phenomenological 
temporality and the primordial Absolute of all transcendental life? The hidden temporal 
unity of the ‘dia-,’ ‘supra-,’ or ‘in-’ temporality on the one hand and of omni-temporality 
on the other is the unitary ground of all the agencies dissociated by the various 
reductions: facticity and essentiality, worldliness and non-worldliness, reality and 
ideality, empeiria and transcendentality.” (IOG 165/148-9t) 
 
All these oppositions are dialectically reconciled in the Living Present. As I noted above, the 
importance of deconstruction vis-à-vis all the epistemological-ontological-ethical problems of 
translation, biopolitics, science and technology studies and ecolinguistics can be demonstrated in 
how Derrida comes to think the dialectics of the Living Present within the more general stricture 
I’m calling general ecology. These questions of earth and world are ones Derrida will put to 
Heidegger in his final seminar, The Beast and the Sovereign, and of the utmost importance for 
the posthumanist ecological ethics I am developing here: how do humans and other living beings 
share a world, share the earth? How can they do so more justly? There is an important sense in 
which the discussions of history, science and translation in Husserl’s later work disclose a 
problematically humanist teleology. For Derrida, Husserl’s use of the Idea in the Kantian sense 
always implies the self-presence of teleology to consciousness; it perhaps embodies the 
phenomenological project itself.60 As he writes in Voice and Phenomenon, any time presence 
finds itself threatened, “Husserl will awaken it, will recall it, will make it return to itself in the 
form of the telos, that is, in the form of the Idea in the Kantian sense.” (VP 8/8) It is through 
reference to the Idea in the Kantian sense as the infinite totality of temporal experiences in Ideas 
I (I’ll call this Idea A), of the world as the infinite ground of possible experiences in Experience 
and Judgment (Idea B), and of an infinite teleology in Cartesian Meditations and the Krisis 
writings (Idea C) that I will show Derrida offer promising challenges to this humanism with 
reference to an originary finitude, indeed, to a death that can never be experienced as such but 





Idea A/Die Welt ist fort/The Infinite Totality of Temporal Lived Experiences of the Pure 
Ego 
Despite being, for Derrida, the most elaborated trace of Husserl’s static phenomenology, as well 
as its closest adherence to an absolute subjective idealism, certain structures in Ideas I already 
reveal the impossibility of phenomenology’s closure.62 I’ve shown how the role of the hylè in the 
originary bestowing intuition discloses a fundamental passivity anterior to the activity of the 
transcendental subject. Indeed, Derrida writes, the temporal hylè, as the originary existential 
kernel, is irreducible to Husserl’s epokhè. The epokhè is nothing less than the absolute nullifying 
of the world itself, the ‘suspension’ of “the whole world with all things, living creatures, men, 
ourselves included.” 63  (Hua 3 §50) This reduction intends to disclose a region of pure 
consciousness, absolutely immanent being, one that might well be modified in the annihilation of 
the world, for Husserl, but would not find its existence thereby affected. 64  The absolute 
transcendental ego in the epokhè is thus not only absolutely independent from the existence of 
the world, but also the earth for Derrida. 65  Absolute consciousness after the epokhè would 
oppose itself to the transcendent world as the indubitable, pure, originary and absolute to the 
doubtful, impure, constituted and relative. 66  How then, Derrida asks, can this absolute 
immanence, pure formalism and homogeneous unity of time therein be reconciled with the 
multiplicity of temporal experiences? Husserl here evokes the Idea in the Kantian sense as “the 
infinite opening of lived experience... the irruption of the infinite into consciousness, which 
permits the unification of the temporal flux of consciousness just as it unifies the object and the 
world by anticipation, and despite an irreducible incompleteness.” (ED 242/204) In other words, 
the Idea is an “infinite totality of temporal experiences.” (PG 39n1/187n12) For Derrida, 
Husserl’s bringing together the flux of an absolute present with the Idea in the Kantian sense 
constitutes a vain attempt to “safeguard the immanent and monadic purity of the temporal ego.” 
(PG 169/98) But of course, I have closely followed Derrida in showing that Husserl’s own 
analyses of time, the other and the hylè are shown to compromise the purity of the ego within. In 
the passage to genetic phenomenology, the world will no longer be bracketed. Instead, it will 





Idea B/Die Welt ist da/ The World as the Infinite Ground of Possible Experiences 
Derrida identifies an ambiguity in Husserl’s concept of world in Experience and Judgement. On 
the one hand, the world is “the universal ground of belief pregiven for every experience of 
individual objects,” the passively pre-given and pre-predicative substrate of any transcendental 
activity, the always already constituted ontological, actual and real substrate of all sense.67 (EU 
§7) On the other hand, the world is understood as the “horizon of all possible substrates of 
judgement.” (EU §9) It is a possibility opened up to infinity, founding the worldliness it 
nonetheless exceeds. Husserl’s concept of world thus opposes this infinite possibility of 
transcendental experiences to their actual, existing substrates. For Derrida, this ambiguity echoes 
that just examined in Ideas I, of the ego as both an originary ‘now’ and the infinite totality of 
possible lived experiences. Again, his point is that both the absolute realism of the pre-
predicative world and its infinite idealization encounter the same aporetics. Let me recall that 
Derrida identifies two meanings of genesis: origin and becoming, transcendence and immanence. 
The ambiguity between the world as real and the world as possible renders these mutually 
exclusive.68 Both movements prove contrary to the vocation of genetic phenomenology and must 
become mediated dialectically; both idealist and realist concepts of the world are thus revealed as 
already constituted. But, as with the hylè, “by making out of passivity the first moment of 
transcendental activity, a rigorous distinction between transcendental originarity and constituted 
worldliness is disallowed.” (PG 193/114-5) As I’ll show, this ambiguity will lend its rhythm to 
all my discussions in science and technology studies and translation studies. If the world is the 
real substrate of all scientific investigation and lived experience, then science and language 
adequately map the same world and translation is always in principle possible. By that same 
token, if the world is its ideal infinitization in the absolute idealism of the epokhè, then one might 
suggest all scientific investigation to be subjective and all language to be untranslatable. That the 
terms are reversed in Husserl’s work precisely illustrates my point; it is only, on Derrida’s 
reading of Husserl, in becoming ideal that an object frees itself from its factically contingent 
ground and becomes universally translatable.69  In both cases, in the dialectic of the Living 
Present, pure realism comes down to pure idealism and pure translatability comes down to pure 
untranslatability.  
 Derrida ties these questions explicitly to language in the Introduction. The condition of 
possibility of ideal objects from the basis of the sensible, finite, and pre-scientific materials of 
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the lifeworld are identified as “language, intersubjectivity, and the world as the unity of ground 
and horizon.” (IOG 3/26) As he explains, this return to pre-predicative experience in Experience 
and Judgement intends to disclose a pre-cultural and pre-historical dimension of experience. 
What assures the unity of sense in the traditionalization of ideal objects, he writes, is the world 
itself, “not as the finite totality of sentient beings, but as the infinite totality of possible 
experiences within a space in general.” (IOG 38/52t) The ideal object obtains its omnitemporal 
value, universal normativity and infinite intelligibility through the possibility of language. 
However, this must be understood as language in general, one might say in the Pure Form of 
language, “not in the facticity of a language and in its particular linguistic incarnations.” (IOG 
57/66t) Nonetheless, a certain worldliness, a materiality of language will always pose a danger to 
transcendental discourse. Indeed, “every critical enterprise, juridical or transcendental, is made 
vulnerable by the irreducible facticity and the natural naiveté of its language.”70 (IOG 61n1/69-
70n66) To return this to my question of temporality, universal language participates in the 
reduction of factical language in the universal intelligibility of ideal objects. Its supratemporality 
is then revealed as a mode of omnitemorality and infinite intelligibility in the dialectic of the 
Living Present. Freed from its attachment to factical contingency, Derrida writes, the possibility 
of tradition and translation is infinitely opened.71 Language and thus also transcendental human 
intersubjectivity are revealed as the conditions of objectivity.72  
The language and consciousness of co-humanity are solidary possibilities and already 
given in the moment where the possibility of science is established. The horizon of co-
humanity supposes the horizon of the world: it stands out and articulates its unity against 
the unity of the world. Of course, the world and co-humanity here designate the single, 
but infinitely open totality of possible experiences and not this world here, this co-
humanity here... The consciousness of being-in-community within one and the same 
world grounds the possibility of a universal language. (IOG 73-4/79t) 
 
Further, it is the question of time as the form of sensibility that structures intersubjectivity in the 
understanding of being before one and the same world. As Husserl writes, “the world is, in the 
most comprehensive sense, as the life-world for a human community capable of mutual 
understanding, our earth, which includes within itself all these different environing worlds with 
their modifications and their pasts.” (EU §38) As Derrida puts it, the unity of the Earth is 
grounded in the unicity of temporality, the fundamental form of all forms, as I showed above.73 It 
is the earth itself, as the absolutely exemplary element that provides the ground of a 
consciousness of “a pure and pre-cultural we,” a consciousness of belonging to “one and the 
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same humanity, inhabiting one and the same world.” (IOG 76/81t) However, he adds, “pre-
cultural pure Nature is always already buried. So, as the ultimate possibility for communication, 
it is a kind of inaccessible infra-ideal.”74 (IOG 77/81-2) An originary finitude would then mark 
the infinite traditionalization and translatability of ideal objectivity from within. Indeed, Derrida 
recalls here that we lack all names for the conjunction of absolute subjectivity and the flux 
constituting internal time consciousness and that Husserl also proclaims that proto- or pre-
temporality (Vorzeit) is not ‘sayable’ for the transcendental ego.75 The same debate repeats itself 
in a fascinating comparison of Joyce and Husserl on the question of univocity and equivocity. As 
Derrida puts it, “absolute univocity is inaccessible, but only as an Idea in the Kantian sense can 
be.” (IOG 107/104) As an infinite task, Husserl puts forth universal language as the very 
condition of historicity, as well as of all the equivocations proceeding from empirical culture and 
history.76 Univocity, in this sense, is an imperative, one the phenomenologist, as the functionary 
for humanity, must take on. 
 
Idea C/Ich muss dich tragen/ The Teleological-Historical Idea 
Certain ethico-political implications result from this. Derrida ties together what one might call 
Husserl’s fort/da of the Earth as follows:  
there is indeed a single world and this world is what appears to the transcendental ego 
precisely there where there is no longer any existing world. The world, worlds, the 
plurality of cultures, all of those are one only in their capacity to disappear, in fact, in 
reality, empirically, without the universal ego ceasing to be able to appear to itself. (FP 
24t) 
  
For Derrida, the cultural and empirical facticity of language would instil an originary finitude at 
the heart of the absolute univocity and universal transmissibility of ideal objects. However, if this 
finitude were shown to disclose the forgetting of the transcendental origins of science not as 
accidental, but as a moment in the dialectic of the Living Present itself, the project of 
phenomenology could thus be saved. It is again through recourse to an Idea in the Kantian sense 
that Husserl will attempt this move in evoking the teleology of history as an infinite task and 
responsibility. As Derrida explains, the concept of teleology has deep roots in Husserl’s 
philosophy, linking together the three Ideas I am examining here. 77  For Husserl, the 
sedimentation of the origins of techno-scientific objectivity corresponds to the dialectic of 
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protention and retention in the Living Present.78 The process of reactivating these sedimented 
origins overcomes this finitude,  
and lets it go beyond itself; this movement is analogous to the constitution, for example, 
of the unity of the world’s infinite horizon or (beyond the finite interconnection of 
retentions and protentions) to the constitution of the evidence for a total unity of the 
immanent flux as an Idea in the Kantian sense. But above all, this movement is analogous 
to the production of geometry’s exactitude: this passage to the infinite limit of a finite and 
qualitative sensible intuition. (IOG 109/106) 
 
For Husserl, the infinite teleological idea is one that would have irrupted upon Greek Europe 
with the advent of philosophy and geometry. And, Derrida recalls, “these ruptures... are always 
already indicated, Husserl recognizes, ‘in confusion and in the dark,’ that is, not only in the most 
elementary forms of life and of human history, but closer and closer in animality and nature in 
general.” (ED 248/208)  
the night that engulfs the ‘arche-premises’... not only hides the fact but also the 
instituting sense... the ‘critical’ forgetting of origins [is] the faithful shadow in truth’s 
advance rather than accidental aberration. This distinction between fact and sense (or the 
de facto and the de jure) would be effaced in the sense-investigation [prise de conscience] 
of an originary finitude. (IOG 108/105t) 
 
But again, this conjunction of facticity and normativity only occurs after the reduction of the 
passively given empirical, contingent, transcendent finitude that thus reveals its transcendental, 
universal, immanent and infinite task and goal. In this indissociability of fact and norm, history 
and the infinite, it is essential to note that normativity and the infinite are nothing outside the fact 
and history within which they appear.79  
Undoubtedly the Idea and the Reason hidden in history and in man as ‘animal rationale’ 
are eternal. Husserl often says this. But this eternity is only a historicity. It is the 
possibility of history itself. Its supratemporality – compared with empirical temporality – 
is only an omnitemporality. The Idea, like Reason, is nothing outside the history in which 
it exposes itself, i.e., in which (in one and the same movement) it unveils itself and lets 
itself be threatened. (IOG 156/141-2)  
 
The same can be said of the task or duty of phenomenology itself.80 As Derrida writes, the 
always-already of the ethico-teleological prescription of the infinite task “is grounded, then, in 
the movement of originary phenomenological temporalization, in which the Living Present of 
consciousness holds itself as the primordial Absolute only in an indefinite protention, animated 
and unified by the Idea (in the Kantian sense) of the total flux of lived experience.” (IOG 148-
9/136t) The ‘after’ in this structure in no way implies a dependence of the ethical on the factical: 
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the sedimentation of sense must be understood in the dialectic of the Living Present as the 
movement that allows the infinite Idea, always already there, to be born to itself.81 Responsibility 
in this case is one of a reactivation before the passive sedimentation of sense, one from passivity 
to activity, from inferior forms of life and nature to consciousness, from reaction to response.82 
The irruption of the infinite idea onto Europe marks a new stage in humanity, for Husserl, of 
which he identifies three. First, what Husserl calls ‘pre-theoretical culture,’ history in the most 
universal sense for Derrida, common to every society, which itself constitutes a new stage of 
animality in opposition to the beast.83 It is at this first level that the infinite task of reason 
slumbers in non-historicity, confusion and darkness. Without this stage, however, the irruption of 
the infinite task upon Europe could not arise as it does in the second level, the Greco-European 
moment of the theoretical or philosophical project. Phenomenological science stands as the third 
stage in this structure. The Crisis faced by the sciences “only finds full achievement in 
phenomenology – the achievement of a Telos that burst upon Europe with the advent of Greek 
geometry and gave its meaning to Europe’s spiritual figure. Europe is not a politico-geographical 
aggregate, but the unity of a responsibility for a task, a project.” (PCM 83/117) As the 
‘functionary for humanity,’ Derrida writes, the phenomenologist is charged with reawakening 
the unity of this task in order to “found and save the unity of mankind.” (PCM 84/118) The 
historical present, founded on the Living Present, thus functions as the condition of possibility of 
the production of infinitely transmissible and translatable truths: the possibility for every culture 
to open itself to the infinite.84 In the historical present,  
irreducible form of every historical experience... I can always come to terms in this 
Present with the most distant, the most different ‘other.’ However foreign to each other 
two men may be, they are always understandable – at the limit – in the commonality of 
their Living Present in which the historic Present is rooted. (IOG 114-5/110)  
 
No matter the material, traditional, social, linguistic or any other factical contingency,  
this in no way affects the commonality of their form. This universal form, which is the 
most originary and concrete lived experience, is supposed by all being-together. This 
form also seems to be the final retrenchment, therefore the most responsible security, of 
every phenomenological reduction. In the ultimate juridical instant [instance] is 
announced the most radical unity of the world. (IOG 115/110-1) 
 
Both The Problem of Genesis and the Introduction conclude with the necessity of an 
articulation between phenomenology and the insights of Heideggerean ontology. In the latter 
text, Derrida defines the auto-affection of the Living Present as the transcendental, indeed 
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ontological difference at its heart, between activity and passivity, the de facto and the de jure, the 
same and the other, the transcendental and the empirical, etc. For both Heidegger and Husserl, he 
writes, appearing and dissimulation are originary and complicit possibilities.85 The metaphysical 
forgetting of the ontological difference is not a fault, but an epoch in the history of Being. 
Similarly, the crisis of forgetting origins indeed founds the possibility of phenomenology’s role 
in the final stage of the history of Reason’s unconcealment. The question of genesis, Derrida 
writes, “is to ask the question about the unity of the world from which transcendental freedom 
releases itself, in order to make the origin of this unity appear.” (ED 251/210) 
It is the question of the possibility of the question, opening itself, the gap on whose basis 
the transcendental I, which Husserl was tempted to call ‘eternal’ (which in his thought, in 
any event, means neither infinite nor ahistorical, quite the contrary) is called upon to ask 
itself about everything, and particularly about the possibility of the unformed and naked 
factuality of non-sense, in the case, for example, of its own death. (ED 251/210-1) 
 
The question, perhaps the question of Being, founds the possibility of the concept of world while 
exposing it to non-sense and death. It is not my intention here to present Derrida’s readings of 
Husserl as outlining an exclusively anthropocentric, ethno- and Eurocentric, idealist philosophy, 
one committed to the erasure of all differences between humans, between their cultures and 
languages, and in the same blow carving out uncrossable lines between the human and other 
living beings, a philosophy centered on the activity of the individual, monadic and non-relational 
subject, in short everything one would imagine environmental ethics and general ecology to 
problematize. In fact, as I will argue in chapter 3, many of these criticisms are those that 
Heidegger levels against Husserl. General ecology does not oppose the logic of the Living 
Present, since this move would itself be dialectical; it articulates its logic within a more general 
stricture. Despite an important shift in emphasis in Derrida’s later readings of Husserl, the 
questions of temporalization, alterity, the hylè and even of the Idea itself all maintain their 
importance, as they contest phenomenology in its principle of principles and can never be given 
as such in an intuition. While it is in Derrida’s reading of Heidegger that I will tie together the as 
such, the question of Being, the ontological difference and the question of sharing a world with 
other living beings more directly, two points may be held in anticipation. 1) While Heidegger’s 
restriction of the ‘as such’ to the human Dasein cleaves an abyss between the world it inhabits 
and that of other living beings, the same is in fact true in Husserl. Both Husserl and Heidegger 
think the world on “a horizon of precomprehension, a presumption of unity, a presupposition of 
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coherence, belonging, the logos or the legein of a gathering, a horizon from which or on the 
grounds of which everything that arrives arrives as such.” (FP 26t) The consciousness of a pure 
and pre-cultural ‘we’ assuring universal translatability rests on the consciousness of being before 
the same object ‘as such.’ As Derrida elaborates, “it is the ‘as such’ of the object’s substantial 
and objective unity which is decisive here. In particular it distinguishes human intersubjectivity 
from that which is created between animals, men and animals, children, etc.” (IOG 76n1/81n84) 
It is precisely along this question of sharing a world with animals that Derrida famously evokes 
Celan’s line “die Welt ist fort ich muss dich tragen” [the world is gone away, I must carry you] in 
relation to Heidegger. Derrida writes that while on the one hand, humans and animals share a 
world and on the other do not, not a single living being shares the same world as another. In fact, 
Derrida also evokes this line of Celan’s in relation to the Epokhè. “In this absolute solitude of the 
pure ego, when the world has retreated, when ‘die Welt ist fort,’ the alter ego that is constituted 
in the ego is no longer accessible in an originary and purely phenomenological intuition.” (SQ 
161) In the absence of a common world, ethics and responsibility come down “to carry oneself 
or bear oneself toward [se porter vers] the infinite inappropriability of the other, toward the 
encounter with its absolute transcendence, in the very inside of me, that is to say, in me outside 
of me” (SQ 161); to comport oneself “as if we were behaving as if we were inhabiting the same 
world and speaking of the same thing and speaking the same language, when in fact we well 
know – at the point the phantasm precisely comes up against its limit – that this is not true at all.” 
(BS2 369/268) The ethics of Celan’s poem, Derrida writes, 
signals toward an alterity that, in the inside of the ‘I’ as the punctual living present, as the 
very point of the self-present living present, an alterity of the wholly other, comes not to 
include and modalize another living present (as in the Husserlian analysis of 
temporalization, where, in the protention and retention of another living present in the 
now living present, the ego comprises in itself, in its present, another present), [this is 
what I’m calling restricted ecology] but – and this is a wholly other matter – lets appear 
something of the present of the other, this ‘letting the most proper of the time of the 
other.’86 (SQ 131e)  
 
But to act ‘as if’ we shared the same world is itself a regulative idea of reason.87 Derrida goes as 
far as to conjugate the Idea of the ‘als ob’ with the Heideggerian ‘als struktur’ – the structure 
through which only the human Dasein has access to the world as such – into an Alsobstruktur. 
Both the world as a regulative Idea of reason and that to which Dasein, as world-forming, has 
access as such, are the exclusive property of the human. Instead, Derrida wishes to think this 
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‘regulative’ carrying in the context of a Nietzschean perspectivism, indeed as a machinic ruse of 
life death; “an agreement, then, an always labile, arbitrary, conventional and artificial, historical, 
non-natural contract, to ensure for oneself the best, and therefore also the longest survival by a 
system of life insurances.” 88 (BS2 368/267) A wholly other matter, a matter of the wholly other; 
this letting and carrying assuring survival, to say it quickly, is impossible in the restricted 
ecology of phenomenology, and indeed ontology, I’ll show in chapter 3. This is why Derrida 
explains Bataille’s transgression of sense as the contrary of a phenomenological epokhè, whose 
reduction operates in a concern for sense.89 Bataille proposes an epokhè of the epoch of sense; 
“sovereign transgression is a reduction of this reduction: not a reduction to meaning, but a 
reduction of meaning,” an untranslatability exceeding the dialectics of Husserlian 
phenomenology as it does that of the phenomenology of spirit. (ED 393-4/339) General ecology 
will allow us to think the impossibility of this letting otherwise, perhaps, even experience it, but 
in a strange experience without experience, an experience without Erlebnis, the ‘unexperienced’ 
experience of the impossible I spoke of in Bataille and Blanchot’s pas de sens. 2) My second 
point relates this question of the ‘as such’ to that of death. Again, Heidegger will write that only 
humans have access to death as such. But death for Derrida can never give itself as such in the 
phenomenological principle of principles, in the Form of the Living Present.  
The theme of death, but of a death that never appears as such, perhaps precisely marks the 
limit of the phenomenological project. One must say... that Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology is a philosophy of life, of the living present, I wouldn’t say a vitalism. 
Nonetheless, Husserl constantly connects the notion of life to the experience of a 
consciousness : the ego is a living ego, and in a certain way death has no place within 
phenomenology as such. (SP 81t) 
 
§2.2: Tra(nscenden)ce: Death, Ethics and Violence in the Living Present 
One can read Derrida’s “Violence and Metaphysics” as opening an ethical reinterpretation of the 
Living Present through the logic of what Derrida and Levinas call the trace. Over three decades 
later, Derrida would reflect on Levinas’s ethics as the interruption of phenomenology, its 
beyond-within, its transcendence in immanence.90 Recalling that the Living Present designates 
an articulation between a philosophy of life and a metaphysics of presence, it can be understood 
as the Greek philosophical concept par excellence for Derrida. Through Levinas, however, 
Derrida pursues an-other origin of the philosophical question, one which would not simply 
oppose itself to or contradict the latter, within which “‘neither no nor yes is the first word’ but an 
 78 
interrogation... the only possible ethical imperative, the only incarnated nonviolence in that it is 
respect for the other.”91 (ED 142/119) Husserlian teleology had identified the phenomenologist 
as a functionary for humanity, taking on the task of a logos that had irrupted upon the human and 
laid dormant in animality and more elementary forms of life. Levinas, for Derrida, points to 
another anterior, absolute, indeed pre-historical origin of this philosophical task, otherwise than 
Greek and, for my purposes, otherwise-than-human. Levinas refers us to an ethical origin of the 
question outside what he calls the Greek dominance of the totality of the same, an ethics as “a 
nonviolent relationship to the infinite as infinitely other, to the Other as the only one capable of 
opening the space of transcendence.” (ED 123/102) This ethical transcendence is posed as 
impossible, as the impossible within the Living Present, and thus the mark of an unassumable 
responsibility, one within which I am powerless before the philosophical invulnerability of the 
Living Present.92 What Derrida and Levinas will develop in the trace, however, will allow one to 
think this powerlessness and impossibility otherwise. But the thrust of Derrida’s argument in this 
essay is that Levinas will always be obligated to speak of this impossible ethical transcendence 
from the Living Present through the language of totality. In other words, the ethical experience 
of the impossible must necessarily maintain itself through some relation to possibility, even some 
relation to transcendental phenomenological violence. It is in this sense that one can interpret 
Derrida’s thought of the trace and an ethical relation to alterity as ‘a certain absence’ within the 
Living Present, beyond the opposition of presence and absence.93 This absence and its ethical 
import, however, would not come to mark the Living Present as its pure exteriority, but work at 
it from within as its ineradicable relation to death and its sur-vivance.  
In a sense, “Violence and Metaphysics” can be read as an attempt by Derrida to articulate 
the quasi-dialectical complications of the Living Present in The Problem of Genesis and the 
Introduction with the Levinasian thought of the trace, as one between, as he puts it almost forty 
years later,  
on the one hand, my other living present (retained or anticipated by an indispensible 
movement of retention and protention), [this is what I’m calling restricted ecology] and, 
on the other hand, wholly other, the present of the other the temporality of which cannot 
be reduced, included, assimilated, introjected, appropriated into mine, cannot even 
resemble it or be similar to it.94 (BS1 364/271-2) 
 
Levinas’s own philosophical project begins with an analysis of Husserl, and I showed for 
Derrida a critique of the absolute privilege of the Living Present.95 Levinas will have always 
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sought to oppose the ethical spirit he sees in Husserl’s descriptions of intentionality, 
temporalization and passive genesis to its letter in the Husserlian corpus. All of these 
movements, for Levinas, lead before and beyond the subject-object and noetico-noematic 
correlations to the dimension of the ethical relation to the other. I noted earlier how the relations 
to time and the other would refer phenomenology to a pre-subjective transcendental field for 
Derrida. Levinas similarly describes a “preobjective sphere of an intentional experience 
absolutely departing from itself towards the other.” (ED 128/399n14) In other words, both 
Derrida and Levinas refer to a space of ethical relationality that transcends the subject-object 
correlation, the immanence of the transcendental and the empirical.96 In Derrida, I interpreted the 
space of this ethical relationality as ecological, where it was impossible to determine in advance 
whether the other interpellating me was human, animal, fungal, vegetal, bacterial, viral, living or 
dead, God or a nonliving material thing. Such is, for Derrida, the condition of ethics: “the 
unrecognizable... is the beginning of ethics, and not of the human. So long as there is 
recognizability and fellow, ethics is dormant. So long as it remains human, among men, ethics 
remains dogmatic, narcissistic, and not yet thinking.”97 (BS1 155/108)  
And here a point of differentiation from Levinas arises: for Derrida and Husserl, the 
transcendence of the real, finite, material, natural things of the external world are those of an 
irreducible alterity for my consciousness, while Levinas cannot abide a thought of the infinite 
other as a thing (or as an animal, let alone a plant). As Derrida explains, Husserl in fact develops 
a system of two alterities inscribed one within the other, that of the thing, and that of alterity in 
general.98 Husserl argues that analogical appresentation – the structure by which I recognize the 
other as another source of ‘I can’s’ distinct from myself by way of analogy – belongs to all 
perception, but the alterity of the transcendent thing is only due to the “indefinite inachievements 
of my originary perceptions,” while the other testifies to “a more profound dimension of 
nonoriginarity – the radical impossibility of going around to see things from the other side.” (ED 
183/155) For Derrida, the transcendence of the other can only be thought on the basis of the 
transcendence of the thing. One must think together the system, indeed stricture of these two 
alterities, these two transcendences from the Living Present, on the one hand below in the finite 
totality of thing, and on the other, beyond in an infinite alterity. This entanglement is required in 
order to think the double indefiniteness and unknowability of the infinitely other, the 
transcendence of the non-proper as the “transcendence of Infinity, not of Totality.” 99  (ED 
 80 
183/155) This double stricture of transcendence, detailing an originary finitude as the condition 
of possibility of the infinite, can be read as heralding Derrida’s later reflection on Levinas in 
Adieu and The Gift of Death: ‘tout autre est tout autre,’ every other (one) is every (bit) other, and 
the fact that I can never know in advance to what transcendence I am responding in no way 
diminishes ethical responsibility, but stands as its very condition of possibility, its violent 
opening.  
Each of us, every one else, each other is infinitely other in its absolute singularity, 
inaccessible, solitary, transcendent, nonmanifest, originarily nonpresent to my ego (as 
Husserl would say of the alter ego that can never be originarily presented to my 
conscience and that I can apprehend only through what he calls appresentation and 
analogy), then what can be said about Abraham’s relation to God can be said about my 
relation without relation to every other (one) as every (bit) other [tout autre comme tout 
autre] in particular my relation to my neighbour or my loved ones who are as inaccessible 
to me, as secret, and as transcendent as Yahweh. Every other (in the sense of each other) 
is wholly other (absolutely other). (DM 109-10/78) 
 
This structure of every other (one) as every (bit) other would thoroughly overwhelm the 
phenomenological principle of principles in the Living Present. As Derrida puts it in The Politics 
of Friendship, its logic “comes here to upset the order of phenomenology. And good sense. That 
which comes before autonomy must exceed it – that is, succeed it, survive and indefinitely 
overwhelm it.” (PA 259/232) Levinas understands phenomenology as a philosophy of violence, 
and the key disagreement between him and Husserl lies in the latter’s account of the 
transcendental constitution of the alter ego. Because of the necessity of passing through the 
transcendence of a finite material alterity to encounter the infinite alterity of the other, Husserl 
cannot respect the other as such. The structure of analogical appresentation can only do violence 
to the trace of the invisible transcendence of the other, and reduces the infinite alterity of the 
other to the same. Further, phenomenology’s inability to think the other also entails its inability 
to think time and history: the absolute alterity of instants comes into time through the other and 
cannot be subjectively constituted. 100  Levinas describes here an anteriority of alterity over 
temporality, one Derrida would complicate in his own evaluations of the trace and différance.101 
It is precisely this co-implication of time and alterity for every living being that for Derrida 
contests the absolute privilege given to the self-evidence of the Living Present. What I’m trying 
to describe as the double auto-transcendence of the Living Present, both as its finite materiality 
and its infinite alterity constitutes precisely the system or stricture of this im-possible ethical 
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relationality. History, Derrida writes, is impossible within both finite totality and positive 
infinity, in the same sense as I showed him refer to the infinite finitude of différance in chapter 1. 
General ecology might be another name for this stricture between the restricted ecology of finite 
totality and absolute, impossible positive infinity. In maintaining itself within the difference 
between totality and infinity, ecology may be “precisely what Levinas calls transcendence... 
neither finite nor infinite.” (ED 180/153) 
As Derrida writes, it is impossible to immediately encounter the alter ego in the sense 
Levinas demands, just as we are powerless to exit the invulnerable Living Present. If pure 
alterity did not present itself through some differing and deferring relation to the same, however, 
its absolute otherness would come down to absolute sameness. He goes on to point out that 
Husserl is at pains to show how the other does in fact present itself as such to me in its 
irreducible alterity as an originary non-presence, but this ‘as such’ to me is the only possible as 
such. He thus aims to demonstrate the intentional relation to the other as irreducibly mediate.102 
The other can never be given to me originarily, only through analogical apposition, and the 
double transcendence of this finite/infinite system permits the only possible encounter or 
experience of this impossibility. This non-dialectical mediation maintains the necessity of an 
ethical separation, indeed a necessary violence which would guard the infinity of the other from 
presenting itself absolutely and immediately, where its infinity would come down to pure death. 
It thus guards against the world of immortality, against the pure and worst violence of the 
absolute life and pure self-presence of the Living Present by inscribing it originarily with 
death.103  
The arche-factuality of the Living Present, Derrida writes, constitutes the irreducible and 
absolutely universal form of egological life. To live an experience otherwise than in the present, 
I mentioned, is an absolute and eternal impossibility, unthinkability and unsayability. And yet, 
“Violence and Metaphysics” opens with the claim that the impossible has already occurred; what 
Derrida is beginning to formulate as the trace-structure of the Living Present will suggest that its 
general ecological stricture, in its transcendence in temporalization and alterity, maintains itself 
through a certain relation to and experience of an impossible past which has never been present. 
Since time designates the necessity that the other appear as other to the same, time is violence for 
Derrida. But this violence is in fact the very condition of the least possible violence: as the 
absolute opening to time and the other within itself, “the present, the presence of the present, and 
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the present of presence are originarily and forever violent. The Living Present is originarily 
marked by death.” (ED 195/166t) And, as I’ve shown, this death, violence and finitude within 
the Living Present are themselves the very condition of possibility of ethics, or at least the only 
possible ethics. The only possible ethics: an economy of violence.  
In elaborating the ethics of general ecology, it is essential to recall Derrida’s gradual 
abandonment of what he will later call the restricted economy of dialectics, or its articulation 
within an-other economy, an ‘economy in a new sense,’ or even a ‘trans-economy.’104 The 
following will thus necessitate an interrogation of Levinas’s non-negative, that is, non-dialectical 
transcendence. As Derrida explains, Levinas understands ethical transcendence in contrast to 
Hegel and the movement of negation. For the latter, just as Husserlian consciousness cannot give 
itself time and the absolute alterity of instants without the irruption of the wholly other, and the 
ego cannot engender within itself the encounter of the other, the negative cannot think the 
relation to and separation from the other within transcendence. The ethical encounter for Levinas 
is a relation that announces itself as a rupture within economy, a separation towards the other 
without any hope of possibly returning to the same. The encounter of the other as unforeseeable, 
Derrida adds, is “the only possible opening of time, the only pure future, the only pure 
expenditure beyond history as economy.” (ED 142/118e) Levinas’s understanding of the trace is 
precisely a ‘transcendence beyond negativity,’ a beyond of economy, history and dialectics, but 
also a beyond and a future which is “not another time, a day after history, a tomorrow of history. 
It is everywhere at the heart of experience. Present not as a total presence but as a trace.” (ED 
142/118-9) This non-negative transcendence of the trace would thus constitute the immediate 
and non-violent respect of the other. In a sense, Derrida’s adoption of the Levinasian trace as a 
past that has never been present, as the alterity of the other, can be understood as detailing the 
necessity of the inscription of the trace within the Living Present, and perhaps even in the finite 
materiality of the earth, as its condition of possibility, the impossible inscription of the relation 
that goes beyond the world within immanence.105 This inscription returns us to the question of 
language and writing broached in the Introduction: the violence of this inscription opens the 
relation to the infinitely other as death and as dead within the Living Present, “thus practicing 
writing as différance and as an economy of death.”106 (ED 151/127) 
The necessary violence of “language, son of earth and sun, writing,” of originary finitude 
and death will be shown to constitute the very condition of possibility of ethics within general 
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ecology. (ED 166/140) In his pursuit of another origin of the question, where the only ethical 
imperative as non-violence would be an interrogation anterior to the yes and the no, Levinas is 
nonetheless obligated to speak of this ethical tra(nscenden)ce in the language of the negative, of 
finitude, of totality and of death.107 “One must state the excess of infinity over totality in the 
language of totality, one must say the Other in the language of the Same.” (ED 165/140t) One 
must say the relations transcending the opposition of inside and outside – “the relation to the 
other, the relation of Instants to one another, the relation to Death” (ED 165/139t,e) – within 
this very opposition, within the Living Present; once again the logics of the beyond-within and of 
the pas au-delà I discussed in chapter 1. The infinite alterity of the other is made possible by its 
mortality and finitude, as well as my own, within “the irreducibly common horizon of Death and 
the Other. Horizon of finitude of the finitude of the horizon.” (ED 170/144) This finitude of the 
horizon will force an entire rethinking of the Kantian teleology that dominates the restricted 
ecology of the Living Present. One must, in the language of life and the Living Present, say its 
excess as the transcendence of the sur- in survivance. This enables the articulation of the relation 
to the infinitely other as death, as the corporeal finitude of the face, and to the infinitely other as 
God, the logic by which Derrida would write “tout autre est tout autre,” decades later. The pure 
infinite living presence of God thus really means death, unless the alterity of death, which in 
advance forbids one from knowing the singularity to which one is always already responding, 
human, animal, vegetal, fungal, bacterial, viral or inorganic, technological or machinic, linguistic 
or cultural, appears, is named and inscribed “in the difference between... Life and death. Within 
difference, and at bottom as Difference itself.” 108  (ED 170/144) Since nothing escapes this 
inscription in the différance between life and death, in the originarity of survivance and life 
death, the alterity therein can be anything whatsoever. 
There is a sense in which ecological ethics can be thought to practice “the lesser violence 
in an economy of violence,” within and through the ecology of the Living Present, within and 
from the Greek origin of the question, the metaphysics of presence and the philosophy of life. 
(ED 136n1/400n21) Violence against violence in an economy of violence, one that takes finitude 
and history seriously in its vigilance against the worst possible violence. “We do not say 
absolutely peaceful. We say economical. There is a transcendental violence, a (general) 
dissymmetry whose archia is the same and which eventually permits the inverse dissymmetry, 
the ethical nonviolence of which Levinas speaks.” (ED 188/160) This transcendental violence 
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installs the ethical relation precisely through finitude and mortality. The economy of 
transcendental violence is thus another name for différance, on the one hand the restricted 
ecology of violence against violence, and through this, the non-violent opening of the relation to 
the other. However, if Levinasian transcendence remains exclusively and properly conferred 
upon the human, it is insufficient for my purposes here.109 In opening the restricted ecology of 
the Living Present to its absolute other, however, to the impossible beyond of economy, the 
question, history and philosophy, Levinas’s thought allows us to think together an economy, 
indeed a necessary ecology of violence, and that which at the same time exceeds all economy, or 
any propriative thought of oikos. In the same sense, it points beyond violence, force, power and 
sovereignty, disclosing environmental ethics and biocultural sustainability in their concern for 
letting the other live-on. Derrida’s reading of Levinas clarifies the ethical stakes of the relations 
to time, alterity, death and materiality transcending the Living Present precisely as the 
impossibility of knowing to what, in the quasi-infinitely complicated originary ecological 
relationality of the pre-subjective transcendental field, one has always already begun to respond, 
has addressed and done violence to in this address, as the necessity of a critical vigilance in 
maintaining the infinite alterity of the finite “every other (one) as every (bit) other... whatever it 
may be, X, the animal, God or man.” (FP 6t) Articulating the restricted ecology of the Living 
Present within a general stricture, exposing it originarily as its auto-affection and self-relation to 
its ecological, ethical tra(nscenden)ce. 
 
§2.3: The Arche-Writing of Ecological Relationality 
I began this chapter by bringing together three later remarks of Derrida’s on the Living Present 
and their relevance for the ethics of ecological relationality I am attempting to develop here. The 
first, from The Animal..., where he admits that at the heart of his reflections on life before and 
beyond what calls itself the human are the problematizations of the Living Present with which 
his work began. The second, from Spectres of Marx, where he writes that no ethics is possible 
without the disjunction and non-self-contemporaneity of the Living Present, and the third, from 
“Eating Well,” that the passive geneses of temporalization and intersubjectivity constitute an 
effraction of the Living Present and lead back to a ‘pre-egological or pre-subjectivist zone,’ one 
where the subject appears as relationally (I said ecologically) constituted, but can never in 
advance know the nature of this relationality, pluralizing and complicating the distinctions 
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between “the nonliving, the vegetal, the animal, man, or God.” (PDS 284/269) This impossibility 
of knowing in advance the addressee/s to which one has always already begun to live with, 
respond to and be responsible for was shown to constitute the difficult structure of an originary 
violence as the non-ethical opening of ethics. This last section will attempt to flesh out the 
ecological structure of this pre-subjective transcendental field. I’ll begin in §2.3.1 by showing 
how the transcendences of time, alterity and death structure subjectivity, life and organic auto-
affection in their relation to what Derrida calls arche-writing. In §2.3.2, I’ll detail the ecological 
imperative general ecology gives to be thought in differentially sharing the world with its others, 
in a living-on beyond the Living Present.  
 
§2.3.1: The Living-Dead Present 
As I have shown, the Living Present conjoins pure life and absolute subjectivity, functions as the 
universal and absolute form of all transcendental experience, source and guarantor of the full 
presence of the givenness of intuition to consciousness, presence of sense to intuition and the 
infinite possibility of the repetition of this sense in ideality. It is for Derrida what structures 
consciousness and indeed subjective existence in general as the self-presence of transcendental 
life. 110  Despite Husserl’s analyses of passive genesis, intentional consciousness remains 
synonymous with volitional consciousness, and phenomenology thus remains within the tradition 
of voluntaristic metaphysics; metaphysics itself, for Derrida, of which the Living Present is the 
founding concept.111 Denoting both the pure livingness of presence and the pure self-presence of 
life, phenomenology for Derrida would ultimately come down to “a philosophy of life.” (VP 9/9) 
Even when phenomenology brackets empirical life, one is still lead back to “a transcendental life 
or in the last instance the transcendentality of a living present.” (VP 9/9) In the metaphysics of 
living presence and presencing life, the absolute temporal and spatial self-proximity of the life of 
the present and the presence of life maintains this pure self-presence precisely by putting out of 
play the exteriorities or transcendences of time, alterity, materiality and death. However, Derrida 
again reminds us that phenomenology finds itself contested from within in its descriptions of 
temporalization and intersubjectivity, leading back to a constituting and irreducible non-
presence, non-life and non-originarity at the heart of the Living Present.112 Against the mutual 
immanence of empirical and transcendental life, and with it the notion of death as a mere 
empirical accident befalling life, Derrida attempts to formulate an “ultra-transcendental concept 
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of life,” which “welds the transcendental to its other.” (VP 14/13, 14/12) In other words, binds it 
to what transcends the transcendental field of the Living Present of consciousness, its outside, its 
other in a stricture designating an originary ecological relationality where every other (one) is 
every (bit) other.113  
 However, to treat separately the relations of transcending the living present and the self-
presence of the transcendental subject (temporalization, alterity and intersubjectivity, materiality, 
space, the outside and death) poses some important difficulties, given that in the end, these all 
really come down to the same for transcendental idealism. 114  Indeed, every description of 
temporalization in Husserl that would not contest the Living Present would confirm the 
belonging of phenomenology to metaphysics.115 In Derrida’s formulations of différance and the 
trace, however, the movements of temporalization and intersubjectivity appear at first to have a 
certain privilege.116 What Derrida calls their irreducible complicity comes to designate precisely 
the differantial or trace-structure of the Living Present, its non-presence to itself.117 As covered 
in Derrida’s analysis of Husserl’s Lectures..., the presence of the Living Present maintains itself 
continuously through the retention and memory of a past now and the protention or anticipation 
of a future now. In other words, Derrida writes, the flux of the Living Present constitutes itself in 
relation with a non-present, a not-now and indeed an alterity within its self-identity as the very 
condition of its presence. This is, one might say, the restricted pole of the stricture of two 
transcendences, different from the alterity of the past that has never been present and of the 
future-to-come. In this sense, and very similarly to Derrida’s dialectical explanation in 1954, 
time must be thought “beginning from the différance in auto-affection, beginning from the 
identity of identity and non-identity in the same.” (VP 77/59) Indeed, he adds, “this ‘dialectic’ – 
in all the senses of this word and prior to every speculative resumption of this concept” opens 
every living to différance and constitutes “in the pure immanence of lived experience,” the very 
transcendences Husserl attempts to bracket in the phenomenological reduction. (VP 77/59) 
Différance in this sense is not something that supervenes upon the self-relation of a 
transcendental subject, but rather produces the subject in its difference with itself.118 As with 
Derrida’s discussion of Levinas, the same does not come down to the identical, but rather 
constitutes the only possible experience of alterity as its own condition of impossibility. But this 
apparently still dialectical complication of the Living Present is more clearly abandoned once 
and for all in Of Grammatology, or rather rearticulated within a more general stricture. The 
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necessity that temporal experience minimally retain the other as other within the same is again 
presented as the condition of all phenomenality, but its retention as trace is expressed as a 
“temporalization of a lived experience [vécu] which is neither in the world nor in ‘another 
world,’” in other words, in relation to a past which has never been present.119 (DG 95/65) As he 
notes, the past and future have always and only ever been thought as modifications of the 
present; past-present and future-present. To deconstruct the Living Present for Derrida does not 
come down to “a ‘dialectic’ of protention and retention that one would install at the heart of the 
present.” (DG 97/67) It is not a question of merely showing that present-past and present-future 
constitute and divide the Living Present. As he claims, Husserl had already done this himself. To 
affirm an equal and therefore dialectical importance to protention in relation to retention, 
however, would risk effacing the radical passivity of time. 120  The Living Present can only 
maintain itself in relation to an absolute past, one that “no longer rigorously merits the name 
‘past,’” a radical passivity that is paradoxically also a relation to the future. (DG 97/66) Derrida 
again credits Levinas with this notion.121 In “Différance,” he will reject the concept of retention 
altogether in describing the trace-structure of the Living Present. As this relation to an 
immemorial past, to an alterity that cannot be reproduced within the self-presence of 
consciousness,  
with the alterity of the ‘unconscious,’ we are dealing not with horizons of – past or future 
– modified presents, but with a ‘past’ that has never been present and never will be, 
whose ‘future-to-come’ [à-venir] will never be a production or a reproduction in the form 
of presence. The concept of trace is thus incommensurable with that of retention, the 
becoming-past of what has been present.122 (MP 22/21t)  
 
Keeping in mind the systematic solidarity of consciousness, subjectivity and voluntarism, allow 
me to pursue the pre-subjective implications of the temporalization of the trace and their 
‘ecological’ inscription into matter, ‘nature’ and the earth. As I showed, the thought of the trace 
can neither break with nor be reduced to transcendental phenomenology for Derrida. While I 
noted that immanent time consciousness is transcended in the Living Present both in the 
originary hyletic impression and in the constituting flux for which we lack names, Derrida now 
writes that “it is no accident if [Husserl] still designates this unnameable as ‘absolute 
subjectivity.’” (VP 94n1/72n)  
 What is unnameable in the constituting flux of the Living Present is not a present being, 
self-present or self-identical, etc. “All of that is present and we can name it; its proof is that we 
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cannot put into question its being as absolute subjectivity.” (VP 94n1/72nt) That for which we 
lack names in the Living Present, Derrida explains, is simply its ‘absolute properties,’ in other 
words its relative objective determinations in opposition to the absoluteness of its subjectivity. 
The flux of the Living Present for Husserl, I showed, lacks all temporal objectivity. But, as 
Derrida shows, this means that even the self-presence of absolute subjectivity is supplementarily 
constituted by its unnameable object: its absolute properties. Against this constituting 
subjectivity, whether transcendental or absolute, the relations to time and the other reveal 
subjectivity as always already constituted: the concept of constitution itself demanding 
deconstruction, he adds. When Derrida speaks of ‘radicalizing’ Husserl’s determination of the 
unnamability of the Living Present, it is because to think the Living Present on the basis of 
différance means to erase its determination as absolute subjectivity.123 
This pure difference, which constitutes the self-presence of the living present, 
reintroduces into it originarily all the impurity we had believed we were able to exclude 
from it. The living present arises on the basis of its non-self-identity, and on the basis of 
the retentional trace. It is always already a trace. The trace is not an attribute about which 
we could say that the self of the living present ‘is originarily’ the trace. It is necessary to 
think originary-being from the trace and not the trace from originary being. (VP 95/73) 
 
As every impurity one believed one could exclude, reduce and bracket from the interiority of the 
Living Present comes to constitute it originarily – that is to say every transcendence, exteriority, 
every alterity, the world, materiality, etc.  – “The trace is the intimacy of the living present to its 
outside, the openness to exteriority in general, to the non-proper, etc., the temporalization of 
sense is from the very beginning ‘spacing.’ (VP 96/73) The exteriority of space, Derrida writes, 
is ‘in’ time; temporalization is precisely this opening to its outside, indeed to the world. Time can 
therefore never be the pure interiority and self-presence of an absolute subjectivity because “the 
‘world’ is originarily implied by the movement of transcendence.” (VP 96/74) 
 Despite these analyses, however, one should be cautious to not privilege the 
ultratranscendental concept of time in relation to the other exteriorities it makes possible, since 
these in turn also function as its own condition of possibility. The opening of the present to its 
outside is inseparable from intersubjectivity. 124  Even Husserl himself admits a relation of 
analogy between the relation to the alter ego and that to future of past moments in the Living 
Present.125 As both temporal delay or deferral and spatial alterity and difference, différance, 
Derrida writes, is “temporalization and spacing, the becoming-time of space and the becoming 
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space of time.” (MP 8/8) The living now of the Living Present must pass through both the 
mediations of temporal re-tention (temporalization) and spatial, intersubjective analogical re-
presentation (alterity) to constitute itself, and this relation between time and the other, Derrida 
writes, is nothing less than the history of life. Without wanting to reduce the ‘abyss’ that can 
separate these two, Derrida argues that the trace, as the common root of their relationships, “is 
nothing other than the history of ‘life’ and of life’s becoming-conscious.” (VP 75/58) The trace 
is indeed, I said above, the very condition of the relationality between any living beings, whether 
human, animal, fungal, vegetal, bacterial, viral, even problematizing the distinction between the 
living and the non-living. And it is also at the heart of the ethics of an ecological relationality of 
compassion for the mortal finitude of other living beings. As Derrida writes in Of 
Grammatology, “the relation with the other and the relation with death are one and the same 
opening.”126 (DG 265/187)  
 Despite the four transcendences from the Living Present being, in a sense, the same, the 
relation to death must claim a certain originarity, if not a privilege at least in my discussions of 
survivance and life death. In Voice and Phenomenon, Derrida suggests that every exit from the 
life of a self-present presence into the world, space and nature would bear the structure of a 
process of and relation to death.127 In Of Grammatology, the objective and spatial exteriority that 
appears as most familiar to us could never appear “without différance as temporalization, without 
the nonpresence of the other inscribed within the sense of the present, without the relationship 
with death as the concrete structure of the living present.”128 (DG 103/71) At the heart of the 
most familiar, of the oikos, the trace is “the opening of the first exteriority in general, the 
enigmatic relationship of the living to its other and of an inside to an outside: spacing.” (DG 
103/70) This book concludes in showing a mortal doubling, representation and repetition to 
originarily constitute and supplement the Living Present, which allows me to further deepen my 
discussion of the pre-subjective transcendental field and its potential for thinking ecological 
relationality. 129  In Voice and Phenomenon, Derrida recalls that the Living Present, as the 
universal form of all lived experience and all life, is always and irreducibly mine.130 Even in the 
annihilation of the world in the Epokhè, and in the event of my absolute empirical disappearance, 
the Living Present as the universal form of transcendental life would be unaffected. For Derrida, 
however, this logic dissimulates a relation to my death and my disappearance in general as the 
condition of transcendental life. The possibility of my death and absolute disappearance would 
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not come to modify a preexisting subject. Rather, “the appearing of the I to itself in the I am is 
therefore originarily the relation to its own possible disappearance. I am means therefore 
originarily I am mortal. I am immortal is an impossible proposition.”131 (VP 60-1/46)  
This relation to death, I’ll show, is itself the condition of what I’m calling the arche-
writing of ecological relationality; the pre-subjective and pre-egological transcendental field as 
an “originary exteriority.” (DG 443/315) While the self-presence of the living voice is classically 
seen as contaminated by the exteriority of writing, the relation to writing, and indeed to its death, 
is its very condition of possibility.132 Beyond any classical opposition of inside and outside, 
writing in general or arche-writing entails that “the division between exterior and interior passes 
through the interior of the interior or the exterior of the exterior, to the point where the 
immanence of language is essentially exposed to the intervention of forces that are apparently 
alien to its system.” (DG 63/43) This writing  
is the becoming-absent and the becoming-unconscious of the subject... This becoming – 
or this drift/derivation – does not befall the subject that would choose it or passively let 
itself be drawn along with it. As the subject’s relationship with its own death, this 
becoming is the constitution of subjectivity. On all levels of life’s organization, that is to 
say, of the economy of death.” (DG 100/69t)  
 
And here we have, I believe, the clearest conjunction of the pre-subjective transcendental field 
and a relational ecology of life death, where the spacing of arche-writing marks what Derrida 
calls a ‘dead time’ within the Living Present.133 The transcendences complicating the restricted 
ecology of the Living Present are indeed its inscription in arche-writing, its opening to 
temporalization, intersubjectivity and language itself.134 This language and writing, however, 
must be understood as radically anterior to the opposition between the human and its other. 
Derrida even speaks of arche-writing as nature de-naturing itself; “nature is affected – from the 
outside – by an upheaval that modifies it in its inside, denatures it and obligates it to be diverted 
from itself. Nature denaturing itself, diverting itself from itself, naturally welcoming its outside 
into its inside.” (DG 61/41t)  
Throughout Of Grammatology, an ecological determination of arche-writing lets itself be 
confirmed, as I showed in chapter 1 in a discussion of the pro-gramme.135 To think the trace as 
the retention of difference as such, another Living Present within my own, requires  
a synthesis within which the wholly other is announced as such – without any simplicity, 
identity, resemblance or continuity – within what it is not. Is announced as such: there we 
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have all of history, from what metaphysics has determined as the ‘non-living,’ up to 
‘consciousness,’ passing through all levels of animal organization. (DG 69/47t)  
 
Derrida would return to these questions decades later in For What Tomorrow, where he 
recalls that the concept of the trace in Of Grammatology “had to be extended to the entire field of 
the living, or rather to the life/death relation,” he adds that “‘concepts of writing, trace, grammè 
or grapheme’ exceeded the opposition human/nonhuman,” and that these extensions would also 
hold for différance. (DQ 106-7/63) “Indissociable from this concept of the gramme or the trace, 
and however ‘unthinkable’ it may seem, différance extends to ‘life:death’ in general and brings 
the economic and the aneconomic into an alliance beyond the limits of the human.” (DQ 
107n1/210n2) And it is again a question of how différance and the trace will articulate the 
economic and the aneconomic that is so important general ecology, “the relation of the living to 
its other and of an inside to an outside,” where tout autre est tout autre, “articulating the living 
upon the nonliving in general.” (DG 103/70, 95/65) Différance is there “as soon as there is a 
living trace, a relation of life/death or presence/absence... as soon as there is something living [du 
vivant].” (DQ 43/21) Originarily complicating the Living Present, Derrida indeed speaks of an 
“originary violence of writing.” (DG 55/37) To think arche-writing as the condition of ecological 
relationality connects directly to the difficult ethics I broached in “Violence and Metaphysics.” 
As he writes, “there is no ethics without the presence of the other but also, and consequently, 
without absence, dissimulation, detour, différance, writing. The arche-writing is the origin of 
morality as of immorality. The nonethical opening of ethics. A violent opening.” (DG 202/139-
40) But, as I showed, the irreducibility of the imprint also structures the living as a radical 
passivity, not only as the relation to an immemorial past but as a hetero-affection at the heart of 
auto-affection; the universal structure of experience for all living things.136 Only a being capable 
of auto-affection “may let itself be affected by the other in general.” (DG 236/165) The 
possibility of letting oneself be affected by alterity in general is, for Derrida, “another name for 
‘life’ – is a general structure articulated by the history of life.”137 (DG 236/165) Against the 
purity of an auto-affection admitting no exteriority, in what Derrida calls ‘auto-hetero-affection,’ 
just as with ex-appropriation, “the exteriority of space is irreducible... welcomes the other within 
the slim difference that separates acting and suffering [pâtir]. And the outside, the exposed 
surface of the body, signifies and marks forever the division that shapes auto-affection.”138 (DG 
235/165) The interruption of organic auto-affection must itself be thought as death, the 
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inorganic, the techno-machinic. This radical passivity originarily inscribes all the transcendences 
of temporalization, materiality, alterity and death at the heart of the Living Present, of the self-
present, self-identical subject and thus refigures the ground of transcendental lived experience [le 
vécu] as the arche-writing of ecological relationality, of le vivant. But despite these difficult 
analyses, I have still yet to broach the ethical implications and potentials of this, and I use the 
word under erasure here, ontology of radical passivity. A detailed analysis of this must wait for 
my following chapter on Heidegger, but I can conclude with a few points on this articulation of 
the ontological and the ethical, the material and the ideal, and a thought of a historiality which 
would disclose the ethical-ontological fallacy of the naturalistic fallacy.  
 
§2.3.2: General Ecology: The Parliament of the Sur-viving Present 
It might seem as though I have neglected the transcendences of the material world, of materiality 
itself and of empirical reality in these analyses. To treat these questions in the early Derrida 
through the concept of history might seem perplexing if one did not recall that, along with the 
question of the possibility of scientific knowledge, history constitutes one of his earliest interests 
in phenomenology. Much will be at stake in this thought of a history beyond the opposition 
between the so-called ‘natural’ and ‘human’ sciences. What fascinates Derrida about Husserl 
with respect to the transmission of ideal objects is that while these have their roots in empirical 
facticity (the Introduction shows how language and writing play an essential role in ideality), this 
empiricity can become immediately bracketed in the phenomenological reduction and the 
investigation of the transcendental conditions of scientific knowledge. As the universal form of 
transcendental experience, the Living Present goes hand in hand with the founding opposition of 
metaphysics for Derrida, that of form and matter, and along with it the hierarchical dualisms 
between culture and nature, the intelligible and the sensible, the human and its others, all of 
which would have collaborated in the exclusion of arche-writing in a “naturalist, objectivist, and 
derivative determination of the difference between outside and inside.”139 (DG 105/71) All these 
oppositions, it seems, serve to reinforce a logic of identity, keeping the outside out and the 
proper uncontaminated. What one could call Derrida’s logic of supplementary transcendence, 
however, would thoroughly complicate this distinction between inside and outside in inscribing 
the beyond within the Living Present. 140  Furthermore, I have shown that phenomenology 
constitutes for Derrida a philosophy of life not only because death can be bracketed as a mere 
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external and empirical accident befalling life, but because even after the reduction of empirical 
life one is still left with transcendental life and consciousness, even after the annihilation of the 
world in the Epokhè. Derrida, however, will always insist on an essential contamination between 
the transcendental and the empirical, but a contamination that, one must recall, is wholly other 
than their reciprocal immanence. Far from a simple mnemonic technique supervening upon 
ideality, writing is instead revealed as ideality’s originary transcendental condition of possibility. 
Far from a simple external accident befalling life, death is revealed as the original condition of 
its sur-vival. The ultratranscendental concept of life put forth by Derrida insists precisely on this 
contamination, articulating the transcendental and the empirical and its other transcendences 
across the ‘nothing’ separating them, this nothing which (is) différance, as the supplementary 
difference of a death which is itself nothing and impossible to die, and inscribes its impersonal 
materiality at the heart of the form of the Living Present.141  
And this is why, for Derrida, even the most radical phenomenological reduction, the total 
annihilation of the world in the Epokhè, cannot sustain itself without the inassimilable alterity of 
the material world. The pure form of the Living Present is originarily contaminated by this 
material remainder, one could call it the restances, the res(is)tances of the arche-materiality of 
time, alterity and death. Even after the annihilation of the world, there remains an inappropriable 
and constitutive alterity at the heart of transcendental subjectivity. And there lies, in a sense, the 
beginning of the ethics of Celan’s poem Derrida cites above; “die Welt ist fort, ich muss dich 
tragen,” where the ‘tragen,’ the carrying, demands, in the absence of the world, “to carry oneself 
or bear oneself toward [se porter vers] the infinite inappropriability of the other, toward the 
encounter with its absolute transcendence in the very heart of me, that is to say, in me outside 
me.” (SQ 161) As mentioned in the conclusion to §2.1, this carrying cannot be accomplished in 
the dialectic of the Living Present, but wholly otherwise, must let the time of the other come.142 
The possibility of justice relies precisely on this disjunction and non-contemporaneity of the 
Living Present: its being ‘out of joint’ installs the relation to the other.143 The world is gone 
indeed, but justice also cannot maintain itself without this carrying, “without the promise of a 
now in common, without the pledge, the vow of synchrony, the desired sharing of a living 
present.” (P2 135/131) Perhaps everything I am trying to say here involves the passivity of this 
letting, irreducible to the opposition of passivity and activity, a letting beings be before and 
beyond their determination as human, animal, fungal, vegetal and so on. But this in no way takes 
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away from the stricture of the ‘ich muss’; I must, one must, il faut. The ‘il faut’ in Derrida 
adheres precisely to the complication of the fait and droit, de facto and de jure, empirical 
facticity and transcendental possibility, and functions both as an originary violence and an ethical 
transcendence, the necessity and impossibility of an ethics of ecological relationality. In this 
ethics, I must carry the other across the abyss of a world gone away, I must as the very empirical 
condition of my being-present, and I must also in an ethical sense, I must carry the other across 
and in its infinite transcendence despite and perhaps precisely because of and through this 
impossibility. I must not pre-determine the absolute and infinitely transcendent alterity that 
constitutes my originary ecological relationality, but I must, and have always already begun to. It 
is perhaps in a certain vigilance towards this originary violence that a post-deconstructive 
account of ecological subjectivity, if one even needs to keep the word, can let itself be sought.144   
 In a sense, the complications posed to the Husserlian Living Present by Derrida can be 
read as the reinscription of what calls itself the human subject within an-other thought of history, 
its pre-history before and beyond Husserl’s crisis, which is really a crisis of European humanity, 
a thought of history that would mark the infinite telos of the Living Present with a radical 
finitude.145 However, the crisis of the European sciences for Husserl is not an accident befalling 
historical teleology. The possibility of the impossibility of a full and immediate intuition, of the 
fulfillment of the phenomenological principle of principles in the Living Present “is not simply 
negative; the trap becomes a chance.” (NII 402n24) As he shows in Of Grammatology, the 
possibility of crisis is connected to the possibility of truth, its inscription in writing, indeed 
within the arche-writing of ecological relationality I am discussing here. As an Idea in the 
Kantian sense, the self-presence of consciousness functions as an ideal and infinitely anticipated 
universality and unity of a world in the face of its factical finitude. This thought of ideality 
implies that the Living Present itself is, in fact, and in reality, infinitely deferred.146 What this 
means, he explains, is that the infinite teleology of transcendental life and history is originarily 
inscribed with death and the real, the material and the empirical. Différance, he adds, “becomes 
the finitude of life as the essential relation to itself and to its death. Infinite différance is finite. 
One can no longer think it within the opposition of finitude or infinity, absence and presence, 
negation and affirmation.” (VP 114/97t) Derrida even refers to this in Rogues as transcendental 
phenomenological auto-immunity in the Living Present.147 In this finite/infinite différance of the 
Living Present, “the difference between principle and fact, ideality and reality” erases itself, 
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“their possibility is their impossibility.” (VP 113/87) An ecological democracy-to-come, the 
Parliament of the Living as David Wood has called it, can precisely never be a utopian future 
democracy, a regulating Idea, since its inaccessibility “would still retain the temporal form of a 
future present, of a future modality of the living present.” (SM 110/81) This teleological 
structure would moreover annul and neutralize the unknowability and incalculability of the 
transcendence of the alterity of the other in my ecological relationality. How far must this 
democracy-to-come extend, Derrida asks?  
Must we extend it to the whole world of singularities, to the whole world of humans 
assumed to be like me, my compeers [mes semblables] – or else, even further, to all 
nonhuman living beings, or again, even beyond that, to all the nonliving, to their memory, 
spectral or otherwise, to their to-come or to their indifference with regard to what we 
think we can identify, in an always precipitous, dogmatic, and obscure way, as the life or 
the living present of living [la vivance] in general... to the dead, to animals, to trees and 
rocks? (V 81-2/53-4)  
 
As Derrida writes, the absolute teleological horizon of the unity of the world “leaves no place for 
the alterity or the radical foreignness of this other, the absolute arrivant... no place for any ‘other 
world.’” (FP 25t) The unity of the world, however, is also the very condition of hospitality, of a 
sharing of the earth.148 As I will continue to develop the general ecology of this oikos, “the at 
home in general that welcomes the absolute arrivant,” one must keep in mind that, as I noted in 
my discussion of Levinas, the arrivant must exceed every horizon of anticipation. (A 68/34) Or 
rather, as Derrida puts it, this horizon, “even before letting itself be traversed, is traversed, 
passively, by some wholly other. Here is what would require (without requiring anything) the 
surprise of the arrivant, that is to say the wholly other that irrupts in a space I call mine or I 
attempt to appropriate for myself.” (FP 26t) To think the oikos of this at-home is to think what I 
in chapter 1 followed Derrida in calling the unity without unity, totality or homogeneity of the 
world, the earth or the world of life death. One can only think this ecology in the ruin of 
intentionality, in “the annulment of experience itself: the encounter affected, at the heart of a 
non-intentional passivity, by the arrivant, the wholly other that comes upon us.” (FP 30t) Beyond 
any horizon of anticipation, one must think ecology as “relation to the future, the other, the event 
– and death,” open to an alterity of “what one so easily calls an animal or a god. Good or evil, 
life or death.” (FP 26-7t) It is through Heidegger, however, that Derrida will sharpen the 
strictures of life-death and survivance in the thought of ecological relationality I am attempting 
to develop. The relation between de facto and de jure, and ontology and ethics, will find itself 
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thoroughly complicated, if not altogether jettisoned. While for Heidegger as well, the thought of 
transcendental historicity is one reserved to the human Dasein, as are indeed all of the 
transcendences from which we have been unable to indemnify the Living Present (an authentic 
relation to time, access to the alterity of the other, to death, to the world as such, and indeed the 
very concept of transcendence will require an important reinterrogation through Heidegger), not 
to mention to language and to an access to the very question of Being, anterior to the opposition 
of affirmation and negation and the metaphysics of Presence, Heidegger’s thought opens for 
Derrida a deeper understanding of the radical passivity and unpower shared by all living beings, 
and a complication of the letting I find so essential to ecological ethics. This letting, I’ll show, is 
an opening to an affirmation, to a yes in the form of a promise which would at once confirm the 
philosophical invulnerability of transcendental life, historiality and the Living Present of human 
subjectivity while exposing it originarily to its own impossibility, its ecological pre-history and 
pre-subjectivity and an an-other thought of ethics for sharing the earth and the world of life-death 
more justly with its other living beings. 
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It is this resistance that interests me. It is this excess that at once, since forever, has made events, 
ruptures, effects of difference possible everywhere, and not only in what we call the history of 
humanity: I would even say everywhere that there is life and animality. 
Jacques Derrida: “L’esprit de l’argent,” 207. 
 
Three: Resistance and Ex-appropriation: Letting Life Live-On 
While in the previous chapter, I had attempted to show how the transcendences of organic life in 
and as temporalization, alterity, materiality and death necessitated a radical rethinking of 
ecological relationality, my intent was not to generalize these structures across ‘the living in 
general,’ but rather to think the ‘general’ itself as the multiplication, pluralization and articulation 
of limits, each time infinitely abyssal and yet infinitely demanding, as I read Celan’s line ‘die 
Welt ist fort ich muss dich tragen.’ It is through Heidegger’s rethinking of transcendence itself, 
“of Being as a non-generic generality, as transcending generality,” that I will sharpen this 
originarily differential and interruptive relationality at the heart of ecology along with its 
implications for environmental philosophy, biopolitics, science and translation. (HQ 31/7) 
However, Heidegger’s overreliance on the concepts of the authentic [Eigentlich] the proper 
[Eigen] to man, the propriative event [Ereignis], gathering [Versammlung], of justice as jointure 
[Fug] and so on will in the end restrict the latter’s thought to the circulation of what I’m calling 
restricted ecology. These structures will come to designate Heidegger’s interpretation of Walten, 
his translation of the Greek word for what we call ‘nature,’ phusis: “Being, phusis, is, as sway 
[als Walten], originary gatheredness [Gesammeltheit]: logos. Being is fittingness [Fug] that 
enjoins: dike.”1 (GA 40 123/171) We’ve already encountered Heidegger many times in chapter 1; 
I showed Derrida suggest that Freud’s death drive bears an important similarity to Husserl’s 
Living Present and Heidegger’s auto-affective temporalization. I’d also mentioned that auto-
affective temporalization, for Derrida, was irreducible to what he called the finite promise of the 
earth. In chapter 2 I showed that like Husserl, Heidegger’s concept of world restricts its access 
‘as such’ to the human, the two understanding ‘world’ in terms of unity, coherence and 
belonging. Back in chapter 1, I’d also begun examining Derrida’s logic of the remainder, the 
resistance of a restance that would be irreducible to dialectical, transcendental or ontological 
questioning.2 I’d then suggested that this resistance necessitated a thought of materiality as the 
absolute Outside, akin to what I’d discussed in Husserl’s concept of the urhylè as the ichfremde 
kern, irreducible to the opposition of form and matter. If restricted ecology concerns itself with 
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the proper, the familial, the calculable and the oikos, general ecology binds its logic to something 
that resists this propriation, that ex-propriates it and interrupts its economy without return. Ex-
appropriation is another name for this stricture that concerns itself with both dialectical, 
transcendental and ontological propriation in their economies and ecologies and the irreducible 
alterity resisting this circulation.3 To think the materiality of this res(is)tance anterior to the 
opposition of form and matter is another way to bring into conversation Derrida’s critique of 
form in ‘Form and Fashion,’ where Heidegger is also targeted. 4  This will have important 
implications for the discussions of biopolitics in chapters 4 and 5: while Foucault understands 
sovereign power as the capacity to make die and let live, and biopower as the power to make live 
and let die, I’m trying to think a concept of resistance anterior to the opposition of power and 
resistance, and a letting life live-on anterior to the opposition of making and letting live and die, 
one that I think would strangely be beyond differentials of violence, force, power and even 
Walten itself (but in a sense of ‘beyond’ remaining to be determined).5 As I will show in chapter 
6, these questions will be of the utmost importance not only to contemporary science and 
technology studies but also to issues of translation and ecolinguistics. To posit nature in the sense 
of classical physics as infinitely calculable and determinable non-relational objects, I’ll show, 
shares an almost total conceptual overlap with what Heidegger calls the breaking-apart of 
language into “word-Things which are present-at-hand.” (GA 2 161/204) When grammar seizes 
control of language,  
language surrenders itself to our mere willing and trafficking as an instrument of 
domination over beings. Beings themselves appear as actualities in the interaction of 
cause and effect. We encounter beings as actualities in a calculative businesslike way, but 
also scientifically and by way of philosophy, with explanations and proofs. (GA 9 
318/243)  
 
Perhaps, however, Heidegger’s later concept of the Zusage, an affirmation anterior to language 
and the question – within which, for Derrida, “one must seek a new (post-deconstructive) 
determination of the responsibility of the subject” – can place us another step along the path to 
thinking the posthuman promise of the earth. (PDS 268)  
 I begin, in §3.1.1, by exploring the ontological and ethical complications Heidegger poses 
to Scheler’s notion of organic resistance via the transcendence of Dasein. This transcendence, I 
show, not only originarily situates Dasein in a world and with others, but also discloses, in 
Dasein’s powerlessness, its capacity to let beings be outside of their calculability and use-value. 
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In §3.1.2, I turn to an examination of how Heidegger links the determination of phusis as idea at 
the end of Greek philosophy with this calculative comportment towards beings and the 
objectification of nature, and tie this in to the critique of form I’ve taken up in chapters 1 and 2 to 
suggest the necessity of thinking a material resistance beyond the classical oppositions of form 
and matter, making and letting. I then in §3.1.3 turn to Heidegger’s concepts of auto-affective 
temporalization and being-towards-death, and show how these, in the powerlessness and 
passivity of resistance with which they constitute Dasein, expose it to an alterity which it can 
never master but can only let be. This resistance, I argue, is indeed a dead, inorganic materiality 
that originarily constitutes every living being and expropriates these structures from the proper of 
the human. I turn to Derrida’s reading of Heidegger in §3.2, and in §3.2.1 explore the destruktion 
Derrida sees the former undertake of the Husserlian Living Present with respect to its idealism, 
subjectivism, humanism and complicity with technological calculability, marking these all with 
the transcendence of Dasein. In §3.2.2, I show how Derrida defends ontological transcendence as 
the sole possibility of Levinasian ethical transcendence. But, as in his reading of Husserl, a 
certain change of emphasis occurs here: if “Violence and Metaphysics” is Derrida’s necessary 
binding of Levinasian transcendence to a restricted ecology, all his later readings of Heidegger 
will seek this ex-propriation, impossibility, otherwise than Being and aneconomy within the 
latter’s discourse. §3.2.3 thus develops these logics of ex-appropriation with respect to 
Heidegger’s notions of Ent-eignis, Ent-fernung and their relevance for Derrida’s concepts of the 
gift, the promise and justice. If both Heideggerian and Levinasian transcendence solely concern 
the proper of the human, however, this relation requires another articulation for what I’m trying 
to do with general ecology. §3.2.4 recalls several well-known examples of Derrida’s engagement 
of the animal question with respect to Heidegger, where the animal is denied access not only to 
time, death, the other and the world ‘as such,’ but also the transcendence that would allow it to 
let beings be.6 In §3.2.5, however, I conclude by suggesting that Heidegger’s concepts of the 
Zusage, Gelassenheit and Verlässlichkeit allow precisely for rethinking this transcendence in the 






§3.1: Heidegger and Res(is)tance 
§3.1.1: Dasein’s Resistance and Transcendence: World, Others and Things. 
Many environmental philosophers have argued that the move beyond the calculative, indeed 
economic frameworks of moral extensionism must rest on a certain articulation of ethics and 
ontology.7 How this articulation gives itself to be thought – whether as the mutual immanence of 
the ethical and the ontological or along what I’m proposing with the stricture of general ecology 
– being one of the key stakes of my study. The question is also one of asking whether the concept 
of ‘value,’ even in its refiguration as the ‘intrinsic’ ethical value of non-human organisms, abiotic 
environments, nature and the earth, understood as and through their ontological properties 
(relationality, drive for survival, conatus essendi, symbiosis) is sufficient to think what I’m 
attempting with general ecology. Or, is the concept of value itself too closely tied up with 
economic circulation and a thought of ecology as a merely cyclical and reappropriative flow of 
life and death? In my first chapter, I showed Derrida suggest that any ecological living-together 
ought not regulate itself on either organic symbiosis or on any juridico-political contract but 
rather give itself to be thought as an interruptive excess – the very condition of justice being the 
anachrony with itself of the Living Present – an excess which must be thought (although it is 
almost unthinkable, impossible) beyond all economic calculation and reappropriation, as well as 
beyond the oppositions of physis/nomos, physis/thesis and all other oppositions of ‘nature’ to its 
others.8  
 In his “Letter on Humanism,” Heidegger responds to a letter from Jean Beaufret in which 
the latter writes “what I have been trying to do for a long time now is to determine precisely the 
relation of ontology to a possible ethics.” (GA 9 353/268) Of course, Heidegger notes, a concern 
for the ethical is of the utmost importance, especially in an age in which the human orders all its 
plans and activities according to technology.9 As he shows, however, early Greek thought did not 
separate itself into the disciplines of logic, physics and ethics, but did think a concept of phusis. 
Phusis, he writes, “says what emerges from itself (for example, the emergence, the blossoming of 
a rose), the unfolding that opens itself up, the coming-into-appearance in such unfolding, and 
holding itself and persisting in appearance – in short, the emerging-abiding sway [Walten].” (GA 
40 11/15) All physicalist and naturalist determinations of ‘nature’ would be derivative from this 
concept of phusis. The Greeks, he adds, also thought an ethos, an abode or dwelling place, which 
persists in our word ‘ethics.’ Ethos is also a thinking of the oikos in economy and ecology.10  
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 As is well known, Heidegger’s entire philosophical project revolves around thinking the 
meaning and truth of Being. If ethics bears some relation to ethos, he argues, then the original 
ethics would be that which thinks the abode of man as the truth of Being. While this thinking 
would seem to correspond more closely to ontology than to ethics in its concern for existence and 
Being, Heidegger would increasingly distance himself from the term ‘ontology’ so prevalent in 
Being and Time.11 By 1935, Heidegger will write that Being is phusis.12 As he explains in the 
“Letter,” to think the truth of Being is in fact impossible for ontology, which cannot really think 
the wholly other dimension of language that is the poetic Saying [sage], the language that is the 
house of Being. In the end, both ethics and ontology are incapable of thinking the human’s 
essential dwelling in the truth of Being.  
 These questions of ethics and ontology are also at the heart of thinking life death on earth 
with its others in Derrida’s work, who writes that  
relations between humans and animals [and, we add here, any other living being, fungal, 
vegetal, bacterial, viral] must change. They must, both in the sense of an ‘ontological’ 
necessity and of an ‘ethical’ duty. I place these words in quotation marks because this 
change will have to affect the very sense and value of these concepts (the ontological and 
the ethical). (DQ 108/64) 
 
 But what sort of obligation might such a change the sense and value of these terms imply? As 
concerns how the thinking of Being might be applied to our active lives, Heidegger claims that it 
is beyond the opposition of theory and practice, having no result or effect.13 Before any naïve or 
volitional theory of action, the thought of Being lets beings be: it lets beings be what they are and 
understands beings as such.14 Ethics and ontology then are derivative with respect to thinking the 
meaning of dwelling in the house of Being, in its oikos, the originary structure of being-in-the-
world, Being in relation to phusis, to beings-as-a-whole and letting them be. This question of 
letting, broached in my discussions of passivity in chapters 1 and 2, has important environmental 
and ethical implications for Heidegger, who writes in “Building, Dwelling, Thinking” that 
mortals dwell in that they save the earth... Saving does not only snatch something from a 
danger. To save properly means to set something free into its own essence. To save the 
earth is more than to exploit it or even wear it out. Saving the earth does not master the 
earth and does not subjugate it, which is merely one step from boundless spoliation.15 
(GA 7 152/BW 352) 
 
What I’ll call letting life live-on cannot go without a thought of death, a death I’ll reveal as the 
originary ex-propriation of the proper to the human. Beyond an ethics of calculation which would 
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delimit the scope of moral considerability according to what a living organism can do – and I 
recall that Derrida draws from Bentham the injunction to think a radical passivity in suffering 
and in death, a passion or a non-power as the source of compassion – Heidegger places us on an 
important path towards thinking the passivity of letting, the finitude of life, and of death as the 
possibility of an impossibility.16 The thinking of Being must necessarily take its distance from a 
positing of value, indeed – and I’ll examine this in much more detail in his critique of Nietzsche 
in chapter 4 – both the positing of values and their critical disestablishment and revaluation 
equally rely on a wilful and self-congratulatory subjectivism.  
Precisely through the characterization of something as ‘a value’ what is so valued is 
robbed of its worth. That is to say, by the assessment of something as a value what is 
valued is admitted only as an object for human estimation. But what a thing is in its being 
is not exhausted by its being an object, particularly when objectivity takes the form of 
value. Every valuing, even where it values positively, is a subjectivizing. It does not let 
beings: be. Rather, valuing lets being: be valid – solely as the objects of its doing. (GA 9 
349/265) 
 
Heidegger’s thinking of Being thus seems to not only break with the economic calculation of 
subjectivist moral extensionism, but also seems to caution against a certain equally economic 
rehabilitation of the concept of value, inviting us to think the ‘worth’ of life death on earth 
otherwise. On Derrida’s reading of Heidegger however, the latter’s own restriction of his 
analyses of transcendence, being-in-the-world, being-towards-death and being-with others to the 
proper of the human constitutes not only the Achilles’ heel of the entire project of fundamental 
ontology for the former, but also of everything following his much discussed Kehre or turning, 
which, for David Farrell Krell, indeed constitutes an intensification of this anthropocentrism, if 
this turning can be said to exist at all.17 In what follows, and building on the insights of my 
previous chapter (namely, Derrida’s claim that phenomenology is a philosophy of life), I’ll show 
that thinking together life and intentionality in their resistance in the Heideggerean sense lends a 
new rhythm to the questions of life and death, self and other/world, idealism and 
materialism/realism, form and matter, immanence and transcendence, ‘nature’ and all its others 
worthwhile for the development of general ecology.  
 Heidegger’s early confrontations with life-philosophy [Lebensphilosophie] in Dilthey and 
Scheler are well documented, as are his engagements with and critiques of Husserlian 
phenomenology, and, I’ll show in chapter 4, his critique of biologism.18 In an early 1925 lecture, 
The History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger argues against Scheler that we cannot entirely 
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understand reality as that which resists against drive and effort, although noting himself that this 
comes closest to his own interpretation of reality. For Scheler, the resistance of the world is 
understood as the correlate to a subjective will, impulse and striving, which grounds not only his 
interpretation of biological facts but also his epistemology, which is itself rooted in the question 
of how a world is given to primitive life forms.19 For Heidegger, however,  
this method of clarifying by analogy from primitive life forms down to single-celled 
animals is wrong in principle. It is only when we have apprehended the objectivity of the 
world which is available to us [to humans, presumably], that is to say, our relationship of 
being toward the world, that we can perhaps also determine the worldhood of the animal 
by certain modified ways of considering it. (GA 20 305/222) 
 
The authentic correlation of world and the human Dasein for Heidegger is not one between 
impulse and resistance, but one of care, meaningfulness and concern. In fact, these relations 
constitute the possibility of resistance in the first place: “resistance is a phenomenological 
character which already presupposes a world.” (GA 20 304/222) Drive and will are both 
modifications of care, and  
[o]nly entities with this kind of Being [care] can come up against something resistant as 
something in the world…resistance characterizes the ‘external world’ in the sense of 
entities within-the-world, but never in the sense of the world itself. Consciousness of 
Reality is itself a way of Being-in-the-world. Every ‘problematic of the external world’ 
comes back necessarily to this basic existential phenomenon. (GA 2 211/254) 
 
Heidegger thus inverts the Cartesian cogito: rather than ‘I think therefore I am,’ ‘I am’ as ‘I am in 
a world’ becomes the primary assertion, and grounds the possibility of cogitationes, comporting 
oneself alongside other beings in the world.20 Only the kinds of Being who have care as their 
basic existential structure, the human Dasein, can have an authentic relation to the world as such. 
The phenomenon of material resistance as experienced by non-human life does not disclose a 
world for these organisms, and if present at all in the human Dasein’s experience is secondary to 
Dasein’s authentic and originary Being-in-the-world. If one could think, then, a certain arche-
material res(is)tance at the heart of the human Dasein’s transcendence, this would perhaps be 
sufficient to ex-appropriate any axiomatic or economy regulated upon its self-assured propriety, 
but I am still a ways off from this analysis.  
 As I will show, this question of Being-in proposes a radical rethinking of the questions of 
self and world, transcendence and immanence. What is meant by the transcendence of Dasein is 
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difficult in Heidegger, and differs importantly from that which I examined in Husserl and 
Levinas. As Heidegger puts it, the meaningfulness of the world for Dasein is  
not a network of forms which a worldless subject has laid over some kind of material… 
the ‘problem of transcendence’ cannot be brought round to the question of how a subject 
comes out to an Object, when the aggregate of objects is identified with the idea of the 
world. Rather, we must ask; what makes it ontologically possible for entities to be 
encountered within-the-world and Objectified as so encountered? (GA 2 366/417-8) 
 
In other words, what does it mean, ontologically, to encounter entities as such, in the Being of 
their being? For Heidegger, this requires thinking what he calls the ‘ecstatico-horizonal’ 
foundation of the transcendence of the world. 21  While I must delay the considerations of 
temporalization as this ecstatico-horizonal, indeed auto-affective foundation, allow me to further 
inquire into this question of transcendence. As Heidegger explains, the temporality of the 
understanding of Being – the understanding of its meaning as such, as a question, in its 
difference from beings – can only be grasped on the basis of its connection with the 
transcendence of Dasein. Transcending Dasein understands beings in their Being because Dasein 
is already in a world, and the transcendence of the world is its own. The transcendence of the 
world and that of Dasein are the same thing: Dasein’s transcendence is Being-in-the-world. 
Heidegger thus proposes a relational structure of transcendence anterior to any derived 
opposition between materialism/idealism, realism/idealism, outside/inside, object/subject.22 As 
the co-belonging of self and world, Dasein is “the transcendent.” 23  Beings are always 
encountered within a world and thus presuppose a certain understanding of world, whose 
transcendence is beyond that of objects and is the transcendence of Dasein. As he elaborates in 
“On the Essence of Ground,” the world is that towards which Dasein transcends, and this world 
is beings-as-a-whole, what I earlier called phusis. “‘Dasein transcends’ means: in the essence of 
its being it is world-forming, ‘forming’ [bildend] in the multiple sense that it lets world occur.”24 
(GA 9 158/123e) Dasein, in other words, lets phusis, as the totality of beings, occur. 
 The slogan of phenomenology, ‘to the things themselves!,’ or ‘to the subject matters 
themselves!’ means precisely to encounter things as they are encountered, to perceive things as 
they are perceived. Apophainesthai ta phainomena means “to let that which shows itself be seen 
from itself in the way in which it shows itself from itself.” (GA 2 34/58e) To the difference of the 
Husserl of Ideas I, however, this letting something show itself is only possible on the basis of 
Dasein’s transcendence as Being-in-the-world. One will recall that in the Husserlian Epokhe, the 
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analysis of the pure life of consciousness and of transcendental lived experience entails the 
annihilation of the entire world, what Heidegger calls a ‘not-going-along-with’ the material and 
transcendent world, a thought of the world as alien, other, separated from the pure, ideal and 
absolute being of consciousness by a gulf.25 Pure consciousness, in its absolute immanence, must 
be understood as absolute and pure Being, having no need for real, transcendent beings or 
things.26 For Heidegger, however, the transcendence of Dasein is nothing other than Being-in-
the-world. As such, the absolute idealism of Husserl’s Ideas I neglects the question of Being. 
 As Heidegger explains, transcendence in the philosophical sense is usually used to 
designate a being beyond worldly being. In a theological sense, it can refer to God, while in an 
epistemological sense, in what he calls the theory of knowledge and as he attributes it to 
Husserlian phenomenology, the transcendent refers to what lies beyond the subject’s sphere of 
immanence, where the subject is like a box that must be stepped out of to attain the transcendent 
thing. Resisting both interpretations, transcendence for Heidegger is  
not a relationship between interior and exterior realms such that a barrier belonging to the 
subject would be crossed over, a barrier that would separate the subject from the outer 
realm. But neither is transcendence primarily the cognitive relationship a subject has to an 
object, one belonging to the subject in addition to its subjectivity. Nor is transcendence 
simply the term for what exceeds and is inaccessible to finite knowledge. (GA 26 210-
1/165) 
 
Rather, what Heidegger calls ‘the transcendent’ appears to cohere more with the relation of 
overstepping, the ‘pas au-delà’ itself, than it does that which is stepped towards: ‘the 
transcendent’ is the relation of transcendence and not the transcendent object.27 As such, the 
relations between transcendence and immanence as I have shown them used in Husserlian 
phenomenology undergo a complete inversion; the sphere of the subject is no longer the 
immanent but the transcendent, one within which Dasein is always already outside with other 
beings and the world. Transcendence is thus presupposed by whatever one may call the ego, 
individual, self or subject.28 If one is to choose the term ‘subject’ at all, then “to be a subject 
means to be a being in and as transcendence.” (GA 9 137/108)  
 While transcendence constitutes the selfhood of the Dasein, this does not entail that the 
world is related to Dasein egoistically. To say so, whether at the level of other Daseins or of 
natural things, would be to confuse an ontic or existentiell relation (concerned with beings) for an 
ontological one (concerned with Being). To say that Dasein understands beings as for-the-sake-
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of-itself simply means for Heidegger that Dasein is concerned with its own being and projects.29 
All ‘ethical’ determinations of an egotistical or altruistic relationship to beings are derivative 
determinations of Dasein’s metaphysical isolation, since its transcendence as being-in-the-world 
is itself being-with-others. “It becomes clear that the problem of empathy is just as absurd as the 
question of the reality of the external world.” (GA 20 335/243) Indeed, quite similarly to Husserl, 
the world is the very condition for understanding another Dasein, a ground of comprehensibility 
– I’d say translatability – that makes distance, incomprehensibility and untranslatability 
possible.30 Further, all natural and utilizable beings may be for the sake of human Dasein, but this 
does not mean that ‘nature’ exists for its use and purposes. And yet, the structure of 
transcendence is one belonging exclusively to the human Dasein: if the ground of the ontological 
difference is the transcendence of Dasein, then non-human living things will be deprived of a 
relation to the world ‘as such,’ an understanding of Being and the freedom to let beings be.31  
 What precisely does Heidegger mean by the ‘freedom’ to let beings be? “To put it briefly, 
Dasein’s transcendence and freedom are identical!”32 (GA 26 238/185) To let beings be does not 
mean to abandon, renounce or neglect them, rather the opposite: “to let be is to engage oneself 
with beings... To let be – that is, to let beings be as the beings that they are – means to engage 
oneself with the open region and its openness into which every being comes to stand, bringing 
that openness, as it were, along with itself.” (GA 9 144/188) This process of emerging and 
‘standing-out-in-itself-from-itself’ is precisely what Heidegger understands as phusis or ‘nature,’ 
the ‘upsurgent presence’ of beings as a whole.33 Transcendence itself is determined as “freely 
letting world prevail [freie Waltenlassen von Welt als Transzendenz].”34 (GA 9 165/127) As I 
just showed, Dasein’s proper relation to beings is understood by Heidegger as a purposive for-
the-sake-of, distinguished from any notion of nature as something belonging to humans with 
which they can do as they please. The for-the-sake-of of beings is indeed the necessary correlate 
of a willing, but one that must be distinguished from its existentiell or ontic determination, and 
also from the opposition of an organic spontaneity to a mechanical compulsion.35 Indeed, all 
‘ontological’ willing for Heidegger is grounded in the letting that is the freedom and 
transcendence of Dasein.36 Furthermore, freedom is not a property or possession of the human as 
something it ‘has.’ Rather, Dasein possesses the human and grants it alone the relation to beings 
as a whole, one denied to ‘nature.’37 But this freedom is itself inseparable from what Heidegger 
calls the binding counter-hold of the world.38 Suspended between its excessive transcendence and 
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the counter-hold of the world, Dasein’s freedom is revealed as its impotence and powerlessness. 
As Heidegger writes in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics,  
in man’s comportment towards beings which he himself is not, he already finds the being 
as that from which he is supported, as that on which he is dependent, as that over which, 
for all his culture and technology, he can never become master. Depending upon the 
being which he is not, man is at the same time not master of the being which he himself 
is. (GA 3 228/155) 
 
Dasein’s powerlessness in its freedom, for Heidegger, can in fact be understood as the origin of 
responsibility.39 In its transcendence, “Dasein is, in each case, beyond beings, as we say, but it is 
beyond in such a way that it, first of all, experiences beings in their resistance, against which 
transcending Dasein is powerless.” (GA 26 279/215) I showed above that Heidegger complicates 
the idea of material resistance as the correlate of organic striving in Scheler, faulting the latter for 
beginning with elementary forms of life and generalizing these to the human Dasein, suggesting 
that we can only begin any such reflections from the type of being we ourselves are. If, however, 
this transcendence of Dasein is exclusively conferred upon the human, as Derrida believes, it 
remains to be seen whether both this resistance and this powerlessness are thought in a 
sufficiently radical sense in Heidegger, and along with it the differentiation of ‘letting’ from its 
classical, humanist and voluntarist correlate. To anticipate my reading of Derrida, if one can 
somehow think an arche-material res(is)tance, older than the distinction between Being and 
beings holding sway in the Walten of phusis, one can orient oneself otherwise in thinking a 
powerlessness in death which would radically expropriate any transcendence proper to the 
human Dasein, which would in turn instil the hetero-affection of a material restance at the heart 
of its auto-affective temporalization, a res(is)tance that resists the ontological ‘is’ at its heart, 
places Being under erasure, resisting all objectification, all the while making it possible.40 As 
Heidegger writes, Dasein’s powerlessness must be understood as originary; “it cannot be 
removed by reference to the conquest of nature, to technology, which rages about in the ‘world’ 
today like an unshackled beast; for this domination of nature is the real proof for the 






§3.1.2: Letting Beings Be: Beyond the Economy of Eidos and Idea 
In order to situate these thoughts in my elaboration of general ecology, let me recall Derrida’s 
discussion of form, morphè, eidos and idea in chapters 1 and 2, one extending to Heideggerian 
ontology. In “Form and Fashion,” Derrida entertains the thought that a common root of racism 
and anti-Semitism – I added anthropocentrism and other mutually reinforcing structures of 
domination – could be located in a fascination for form, visibility, the organic and organizing 
contour of an eidos and idealization, one that seems bound with the questions of objectification 
and calculative value I am discussing here.41 I recognize, however, the immense difficulties 
involved in engaging such questions, especially that of anti-Semitism, with regard to Heidegger, 
and its spectre will haunt my next two chapters. For Heidegger, the shift from the thinking of 
Being as phusis to that of Being as Idea, the latter restricting the relation to beings solely in terms 
of production, calculation, objectification, indeed commerce can be traced to a certain inversion 
in relation between the original concept of morphe and the eidos – the form and the look – one in 
which Plato will come to interpret the materiality of beings as me-on, “that which really should 
not be and really is not either, because beings always deform the pure look, by actualizing it, 
insofar as they incorporate it into matter.”42 (GA 40 140/196) For Heidegger, the relationship to 
beings as disposable and calculable objects itself manifests a certain understanding of Being in 
its everydayness, and by repeating this gesture, the one-sidedness of its viewpoint is revealed. All 
production requires something with which to produce, that does not itself need to be produced, 
something “offer[ing] resistance to the formative processes that produce things.” (GA 24 
164/116) Therein lies the concept of matter, the hylè, of fundamental importance to the Greeks 
not due to their materialism, he notes, but because matter is necessary to the understanding of a 
being in productive comportment.43 As I showed, Derrida is not only suspicious of any return to 
materialism that would solidify its binary opposition to form, but also of the corrective proposed 
by so-called material phenomenology, for reasons that Heidegger would no doubt share given the 
latter’s own serious reservations before Lebensphilosophie: the trust material phenomenology 
places in the concepts of pure immanence, pure transcendental life, transcendental vitalism and 
so on. 44  Both material phenomenology and what one might call a ‘biopolitical’ calculative 
enframing seem in this sense to come down to one another.45 Indeed, it is precisely in response to 
the dark historical connotations of these concepts of pure life and ‘feeling oneself alive’ that 
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Heidegger will resist the Nazi appropriation of Nietzsche’s philosophy by reading the latter’s 
thought as a metaphysics of life rather than a vitalism or biologism.46  
 It is rather through a reworking of intentionality as the ontological transcendence of 
Dasein and as fundamentally affective that Heidegger will short-circuit the debates between 
formalism/materialism, realism/idealism, subjectivism/objectivism, etc. Derrida will credit 
Heidegger for rethinking affectivity beyond the opposition of reason and sensibility. 47  As I 
showed in chapter 2, all consciousness is consciousness of something for Husserl; it intends 
towards beings. Heidegger’s phenomenological reduction is not one of subjectively or 
immanently apprehending a being, but of understanding a being as it unconceals itself in its 
Being. Intentionality must thus be understood on the basis of the transcendence of Dasein.48  
intentionality is not an extant relation between an extant subject and an extant object but 
is constitutive of the relational character of the subject’s comportment as such. As the 
structure of subject-comportment, it is not something immanent to the subject which 
would then need supplementation by a transcendence; instead, transcendence, and hence 
intentionality, belongs to the nature of the entity that comports itself intentionally. 
Intentionality is neither something objective nor something subjective. (GA 24 446/313-
4) 
 
As I mentioned, Dasein’s transcendence is understood by Heidegger as Being-in-the-world, and 
makes possible what Heidegger calls the ‘ontic’ transcendence of Husserlian intentionality.49 
Being-in involves letting beings be encountered, which is not simply sensing, visibly or 
otherwise, but involves what Heidegger calls circumspective and affective concern: the being 
encountered matters to Dasein.50 But this becoming-affected by the resistance of beings is itself 
only possible in Dasein’s structure as being-in-the-world; resistance presupposes world.51  
Under the strongest pressure and resistance, nothing like an affect would come about, and 
the resistance itself would remain essentially undiscovered, if Being-in-the-world with its 
state-of-mind, had not already submitted itself [sich schon angewiesen] to having entities 
within the world matter to it in a way which its moods have outlined in advance. 
Existentially, a state-of-mind implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which 
we can encounter something that matters to us. (GA 2 137/177) 
 
Dasein’s intentionality, then, “surrenders itself to the world and lets the world matter to it.” (GA 
2 139/178) At the risk of resurrecting the played-out puns on mattering – materially and 
affectively – one can at least note a certain articulation between Dasein’s in-Being and the beings 
with which it concerns itself. Heidegger warns, then, that intentionality must not be understood 
according to the traditional concepts of form and sensile matter, or the opposition of the 
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spontaneity of understanding and the receptivity of sensuousness, “an intellect which glues and 
rigs together the world’s matter with its own forms.” (GA 20 96/70) What Heidegger understands 
as form or morphè is not the construct of a subjective act added to objects, but rather the ‘being-
in-itself,’ and to constitute a being is not to produce, make or fabricate one, but means “letting 
the entity be seen in its objectivity.”52 (GA 20 97/71)  
 The neglect of the question of Being and the misunderstanding of transcending Dasein as 
Being-in-the-world are for Heidegger themselves the reason behind all opposition of 
realism/idealism, materialism/formalism, objectivism/subjectivism.53 These debates, underlying 
all contemporary epistemology, theory of knowledge and scientific practice are coextensive with 
a forgetting of the meaning of Being as a question, one that reduces all beings to their 
disposability for technicist calculability, use-value, their restricted economy. While the 
transcendence of Dasein and that of the world are not two separate beings and designate an 
originarily relational structure, “idealism and realism both let the relationship between subject 
and object first emerge.” (GA 20 225/166) Whether in idealism, where the subject creates the 
relationship to the object, or in realism, where the object effects the relation to the subject, both 
subject and object are separable.  
 Let me now attempt to tie together these reflections on Heidegger’s radicalization of 
intentionality with my earlier adaptation of Derrida’s critique of form as underlying what one 
could call the ‘biopolitical’ mechanisms responsible for environmental degradation. As I noted, 
all the problems of subject-object, inside-outside, etc., stem from forgetting the question of Being 
and misunderstanding the transcendence of Dasein; a forgetting and misunderstanding which are 
not accidental but belong to the very structure of Being, phusis. How did the covering-up of this 
meaning come about? I noted above that phusis, for Heidegger, means how something unfolds 
itself and comes into appearance, “phusis is Being itself, by virtue of which beings first become 
and remain observable.” (GA 40 11/15e) As he notes, phusis and phainesthai share the same 
etymological root concerning lighting up, self-showing and appearing. Phusis, then, is 
phenomenological through and through. In the original Greek sense of morphè and form, what 
becomes observable is what stands and places itself forth and enacts its limit. For the human 
observer, the morphè offers itself in terms of how it looks, which the Greeks call eidos or idea.  
 The degeneration from Greek thinking, in which humans now consider all beings as 
objects for their disposal and calculation, stems from the reduction of the phainesthai to the 
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visibility of things present-at-hand.54 As appearing, phusis first offers a form, a morphè, which 
then grounds the look, the eidos, the idea. Appearing itself has these two meanings; on the one 
hand, and authentically so for Heidegger, phusis as form-appearing means “the self-gathering 
event of bringing itself to stand and thus standing in gatheredness.” (GA 40 139/194-5) On the 
other hand, phusis as idea-appearing means “as something that is already standing there, to 
proffer a foreground, a surface, a look as an offering to be looked at.” (GA 40 139/195) The end 
of Greek philosophy, however, is not so much that phusis becomes determined as idea, but that 
this becomes its sole and definitive interpretation. Greek philosophy thus “becomes a matter of 
schools, organizations, and techniques… when… the Being of being appears as idea, and as idea 
becomes the ‘ob-ject’ of episteme (scientific knowledge.)” (GA 40 92/128) In fact, he writes, 
with Plato, the connection between morphè and eidos becomes reversed, and the latter comes to 
ground the former. The eidos serves as the model in view of which every forming production will 
orient itself. This comes to determine phusis as ‘nature’ as well, ‘nature’ being that which 
produces products which give themselves to the look for their use-value.55  
 To repeat, Heidegger does not see the determination of phusis as idea as accidental, this 
determination belongs to the definition of phusis as appearing, and to encounter beings in view of 
production occupies the majority of our everyday engagement with them. Shaping, forming, 
making and producing in view of the look/eidos/idea are basic comportments of the Dasein, and 
“are now handled like well-worn coins,” they belong to our economy, indeed constitute it. (GA 
24 152/108) However, in the necessary repetition of this relationship to beings, something like an 
understanding of Being does begin to disclose itself. Productive comportment for Heidegger 
must necessarily understand its activity as eventually finished, and in this finishing, extricated 
from any teleology, productive comportment releases the being from its activity and lets it be in-
itself. Standing on its own as finished, not only is the product “no longer bound to the productive 
relation, but also, even as something still to be produced, it is understood beforehand as intended 
to be released from this relation.” (GA 24 160/113) This originary relation of discharge and 
setting-free, indeed of letting beings be, in which Dasein “comports itself in such a way that it 
even desists from all commerce [Hantieren] with the being, from occupation with it” is 
obfuscated by what Heidegger calls the theory of knowledge and the false debates it engenders. 
(GA 24 167/118e)  
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 One might imagine, given these reflections, that the hesitations faced by Derrida in “Form 
and Fashion” concerning what I have just called the biopolitics of form have less to do with form 
itself than with the eidos and ideality determining how a thing should look, if the thing fits, and 
so on. If Heidegger is correct in his radicalization of intentionality as the transcendence of Dasein 
that form, morphè in its original sense coheres more with letting the thing show itself as it shows 
itself in its affective materiality, one in fact finds therein a gentle resistance to biopolitical 
enframing.56 Of course, the objectification of beings in view of production and calculation that 
lends its rhythm to classical science, language and man’s domination over nature is not 
something that can be theorized away; such a relation belongs to the very definition of phusis. 
But, as I’ve hinted throughout, the freedom to let beings be would be one exclusively conferred 
upon the human for Heidegger on Derrida’s reading, as would be the stepping back from 
economic enframing and valuation. But as I’ve stressed, my intention is not to return whatever 
has been reserved for the human to the forms of life that have been denied it, or at least not 
primarily so. Rather, general ecology not only thinks this restricted circular propriation, but its 
radical expropriation; general ecology thinks the two together in what Derrida calls ex-
appropriation. However, my engagement with Heidegger is far from complete, as I have yet to 
examine the crucial issues of ecstatic and auto-affective temporalization, finitude and death and 
how these play into the above discussions. Affective concern, Heidegger writes, is having the 
mode of being of “pure letting-become-present – a remarkable kind of being which is understood 
only when it is seen that making present and appresenting is notion other than time itself.” (GA 
20 292/213-4) Closing the discussion of eidos and morphè with the following:  
the thing to see is this. In the intentional structure of production there is implicit reference 
to something, by which this something is understood as not bound to or dependent on the 
subject but, inversely, as released and independent. In terms of fundamental principle, we 
encounter here an extremely peculiar transcendence of the Dasein…which, as will 
appear, is possible only on the basis of temporality. (GA 24 161/114) 
 
§3.1.3: Death, Time and Powerlessness  
Let us recall Derrida’s claim, perhaps striking to Heidegger scholars, that the latter’s entire 
philosophical project along with Levinas’s begins with a certain challenge to the Husserlian 
Living Present.57 This claim is particularly interesting since nowhere in the readings discussed 
does Heidegger make reference to the lebendige Gegenwart by name. However, Heidegger goes 
to great lengths to distance phenomenology as he understands it from a philosophy of life, as I 
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have just shown evidenced in his radicalization of Husserlian intentionality and the immanence 
to consciousness of ‘lived experience,’ [Erlebnis] as the transcendence of Dasein, challenging the 
Pure Form of the Living Present as the unique and absolute condition of possibility of all 
experience. The transcendence of Dasein reintroduces the world at the heart of its affective 
relation to beings-as-a-whole, phusis. What seems to interest Derrida so much in Heidegger’s 
reading of Western metaphysics, however, is that the latter does not attempt to simply seek a 
beyond of metaphysics, of the Living Present, as if the tradition could somehow be overcome and 
done away with. Rather, it is Heidegger’s soliciting of what Derrida calls ‘philosophical 
invulnerability’ of the Living Present, the structural impossibility of exiting the Living Present 
that Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics begins to shake up. As I mentioned, a specifically 
Heideggerian reading of the Living Present occupies Derrida’s entire early work; from the 
necessity of dialectically reconciling Husserlian phenomenology with ontology in The Problem 
of Genesis... to the thought of transcendental difference at the heart of the Living Present in the 
final pages of the Introduction. 58  As I argued in chapter 2, however, these moves only 
accomplished what I called the restricted ecology in Derrida’s work. Indeed, the questions of 
authentic temporalization in ecstasis and auto-affection, death and finitude – insofar as they can 
be shown to be the sole property and propriety of the human Dasein – will also restrict 
Heidegger’s thought to the propriative circulation of a restricted ecology. But to think the ex-
propriation of these structures, those at the heart of any appropriation, will perhaps allow us to 
think the philosophical vulnerability of the Living Present otherwise, the impossibility of its exit 
otherwise, beyond the simple overpowering of the human Dasein in its transcendence towards 
phusis in the finitude of the time, Being, history, sense, experience and life we share with all 
living beings on Earth, perhaps even the infinite finitude of this finitude itself.  
 Before inscribing Derrida’s Heideggerian reflections in the logic of general ecology, let 
me return to Being and Time, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics and The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology. For Heidegger, temporality is the sole basis for transcending Dasein’s 
releasement of beings from productive comportment: its letting beings be. I showed that 
Heidegger opposes what he calls the ontic/existentiell transcendence of intentionality to that of 
Dasein, whose relation to beings and to itself is one of care and concern. Temporality for 
Heidegger is the ontological meaning of this care, indeed of Dasein itself. To say that Dasein 
comports itself in care is to say that Dasein is concerned with its possibilities, and for Heidegger, 
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Dasein’s ownmost and most proper possibility is its death, one it has to take over in each case 
and cannot be outstripped; the possibility of its impossibility of being-there.59 The anticipation of 
death ultimately individuates Dasein as its ownmost, non-relational possibility. But do we 
understand this anticipation of death as one merely off in the future, a ‘not yet’ that every form of 
life eventually encounters?60 From the viewpoint of biology and physiology for Heidegger, this 
seems to be the case. Plants and animals eventually perish [Verenden].61 However, opposed to 
this inauthentic interpretation of death is the authentic being-towards-death of the human Dasein 
in its resoluteness [Entschlossenheit].62  Dasein’s death is not simply ‘not yet,’ but “has the 
character of something towards which Dasein comports itself. The end is impending [steht… 
bevor] for Dasein.” (GA 2 250/293) In authentic being-towards-death, Dasein chooses its 
ownmost potentiality for Being, a possibility it has nonetheless inherited before any willing on its 
part and which can never be done away with.63  
 Suspended between choice and inheritance, resoluteness must not be understood as the 
wilful or heroic activity of a subject before a situation, its ‘taking action’ in productive 
comportment. As resolute, Dasein is always already taking action, in a situation. However, “the 
term ‘take action’ [Handeln] is one which we are purposely avoiding. For in the first place this 
term must be taken so broadly that ‘activity’ [Aktivität] will also embrace the passivity of 
resistance.” (GA 2 300/347) Resolute anticipation thus also involves powerlessness, granting 
death a power over Dasein’s existence.64 As Heidegger elaborates,  
if Dasein, by anticipation, lets death become powerful in itself, then, as free for death, 
Dasein understands itself in its own superior power, the power of its finite freedom, so 
that in that freedom, which ‘is’ only in its having chosen to make a choice, it can take 
over the powerlessness of abandonment to its having done so. (GA 2 384/436)  
 
This ability or capacity to come towards and stand before itself for Dasein is thus also a letting 
itself come towards itself, and the being-ahead-of-itself in resolute anticipation is precisely what 
Heidegger calls care. Temporality is the ontological meaning of care because Dasein’s coming to 
itself in its authentic being-towards-death is grounded in the future as coming towards.65 The 
essence of futurity, he writes in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, is this character of 
coming-toward oneself [Auf-sich-zukommen].66 As such, futural Dasein comes towards itself as 
having-been.67 Along with futurity and having-been, the temporal structure of care also holds 
towards Dasein’s everyday comportment towards beings which are ready-at-hand; it lets beings 
show themselves in their Being by making them present.68  
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 Futurity, making-present or empresenting, and having-been: these designate what 
Heidegger calls the ecstases of temporalization. Temporality “is not an entity. It is not, but it 
temporalizes itself.” (GA 2 328/377) As this self-temporalization, it is “the ekstatikon pure and 
simple. Temporality is the primordial ‘out-side-of-itself’ in and for itself.”69 (GA 2 329/377) If 
such a description recalls Derrida’s own reworking of the Husserlian Living Present in the final 
pages of the Introduction, let us further supplement this reading with Heidegger’s discussion of 
what Derrida will call auto-affection. In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger recalls 
that the pure intuition of time must always affect the representation of objects, but is not a being 
at-hand that comes from outside to affect these representations. Rather, time is a pure intuition 
that allows Dasein to take things in stride and to let beings be. As pure auto-affection, 
time is not an acting affection that strikes a self which is at hand. Instead, as pure it forms 
the essence of something like a self-activating. However, if it belongs to the essence of 
the finite subject to be able to be activated as a self, then time as pure self-affection forms 
the essential structure of subjectivity. Only on the grounds of this selfhood can the finite 
creature be what it must be: dependent on taking-things-in-stride.” (GA 3 189/129) 
 
Pure self- or auto-affection is for Heidegger “the innermost essence of transcendence.” (GA 3 
190/130) The ecstases of time are not exteriorities towards which primordial time would then 
exit; as pure auto-affection, temporality temporalizes itself in its ecstases.70 As the transcendence 
of Dasein must likewise not be understood as the relation between an inside and an outside, a 
derivative relation with respect to its transcendence as Being-in-the-world, “if Dasein’s Being is 
completely grounded in temporality, then temporality must make possible Being-in-the-world 
and therewith Dasein’s transcendence; the transcendence in turn provides the support for 
concernful Being alongside entities within-the-world.” (GA 2 364/415)  
 For Heidegger the ecstases of time must not be understood as pure raptures, but always in 
relation to certain horizons that constitute the very possibility of world.71 The world is already 
disclosed and presupposed within ecstatico-horizonal temporalization. As I hinted at the 
beginning of my investigation, the ontological possibility of letting entities be encountered and 
objectified within-the-world must be understood in the ecstatico-horizonal transcendence of the 
world. Beyond the derivative distinctions between subject and object, the possibility of Dasein’s 
meaningful intentional relationship to entities within the transcendent world can be explained 
thusly: on the one hand, because Dasein’s being-in-the-world is grounded in its own 
temporalization, the world is subjective. On the other hand, since the world is temporally 
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transcendent, its objectivity is beyond that of any object. 72  Inasmuch as Dasein exists, it is 
“further outside than any object and at the same time further inside, more inward (more 
subjective), than any subject or soul (because temporality as transcendence is openness).”73 (GA 
24 359-60/255) Because transcendence is itself the finite structure of any relation to beings, in a 
statement that ought give pause to any proponent of object-oriented ontology, Heidegger notes 
that “it is not necessary, in order to escape an alleged ‘subjective idealism,’ to invoke a ‘turn to 
the Object’ – a turn which is praised again today all too noisily and with all too little 
understanding of the problem.” (GA 3 73/49) 
 As pure auto-affection, as the pure outside-of-itself in-and-for-itself in the unity of its 
ecstases, temporalization constitutes the transcendence of Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, and its 
capacity to let beings be and to take things in stride. To say that time is the condition of letting 
beings be in their Being, to let them Be as such in the difference from their being is another way 
of saying that authentic temporalization is the ground for the understanding of Being. 74 
Moreover, temporalization functions as the possibility of both Dasein’s authentic and inauthentic 
relation to death, since it constitutes Dasein in its originary finitude. Indeed, Heidegger notes, 
authentic temporality must itself be understood as finite; infinite time is the inauthentic levelling 
of primordial temporality. This finitude of time is also that of Dasein, and furthermore that of its 
knowledge.75 Indeed, as Heidegger puts it in the Kantbuch, “finite intuition of the being cannot 
give the object from out of itself. It must allow the object to be given. Not every intuition as 
such, but rather only the finite, is intuition that ‘takes things in stride.’ Hence, the character of the 
finitude of intuition is found in its receptivity.” (GA 3 26/17) Transcendence, Heidegger writes, 
“is finitude itself, so to speak.” (GA 3 91/62) The auto-affection of time, anterior to any 
experience, sensibility or empirical receiving allows the finite human Dasein to be open to that 
which it is not, to the wholly other [ganz anderen], something “that the knowing creature itself is 
not and over which it is not the master,” and lets it be encountered as standing-against.76 (GA 3 
115/79) In the ecstatico-horizonal temporality of concern, “Dasein understand[s] itself in its 
abandonment to a ‘world’ of which it never becomes master.” (GA 2 356/407) In short, time 
functions as the condition of possibility of experience itself, and no knowledge of the being that 
it is not and can never master can be said to be more disempowering than the relation of Dasein 
to its death, the impossibility of its being-there, the possibility of its impossibility. To put a 
pertinent question far too succinctly, if the human delimitations of all these reflections were to 
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find themselves complicated in a certain logic of ex-appropriation, could one not think this 
powerlessness before death as the original expropriation of the human, as the originary finitude 
of life differentially shared [partagée] by all living beings? Indeed, can this non-power be 
thought even further in the resistance of materiality itself? As Heidegger himself puts it in The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics,  
only something that is capable, and remains capable, is alive. Something which is no 
longer capable, irrespective of whether a capacity is used or not, is no longer alive. 
Something which does not exist in the manner of being capable cannot be dead either. 
The stone is never dead because its being is not a being capable in the sense of what is 
instinctual or subservient. ‘Dead matter’ is a meaningless concept. Being capable is not 
the possibility of the organism as distinct from something actual, but is a constitutive 
moment of the way in which the animal as such is – of its being. (GA 29-30 343/236)  
 
But rather than the corrective which posits the agency, dynamism and liveliness of matter so 
prevalent in new materialism, could one not think materiality as a dead and expropriating 
powerlessness before and beyond the opposition of capacity and incapacity, power and 
powerlessness? To think not only the hetero-affective alterity and transcendence of a worldly and 
material res(is)tance at the heart of the purity of the restricted ecology of this auto-affection of 
life, but to think impossibility and experience together, in an experience without experience, an 
‘unexperienced experience’ of the impossible? When Derrida writes, for example, that 
“exteriority is inanimate,” but this death, which is also space and nature, inscribes itself at the 
heart of human living presence. (DG 280/196) As Krell wonders, if both Dasein and Being are 
finite, and thus so must also be the horizon of the question of Being, “how can a transcendental 
horizon, conceived ontologically as an a priori condition-of-possibility, be finite?”77 As quasi- or 
ultra-transcendental, I’d reply, as having its condition of possibility in its own impossibility, in 
an impossibility older than the ontological difference. As Derrida concludes his seminar on 
Heidegger, this calls for thinking a destruction, indeed a deconstruction.  
It is accomplished slowly, patiently, it patiently takes hold of the whole of language, of 
science, of the human, of the world. And this patience is not even ours, it is not an ethical 
virtue. It is the auto-affection of what one can no longer even call Being. Being and 
history would thus still be metaphorical expressions. (Destroy the word metaphor = 
linguistics. Heidegger does not use it. (HQ 325/224) 
 
To think life death on earth otherwise, beyond the name, ontic metaphor, question, as response, 
promise – this is perhaps the task of deconstruction as general ecology.  
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§3.2: Derrida and Ex-Appropriation 
§3.2.1: The Destruktion of the Living Present 
In a 1967 interview, Derrida writes that nothing in his work would have been possible without 
Heidegger, particularly with respect to the difference between Being and beings, the ontological 
difference.78 But he quickly adds here, and out of fidelity to this debt, the necessity of confirming 
a certain metaphysical belonging of the ontological difference.79 As I showed, the final stage of 
what I called Derrida’s restricted ecology consists of thinking a transcendental difference, I 
believe in a Heideggerian sense, at the heart of the Living Present.80 In fact, the distance Derrida 
comes to take from Heidegger corresponds to the degree to which the restricted ecology of the 
Living Present becomes rearticulated within a more general structure. Again, this occurs in 
problematizing a movement of propriety, economic reappropriation without remainder, auto-
affective circulation and immanent self-presence. It does so by revealing, as their condition of 
possibility and as their structural impropriety and expropriation, what I have called the 
transcendences of the alterity of the wholly other: the past which has never been present, the pre-
historical, radical passivity, the vulnerability of finitude and death differentially shared by all 
living beings, the res(is)tance of materiality, etc. General ecology, then, must be understood as 
the stricture binding together these transcendences with the restricted ecologies of the 
transcendence of Dasein, Being-with-others, Being-in-the-world, phusis, being-towards-death, 
the ontological difference, and so on.  
 To understand these remarks in the context of my examination of Husserl, let’s see how 
Derrida presents Heidegger’s thinking in relation to phenomenology in a series of lectures held in 
1964-5: Heidegger: The Question of Being and History. In chapter 2, I’d examined the 
transcendental sense of history understood by Husserl to have lain dormant in confusion and 
darkness in animality and in the most elementary forms of life, and then irrupting upon Greek 
humanity as the prescription of an infinite task in view of producing the infinitely transmissible 
and translatable truths of science, mathematics and ultimately phenomenology. As I showed 
above, however, Heidegger’s first and primary criticism of Husserl, grounding all his others, 
concerns phenomenology’s strict adherence to a classical subjectivism, the subjectum understood 
as substance, hupokeimenon, a being ready-to-hand, and the essential link of these determinations 
to technicizing calculation. Second, this subjectivism is essentially connected to a humanism, 
despite Husserl’s attempt to distance the transcendental ego from any anthropologism.  
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‘humanity,’ here is still the name of the being to which the transcendental telos – 
determined as Idea (in the Kantian sense) or even as Reason – is announced. It is man as 
animal rationale who, in his most classical metaphysical determination, designates the 
site of the unfolding of teleological reason, that is to say history... reason is history, and 
there is no history but of reason. The latter functions in every man, as animal rationale, 
no matter how primitive he is. (MP 146/122t) 
    
Third, this teleology understands its task as the infinite transmission of the truths of science, the 
univocal production of ideal objects, one Heidegger associates with their calculability and use-
value. Fourth, Husserl’s concept of the Lebenswelt relies on a derivative opposition of nature and 
culture and cannot think phusis. Finally, fifth, Husserl’s thinking of history still belongs to what 
Heidegger calls the age of the world-picture.81 As Derrida explains, the determination of phusis 
as eidos from Plato to Husserl is itself the condition of the world becoming an image, picture and 
object. The great epoch of ‘world’ thus overflows all differences between cultures and time 
periods as the destiny of Europe, finding its ultimate fulfillment for Heidegger in a contemporary 
science and technology that determines the world as an object available for action, conception, 
calculability and predictability. Husserl thus thinks history as the subjectivist and humanist 
project of the infinite transmission of the truths of science, according to a derivative opposition 
of nature and culture, in a metaphysical world-picture that unites all of humanity towards the 
calculative and objectifying power of science and technology. Heidegger’s project, however, 
does not consist of wishing to escape this world, its epoch or the project of science and 
technology.82 Rather, he will show that the epoch of Western metaphysics “escapes from itself, 
that it is not simply one with itself and that already a shadow divides it from itself, through which 
its present meaning appears to it and its future is announced. A certain relation to the incalculable 
is the shadow that allows the motif of calculability to be thought as what it is.” (HQ 201/133) 
 Derrida proposes to show that Heidegger’s destruction of classical subjectivity is 
grounded on the historicity of Dasein.83  If I skipped over the question of historicity in my 
engagements with Heidegger, it was not only to avoid overly complicating the above analysis but 
to give it here its proper due. In Being and Time, the finitude of temporality is explained by 
Heidegger as the hidden basis for Dasein’s historicality, the latter simply being a more concrete 
analysis of temporality.84 Why then, does history hold such importance for Derrida in the mid-
sixties, and how does this fit in with his previous work on Husserl? As the former explains, the 
question of Dasein’s historicity is not primary in Being and Time, and needs to be thought both 
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with respect to its being-in-the-world and its temporalization. How does Heidegger’s thought of 
world, time and thereby history differ from Husserl’s for Derrida?  
 As I noted above above, Heidegger is quite critical both of transcendental idealism and 
the Epokhe of Ideas I, which he argues would give way to an egological lived experience 
absolutely independent from the existence of the world itself, an ideal absolute subjectivity that 
can in fact withstand the absolute annihilation of the world. The epokhè leads to an an-historical 
and a-temporal ego for Heidegger, who for his part cannot abide a thought of the absolute 
independence of subjectivity with respect to a world.85 Conversely then, Heidegger’s project of 
the destruction of classical subjectivity consists in affirming the historicity and temporality of 
Dasein. Derrida suggests here that all the difficulties encountered in Husserl’s C-manuscripts 
concerning temporalization, the alter ego and the hylè, after the publication of Being and Time, 
force Husserl to return to “that pre-egological and anonymous stratum of lived experience where 
temporality is constituted and constitutes the ego.” (HQ 186/122) As I also showed, Heidegger 
radicalizes the transcendental reduction beyond the immanence of subjective lived experience: 
the transcendental reduction is insufficiently transcendental. The subjective and egological 
dimension of experience must itself be bracketed and revealed as derivative with respect to the 
more originary transcendence of Dasein. Dasein’s transcendence as Being-in-the-world is not 
only inextricable from the world but is the very structure by which the world worlds itself 
[weltet] in its radical historicity. The transcendence of Dasein, for Derrida, thus points to a more 
originary dimension of existence than the cogito, the ‘I think,’ consciousness or the ego.86 A 
similar gesture, he adds, can be found in Sartre when the latter discusses the pre-subjective or 
pre-egological transcendental field, as I discussed in chapters 1 and 2, where I also showed 
Derrida’s return to this question in ‘Eating Well.’ 87  I also evoked Deleuze and Guattari’s 
reference to this notion in What is Philosophy, which faults Husserl for misrepresenting its 
immanence as transcendence-within-immanence.88 Conversely, one might say that the Husserlian 
notion of the ego as transcendence-in-immanence is insufficiently transcendent for Heidegger.  
 In radicalizing the transcendental reduction, Heidegger attempts to deconstruct and solicit 
the irreducible and absolute egological form of experience that is the Living Present for 
Derrida. 89  In bracketing the world, Husserlian phenomenology cannot think transcendental 
history or temporality. Rather, history must be understood in Dasein’s transcendence as Being-
in-the-world, a Being-in, which Derrida recalls, is not of the immanence of Vorhandensein, the 
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being present-at-hand for scientific and technological calculability. What does Derrida mean by 
the solicitation of the irreducible? Let’s recall from chapter 2 that it is impossible for one to exit 
within the Living Present, one is powerless to do so. However, it is also impossible to remain 
within the purity of its indivisibility; the Living Present gives itself to be thought in terms of an 
originary difference.90 This seems to cohere entirely with the discussion of ecstatic and auto-
affective temporality discussed above. But does Derrida not allow us to think this impossibility 
and powerlessness otherwise? For Heidegger, the continuity of life [Zusammenhang des Lebens] 
is thought as a certain transcendental permanence, unifying the permanence of the self with the 
privileging of the present. “In this sequence of Experiences, what is ‘really’ ‘actual’ is, in each 
case, just that Experience which is present-at-hand [Derrida remarks here on Heidegger’s 
depiction of the Erlebnis as Vorhandene] ‘in the current now.’” (GA 2 373/425) What Heidegger 
is describing is precisely for Derrida the Living Present, in which both phenomenology and, he 
adds, existentialism take presence [Vorhandenheit] and present lived experience [vorhandene 
Erlebnis] as “the very form of real, authentic, effective, full experience. One must understand 
that Heidegger must destroy or shake up this absolute privilege of the Present and the Presence of 
the Present to rediscover the possibility of historicity.” (HQ 209/138t) It is necessary, he adds, to 
understand here the philosophical invulnerability of the Living Present. “Why invulnerable? Well 
it is evident, it is self-evidence itself that any experience is only ever lived in the present and that 
everything of experience that comes about, everything that appears in it, presents itself in it, as 
meaning or as self-evidence, is present.” (HQ 210/139) Any experience, whether in our time, 
across the entire history of humanity, in time in general or millions of years in the future, human, 
animal or divine will be in the present. 
An assertion that is perhaps trivial but irrecusable: we never leave the Present. Life – life 
in the sense in which life is the opening of the difference that allows appearing – life, 
animal life or the life of consciousness, life in general (and people have tried to say that 
Husserlianism is a philosophy of life...) – life is living only in the present and the Living 
Present is a tautological expression in which in any case one cannot tell a subject from a 
predicate. Ultimate foundation of our being-together. (HQ 139-40/210) 
 
I argued in chapter 2 that for any living organism, the Living Present maintains together the flux 
of the retention of past-presents and the protention of future-presents, and that the opening to 
these pasts and futures is itself the Present. The absolute form of the Living Present was shown 
not only to constitute the possibility of any experience but any evidence, and thus any scientific 
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and historical knowledge and their universally translatable languages. The possibility of 
reactivating the truths of science and assuring their infinite univocal transmissibility has the 
Living Present as its foundation.91  
 It is thus the pure temporality of the Living Present that must therefore be destructed to 
accede to the transcendence of Dasein in its originary historicity. The infinite, eternal and an-
historical Living Present would be constituted by a vulgar concept of time for Heidegger, to 
which he would oppose an authentic, finite temporality. To affirm the originarily essential 
finitude of temporality would necessitate a temporalization that does not reduce history, death or 
indeed birth for Derrida.92 Again, this inauthentic thought of history, time and death is not an 
accident or fault in apprehending authentic temporality but a necessary movement in the history 
of Being.93 The impossibility of thinking life in general outside the pure form of the Living 
Present, the unsurpassibility of the Living Present, therefore, allows us to gain a certain glimpse 
of what has not and could not be thought otherwise, but more precisely,   
in the thought of the impossibility of the otherwise, in this non-otherwise is produced a 
certain difference, a certain trembling, a certain decentring that is not the position of 
another centre. Another centre would be another now; on the contrary, this displacement 
would not envisage an absence, which is to say another presence: it would replace 
nothing. (MP 41-2/38t) 
 
To think the presence of the present is thus, for Derrida, to affirm its finitude, because “it also 
consists in affirming the impossibility of getting out of the present – history being born of this 
impossibility of living, this impossibility for an experience to happen other than in the form of 
the present.” (HQ 216/144) This entails that, for Heidegger as well, the historical and teleological 
end of man can only be explicated on the basis of its end in mortal finitude.94 “The name of man 
has always been inscribed in metaphysics between these two ends [the mortal and teleological].” 
(MP 147/123) Against the metaphysical, subjective and humanist determination of transcendental 
subjectivity and its classical attributes of activity, freedom and volition, the auto-affection of time 
at the heart of the Living Present allows us to describe the originary passivity of Dasein, the 
passive affection of time by itself as the basis from which all determinations of subjectivity are 
derivative: “a certain irreducible passivity of ek-sistence and Da-sein. Passivity, nucleus of 
passivity, which must not be understood on the model of thingly intra-worldliness or as 
sensibility, but at the very least as auto-affection of time by itself.” (HQ 250/169) As Derrida 
reminds us, auto-affection is the transcendence of Dasein, “the notion of affectivity is at bottom 
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merely the name of the transcendence of Dasein toward the Being of beings, and as time, the 
meaning of the transcendental horizon of the question of Being. Affectivity is in this sense 
transcendence.” (HQ 267/181) 
 As is well known, Heidegger argues that humanism, subjectivity and metaphysics are 
indissociable, and that the question of Being remains unthought in the ethics and ontology of 
humanism.95 Derrida is hugely recognizant of his debt to what he calls Heidegger’s arche-ethical 
gestures in Being and Time.96 Both share a profound suspicion of any Lebensphilosophie, and it 
is against any philosophy of life, biologistic or organicist interpretation of the subject that 
Heidegger defines Dasein as a mortal existant rather than as a living being. What Heidegger 
wishes to precisely deconstruct is the idea of the human as a living being rather than a mortal 
being and its experience as Erlebnis, lived experience.97  This entire rejection of Leben und 
Erleben, Derrida writes in The Beast and the Sovereign, is also a critique of Husserl,  
and phenomenology that determines its phenomenological absolute as Erlebnis, as life, 
transcendental life; Leben und Erleben; if he adds und Erleben, it’s because he has in 
mind, he’s taking critical aim at, the determination of Being as life, the human absolute as 
living, and thereby phenomenology as a philosophy of life, of transcendental life. Which I 
had also tried to question long ago. (BS2 185n1/124n19) 
 
All ontologies of life and metaphysics of death would be constituted on a pre-comprehension of 
death. Heidegger’s task in the existential analytic of Dasein is thus to make this pre-
comprehension explicit. Dasein’s most proper property is the resolute anticipation of its death as 
the possibility of its impossibility. Again, this anticipation is not a heroic thought of surviving or 
overcoming death. In fact, Derrida suggests that Heidegger’s resoluteness must be radically 
differentiated from Hegel’s restricted economy. In my discussion of Bataille, I’d shown that the 
risk of death in the dialectic of mastery is simply a necessary movement of dialectical mediation, 
a passage, Derrida writes, “from life to life, first of all... life is essential and it must be preserved 
by living it, preserved by living it in the Aufhebung: i.e., in a negation that is not abstract.” (HQ 
291/199-200) The dialectic for Derrida comes down to thinking death “within the horizon of the 
infinite and the parousia of absolute knowledge, which is pure life, life with itself of 
consciousness.” (HQ 292/200) In other words, Derrida writes, as “mediation of the economy 
without loss of meaning.” (HQ 292/200e) How this thought will square with that of death as 
propriation and proper propriety of the human remains to be seen.  
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 Resolute anticipation is an authentic possibility – from which Dasein can always default – 
to constitute the present as the past of a future; to live the present not as the origin and absolute 
form of experience but rather as something derivative with respect to an unsurpassable death 
anticipated from a finite future-to-come.98 This anticipation of death is explained by the structure 
of Dasein’s ex-tension (Er-streckung) between its birth and death. This ex-tension, Derrida notes, 
is not that of an individual subject or consciousness. The fact that death is always mine, its 
Jemeinigkeit or mineness, is constituted from Dasein’s Being-towards-death. In the authentic 
anticipation of death, “I find myself as already being in death, affected to a world, and originarily 
a being amongst others. Being in death-with-others.” (HQ 279/191t) Dasein does not itself 
constitute this structure of being-towards-death with others, but rather designates a Mitsein in 
death as an originary existential structure. But who are these others with which we are towards 
death? “For the moment we do not know.” (HQ 221/147) The ex-tension between life and death 
holds as much for an individual, an intersubjective community, and humanity, all of which are 
eventual and secondary determinations of Dasein for Heidegger.  
 But the ‘we’ who are together in our finitude and anticipation of death are also together in 
a pre-comprehension of Being as those for whom Being is a question. The history of 
metaphysics, for Heidegger, consists of a pre-determination of Being as presence, present-being 
and thus the forgetting of the difference between Being and beings, the ontico-ontological 
difference. However, this forgetting is not accidental; since Being and Time are nothing outside 
of their determination as present beings, Being for Heidegger is transcendence plain and simple 
[das Transcendens schlechthin], the ‘ontic metaphor’ will have always been necessary to speak 
of Being.99 The question of Being is thus irreducibly tied to language, but a language that must 
not be thought as the property of a human subject among others. As Heidegger famously writes, 
“Language is the house of Being,” Being produces itself in its proximity to Dasein as 
language.100 (GA 9 313/239) In language, Dasein is the being for which Being is ontically the 
most proximate, but ontologically the most distant. But language also constitutes Dasein’s 
capacity to let beings be what they are; Dasein’s freedom is the movement of its transcendence 
from beings to the Being of beings, and Being produces itself as such in the question.  
 Much in Derrida’s reading of Heidegger rests on this determination of the proximity of 
Dasein to the question of being and the correlated values of propriety, the proper of man, re-
appropriation, authenticity, the Eigen of the Ereignis and especially the oikos, oikonomia. 
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Despite Heidegger’s express intentions to the contrary, “it remains that man... the proper of man 
– the thinking of the proper of man is inseparable from the question or the truth of Being.” (MP 
148/124) The privilege of Dasein’s proximity to Being in fact repeats the phenomenological 
principle of principles, the necessity of self presence, of our own self-proximity in the question of 
Being as it manifests itself to the Being that ‘we’ are, and is perhaps not so different, Derrida 
suggests, than the subjective consciousness of transcendental phenomenology. “Dasein, though 
not man, is nevertheless nothing other than man,” but rather the necessary repetition of humanist 
metaphysical determinations in their destruction. (MP 151/127) But Derrida sees this privilege of 
proximity as a ubiquitous gesture in Heidegger; despite the ontological distance of Being to 
Dasein, everything appears to hinge on the necessity of reducing this distance. Derrida finds that 
in Heidegger’s destruction of the metaphysics of presence we are inevitably recalled to the values 
of the proper, propriety, propriation and reappropriation that are inextricable from the 
authenticity [Eigentlichkeit] of Dasein’s ownmost relation to Being. “Being is what is near to 
man, and... man is what is near to Being. The near is the proper ; the proper is the nearest 
(propre, proprius). Man is the proper of Being... Being is the proper of man.” (MP 160/133) 
What is taking place today, Derrida writes in “The Ends of Man,” is a certain shaking of the 
security and economy of this propriety of humanity, its oikonomia, perhaps I’d say a certain ex-
propriation of its self-relation within the stricture of a more general ecology. 
 
§3.2.2: Ethical Transcendence, Non-Real Resistance and Letting Life Life-On 
As with his treatment of Husserl, what interests Derrida in Levinas’s reading of Heidegger is its 
attempt to think the impossible beyond of the Greek origin of the question, its ex-propriation, one 
might say, which enjoins an unassumable responsibility before something more ancient. Like the 
past that has never been present resisting the dialectic of the Living Present, Levinas points in 
Heidegger’s discourse to something anterior to the question of Being that I’ll later examine as the 
Zusage, acquiescence and affirmation. The responsibility entailed therein is impossible, but has 
already occurred with respect to the question and the totality of beings; it is an ethical imperative 
radically anterior to any ethical law, I’d also say to any positing of value.101 Ethics is as anterior 
to Heideggerian ontology as it is to Greek thought in general for Levinas.102 Within the Greek 
language – that of the metaphysics of presence – his thought enjoins us to depart from the Greek 
towards its other.103 The Greek origin enduring in phenomenology and ontology will have always 
 126 
consisted of the domination of the Same and the One, the violence of light and the phainesthai, 
the reduction of ethics and the foreclosure of ethical transcendence. Levinas wishes to free 
himself from this phenomenological violence by calling forth a non-violent relation to the infinite 
alterity of the other. 104  Heideggerian transcendence, Being-in-the-world, as Dasein, as the 
relation to the question of Being, the pre-comprehension of the meaning of Being, access to the 
ontological difference, to the as-such – all of these would fail ethical transcendence. Levinas’s 
ethical imperative, ‘thou shalt not kill,’ however “marks the limit of all power, of all violence, 
and the origin of the ethical.” (ED 154/130) Levinasian transcendence seems to think an absolute 
limitation on power, an absolute disempowerment. The face of the other limits my power, but not 
by opposing a counter-force, counter-power or counter-violence to my own; it speaks and looks 
at me “from an other origin of the world, from that which no finite power can restrict: the 
strange, unthinkable notion of non-real resistance.” (ED 154/130) Anterior to the opposition of 
between the intelligible and the sensible, Levinas will speak in Totality and Infinity of an ‘ethical 
resistance.’ Transcendence in Levinas’s sense will thus attempt to free this resistance from the 
light of Being and the phenomenon.105 For Levinas, Heideggerian ontology remains bound to the 
very dichotomies it critiques: the phenomenological violence of light commands the oppositions 
of inside/outside, subject/object as their unveiling, comprehension and indeed pre-
comprehension. Heidegger’s ecstatico-horizonal temporalization is not really transcendence, its 
ecstases simply those from an interiority to an exteriority.106 In the pre-comprehension of the 
Being of beings, Heideggerian ontology ultimately remains an egology for Levinas, 
subordinating the relation to the other, who is a being, to the relation to Being, which permits its 
impersonal apprehension and domination in a relation of knowledge.107 The thought of Being for 
Levinas thus comes down to a thought of possibility, power and violence.  
 As Derrida points out, however, one cannot speak of a priority of Being over beings, 
given that Being is itself nothing outside of beings, no more therefore than one can speak of the 
subordination of the ethical relation to the ontological relation. The thought of Being, he adds, is 
not a thought of power; power and priority can only exist as relations between beings. Derrida 
here recalls certain claims from Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism”; the thought of Being is 
neither ethics nor ontology, it has no results, no effects and exerts no power. In fact, not only is 
the thought of Being not ethical violence, but it seems that no ethics – in Levinas’s sense – can 
be opened without it; the thought of Being conditions the respect of the other as other for 
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Derrida.108 Dasein, as I showed, can only let be or take-in-stride that which it itself is not, that 
over which it is not master. To let the other be in the essence of its alterity requires the thought of 
Being. “Without this, no letting-be would be possible, and first of all, the letting be of the respect 
and the ethical commandment addressing itself to freedom. Violence would reign to such a 
degree that it could no longer even appear to itself and be named.” (ED 202-3/172t) Since Being 
itself is nothing, the ontic metaphor will have always been necessary to speak of it. Similarly, one 
can only address oneself to the other in a language that comprehends the sense of Being, that is to 
say, in the question. But since one can only let be that which one is not, the very relation of 
letting be determines Being as the alterity of the other par excellence. Levinas thus necessitates 
the thought of Being and the ontic metaphor in his own discourse: ethical transcendence 
presupposes ontological transcendence. 109  Both transcendences would thus be practicing the 
same meta-physics, if meta means going beyond phusis as the totality of beings. This 
‘ontological’ transcendence towards beings, Derrida writes, “inhabits and founds language, and 
along with it the possibility of all being-together; the possibility of a Mitsein much more original 
than any of the eventual forms with which it has been confused: solidarity, the team, 
companionship.” (ED 217/183) As the very possibility of letting beings be, the thought of Being 
is thus as close to nonviolence as possible for Derrida. As I showed in chapter 2, however, this 
economy of violence is not pure nonviolence, since pure nonviolence comes down to pure 
violence. 110  Derrida is again referring to Heideggerian transcendence, letting beings be, the 
question of Being, the truth, meaning and sense of Being, the ontological difference as an 
economy of violence, the non-ethical opening of ethics. The necessity of the ontic metaphor, 
predicative language, a language that says ‘this being is,’ practices the least possible violence in 
this economy of violence. Everything I’ve covered so far in Heidegger, however, leads one to 
posit these questions as another face of the restricted ecology of deconstruction. Why do I say 
restricted here? If the question of Being is indeed shown to be inextricable from a certain 
property and propriety of the human, if Dasein’s authentic relation towards time, death and the 
other as such is transcendence as Being-in-the-world, encountering and taking-in-stride the 
passive resistance of materiality, its letting beings be – if all of these are ultimately human, how 
does this bode for an ecological ethics?  
 As different as are Heidegger’s and Levinas’s thoughts of transcendence, Derrida writes, 
they both seem to follow the same schema: for Dasein as well as the other. “Who is the 
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‘neighbour’ dwelling in the very proximity of transcendence? What is still to come or what 
remains buried in an almost inaccessible memory is the thinking of a responsibility that does not 
stop at this determination of the neighbour.” (PDS 298/283-4) This determination being, of 
course, as human. What Levinas’s thought offers Derrida, as it did in his reading of Husserl, is 
indeed an opening to or a trace of something ‘older’ than the question of Being, the ontological 
difference, something that would radically expropriate the propriety of the human, and 
complicate all limits between the non-living, the vegetal, animal, human, or God.  
The ‘logic’ of the trace or of différance determines this re-appropriation as ex-
appropriation. Re-appropriation necessarily produces the opposite of what it aims for. Ex-
appropriation is not what is proper to man. One can recognize its differential figures as 
soon as there is a relation to self in its most elementary form (but for this very reason 
there is no such thing as elementary). (PDS 269/283) 
  
Ex-appropriation, he adds, “no longer closes itself; it never totalizes itself... ex-appropriation 
does not form a boundary, if one understands by this word a closure or a negativity. It implies the 
irreducibility of the relation to the other.” (PDS 270) Such an ex-appropriation, I hope to show, 
would shatter the circulation of the restricted ecology of the transcendence of the human Dasein 
and open it onto the transcendence of the Otherwise than Being, beyond the question, language, 
the name, to the impossible, a passivity anterior to the opposition of activity and passivity, a 
vulnerability which would expropriate any propriety of Being-towards-death, an ecological 
Being-in-the-world, a being-on-earth that would not simply let other living beings be as a 
modification of activity, but a let be otherwise, ‘otherwise’ than letting be, letting be otherwise, 
letting be otherwise, letting be otherwise, something like what Krell calls letting death be, but 
that I prefer to call letting live-on, articulating the ontological transcendence of Dasein with the 
ethical transcendence Levinas seeks within the trace-stricture of general ecology. 
The trace is always the finite trace of a finite being. So it can itself disappear. An 
ineradicable trace is not a trace. The trace inscribes itself in its own precariousness, its 
vulnerability of ashes, its mortality... beyond or before an anthropology and even an 
ontology or an existential analytic. What I say about the trace and death goes for any 
‘living thing,’ for ‘animals’ and ‘people.’ (PM 393-4/159)  
 
§3.2.3: Ent-eignis, Ent-fernung and Ex-Appropriation 
The destructions of classical ontology in both Levinas and Heidegger for Derrida operate through 
a thought of a trace relation to the alterity of a past that has never been present and can never be 
lived in the form of a presence.111 This trace, however, itself exceeds Heidegger’s discourse for 
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Derrida. As ‘older’ than the distinction between Being and beings, the trace or différance 
“exceeds the question What is? and contingently makes it possible,” as well as its foundation of 
the metaphysical opposition between de facto and de jure, one might even say between the 
classical and humanist determinations of ontology and ethics Heidegger critiques. (DG 110/75) It 
is older than the ontological difference because it can no longer be addressed by a question but 
can only be acquiesced to and affirmed, as I’ll show below. As Derrida elaborates, 
Within the decisive concept of the ontic-ontological distinction, all is not to be thought at 
one go; entity and being, ontic and ontological, ‘ontico-ontological’ are, in an original 
sense, derivative with regard to... différance, an economic concept designating the 
production of differing/deferring. The ontico-ontological difference and its ground 
(Grund) in the ‘transcendence of Dasein’ (Vom Wesen des Grundes, p. 16) are not 
absolutely originary. Différance by itself would be more originary. (DG 38/23) 
 
Derrida identifies the necessity of thinking together the trace and the remainder, the ‘restance’ 
preoccupying us here: beyond all ontology or any modification of being, the trace remains.112 
Older than the ontological distinction and the transcendence of Dasein, the trace constitutes the 
very ex-propriation of the human, dislocating all propriety, proximity, immediacy and presence 
in general.113 Like the remainder, différance and the trace are nothing, neither present nor absent, 
without proper substance or essence; there is no trace as such, it rather “threatens the authority of 
the as such in general.” (MP 27/25) It is therefore unthinkable as propriation, as Ereignis, but is 
rather a tomb, oikesis, “tomb of the proper in which is produced, by différance, the economy of 
death.” (MP 4/4) Différance thus fractures both the transcendental and ontological accounts of 
history. Culture and history are nature in différance: “nature denaturing itself, diverting itself 
from itself, naturally welcoming its outside into its inside.” (DG 61/41t) All of nature’s others 
appear as the other in différance within the economy of the same: “culture as nature differed – 
deferred; all the others of physis – tekhnè, nomos, thesis, society, freedom, history, spirit, etc. – 
as differing physis or as deferred physis. Physis in différance.”114 (MP 18/17) But one must be 
careful to not simply posit a refurbished concept of ecology as a new name for différance, 
another opening of the question, proper word or unique name.115 Rather, “‘older’ than Being 
itself, such a différance has no name in our language. But we ‘already know’ that if it is 
unnameable, it is not provisionally so, not because our language has not yet found or received 
this name, or because we would have to seek it in another language, outside the finite system of 
our own.” (MP 28/26) It is not by translating other philosophical-ecological systems into our 
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own that we will adequately think the radical passivity of death, phusis in différance and the ex-
appropriation of the human, but rather by letting something else appear in the impossibility of 
such a translation and, in the experience without Erlebnis of this impossibility, an-other thought 
of ecology, a transcendence that is nothing other than and wholly other from what it transcends 
and the ethical passivity of letting, to name without naming the general ecology of this oikos, 
“the at home in general that welcomes the absolute arrivant.”116 (A 68/34) “A ‘world’ that we no 
longer inhabit: no more oikos, economy, ecology, livable site in which we are ‘at home’” might 
itself be the condition for thinking the promise of the earth. (NII 70) To resist the gathering, the 
Versammlung implied in any oikos or ecology, “might be felt as a distress, a sadness, a loss – 
dislocation, dissemination, the not being at home, etc. – but it is also an opportunity. It is the 
opportunity of an encounter, of justice, of a relation to absolute alterity.” (HF 358) 
 Let me recall what was said in chapters 1 and 2 on justice and its source in the disjunction 
and non-self-contemporaneity of the Living Present. It will be a difficult matter of thinking 
together this dis-junction and ex-propriation of economy with the thought of the gift Derrida 
develops in Given Time, but also the pas au-delà and the ‘without’ of the relation without 
relation as this interruption. If in a sense for Derrida Being and Time is its own ‘pas au-delà,’ on 
the one hand remaining thoroughly enclosed within metaphysics and on the other stepping 
beyond it, the same can be said of Heidegger after the Kehre.117 As he writes in “Pas,” 
all ‘Heideggerian’ thought proceeds, in its decisive ‘turnings,’ by the ‘same’ de-
distancing bringing-near of the near and the far. Entfernung de-distances the far it 
constitutes, brings the far near therefore in holding the far far. The evental propriation [a 
forced or risky etymology for Ereignis] of the far is de-distant from itself... The nearness 
of the near is not near, therefore is not proper. (P 27/17) 
 
For Derrida, Heidegger’s turn to the ‘Ereignis’ in Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event) – a 
term usually rendered as ‘event,’ but also carrying with it notions of propriation and 
appropriation, the authentic [eigentlich] as well as dis-propriation [enteignen], along with the 
proper [eigen] – does not constitute a subordination of the question of Being to the question of 
the Event.118 Between the question of Being and the Event,  
the question of the proper-ty (propre) of propriate, of propriation (eigen, eignen, ereigen, 
Ereignis especially)... its irruption here does not mark a rupture or a turning point in the 
order of Heidegger’s thought. For already in Sein und Zeit the opposition of 
Eigentlichkeit and Uneigentlichkeit was organizing the entire existential analytic. Once 
there has been a certain valuation of the proper-ty (propre) and Eigentlichkeit, it can 
never be interrupted. (É 114-116/115-117) 
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It will be necessary for Derrida to think the propriety of the Ereignis with Heidegger’s thought of 
the Entfernung, which the former renders as ‘é-loignement.’ This ‘pas d’Entfernung,’ the step 
without step beyond complicates any opposition or identity between identity and difference, the 
proximate and distant, the Fortsein and Da-sein of the world¸ the ecological and an-ecological.  
Il faut la distance (qui faut), [that distance (which is lacking) is necessary]...distance out-
distances itself. The far is furthered. One is forced to appeal here to the Heideggerian use 
of the word Entfernung: at once divergence, distance, and the distantiation of distance, 
the deferment of the distant, the de-ferment, it is in fact the annihilation (Ent-) which 
constitutes the distant itself, the veiled enigma of proximation.” (É 48-50/49-51)  
 
Heidegger ceaselessly complicates the proximity of the proper, Derrida writes, “by showing that 
the proximity of the near was far, and that Entfernung, distance, distancing, was also a de-
distancing (Ent-fernung) that undid and therefore reduced distance.” (BS2 118/74) 
 For Derrida, the movement of appropriation and de-propriation in the Event and Being 
cannot be thought apart from the gift. For Heidegger, Dasein is the condition that there is [es 
gibt] Being.119 “The ‘gives’ names the essence of Being that is giving, granting its truth. The self-
giving into the open, along with the open region itself, is Being itself.” (GA 9 334/255) This 
dimension of giving for Derrida becomes articulated within the difficult logic of ex-
appropriation, and one must think both what is proper to the gift, Being and time and how these 
give themselves to expropriation and de-propriation.120 Derrida deploys these aporetics of the gift 
in relation to nature and the originary productivity of phusis-in-différance in Given Time. 
Building on Heidegger’s remark that “the gift of presencing is a property of appropriating [Die 
Gabe von Anwesen ist Eigentum des Ereignens],” if différance has no essence, if it “(is) that 
which not only could never be appropriated in the as such of its name or its appearing, but also 
that which threatens the authority of the as such in general,” then the same must be said about the 
gift; there is no gift itself. (DT 163n.1/127-8 n.12) The gift must rather be thought as another 
name of the impossible and its measureless measure [mesure sans mesure], I’d say its in-valuable 
value, its value without and beyond all economic value. 121  The gift is what overflows and 
interrupts all economy, calculation, circulation and reappropriation. However, one cannot treat 
the gift without treating its relation to economy: “the overrunning of the circle by the gift, if there 
is any, does not lead to a simple, ineffable exteriority that would be transcendent and without 
relation. It is this exteriority that sets the circle going, it is this exteriority that puts the economy 
into motion. It is this exteriority that engages the circle and makes it turn.” (DT 47/30) If we 
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think the gift in relation to time, we must say that it overflows and sets in motion any Living 
Present, any auto-affective temporalization; the gift is the aneconomy and ex-propriation that 
makes their restricted circulations and propriations possible. General ecology thinks together this 
movement of ecological propriation and the radical exteriority of the gift without return, and it 
thinks justice and responsibility in and as this ‘time out of joint’ beyond all Living Present, all 
auto-affective temporalization as the promise of the earth.122 
 For Derrida, justice, the promise and the gift must be thought in terms of the incalculable, 
the an-economic and the irreducibly excessive. They thus require what he calls an anachrony and 
disjuncture within Being and Time themselves.123 Derrida lauds Heidegger’s attempt to think 
dike or justice outside the Roman concept of law, however cannot accept its reinterpretation in 
terms of joining, gathering bringing-together, adjoining, harmony, Fug, Versammlung as the 
latter does.124 I don’t have the space to devote to a careful reading of these passages with respect 
to Heidegger’s “Anaximander’s Saying” here, and only wish to flag a few points with respect to 
this tension between this gathering and dislocation, dispersion and dissemination. Heidegger’s 
thought of justice comes down to a thought of property and presence, of leaving to the other that 
which is most proper to them across the proper jointure of presence, and therefore not without 
economic calculability and a process of rendering justice. While Heidegger sets up the concept of 
Versammlung precisely against any later ‘ethico-juridical’ representations, he runs the risk for 
Derrida of reducing justice to a series of calculable juridical norms in privileging propriety, 
gathering and the same. Again drawing from Levinas and Blanchot, Derrida sees justice in the 
relation to the other in terms of interruption, disjunction, non-relation and dissociation. 125 
However, Derrida clarifies that Heidegger’s thought is not simply one of the Versammlung.126 At 
stake in thinking this concept is  
knowing whether one can think Versammlung while including it, integrating and 
assimilating into it, the play of difference, of dislocation, [this is what I’m calling 
restricted ecology] or whether it is only to the extent that there is an irreducible risk of 
dispersion, of singularity, of dissemination, that Versammlung can emerge. (HF 356)  
 
General ecology thinks both, the stakes therein being immeasurable.127  
  For Derrida, as will prove essential in thinking the ‘ich muss dich tragen’ in light of Die 
Welt ist fort, justice consists not so much in a carrying that bridges together the disparate, “but to 
put ourselves there where the disparate itself holds together, without wounding the dis-jointure, 
the dispersion, or the difference, without effacing the heterogeneity of the other.”128 (SM 58/35) 
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In other words, as the maintenance of an interruption in relationality that “maintains the dis-
jointed as such; it joins the dis- by maintaining the gap... the inter-ruptor maintains together both 
the rupture and the relation to the other, which is itself structured as both attraction and 
interruption, interference and difference, a relation without relation.” (P2 102-3/99-100) To 
maintain this interruption beyond economy, calculation, commerce and an ethics that would 
simply deploy a program, apply a rule and balance values is to recognize “the necessity (without 
force, precisely [justement], without necessity, perhaps, and without law) of thinking the gift to 
the other as gift of that which one does not have and which thus, paradoxically, can only come 
back or belong to the other.” (SM 55/32) This disjunction, he adds, necessarily risks the worst 
evil and expropriation, but no justice is possible without it; it instils an irreducible dimension of 
incalculability and non-knowing at the heart of any relationality, and indeed of any ecology. 
Where one cannot respond to the question “who is the ‘neighbour’ dwelling in the very proximity 
of transcendence” is where ethics begins.129 (PDS 298/283)  
 
§3.2.4: Ex-Propriating the Human: Walten and the World of Life Death 
For the purposes of general ecology, I’m trying think the ethical stakes of this ex-appropriation 
as concerns the proper to the human and what we come to differentially share with other living 
beings in its wake. In the necessity of maintaining the distances, hiatuses, gaps and interruptions 
within this ecological relationality, to avoid a “dedifferentiating discourse of life” (perhaps 
suggested by Derrida’s frequent reference to ‘the living in general’), it is perhaps the stricture of 
this generality that must be further explicated.130 Derrida outlines one simple double rule that 
lends its rhythm to the two Beast and Sovereign seminars: 
no more to rely on commonly accredited oppositional limits between what is called 
nature and culture, nature/law, physis/nomos, God, man, and animal or concerning what 
is ‘proper to man’... than to muddle everything and rush, by analogism, toward 
resemblances and identities. Every time one puts an oppositional limit in question, far 
from concluding that there is identity, we must on the contrary multiply attention to 
differences, refine the analysis in a restructured field. (BS1 36/15-16) 
 
As he elaborates, it is less a question of returning to the non-human what it was once denied than 
showing that what is so called ‘proper’ to man has never really been so.131 Heidegger’s refusal to 
animals of what he grants to the property of Dasein is well known.132 Along with refusing the 
power to access the transcendences I spoke of in Husserl: time, the other, the material world and 
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death as such, the animal lacks the power to speak, access the Being of beings, the ontological 
difference, the question of Being, Historiality, the call to responsibility, witnessing, truth, the 
name, technè, in short is refused the movement of transcendence that would allow it to let beings 
be outside of its vital interests: “the animal does not let be as such that which, entirely other, as 
such, is not in his field of programmed interests;” the animal lacks the authentic mortality that 
would allow it to transcend its vital design.133 (BS2 281/199) 
 All these capacities and powers guaranteeing the sovereignty of the Human Dasein over 
its others are made possible by the originary violence of Walten, Heidegger’s translation of the 
Greek phusis, the arche-originary force older than the distinction between nature and culture that 
is the very ground of the ontological difference and thus everything that separates the human 
Dasein from its others.134 It is through the question of Walten that Derrida will examine the 
differential relations to the world between humans and other animals.135 Walten, he writes, must 
be understood as “dominant, governing power, as self-formed sovereignty, as autonomous, 
autarcic force, commanding and forming itself, of the totality of beings, beings in their entirety, 
everything that is.” (BS2 72/39) It is inseparable from Dasein’s Trieb (drive or instinct), indeed 
from its transcendence as its relation to beings-as-a-whole, the totality of beings, and as being-in-
the-world.136 Dasein’s transcendence in the force, movement, tendency and process of this Trieb 
– which is not a drive among others, or a relation between subject and object – is what the animal 
will be denied.137 Derrida even closes his seminar by recalling that, for Heidegger, at the end of 
Greek thought idea and eidos become the predominant interpretation of phusis.138 The idealism 
that dominates Western metaphysics, the fascination for form, the eidos and the visible object 
would all be consequences of the violence of Walten. 139  For me, this calls for thinking a 
materiality resisting this violence otherwise, and one that must itself rethink the terms of ‘matter’ 
and ‘resistance,’ one I began to examine in §3.1.2 and will to return to in a moment. 
 Let’s recall that in an attempt to circumvent any biologistic interpretation of Dasein, as 
well as any biological continuism between it and other animals, Heidegger was led to posit a 
difference in kind between the two, an absolute oppositional limit between all living beings and 
an originarily mortal Dasein who, even if not a human subject but the basis on which the 
humanity of the human and the subjectivity of the subject must be thought, nonetheless confirms 
an infinite, unconditional superiority to the proper of man and leaves intact the anthropologism 
and humanism Heidegger intends to bypass.140 It is in the question of death that one finds the true 
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limit for Heidegger between the mortal Dasein, who has the power to die authentically as its 
ownmost possibility, to relate to death as such, and all other living beings who, lacking this ‘as 
such,’ do not. “The difference between nature and culture, indeed between biological life and 
culture, and, more precisely, between the animal and the human is the relation to death... the 
relation to the as such. The true border would be there.” (A 84/43-4) Let us recall here 
Heidegger’s critique of Scheler’s philosophical decision to investigate the transcendence of the 
world in the phenomenon of resistance beginning from elementary forms of life. For Heidegger, 
it was instead necessary to begin with the entity that we are; he privileges Dasein because as 
beings concerned with their Being as a question, Being is closest to us. 141  The same 
methodological choice is reflected in Heidegger’s choice of the world to which Dasein relates as 
such.142 As Derrida explains, the necessity, indeed the order or orders to begin from what is near, 
to begin any analysis from here, now, and to finish there,  
this order of orders belongs to the great ontological-juridico-transcendental tradition, and 
I believe it to be undeniable, impossible to dismantle, and invulnerable... except perhaps 
in the particular case called death, which is more than a case and whose uniqueness 
excludes it from the system of possibilities, and specifically from the order that it, in turn, 
may condition. (A 86-7/45) 
 
Let’s also recall here Derrida’s discussions of the philosophical invulnerability of the Living 
Present, of Heidegger’s deconstruction of the subject as mortal against the phenomenological 
privileging of the living being and its Erlebnis. This incontestability is indissociable from the 
concept of prevalence itself in the existential analytic; hierarchy, valorization, evaluation, 
preference, the proper and the authentic.143 However, all these questions of order, foundations 
and transcendental conditions of possibility, capacity, power and potentiality for Derrida “are 
themselves made possible and necessary by a relation to death, by a ‘life-death’ that no longer 
falls under the case of what it makes possible.” (A 87/46) If this proper access to death reserved 
solely for the human Dasein were somehow itself ex-propriated, he writes, the entire existential 
analytic would find itself compromised. As he concludes the Beast and Sovereign seminars, 
“there is only one thing against which all violence-doing, violent action, violent activity, 
immediately shatters... imposes failure on Gewalt and Walten... ‘das ist der Tod’ (C’est la 
mort).” (BS2 397/290) Death would thus be the element of non-violent material resistance. 
 To posit a finitude shared by all living beings is not to erase all the limits between them in 
some homogeneous continuity; partage in French also means dividing out; multiplying, creasing, 
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and folding these lines in attention to differences, heterogeneities, and ruptures. 144  In this 
question of death, Derrida writes, “il y va d’un certain pas [it involves a certain step/not].” (A 
23/6) This brings us back to the question of double death I discussed in Blanchot. A certain 
thought of the possible is at the heart of the existential analytic of death for Derrida, both in the 
sense that death can happen at any instant and in the sense that it concerns something of which 
Dasein is capable, has the power and ability for; “death is possibility par excellence.” (A 113-
4/62-3) But Dasein’s most proper possibility, he reminds us, is the possibility of an impossibility, 
and is thus in a sense its least proper and personal possibility; it is the impossibility of its 
possibility irreducible to the opposition of possibility and impossibility.145 The proper, personal 
death is originarily contaminated by the inauthentic, impersonal modes of finishing common to 
the living in general; we might therefore correlate a certain ends of man with a certain “end of the 
properly-dying.” (A 129/74)  If, as Dasein’s most proper property, death is also shown to be its 
most improper and ex-propriating, “and that a certain expropriation of the Enteignis will have 
always inhabited the propriety of the Eigentlichkeit,” an absolutely indivisible limit between 
forms of dying across the living in general finds itself compromised. (A 135/77t) 
 Let’s recall Derrida’s two points concerning these analyses: on the one hand, to avoid 
dogmatic metaphysical demarcations between the human and its others; in this respect, humans 
and other living beings incontestably inhabit the same world. On the other hand, it is necessary to 
not rush into blurring all lines and differences; in the sense, humans and other animals 
incontestably do not inhabit the same world. But in fact, he adds, not a single singular living 
being inhabits the same world as another; their singularity is each time the birth and death of the 
world and any world deemed common will always be the effect of a construction, even a 
mechanical ruse.146 And yet, one can at least suggest that humans, animals, plants and so on have 
being alive in common, along with “the finitude of their life, and therefore, among other features 
of finitude, their mortality in the place they inhabit” (BS2 33/10) “Whether one calls it the earth 
(including sky and sea) or else the world as the world of life-death. The common world is the 
world in which one-lives-one-dies, whether one is a beast or a human sovereign, a world in 
which both suffer, suffer death, even a thousand deaths.” (BS2 365/264) It is in the finitude we 
share across a world we do not and cannot that we return to Celan’s line die Welt ist fort ich muss 
dich tragen as the very beginning of ethics, indeed of the disjunction of the Living Present: there 
where the world is gone, far or absent I must carry you, and this carrying must occur without any 
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knowledge, foundation or horizon.147 The carrying must be understood both as the necessary and 
impossible desire of a shared Living Present; on the one hand the presumed unity of the world, 
the ‘as-if’ of a common world assuring the longest sur-vival for all living beings (but an als ob, I 
showed in my previous chapter, which must be kept at a distance from an Idea in the Kantian 
sense), and on the other a necessary discourse of multiplicity, untranslatability, the non-
gatherable and expropriation; to live as if we shared a world in order to let life on earth live on.148  
 To give the world to the other, let the living live-on, is one not returned here precisely to 
the non-violent language of Levinas that would depart from the violence of the verb Being and of 
predication, where “language must give the world to the other?” (ED 219/184) An address, a 
promise, indeed a response, anterior to any question, otherwise than Being.149 What Derrida calls 
a quasi-infinite call to give issues precisely from an originary debt, a Schuldigsein Derrida finds 
traces of in both Heidegger and Levinas, “before owing this or that, before incurring a debt or 
committing a fraud, I must respond... I think you find this in Heidegger, and in Levinas in 
another way, when he speaks of an originary debt before any determined debt... When I speak of 
infinite responsibility, it borders on this, it’s very close to this.” (FSC 72-3) And this is how 
Derrida thoroughly breaks with the humanism of both; infinite responsibility is “a responsibility 
for more than one [à plus d’un], indeed, before more than one” ... where “every other is every 
(bit) other [tout autre est tout autre].” (FSC 73) 
 
§3.2.5: The Zusage, the Promise and Letting the Earth Be 
As I have shown, ethics for Derrida is not a question of ‘what can a body do,’ but of interrogating 
a shared passivity, vulnerability, impotence and non-power within mortal finitude as the grounds 
of compassion among other living beings.150 And perhaps everything I have been trying to read 
as the ex-propriation of the proper of the human depends on interrogating this passivity precisely 
not as a power to question. Heidegger himself would eventually come to complicate and displace 
the privilege accorded to the question.151 It is in bringing together the Heideggerean notions of 
the Zusage and Gelassenheit that Derrida signals towards what I’ve mentioned as a post-
deconstructive responsibility of the subject, one we could just as well call post-human and which 
would perhaps itself engage the necessary re-interpretation of the living, the human and 
responsibility in general. 152  The Zusage can be understood as a promise, affirmation, yes, 
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acquiescence or consent anterior to any question, language and activity.153 What does Derrida 
mean by this non-logical, non-chronological anteriority?154  
[the address] is already there, in advance (im voraus) at the moment at which any 
question can arise about it. In this it exceeds the question. This advance is, before any 
contract, a sort of promise of originary alliance to which we must have in some sense 
already acquiesced, already said yes, given a pledge [gage], whatever may be the 
negativity or problematicity of the discourse which may follow. (DE 116n1/129n5)  
 
The temporality of the Zusage and the promise exceeds the auto-affective and ecstatic 
temporality of the Dasein; it always already commits one to an engagement contracted in a past 
that has never been present.155 Recalling here everything I said about the post-human promise of 
the earth from “Avances,” “the proper of man arrives only in this response or this responsibility. 
At least it does this when, and only when, man acquiesces, consents, gives himself to the address 
addressed to him, that is to his address, the one which only properly becomes his own in this 
response.” (DE 120n1/135n5) The Zusage always comes in the form of a response, but one 
which must be radically extricated from any humanist, metaphysical or subjective determination 
of the subject; it makes possible the proper of the human as its very ex-propriation. Indeed, the 
Zusage might not be thought entirely separately from a reaction, one within which every living 
thing is originarily engaged - prior to any active willing on its part, indeed any autonomy – as its 
originary promising, the structuring of the living as the radical passivity of its auto-hetero-
affection, in an obligation that is neither subjective nor human.156 The Zusage simply says yes to 
the event, to the other – and lets it come.  
 The situation for Derrida discloses a dimension of experience as Gelassenheit, a receptive 
or attentive listening that opens onto an-other thought of ethics and responsibility. Against any 
atomistic individual or self-identical subjectivity, Derrida points towards “a singularity that 
dislocates or divides itself in gathering itself together to answer to the other, whose call 
nonetheless precedes its own identification with itself.” (PDS 276/261) In hearing the call of the 
other issuing from an immemorial past, the Zusage promises to prepare a place for the other, to 
let the other come, and thus leave what is most proper to the other as my own absolute ex-
propriation. And death being this radical ex-propriation shared by all living beings, the promise 
to the other in the stricture of general ecology becomes to let live-on. One must let the living live-
on, and this ‘one must,’ Derrida writes,  
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the double necessity, the double law of the inevitable and the imperative injunction, (il 
faut), exceeds the question at the very moment that it reaffirms its necessity,” exceeds and 
makes possible any distinction between ethics and ontology, fait and droit, and points 
towards an-other thought of transcendence, older still or still to come. (NII 356) 
  
In saying yes to a call from a past that has never been present, one could also say that the Zusage 
can help us think the ultratranscendental concept of history Derrida seeks in Husserl and 
Heidegger: “this ‘one must’ seems then to signal the event of an order or a promise that does not 
belong to what is commonly called history.” (P2 169/166t) The ‘one must,’ I’d say, overflows 
any determinable epoch of a metaphysics of volition in the history of Being in disclosing a non-
willing at its heart, indeed something like a bio-logical reactivity, not towards a non-history, but 
perhaps towards the evolutionary history of life on earth as nature de-naturing itself, and a 
promise to allow life to live-on through the compassion in and co-passion of our shared 
mortality.157 
 It is in this sense that one can understand the Zusage as the material resistance that 
productive comportment lets be beyond its utility or value, in the unbinding of the stricture 
relating it to restricted economy. What Derrida reads in Heidegger’s concept of Verlässlichkeit, 
‘reliability’ [fiabilité] designates a pre-originary engagement, gift, credit, debt and duty anterior 
to any social or natural contract, indeed to the opposition of form and matter. “The 
Verlässlichkeit of the product, ‘before’ its usefulness but as the condition of this usefulness, 
engages in the belonging to the earth and to the world.” (VeP 401/351) This engagement is 
granted in what Derrida calls “the silent call of the earth... that language without language or 
correspondence with the earth and the world.” (VeP 402/351) It issues from a ‘combat’ between 
the earth and the world, inviting us to think the earth, the world and Heidegger’s Geviert or 
fourfold otherwise; the play of the earth, sky, divinities and mortals being thought in their 
“expropriating transpropriation,” as he cites it in Dissemination, bound together in the ring, 
(anneau, Ring). (LD 430/354t) This ring is indeed a wedding band, that of a “precontractual or 
precontracted marriage with the earth.” (VeP 404/354) What is promised in this engagement, I 
think, is a thought of material res(is)tance that “‘lets the earth be the earth’” (VeP 405/354) 
Between the violence of Walten, the economy of ontological violence and the promise, the 
Zusage and Verlässlichkeit, general ecology “associates the hidden, crypted secret with the 
being-in-safety, with what one must hold in reserve or conceal in order to live. Such would be the 
tightening of this originary ring, such the effect of Verlässlichkeit.” (VeP 407/356) 
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 If this is thinkable, one might even say that the Zusage allows us to name without naming 
the stricture of general ecology as the bond of a promise given to life on earth prior to any word 
in any language or discourse. Positioned against the Dasein and its power to name as its opening 
to the ‘as such,’ the Zusage would not consist in returning a certain experience of language to 
what was once denied it, but to “think the absence of the name and of the word otherwise, as 
something other than a privation.” (AS 73/48) To think otherwise the passive auto-affective 
transcendence of time in Husserl’s Vorlesungen and Heidegger’s Kantbuch, for which we lack 
names, beyond the still metaphorical determinations of Being or History, ethics and ontology; the 
transcendence of a passivity in “a patience [which] is not even ours.” (HQ 325/224) To let life 
live-on, one could conclude, “would be a question of life or death, the question of life-death, 
before being a question of Being, of essence, or of existence. It would open onto a dimension of 
irreducible sur-vival or surviving [survivance] and onto Being and onto some opposition between 
living and dying.” (SM 235-6/185) Anterior to the question, indeed anterior to any ontology, 
what is promised in the Zusage can only be thought within a spectral ‘hauntology.’ It will then be 
a question of thinking the revenance of this spectral ontology, this promise-engagement-wedding 
ring and the temporality of return in the affirmation of this promise, physis-in-différance as the 
difference and repetition of the Eternal Return, in the wedding band between Dionysus and 
Ariadne contracting double affirmation.158 
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‘But why two? Why two instances of speech to say the same thing?’  
– ‘because the one who says it is always the other.’ (Nietzsche)  
Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, v/ix. 
 
Four: Animmanence: Life Death & The Passion and Perpetual Detour of Difference 
In his fascinating study The Implications of Immanence: Towards a New Concept of Life, 
Leonard Lawlor recalls that for Heidegger, Nietzsche’s account of the Will to Power constitutes 
the last version of metaphysics, which Lawlor ultimately sees correspond to Foucault’s notion of 
biopower.1 At the very crest of Western metaphysics, Nietzsche’s inversion of Platonism consists 
in a revaluation of all superior and transcendent values held hitherto, and life itself as Will to 
Power becomes the principle of this new valuation. Valuation is connected to perspectivism, for 
Heidegger, which completes the metaphysical determination of phusis as idea; value is a point of 
view that fixes the eye towards permanence and presence and, oblivious to the difference 
between Being and beings, does not let beings be. Heidegger concludes that “thinking in terms of 
values is radical killing,” and “the value-thinking of the metaphysics of the Will to Power is 
murderous in the most extreme sense.”2  Relating this more closely to our ecological optic, 
Heidegger also argues that valuation and the Will to Power culminate in an absolute and 
unconditioned domination over the earth: the mastery and objectification of all beings in view of 
their calculation, technicization and mechanization. Lawlor’s suggestion to counter these 
disastrous consequences is a renewal of the concept of life, which he proposes as a new vitalism, 
life-ism or mortalism: a thought of life as powerlessness, an ‘a-perspectivism’ at the heart of 
perspectivism, a thought of death and radical finitude at the heart of life as the only possible 
locus of resistance to biopower. So far, this coheres entirely with the thoughts of survivance and 
life death I’ve been developing here as against what I’ve called the mutual immanence of the 
ontological and the ethical, the form and norm of life, although I’ve also clearly expressed my 
reservations concerning vitalism in this respect. As Lawlor argues, however, “the only way to the 
non-place that defines life-ism lies in the completion of immanence.”3 Quick to distinguish this 
thought of immanence from that of phenomenological immanence, that of lived experience to 
consciousness, Lawlor points to the notion of becoming as detailing its more profound sense. As 
he reads Deleuze and Guattari, the plane of immanence is not immanent to matter or 
consciousness; to think immanence as immanent to something is to reintroduce the 
transcendent.4 The plane of immanence has no supplementary dimension and is based on nothing 
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but itself.5 And yet, it opens on to the outside even more than transcendence; it is itself the pure 
and absolute outside for Deleuze and Guattari.  
 As I’ve noted, both Derrida and Deleuze draw from Sartre’s reworking of Husserl’s 
transcendental field as pre-egological. For Derrida, I showed that the pre-subjective 
transcendental field constitutes the space where the passive geneses of temporalization and 
alterity deconstruct the phenomenological immanence of transcendental subjectivity and its 
humanism from within, structuring phenomenological life as the quasi-transcendental experience 
of the impossible, what I called its auto-hetero transcendences in materiality, time, death and the 
other. For Deleuze, however, the pre-subjective transcendental field is itself the plane of 
immanence, where a flow of non-formed materialities gives itself to organic and inorganic 
individuations. As Derrida writes, transcendence for Deleuze should have no place in 
philosophy, while for his part claiming – unless he has misunderstood what Deleuze means by 
immanence – to resist immanentism.6 In his eulogy for Deleuze, Derrida writes that his first 
question to his friend, had he still the chance to ask it, would concern “the word ‘immanence,’ 
which [Deleuze] always held to, in order to make him or let him say something that is still for us 
undoubtedly secret.”7 (CU 238/195)  
 As Lawlor recognizes, both Deleuze and Derrida are critical of Heidegger’s interpretation 
of Nietzsche. For Derrida, the clearest site of this confrontation is the Life Death seminar, where 
he suggests that in order to rescue Nietzsche’s thought from its recuperation by Nazism, 
Heidegger had to present Nietzsche as proposing a metaphysical rather than biologistic account 
of life.8 To inscribe Nietzsche’s thought on the crest of metaphysics, Heidegger was forced to 
gather Nietzsche’s account of the Will to Power and the Eternal Return of the Same into a unity. 
For Derrida, Heidegger saves Nietzsche by losing him; by misunderstanding and misrepresenting 
the nature of the double at stake in Nietzsche’s work, and by not taking the latter seriously when 
he writes ‘ich kenne beides ich bin beides’ [I know both I am both]; I am the living mother and 
the dead father, the double, the two, life death.9 If deconstruction is always on the side of the 
affirmation of life, I’ll show that this affirmation is immediately and always already doubled. In 
fact, the earliest discussions of survivance in the essays on Blanchot in Parages relate double 
affirmation and survivance to the question of the Eternal Return. However, the expression 
‘double affirmation’ as far as I can tell is itself first elaborated in Deleuze’s Nietzsche and 
Philosophy, which Derrida also cites in “Différance.” In “We Other Greeks,” however, Derrida 
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claims that his reading of Nietzsche is very different from Deleuze’s due to a passage through 
Heidegger and the questions posed to the latter’s interpretation of Nietzsche.10 In chapter 1, I’d 
also explored the roots of deconstruction as an experience of the impossible in Bataille and 
Blanchot; discussions that, I’ll show, themselves take place with respect to the Eternal Return in 
the latter two, and particularly with respect to immanence in Bataille. Blanchot for his part would 
greatly influence Deleuze’s accounts of death and the Outside, but would himself develop these 
notions in a closer proximity, if one can use the word, to Levinas’s account of transcendence, or 
at least the relation without relation, the latter notion itself often discussed by Deleuze. 11 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Bataille, Levinas, Derrida, Blanchot and Deleuze intertwine across these 
nodes in a tangled web, but, as Derrida puts it in Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles, “Ariadne is not so far 
away.” (É 42/43t) Still, these questions are not as simple as opposing a thought of the living 
characterized by immanence, vitalism, immediacy, univocity, action, force, power and intensity 
to one of transcendence, materialism, interruption, equivocity, radical passivity and 
powerlessness; Derrida explicitly defines survivance as “not simply that which remains, but the 
most intense life possible.” (AVE 55/52) As he adds elsewhere, while a thought of death is 
inseparable from an affirmation of life, survivance constitutes “the greatest possible intensity of 
life at every instant,” ... the imminence of death itself not being necessarily sad, negative or 
morbid “but on the contrary life itself, the greatest intensity of life.” (SP 48, 52t) Deleuze’s work 
is itself incredibly attentive to questions of vulnerability, powerlessness, exteriority and death, 
and both Deleuze and Derrida place the differential element between forces at the heart of their 
readings of Nietzsche. 
My guiding threads in this chapter will weave themselves around the following questions: 
in avoiding or at least negotiating the worst; the total domination of the earth by human beings, 
the unlimited sovereignty of techno-bio-power over all its inhabitants, and given everything I’ve 
tried to develop on transcendence, exteriority and powerlessness in the previous three chapters, is 
immanence really the best way to think a new concept of life characterized by its originary 
powerlessness and relation to death?12 I concluded my chapter on Heidegger by suggesting that 
the Zusage, an acquiescence or affirmation anterior to the question, opened onto a thought of life 
death and survivance that would let beings be, let the earth be the earth, anterior to any 
distinction between the human and its others. But the ‘yes’ of this affirmation must be thought of 
in a certain doubling. How does this doubling come about, and what risks does it entail? Might 
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one locate in the Eternal Return a thought of the living in its animmanence, of the very 
incompletion and transgression of immanence, and a possibility for an adequate thought of the 
temporalization of the promise of the Earth, and of life in its radical finitude, passivity and 
powerlessness?  
I don’t intend in this chapter to propose a contribution to Nietzsche scholarship. What 
interests me much more is to tease out how two very ambiguous, often contradictory and indeed 
barely developed concepts in his work have given themselves to be read in the thinkers through 
which I’m trying to develop my ideas of general ecology and life death on earth with its others.13 
The fact that I only cite him through these authors itself testifies to the risk of citational doubling 
underlying double affirmation, as I’ll explain below. This chapter will begin in §4.1 with a closer 
examination of Heidegger’s Nietzsche lectures, and the role the unity of the Will to Power and 
the Eternal Return play in the objectification, calculation and technological enframing of the 
Earth and its organic and inorganic matter. In §4.2, I’ll turn to the work of Deleuze.14 In this 
chapter and the next, what I’ve called restricted ecology will understand life in differentials of 
force and power. But I’ll show in Deleuze, as with Foucault in chapter 5, that these restricted 
ecologies are always exceeded by thoughts of death, the Outside, resistance, powerlessness and 
impossibility within their very discourses. In §4.2.1, I’ll show how Deleuze’s readings of 
Spinoza – with their emphases on the affirmation of action, force, capacity, power, univocity, 
immanence and becoming against a passivity before death and suffering as external accidents 
befalling life – are always complicated by his readings of Nietzsche, particularly the ethics and 
ontology of the Eternal Return as selective that yields the question of double affirmation so 
important to Derrida.15 I then in §4.2.2 examine Deleuze’s plane of immanence as the pre-
subjective and pre-egological flow of a single materiality common to organic and inorganic 
beings and preceding their individuations. But far from proposing a mere differantial between 
forces and powers, the plane of immanence is itself the Outside, as Deleuze draws from 
Blanchot; the domain of a resistance anterior to the opposition between activity and passivity, 
force and counterforce, and thus the site to return life and death against power. I conclude my 
discussion of Deleuze in §4.2.3 by examining his philosophy of individuation across the Living 
Present, an immemorial past, and the time out of joint of the Eternal Return and the death drive 
as itself structured within the Blanchotian notion of double death. The thesis implied in my title 
is that immanence, at least as it operates in Deleuze’s discourse, is as curiously named as the 
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Will to Power and the Eternal Return of the Same. This is why in §4.3 I propose for the latter 
two concepts the redefinitions provided by Blanchot in The Infinite Conversation: Will to Power 
as the Passion of Difference, Eternal Return as the Perpetual Detour of Difference.16 Beginning 
with a reading of Bataille’s general economic reading of Nietzsche in terms of immanence, but 
also the risk of radical evil, I find in Blanchot a thought of the Eternal Return as precisely that 
which resists the human domination of the earth. I then in §4.4 turn to Derrida, beginning in 
§4.4.1 with his reading of Heidegger’s Nietzsche in the Life Death seminar, and show how this 
comes to structure his own interpretation of double affirmation. In §4.4.2, I show how Derrida’s 
notion of differantial force and power in the Will to Power exposes both to an arche-originary 
weakness and passivity as the space of the arche-ethical, concluding in §4.4.3 with Derrida’s 
thought of Eternal Return as the only temporalization capable of thinking the promise of the 
earth announced in “Avances,” beyond the death drive (chapter 1), the Living Present (chapter 2) 
and auto-affective temporalization (chapter 3). 
 
§4.1: Heidegger’s Nietzsche and Planetary Domination 
According to Heidegger himself, his lectures on Nietzsche constitute the most direct site of his 
confrontation with Nazism, as well as the tracing of a path from the thought of Being in Being 
and Time to that of the clearing of Being in the “Letter on Humanism.” 17  While some of 
Heidegger’s commentators have expressed certain hesitations before seeing in these lectures a 
shift from the ‘self-assertion’ of his Rector’s Address to the ‘meek prophet of Gelassenheit,’ 
these lectures clearly express an increasing mistrust concerning Nietzsche’s philosophy, 
particularly of the concepts of the Will to Power and the Overman and what Heidegger reads as 
their dangerous complicity with planetary technology and total dominion over the Earth. 18 
Nietzsche, Heidegger explains, understands his philosophy as an inverted Platonism. I’ve shown 
that Platonism for Heidegger holds the idea, ontos-on, the supersensuous as true being while the 
sensuous is relegated to the state of me-on, that which is not and should not be. Overturning 
Platonism places the supersensuous and ideal at the service of the sensuous and material.19 
Despite the reversal of this metaphysical position, Nietzsche still does not think the difference 
between Being and beings for Heidegger. To understand why Heidegger reads Nietzsche as the 
last metaphysician of the West, it is necessary to show how and why the latter’s thoughts of the 
Will to Power and of the Eternal Return of the Same must be thought of as a unity, as the 
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metaphysical unity of Being as such and of beings as a whole, thus incapable of positing Being 
as a question.  
In their innermost coherence, Heidegger writes, the Will to Power and the Eternal Return 
function as the sensuous principle of a revaluation against the transcendent Platonic Ideas. When 
Nietzsche claims that God is dead, he means the transcendent in general. The principle for a new 
valuation, therefore, will no longer be a transcendent ideal but the immanent domain of life as 
Will to Power. As Heidegger explains,  
by value Nietzsche understands whatever is a condition for life, that is, for the 
enhancement of life. Revaluation of all values means – for life, that is, for being as a 
whole – the positing of a new condition by which life is once again brought to itself, that 
is to say, impelled beyond itself. For only in this way does life become possible in its true 
essence. Revaluation is nothing other than what the greatest burden, the thought of eternal 
return, is to accomplish. (GA 6.1 375/2 156-7)  
 
For Heidegger, the Will to Power is the ontic condition of all beings as such, and the Eternal 
Return the ontological Being of beings as a whole.20 In their unity, the Will to Power and the 
Eternal Return think the unity of Being and beings, that is, in a fundamentally metaphysical way. 
The Will to Power thus concludes the history of Western metaphysics: when Nietzsche writes 
that life is Will to Power, he really means that “Being as a whole is will to power.” (GA 6.1 
443/3 19) As the final word of metaphysics, the essential unity of Will to Power and Eternal 
Return is also its first, the determination of phusis as idea and eidos.  
Heidegger returns to The Basic Problems of Phenomenology to flesh this out. The Will to 
Power names the ‘what-being’ of beings and Eternal Return the ‘that-being’ of Being. The 
distinction between these is sustained by the Platonic distinction between ontos on and me on, 
the true and apparent worlds.21 This privilege of eidos, fixing into permanence by way of the 
look, I showed, perseveres throughout the history of metaphysics for Heidegger. Despite 
Nietzsche’s inversion of metaphysics, the distinction between what-being and that-being remains 
unthought; Nietzsche cannot address the ontological difference or pose the question of being. 
Will to Power and Eternal Return  
say the selfsame thing. At the end of the history of metaphysics, the thought of eternal 
recurrence of the same expresses precisely what will to power, as the fundamental trait of 
the beingness of beings, says at the consummation of modernity. Will to power is self-
surpassment into the possibilities of becoming that pertain to a commandeering which 
now begins to install itself. Such self-surpassing remains in its innermost core a 
permanentizing of Becoming as such. (GA 6.2 17/3 171) 
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Nietzsche’s inversion thus still engages a determination of being as hypokeimenon, sub-iectum 
and permanencing of presence. More than a mere reversal, this inversion transforms the material 
realm into life as Will to Power. Nietzsche’s perspectivism, however, remains bound to a 
representationalist logic for Heidegger; all perception is determined by the securing of the 
permanence of a being by way of its outward appearance. 22  Indeed, in this inversion, idea 
becomes determined as perceptio, and aim, view, vision and seeing understood in terms of the 
striving or appetite of life as Will to Power. In the end, Nietzsche’s philosophy comes down to a 
‘morphology,’ “the ontology of on, whose morphè (which too was changed when eidos was 
changed into perceptio) appears as the will to power in the appetitus of the perceptio.” (GA 5 
236/176)  
Will to Power is then to be thought as this unity of perceptio and appetitus, representation 
and striving, and perspectival life the grounds for the new valuation.23 However, Heidegger 
distinguishes this definition from any ‘striving in general’ or ‘mere striving,’ these being simply 
rudimentary forms of willing.24 The Will to Power does not will or strive for power in the sense 
of willing something external to it. Will wills nothing other than itself as power, which is to say 
that the Will to Power is self-willing or will-to-will.25 In reaching out beyond itself, willing is 
ultimately to have mastery over beings: “will is intrinsically power. And power is willing that is 
consistent in itself. Will is power, power is will.” (GA 6.1 38/1 41) The Will to Power is the 
original form of affect in organic life; even the smallest organism wants an increase in power. As 
Nietzsche writes on nourishment, “the protoplasm extends its pseudopodia in search of 
something that resists it – not from hunger but from will to power. Thereupon it attempts to 
overcome, appropriate, assimilate what it encounters: what one calls ‘nourishment’ is merely a 
derivative phenomenon, an application of the original will to become stronger.”26 The Will to 
Power does not therefore originate out of a lack for Heidegger but is the ground of 
superabundant life as will to will.27 As the pervasive and perspectival characteristic of all beings 
as such, the Will to Power undoes any distinction between the organic and the inorganic. “Even 
the latter has its perspective... the mechanistic representation of ‘inanimate’ nature is only a 
hypothesis... Every point of force per se is perspectival. As a result it becomes clear that ‘there is 
no inorganic world.’ Everything ‘real’ is alive, is ‘perspectival’ in itself.” (GA 6.1 215/1 213) 
Life is thus another word for Being; “‘Being’ – we have no idea of it apart from the idea of 
‘living.’ How can anything dead ‘be’?”28 
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As I mentioned above, life as Will to Power for Nietzsche becomes the ground for a new 
valuation following the devaluation of all transcendent values and truths held hitherto. This is 
why Heidegger interprets the Will to Power as knowledge within this new valuation; “truth is the 
kind of error without which a certain species of life could not live. The value for life is ultimately 
decisive.”29 The perspectival truth for life is what, from its immanent point of view, secures the 
conditions of its preservation and enhancement. In being urged beyond itself, the living being 
constrains itself through the formation of horizons. These limits are not imposed to life from 
without, but are precisely that from which the vitality of life takes its stride.30 The horizonal 
character of perspectives is how life secures beings in their permanence and stability through the 
morphological viewpoint of a certain seeing. Life looks ahead through the formation of a 
horizon, and this perspectival securing of stability is “necessary for the survival of the living 
being. The need for schematizing is in itself a look for stable things and their ascertainability, 
that is, their perceptibility.” (GA 6.1 518/3 88) Life thus determines its own values from its 
vantage points in view of its preservation and enhancement. As Heidegger specifies, preservation 
and enhancement are not two separate things: both cohere in life as the Will to Power as what is 
overcome and what overcomes, the permanent (enhancing) and impermanent (preservation). In 
its perspectival-horizonal structure, values are the constructs of domination through which life 
structures chaos as Will to Power. In this structuring, viewpoints are always given as numbers, 
measures and values. Values for Nietzsche “are everywhere reducible to this numerical and 
mensural scale of force.”31 “Nietzsche always understands ‘force’ in the sense of power, that is, 
as Will to Power. Number is essentially ‘perspectival form’ Thus it is bound up with the ‘seeing’ 
that is proper to the Will to Power, a seeing that in its very essence is reckoning with values.”32 
(GA 6.2 269/3 198) 
It is essential to note that Heidegger is at pains to differentiate Nietzsche’s thought of life 
as Will to Power and becoming from any biologistic interpretation; life is not meant either 
biologically in terms of animal and vegetal being, or practically in terms of everyday existence, 
but metaphysically.33 To think beings as such and as a whole in the unity of the Will to Power 
and the Eternal Return constitutes for Heidegger a radical humanization of all beings, ‘human’ 
being intended here in the metaphysical sense of animal rationale. Biology is for Heidegger a 
regional or ontic science that always operates on a pre-determined metaphysical understanding of 
life and death. When Nietzsche interprets plant and animal life and the inorganic as perspectival-
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horizonal, commanding and poeticizing, he interprets these humanly rather than biologically.34 
The values of preservation and enhancement for life as Will to Power are thus not understood as 
a ‘Darwinian’ struggle for existence and self-preservation “but rather as a self-transcending 
enhancement.” (GA 6.1 439/3 15) 
The Eternal Return for Heidegger is itself susceptible to this ‘humanization’ of beings as 
a whole.35 What Heidegger calls the collective character of the world involves the entirety of 
inanimate and animate existence. However, the inanimate and the animate are not in this sense 
thought as “laminated one on top of the other,” but rather “interwoven in one vast nexus of 
Becoming.” (GA 6.1 304/2 84) Here, Heidegger identifies what he sees as two perhaps opposed 
fragments in Nietzsche to which Derrida will return to in Life Death. The first from the notes of 
the Will to Power, XII number 112, in which Nietzsche writes “Our whole world is the ashes of 
countless living creatures: and even if the animate seems so miniscule in comparison to the 
whole, it is nonetheless the case that everything has already been transposed into life – and so it 
goes.” (GA 6.1 304/2 84) The next in The Gay science: “let us beware of saying that death is 
opposed to life. The living is only a form of what is dead, and a very rare form.”36  What 
Nietzsche seeks in thinking this unity of the living and the dead, the totality of the world as chaos 
and becoming is to “dehumanize and de-deify being as a whole.” (GA 6.1 315/2 94) As 
Heidegger puts it, however, “viewed as a whole, Nietzsche’s meditations on space and time are 
quite meagre.” (GA 6.1 310/2 90) The temporalization of the Eternal Return remains bound to a 
metaphysical, vulgar and indeed human characterization of time in relation to the Instant. For 
Heidegger, any thought concerning beings as a whole must be related to the human thinking 
beings as a whole, and this is true of the Eternal Return, ultimately a thoroughly humanized 
temporality.37  
The Eternal Return is the highest possible affirmation because “it affirms the uttermost 
‘no,’ annihilation and suffering, as proper to beings.” (GA 6.1 249/2 30) The ring of Eternal 
Return thinks living, suffering and circling in a unity and in the unity of their returning.38 This 
unity is affirmed in the supreme moment of Zarathustra’s affirmation, his supreme ‘Yes.’ 
Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche’s Eternal Return is thus brought into the latter’s discussions of 
nihilism. An absolute ‘no’ entails the becoming valueless and meaningless of the transcendent in 
general, along with the highest values of ideas, norms, principles, rules and ends, which comes 
out of a ‘yes’ to the new positing and revaluing of values. Nietzsche defines this new positing 
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itself as nihilism, but his use of term is double; on the one hand, nihilism refers to the classical 
nihilism completed by the absolute devaluation of all values hitherto, but on the other the 
unconditionally affirmative countermovement to this devaluation.39 As is well known, Nietzsche 
identifies the overman as the being capable of the supreme affirmation of the Eternal Return and 
the revaluation of all values. As Heidegger puts it, the ‘over’ in overman is the absolute negation 
of the human as it has been. This ‘no’ comes from the yes of the Will to Power in view of a new 
metaphysical history of humanity. It thus constitutes the human as animale rationale; after the 
abolition of the supersensuous world, all that remains is the sensuous world, animality and the 
body. Thought (ratio) becomes relegated to the service of animality (animalitas).40 The body is 
not meant to imply a biologism of beings as a whole, rather, “it means that the special domain of 
the ‘vital’ is conceived metaphysically as Will to Power.... Will to Power subsumes reason in the 
sense of representation under itself by taking it into its service as calculative thinking (the 
positing of values).” (GA 6.2 300/3 224) For Heidegger, Nietzsche’s determination of the 
overman as the meaning of the earth culminates in the humanization of beings as a whole in view 
of their mastery, calculability for technical utility and objectification. Indeed, Heidegger’s 
reading of Nietzsche posits nothing less than the worst, I think, for all of life and inorganic 
matter on earth, culminating in the absolute objectification of the world.  
World becomes object. In this insurgent objectification of all beings, that which must 
previously have been brought into the disposal of representation and production [Vor- 
und Her-stellens] – earth – moves into the centre of human setting and confronting. Earth 
itself can show itself only as the object of the attack arranged in the willing of man as 
absolute objectifying. Because it is willed out of the essence of being, nature appears 
everywhere as the object of technology. (GA 5 256/191) 
 
What one could call the bio-eco-techno Will to Power for Heidegger struggles to “exploit the 
earth without limit as the domain of raw materials, and to employ ‘human resources’ soberly and 
without illusion in the service of the absolute empowering of the will to power.” (GA 5 256/191) 
The principles for new valuation become those of utility, calculability and manipulability; the 
unity of perspective and horizon operate as a ‘business transaction’ determining the ‘rightness’ 
for life, “that is to say, supreme will to power. Only an unconditioned domination over the earth 
by human beings will ever be right for such ‘rightness.’ Instituting planetary dominion, however, 
will itself be but the consequence of an unconditioned anthropomorphism.”41 (GA 6.2 20/3 173-
4) Domination over the earth is ensured in the positing and calculation of values, “through a total 
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‘mechanization’ of things and the breeding of human beings... mechanization makes possible a 
mastery of beings that are everywhere surveyable, a mastery that concerns – and that means 
stores – energy.” (GA 6.2 308/3 230) While Heidegger argues that the sciences belong to this 
program of mechanization, he recalls that Nietzsche’s thought is metaphysical rather than 
biologistic, as is his racial thought of breeding.42 The overman, as that which surpasses man as 
he has been hitherto, is the only one up to the task of “the modern ‘machine economy,’ the 
machine-based reckoning of all activity and planning... only the overman is appropriate to an 
absolute ‘machine economy,’ and vice versa: he needs it for the institution of absolute 
domination over the earth.” (GA 6.2 166/4 116-7) Nietzsche’s thought thus brings to a close the 
metaphysics of absolute subjectivity in the absolute objectivation of the earth and the 
perspectival-horizonal securing and permanentizing of beings as a whole in view to their 
economic use value and calculability: “all beings become objects. As what is objective, beings 
are swallowed up into the immanence of subjectivity.” (GA 5 261/195) Value-positing, as that 
which strives to ‘make secure’ “has killed beneath itself all beings in themselves, thereby doing 
away with them as beings for themselves.” (GA 5 262/195) Thinking in terms of values, he 
concludes, “is to kill radically. It not only strikes down beings as such in their being-in-
themselves, but it also puts being entirely aside... killing at the roots.” (GA 5 263/196) In the 
calculability of beings as such and as a whole, “value does not let being be.” (GA 5 259/193) 
Having organized everything on earth in view of its disposal for the action of a subject, the 
history of metaphysics culminates in the ecological domination of the overman over the animate 
and the inanimate. 
 
§4.2: Deleuze, Double Affirmation, Double Death and the Outside 
Despite the fact that Deleuze and Derrida are quite critical of Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche 
on several of these points, I think one needs to take Heidegger very seriously here. His readings 
seem to anticipate so much of what is at stake in contemporary debates concerning the earth, its 
living beings and the animate and inanimate matter of their ecologies. Heidegger’s critique 
outlines potentially devastating consequences of pushing object-oriented philosophy and certain 
strains of new materialism to their limits at the same time as it guards against the vitalization, 
immanentization and processualization of beings as a whole one finds in the material 
phenomenology critiqued by Derrida, in affirmative biopolitics, new vitalism and in certain 
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interpretations of Deleuze, often through the latter’s own readings of Nietzsche, Spinoza and 
Simondon. Such interpretations, however, often fail to address important nuances in Deleuze’s 
thought on death, powerlessness and the Outside. Deleuze is fully aware of the dangers of a 
simply inverted Platonism, and his thought of immanence situates the selective element of 
Eternal Return precisely against this. As he writes,  
Every reaction against Platonism is a restoration of immanence in its full extension. The 
question is one of knowing if such a reaction abandons all rival projects of selection, or 
on the contrary establishes, as Nietzsche believed, entirely different methods of selection 
(eternal return). Perhaps only the philosophies of pure immanence escape the Platonism 
of the Stoics, of Spinoza and Nietzsche.43 
 
I’ll begin by reading Deleuze’s works on the latter two before developing both in relation to his 
reflections on life, death and the plane of immanence in sections §4.2.2 and §4.2.3.44  
 
§4.2.1: Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Spinoza: Double Affirmation and Eternal Return 
Against Heidegger’s interpretation, Nietzsche absolutely thinks difference for Deleuze.45 In an 
interpretation that would prove influential for Derrida, Deleuze understands the Will to Power as 
the principle of an originary difference between active and reactive forces, as “the differential 
element of force.” (NP 7/7) Against any physical atomism or psychic egoism, force is essentially 
plural and always related to another force.46 Nietzsche’s world is precisely that of what Deleuze 
calls impersonal individuations and pre-individual singularities. 47  On this basis, Nietzsche’s 
project consists of the reintroduction of the concepts of value and sense into philosophy, value 
being understood as evaluation from the basis of ‘perspectives of appraisal’ and in view of the 
creation of new values.48 Against any axiology, value for Nietzsche destroys all known and 
established values and works towards the creation of the unknown.49 This creative element of 
evaluation will prove fundamental to Deleuze’s readings of Spinoza, since ethics for the latter 
comes down to determining what a body can do and what affects it is capable of. What Deleuze 
understands as affirmation is conceived of precisely along such lines; affirmation and creation 
“make use of excess in order to invent new forms of life rather than separating life from what it 
can do.” (NP 212/185) Against carrying the burdens of transcendent values, “to affirm is not to 
take responsibility for, to take on the burden of what is, but to release, to set free what lives. To 
affirm is to unburden, not to load life with the weight of higher values, but to create new values 
which are those of life, which make life light and active.” (NP 212/185) As a ‘skin disease’ of 
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the earth, the human’s constitutive negativity entails the depreciation of the whole of life and the 
sinking and sickening of the earth.50 The overman, in the ‘yes’ of the Will to Power, will affirm 
the earth in its lightness and weightlessness.51 “Affirmation is the highest power of the will. But 
what is affirmed? The earth, life.” (N 33/83-4) 
 For Deleuze, to understand the sense of any phenomenon, whether human, biological or 
physical is to know the forces composing it.52 Beyond the scientific calculus of cause and effect, 
the Platonic doctrine of the two worlds and its reformulations across various idealisms and 
realisms, Deleuze invokes Nietzsche’s perspectivism in evaluating the forces taking hold of a 
given phenomenon.53 Every force appropriates, dominates and exploits reality and nature, and 
every perception is itself an expression of force.54 In this sense, Nietzsche also reads the will 
differentially; it does not exercise itself on muscles, nerves or matter but only on another will.55 
As I showed with Heidegger, Nietzsche substitutes the body for the ideal of consciousness as the 
source of interpretation and evaluation. Spinoza’s claim that we do not know what a body can do 
means for Deleuze that “we do not know... what forces belong to it or what they are preparing 
for.” (NP 44/39) Every force is inseparable from what it is able to do, and any organic or 
inorganic body is the living product of tensions between active, superior, dominating forces and 
reactive, inferior and dominated ones. 56  This perhaps details what many have read as a 
panpsychic vitalism in Deleuze, which of course is not too distant from what Heidegger reads in 
Nietzsche, but I think something else is at stake here. To interpret a body solely by way of 
reactive forces – that is, by way of the forces organizing consciousness – has led to the false 
classical dualisms between mechanism and ‘finalism’ or vitalism; both interpret the organism by 
way of “securing mechanical means and final ends, by fulfilling the conditions of life and the 
functions and tasks of conservation, adaptation and utility.” (NP 46/40) In both, “we do not know 
what a body can do, or what activity it is capable of.” (NP 47/41) Through Nietzsche and 
Spinoza, Deleuze gestures towards an ethical interpretation of organic and inorganic life that 
privileges material affect over form and function. What is true of the biological here is also true 
of physics in Nietzsche’s sense; both go hand with classical nihilism in their need to reduce 
differences and even out inequalities in “denying life, depreciating existence and promising it a 
death.” (NP 51/45) 
 As I have shown, the Will to Power for Deleuze is the differential element between 
forces; it exists both in active, dominating and reactive, dominated forces.57 When Nietzsche 
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writes against Darwin that we must defend the strong from the weak, he is attempting to show 
that “the criteria of the struggle for life, of natural selection, necessarily favour the weak and the 
sick.” (N 26/75-6) In separating the strong from what they can do, the weak and sick 
contaminate, decompose and entail the degeneration and becoming-reactive of active forces.58 
While reactive forces separate a body from what it can do, Deleuze seeks in the Will to Power 
the principle of a new affirmation of life, one that works to evaluate and organize its active 
forces in composing joyfully with others. Here, Deleuze’s Nietzsche is very close to his readings 
of Spinoza. Because force is always in relation, affected by inferior or superior forces, the Will 
to Power names a capacity to be affected. 59  Long before Nietzsche, Spinoza had seen this 
capacity as expressing the ‘puissance’ of any force.60 For Nietzsche, however, “Spinoza was not 
able to elevate himself to the conception of a will to power. He confused power with simple 
force and conceived of force in a reactive way (cf. conatus and conservation).” 61  (NP 
70n1/206n18) Still, for both Spinoza and Nietzsche, the power to be affected is not a simple 
passivity but affectivity itself. This is why Nietzsche reads the Will to Power as the originary 
form of affect both in the organic and inorganic world.  
 Deleuze’s Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza lets us develop these reflections in 
further detail. As Deleuze helpfully summarizes, “all of Spinozism agrees in recognizing in finite 
beings a power to exist, act, and persevere.” (SPE 80/91t) Spinoza often speaks of the conatus as 
an effort to persevere in existence, but this effort must be understood as potentia agendi, “a 
power of existing and acting.” (SPE 78/90) How are the relations of action and passion, activity 
and passivity, correlated to these discussions of puissance and pouvoir? All power for Spinoza 
entails an inseparable capacity to be affected, one that is always fulfilled, either by external, 
passive affections or its own active affections.62 A finite body is structured in a differential 
relation between “two equally actual powers, that of acting, and that of suffering action 
[puissance d’agir et puissance de pâtir].”63 (SPE 82/93) To ask what a body can do also inquires 
into the limits of its activity. The affections of a finite being are first and foremost passions, since 
a finite being does not exist by virtue of its own nature, as does God, for example. The ethical 
question concerning finite beings more precisely asks if and how they can attain active 
affections. A living being, however, will never be able to suppress all passions, but must 
minimize them as much as possible.64 Deleuze turns to Leibniz to flesh this out: the duality of 
active and passive forces relates directly to life and death for the latter; an active force dies or 
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lives according to the external obstacles or supports it encounters. Indeed, the morbid effects of 
passive forces (death) cannot even said to be real; only active force (life) is real, and passive 
forces the mere finite imperfection and limitations of active force.65 Spinoza takes this a step 
further:  
The power of suffering expresses nothing positive. In every passive affection, there is 
something imaginary which inhibits it from being real. We are passive and impassioned 
only by virtue of our imperfection, in our imperfection itself... We suffer [pâtissons] 
external things, distinct from ourselves... But our force of suffering is simply the 
imperfection, the finitude, the limitation of our force of acting itself. Our force of 
suffering affirms nothing, because it expresses nothing at all: it ‘involves’ only our 
impotence, that is to say, the limitation of our power of action. Our power of suffering is 
in fact our impotence, our servitude, that is to say, the lowest degree of our power of 
acting. (SPE 204/224) 
 
Deleuze articulates Spinoza and Nietzsche’s philosophical position on three points in Spinoza: 
Practical Philosophy. First, the two come together on the question of materialism, the 
devaluation of consciousness in favour of the body. Second, what is ethically at stake in the 
question of what a body can do does not relate to any transcendent ideal, moral or value based on 
notions of Good and Evil, but rather relate to what is good or bad for a living being.66 “In an 
ethical vision of the world it is always a matter of capacity and power, and never of anything 
else. Law is identical to right. True natural laws are norms of power rather than rules of duty.” 
(SPE 247/268) The norms of life constitute the laws of nature, and within these, relations 
between bodies can either combine or compose together insofar as they agree, or one body can 
destroy and decompose another’s relations insofar as they disagree; Deleuze illustrates this by 
contrasting nourishment with poison.67 The norms of life for Spinoza are immanent to life itself, 
and an ethical attention to the immanent modes of life and existence replaces the appeal to 
transcendent morals.68 The conatus searches at every instant for what affections can be useful to 
it, and its power and right to go as far as it can in passion and action are unconditional. Any 
moral duty is always relative and secondary to the affirmation and exercise of the conatus’ power 
and natural right.69 
The final point of conversion between Spinoza and Nietzsche in Deleuze’s essay 
champions joy against what he calls ‘sad passions,’ particularly as concerns the affirmation of 
life and its relation to death.70 As he cites Spinoza, “A free man thinks of nothing less than of 
death, and his wisdom is a meditation on life, not on death.” (in SPE 250/271) This man exists so 
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fully and intensely, Deleuze writes, “that he has gained eternity in his lifetime, so that death, 
always extensive, always external, is of little significance to him.” (SPP 57/41) Long before 
Nietzsche, Spinoza denounces all the values and ‘sad passions’ that depreciate life. According to 
Deleuze, Spinoza proposes a philosophy of life, since he engages “precisely in denouncing all 
that separates us from life, all these transcendent values that are turned against life... Life is 
poisoned by the categories of Good and Evil.” (SPP 38/26) Burdened with these sad passions, 
“we do not live, we only lead a semblance of life; we can only think of how to keep from dying, 
and our whole life is a death worship.” (SPP 39/26) What is bad for a living organism seems to 
only come from the outside as that which exceeds its power to be affected.71 Deleuze similarly 
insists on the always irreducibly external or extrinsic character of death in Spinoza. This is what 
we can learn from the animals; “they do not carry it within, although they necessarily give it to 
one another: death as an inevitable bad encounter in the order of natural existences. But they 
have not yet invented this internal death, the universal sado-masochism of the slave-tyrant.” 
(SPP 20-1/12-3t) The inevitability of death is not an internal condition of a body but due to its 
structural passive opening to its outside and to what endangers its vitality. 72  Of course, as 
Deleuze recognizes, “all that we call bad is strictly necessary, and yet comes from the outside: 
the necessity of the accident. Death is all the more necessary because it always comes from the 
outside.” (SPP 58/41-2t) One might well suspect (and this is certainly the thesis of many 
problematic readings of Deleuze), that the latter ends up proposing a certain axiology, for action, 
affirmation, life, power, force, interiority, immanence and univocity against passivity, negation, 
death, powerlessness, incapacity, exteriority, transcendence and equivocity, but the situation is 
much more complex. Let me attempt to flesh this out through Deleuze’s notion of double 
affirmation and its relation to univocity and immanence, and see how this fits in with his 
readings of the Will to Power and the Eternal Return. 
 As Deleuze explains, the affirmation of an active force over a reactive one in no way 
proceeds by way of its dialectical negation but rather by affirming its difference from it. What 
the will wills is precisely to affirm its difference, to make its difference from the other the object 
of an affirmation.73 “Nietzsche’s ‘yes’ is opposed to the dialectical ‘no’; affirmation to dialectical 
negation, difference to dialectical contradiction.” (NP 10/9) But what is the nature of this 
‘opposition’ at stake here? For Deleuze, the negative is not the dialectical motor of an active and 
differential affirmation, but rather results from it. There is no affirmation for Nietzsche that is not 
 157 
also immediately followed and preceded by a negation; without these, affirmation would be 
powerless to affirm itself, it would be nothing. As is well known, Dionysus is for Nietzsche the 
god of affirmation, affirming life in the solar, airy ‘yes’ in all its lightness and gaiety. In this 
sense, one could imagine that Zarathustra’s donkey, who eternally brays ‘yes’, I-A, would be the 
Dionysian animal par excellence, but this is not the case; the donkey does not know how to say 
no, and its affirmation is separated from the negations that ought precede and follow it.74 The 
donkey’s affirmation, Deleuze explains, is “affirmation understood as adherence or acquiescence 
to the real, as taking on the real... but this affirmation is an affirmation of consequence, the 
consequence of eternally negative premises, the yes of a response, answering to the spirit of 
gravity and all its solicitations.”75 (NP 209/182t,e)  
 For Deleuze, there is no contradiction in thinking together the Dionysian affirmation that 
radically expels all negation and Nietzsche’s critique of the donkey’s affirmation without 
negation: this is precisely the structure of double affirmation, which Deleuze illustrates by way 
of the affirmation of becoming; on the one hand, the affirmation of becoming means that there is 
nothing outside becoming, on the other, it is also necessary to affirm the being of becoming.76 
Affirmation is doubled since it affirms both inseparably;   
for there is no being beyond becoming, no one beyond the multiple... the multiple is the 
affirmation of the one, becoming is the affirmation of being. The affirmation of becoming 
is itself being, the affirmation of the multiple is itself the one, multiple affirmation is the 
way in which the one affirms itself. ‘The one is the multiple.’ (NP 27/24t)  
 
But the being of this becoming, Deleuze argues, is itself a returning. “Returning is the being of 
that which becomes... the being that affirms itself in becoming. The eternal return as law of 
becoming.” (NP 28/24t) The Eternal Return holds together these affirmations in their 
multiplicity, in the multiplication of their temporalities, both as the instant and cycle of time.  
On the one hand, a continuation of the process of becoming which is the World; and on 
the other, repetition, lightning flash, a mystical view on this process or this becoming[.] 
On the one hand, the continual rebeginning of what has been; and on the other, the 
instantaneous return to a kind of intense focal point, to a ‘zero’ moment of the will[.] (ID 
169/121) 
 
Perhaps indeed at once both the cyclical reappropriation of restricted ecology, the differential 
stricture of forces, active and passive affections and the expenditure of an unconditional 
affirmation without return; the synthesis of Eternal Return thinking together both cyclical 
temporality (the Living Present, auto-affective temporalization, the death drive) and what 
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remains infinitely irreducible to this reappropriation, both life surviving itself, surviving death as 
an external accident and as its ineradicable, impersonal interiority. As both Blanchot and Derrida 
emphasize, Dionysus is always doubled by Ariadne: “the Dionysian affirmation demands another 
affirmation which takes it as its object. Dionysian becoming is being, eternity, but only insofar as 
the corresponding affirmation is itself affirmed: ‘Eternal affirmation of being, eternally I am 
your affirmation.’” (NP 215/187) The Eternal Return affirms becoming and the being of 
becoming and requires this second affirmation to bring the two together. “This is why the eternal 
return is itself a wedding ring... According to the constitution of the eternal return Dionysus is 
the first affirmation, becoming and being, more precisely the becoming which is only being as 
the object of a second affirmation, Ariadne is this second affirmation.” (NP 215/187-8) This is, 
as I closed chapter 3, perhaps precisely what I read in the Zusage and Heidegger’s concept of 
Verlässlichkeit, a promise and an engagement bound in a ring (anneau, Ring) that lets the earth 
be the earth. 
The Eternal Return is precisely this synthesis of difference and repetition, being and 
becoming and double affirmation.77 It is not the return of the Same, for Deleuze, but rather that 
of the diverse and the multiple, and is thus paradoxically a repetition that is also selective and 
liberating.78 This selection is twofold and expresses Nietzsche’s ethics and ontology. Ethically, 
its selection demands that we will only that of which we will the Eternal Return. Ontologically, 
its selection operates in that the only being that returns is becoming, the active and affirmative. It 
is therefore a transmutation and not a repetition of the same.  
The Eternal Return is the instant or the eternity of becoming eliminating whatever offers 
resistance. It brings out, or better yet, it creates the active, the pure active, and pure 
affirmation. The overman has no other meaning: it is what the Will to Power and the 
Eternal Return, Dionysus and Ariadne, produce together. (DF 190/207)  
 
The Eternal Return thus requires a principle for its synthesis that is not that of identity but of 
difference and repetition, this principle being the Will to Power.79 As the One which is affirmed 
of the multiple, I can now approach Deleuze’s difficult understandings of univocity and 
immanence in their relation to double affirmation, Eternal Return and the Will to Power and read 
these in line with what Deleuze develops as an ethical ethology: an interpretation of organic and 
inorganic beings not in terms of a transcendent visible or organizing form, but in terms of the 
materiality of their affections. As Deleuze claims, ‘Being is univocal’ has been the sole 
ontological proposition from Parmenides to Heidegger.80 With Spinoza, however,  “univocity 
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becomes the object of a pure affirmation.” (SPE 58/67) The univocity of Being means that Being 
is said in the same sense for everything that is, infinite or finite, organic or inorganic. Spinoza 
wishes to assert the value of positivity; the immanence of the expressed in the expression, as 
against the negative transcendence of negative theology.81 An immanent cause is one that does 
not go out of itself and produces its effect in remaining within itself.82 It is thus in immanence for 
Deleuze that univocity finds its fullest elaboration in Spinoza, making of univocity the object of 
a pure affirmation, “which is actually realized in an expressive pantheism or immanence.” (SPE 
305/333) 
 When Deleuze writes that immanence implies a pure ontology, that “with immanence all 
is affirmation,” he essentially posits Spinoza’s philosophy as a plenum, one quite problematic for 
questions of exteriority, supplementarity and death.83 “No ‘nature’ lacks anything; all forms of 
being are affirmed without limitation, attributed to something absolute, since the absolute is in its 
nature infinite in all its forms.” (SPE 71/82e) But he also warns against what he sees as a false 
alternative between Being as a pure positivity, pure affirmation without differences and being 
with differences, as difference itself, involving non-being and negation. “We must both say that 
being is full positivity and pure affirmation, and that there is (non)-being.”84 (DR 345/269) 
Deleuze closes Difference and Repetition in noting that “all that Spinozism needed to do for the 
univocal to become an object of pure affirmation was... to realize univocity in the form of 
repetition in the eternal return.” (DR 388/304) Deleuze thus accounts for both the univocity of 
being and individuating differences. Being is univocal, 
that of which it is said, however, differs; it is said of difference itself... the beings which 
are distributed across the space of univocal being, opened up by all the forms. Opening is 
an essential feature of univocity... Only there does the cry resound: ‘Everything is equal!’ 
and ‘Everything returns!’ However, this Everything is equal and this Everything returns 
can be said only at the point at which the extremity of difference is reached. A single and 
same voice for the whole thousand-voiced multiple, a single and same Ocean for all the 
drops, a single clamour of Being for all beings. (DR 388-9/304) 
 
§4.2.2: The Plane of Immanence and the Resistance of the Outside 
I now want to examine how what I called the auto-hetero-transcendences or exteriorities of 
materiality, alterity, death and temporalization let themselves be read in Deleuze’s plane of 
immanence. To recall a few of my earlier questions: is immanence really the best way to think 
the passivity of a letting live-on before and beyond the opposition of activity and passivity? the 
powerlessness, non-power or un-power before death in suffering? the experience of the 
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impossible Outside so necessary to break with the total enframing of all living and nonliving 
matter on Earth in view of its objectification and calculability and the radical killing in the 
murderous positing of values? Deleuze’s readings of the Eternal Return and double affirmation 
seem to challenge this, but how does the plane of immanence think death, resistance and the 
Outside in the affirmation of life? Precisely in its doubling, I’ll show.    
I noted that the ethical question of what a body can do for Deleuze can only be answered 
by understanding a body as a difference between forces; relational differences of motion and 
rest, speed and slowness, actions and passions.85 This entails that each living individual must not 
be understood in terms of its form or functions but rather “as a complex relation between 
differential velocities, between deceleration and acceleration of particles. A composition of 
speeds and slownesses on the plane of immanence.” (SPP 162/123) It is also necessary to 
understand how a body affects and is affected by other bodies. One can never know a living 
organism in thinking of it as a subject; it can only be defined by the affects of which it is capable 
and incapable.86 Here Deleuze draws on Uexküll in explaining Spinoza’s ethics as ethology: 
“ethology is first of all the study of the relations of speed and slowness, of the capacities for 
affecting and being affected that characterize each thing.” (SPP 165/125) Because no one knows 
what a body, human or animal can do, “it is a long affair of experimentation, requiring a lasting 
patience, a Spinozist wisdom that implies the construction of a plane of immanence.” (SPP 
164/125) What does Deleuze mean by this? To recall an earlier point, it suggests an affirmation 
and creativity that invents new possibilities of life by making use of an excess, rather than 
separating life from what it can do. These inventions of new possibilities of life, he adds 
elsewhere, “depend on death too, on our relations to death.” (PP 127/92) But what does Deleuze 
mean by ‘excess’ here? The question is difficult, particularly because, as he recalls, the plane of 
immanence contains no supplementary dimension. In Spinoza, Uexküll and theories of 
autopoiesis, I showed, “an animal, a thing, is never separable from its relations with the world. 
The interior is only a selected exterior, and the exterior, a projected interior.” (SPP 165/125) 
Every living or nonliving thing on the plane of immanence perspectivally selects in the world or 
Nature what affects or is affected by it. If the plane of immanence is without supplement, 
ethology must grasp this plan or process or composition in and for itself. 87  Immanence, as 
Deleuze stresses throughout his work, is only immanent to itself; “there is no longer a form, but 
only relations of velocity between infinitesimal particles of an unformed matter. There is no 
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longer a subject, but only individuating affective states of an anonymous force.” (SPP 169/128) 
The plane of immanence for Deleuze is precisely the pre-subjective and pre-egological 
transcendental field so important to Derrida in defining the zone of passive geneses over and 
against transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity, beyond any determination in advance as 
animal or vegetal, organic or inorganic.88  
Le me recall, however, that I wish to avoid Deleuzian readings that present his thought as 
something of a panpsychic vitalism, a poststructuralist biocentrism. There are then some 
important difficulties for me when Deleuze writes in a discussion of non-organic life that 
“everything I’ve written is vitalistic, at least I hope it is.” (PP 196/143) What is Deleuze referring 
to when, although careful to distinguish his thought of the overman as implying an 
undifferentiated abyss, he speaks of a “free, anonymous, and nomadic singularity which 
traverses men as well as plants and animals independently of the matter of their individuation 
and the forms of their personality.” (LS 131/107) Or, for example, when with Guattari he ties 
together anorganic life, unformed matter and other-than-human becomings, explaining that “not 
all Life is confined to the organic strata: rather, the organism is that which life sets against itself 
in order to limit itself, and there is a life all the more intense, all the more powerful for being 
anorganic.” (MPl 628/503) Adding that  
if everything is alive, it is not because everything is organic or organized but, on the 
contrary, because the organism is a diversion of life. In short, the life in question is 
inorganic, germinal, and intensive, a powerful life without organs, a Body that is all the 
more alive for having no organs, everything that passes between organisms. (MPl 
623/499)  
 
Or when they define vitalism as “that of a force that is but does not act – a pure internal 
Sension.” (QP 214/213) Or, finally, when Deleuze concludes his final essay with a thought of 
absolute immanence as A LIFE. 89  One can perhaps see the grounds for these neovitalist 
interpretations of his philosophy here, but it may also be shown that something else, and 
something more profound and complicated, is at stake.  
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze explains that individuation precedes the opposition 
of form and matter. The field of individuation, or ‘singularization’ as he puts it in “Immanence: 
A Life,” is that of pre-individual individuations and pre-subjective singularities. It is instructive 
here to paint in broad strokes a debate Deleuze refers in the majority of his monographs between 
Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire and Cuvier. In both Spinoza books, Deleuze refers to Spinozist univocity 
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as a forerunner of Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire. 90  Against the Aristotelian definition of living 
organisms in terms of their forms and functions, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire understands all living 
beings as variations and modifications of a single abstract animal.91 Cuvier in contrast sees 
irreducible gaps and impassable gulfs between the different forms of life on earth.92 Against 
Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire’s immanent univocity, Cuvier proposes a transcendent relation of analogy 
between living beings.93 Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire concerns himself with the differentials of speeds 
and slowness of unformed material particles and elements I showed in Spinoza’s ethology.94 This 
discussion is taken up in Deleuze and Guattari’s analyses of the Body without Organs 
(abbreviated as BwO).95 The BwO, they write, is a collectivity of humans, animals, plants, 
inorganic matter and technological objects that does not limit itself to the limits of a self-
enclosed organism. 96  The organism is what fixes this immanent flow of matter by way of 
imposing forms and transcendences onto it.97 The ethical question of what can a body do, or 
what kinds of affects is it capable of, involves in a sense ceasing to see the body as a formed, 
individual organism.98  
The unformed and non-stratified flow of intensities and singularities composing the BwO 
is matter itself. It is thus correlated to Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire’s position as follows;  
there is no vital matter specific to the organic stratum, matter is the same on all the strata. 
But the organic stratum does have a specific unity of composition, a single abstract 
Animal, a single machine embedded in the stratum, and presents everywhere the same 
molecular materials, the same elements or anatomical components of organs, the same 
formal connections. (MPl 61/45) 
 
However, Deleuze and Guattari write, this in no way denies any difference between organic 
forms; Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire simply sees differences of degree between them. The unbridgeable 
gaps or interruptions posited by Cuvier, they add, only hold insofar as the question is posed as 
between fixed and pre-established organic forms. Any possible fault, fracture, interruption or 
untranslatability within these assemblages, Deleuze and Guattari write, would not be “by virtue 
of their essential irreducibility but rather because there are always elements that do not arrive on 
time, or arrive after everything is over; thus it is necessary to pass through fog, to cross voids, to 
have lead times [avances] and delays, which are themselves part of the plane of immanence.”99 
(MPl 312/255)  
But the thought of immanence is not, for all that, without a thought of the Outside, it is in 
fact for Deleuze and Guattari the absolute Outside itself, “an outside more distant than any 
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external world because it is an inside deeper than any internal world: it is immanence.” (QP 
61/59) Deleuze and Guattari cite Blanchot here on “‘intimacy as the Outside, the exterior 
becomes the intrusion that stifles, and the reversal of both into one and the other,’” before 
referring to Spinoza again in explaining what they call “the non-external outside and the non-
interior inside – that which cannot be thought and yet must be thought... the possibility of the 
impossible.” (QP 61-2/59-60) But it is in his work on Foucault that Deleuze develops this 
thought of the Outside in the most detail, particularly through how the former reads Blanchot on 
the questions of death and exteriority. Deleuze, however, distinguishes between the Outside and 
exteriority in Foucault. The Outside is the domain of the differential relations between unformed 
material forces. The exterior, by contrast, is where these relations are actualized in what Deleuze 
calls Foucault’s ‘forms’ of knowledge: the visible and the utterable.100 Deleuze explains that 
Foucault’s thinking is close to Nietzsche in defining power as a relation between forces.101 But 
the main question for Foucault is not to ask ‘what is power?’ but rather to inquire into how 
power exerts itself. All exertion of power is doubly affective, since every force both affects and 
is affected by others. The emancipatory dimensions of power (inciting, inducing, producing) are 
understood here as active affects, whereas to suffer these (being incited, induced, produced) are 
reactive. However, Deleuze writes, “the latter are not the simple ‘repercussion’ or ‘passive 
underside’ of the former, but are rather the ‘irreducible encounter’ between the two, especially if 
we consider that the affected force is not without a capacity for resistance.” (F 78/71t) Life’s 
spontaneity, its power to affect, is understood here as a function of force, whereas life’s 
receptivity, its being-affected, is the matter of force. Both, as in Deleuze’s discussion of Spinoza, 
are to be understood as a pure, non-formalized function and a pure, unformed matter. But force, 
he adds, only and always affects or is affected by others from the Outside.102 The Outside is itself 
the irreducible condition for any relation between forces, a ‘non-place,’ ‘pure distance,’ 
following Blanchot, “an outside more distant than any external world and even farther than any 
form of exteriority.” (DF 238/253) There is thus, Deleuze writes, a third power distinct from the 
powers to affect or be affected, and this power is resistance.103 Ultimately, “the final word on 
power is that resistance comes first... while resistances necessarily operate in a direct relation 
with the outside... the thought of the outside is a thought of resistance.” (F 95-6/89-90) Again 
following Blanchot, the relation between activity and passivity opens onto the Outside in the 
form of a relation without relation.104 And this relation to the Outside, he continues, also carves 
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out an inside deeper than any internal world; this is Foucault’s figure of the double.105 Further 
still, Blanchot’s concept of the neutral, the ‘one dies,’ entails “the conversion of the near and the 
far along the line of the Outside, as a trial of life and death.” (PP 133/97t) 
One can thus enter the question of unformed materiality with a resistance and an Outside 
beyond the differantials of force and power, activity and passivity. The beyond of relations of 
power and force is precisely Blanchot’s Outside for Deleuze and Foucault, and this Outside is the 
alterity of our double.106 This is precisely what will be at stake in differentiating an affirmative 
biopolitics from the double affirmation of life in chapter 5. “It’s a question of ‘doubling’ the play 
of forces, of a self-relation that allows us to resist, to elude power, to turn life or death against 
power.”107 (PP 134-5/98) Returning to Nietzsche, and closely tying in to our above discussion of 
the BwO, Deleuze reads in this resistance the liberation of “a life that is larger, more active, and 
richer in possibilities. The overman has never meant anything but that: it is in man himself that 
we must liberate life, since man himself is a form of imprisonment for man.” (F 98/92t) Against 
both forms of biopolitical sovereignty, the sovereign power to make die and let live and the 
biopower to make live and let die, resistance for Deleuze becomes correlated to a certain 
vitalism, the capacity of life to resist force.108 Deleuze here recalls Foucault’s admiration for 
Xavier Bichat who, like Nietzsche, had invented “a new vitalism by defining life as the set of 
those functions which resist death,” before glossing Spinoza and Foucault thusly: while the 
former claims that we do not know what a body can do, the latter suggests that we do not know 
what a living being can do “‘as a living being,’ as the set of forces that resist.” (F 98-9/93) But 
this vitalism, as Deleuze and Foucault put it, is only possible on the grounds of a ‘mortalism.’109   
 
§4.2.3: The Syntheses of Individuation and Double Death 
My concluding discussion on Deleuze will attempt to show how his elaboration of organic and 
inorganic individuation from the pre-subjective transcendental field allows us to think not only a 
distinction between what he will call the event and the accident of death, but also the necessity of 
thinking the two together in double affirmation and the Eternal Return.  
Difference and Repetition opens with Deleuze positing a belief in the world of impersonal 
individuations and pre-individual singularities.110 The pre-individual is singularity itself, neither 
active nor passive but neutral and non-personal, “entirely indifferent to the individual and 
collective, personal and impersonal, particular and general – and to their oppositions.” (LS 
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67/52t) For Deleuze, Sartre had been the first to read in Husserl a pre-subjective transcendental 
field of which the subject is always a constituted effect.111  As Deleuze and Guattari argue, 
Husserl had attempted to define immanence as immanent to transcendental subjectivity and lived 
experience. Everything that does not belong to the immanent sphere of lived experience, whether 
the ‘primordial immanent transcendence’ of the world of intentional objects, the intersubjective 
world populated by other egos, or the world of the ideal objects of historical, cultural and 
scientific transmission becomes refigured as transcendent in Deleuze’s reading of Husserl. 
Transcendence within immanence, then, is seen as a break from immanence.112 Husserl and his 
successors would thus discover in the Other “the mole of the transcendent within immanence 
itself.”113 (QP 50/46) Sartre by contrast, particularly in invoking Spinoza, gives immanence its 
due in thinking of immanence as immanent to nothing other than itself.114 Sartre posits a world 
of events,  
that is, possible worlds as concepts, and others as expressions of possible worlds... the 
event does not relate lived experience to a transcendental subject = Ego, but rather is 
related to the immanent survey of a field without subject; others do not restore 
transcendence to another ego, but returns every other ego to the immanence of the field 
surveyed. (QP 51/48t) 
 
To think immanence in terms of a radical empiricism, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, means to 
think the subject as a habit or habitus, “nothing but a habit in a field of immanence, the habit of 
saying I.” (QP 51/48) This definition will provide us with the tools with which to read Deleuze’s 
first synthesis of time, the passive synthesis of the Living Present as the habit of contraction, but 
let’s first examine this question of the event in relation to Gilbert Simondon’s philosophy of 
individuation. For Deleuze, along with the critique of hylomorphism (the form/matter binary), 
Simondon proposes the most thoroughly worked-out philosophy of impersonal and pre-
individual singularities. He begins his philosophy of individuation by noting that all 
individualities are constituted by differences in intensities.115 The transcendental field of events 
and singularities is understood as metastable, in terms of the potential disparate and 
differentiated energies of the event as against the forms of its actualization. Here, Deleuze writes, 
“an ‘objective’ problematic field thus appears... individuation emerges like the act of solving 
such a problem.” (DR 317/246) Individuation determines which relations to actualize to resolve 
the problem of disparate realities.116 But this passage from the pre-individual to the individual is 
itself the grounds for a further individuation. Deleuze’s three syntheses of time correspond 
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accordingly; first the pre-individual posing of a problem, second the individuating solution, and 
third that by which this individuality is fragmented and dispersed and must begin again.  
The syntheses of time in Difference and Repetition pose a fascinating site for a 
comparative reading of Deleuze’s philosophy of life and death with Derrida’s. For both, the 
presubjective transcendental field is the site of passive geneses; Deleuze begins with what he 
calls the Living Present, the habit of contraction, as the first passive synthesis, followed by the 
second synthesis of memory, alternately described as both active and passive, which refer the 
first synthesis to a past that has never been present, a pure and immemorial past.117 Finally, the 
third, active synthesis brings together the death drive and the Eternal Return as the 
temporalization within which, as both cite Hamlet, “the time is out of joint.”  
The first synthesis constitutes lived experience within the Living Present. As in Husserl, 
the Living Present contracts past and future in a series of protentions and retentions, and does not 
have to go outside of itself to do so.118  Within this constituting passivity, the syntheses of 
contraction also refer to an organic synthesis:  
a primary sensibility that we are. We are made of contracted water, earth, light and air – 
not merely prior to the recognition or representation of these, but prior to their being 
sensed. Every organism, in its receptive and perceptual elements, but also in its viscera, is 
a sum of contractions, of retentions and expectations. (DR 99/73)  
 
For Deleuze, the first synthesis joins together organic contraction with the passivities of 
exhaustion, fatigue and need. However, one misunderstands this passive dimension in 
representing it as the negative counterpart of an activity. Rather, these passivities express 
questions and problems. What Deleuze calls the passive Ego is not simply the receptive capacity 
to exhibit sensations; the organism is constituted by habitual contractions and questioning 
contemplations prior to its sensations.119 I’ve shown Deleuze and Guattari define vitalism as a 
force which is but does not act; a pure Sensing, and this is because “the contraction that 
preserves is always in a state of detachment in relation to action or even to movement and 
presents itself as a pure contemplation without knowledge... even when one is a rat, it is through 
contemplation that one ‘contracts’ a habit.” (QP 214/213) To contemplate is to question, and 
these questions deploy themselves on the plane of immanence. The Living Present is the site of 
the problems and questions that structure the urgencies of life.120 Problems and questions are 
“living acts... destined to survive the provisional and partial state characteristic of responses and 
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solutions... Birth and death... are the complex themes of problems before they are the simple 
terms of an opposition.”121 (DR 141/107) 
The second synthesis of time, of memory and of the pure past, is expressed in relation to 
the first as follows. If habit is the passing of the present, the pure past is another time that allows 
the present to pass.122 In other words, the Living Present is the foundation of time while the pure 
past is its ‘ground,’ [fondement] allowing for a time within which the self-constitution of the 
Living Present can effectuate itself. Through Bergson, Deleuze calls this a past that has never 
been present. While the first synthesis in its radical passivity involves a certain powerlessness, 
where the action is too much, too large for the organism, the second involves measuring up to the 
action, ‘becoming-equal” and capable of the action. If the first constitutes the posing of a 
problem, the second may be read to offer a kind of solution.  
 Deleuze, however, announces the third synthesis of time as its empty form, citing 
Hamlet; “the Northern prince says ‘time is out of joint.’” (DR 119/88) Beyond the incapacity and 
the becoming-equal to the action posited in the first and second syntheses, the third, the time of 
the future and the event, return themselves against the self, “and smash it to pieces... what the 
self has become equal to is the unequal in itself.” (DR 121/89-90) Deleuze reads the posing of 
questions in the Living Present, following Blanchot, as imperatives; imperatives conjoining both 
ethical necessity on the one hand, and powerlessness and impossibility on the other, as that 
which both must and cannot be thought.123 In the third synthesis, this powerlessness is “raised to 
the highest power.” (DR 258/200) To elevate an unpower to the highest form of affirmation is 
precisely what Nietzsche understands by the Will to Power, Deleuze adds.124 The third synthesis 
is also the excessive repetition of the future as the Eternal Return. In the Eternal Return, “the 
form of time is there only for the revelation of the formless in the eternal return... the ground has 
been superseded by a groundlessness [sans-fond], a universal ungrounding [effondrement] which 
turns upon itself and causes only the yet-to-come [l’à-venir] to return.” (DR 122-3/91) This pure 
form of time, which Deleuze also calls Aiôn, is less a form than the unformed materiality 
constituting his thought of univocity, an empty form and a without-ground.125 Evoking Derrida’s 
discussion of the dead time at work in the Living Present, Deleuze and Guattari write that the 
pure event of the Aiôn, univocal Being, is to be understood as an ‘entre-temps,’  
the meanwhile [l’entre-temps], the event, is always a dead time, it is there where nothing 
takes place, an infinite awaiting that is already infinitely past, awaiting and reserve. This 
dead time does not come after what happens; it coexists with the instant or time of the 
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accident, but as the immensity of the empty time in which we see it as still to come and 
having already happened. (QP 158/158)  
 
But again, this univocity, this pure and empty form of time must not be understood as an 
undifferentiated abyss, but rather as the return of the impersonal individuations and pre-
individual singularities in Blanchot’s neural ‘One’ [On]. 
 Deleuze’s discussion of the ‘On’ in relation to death returns us to Blanchot’s notion of 
double, personal and impersonal death I covered in chapter 1. Deleuze also discusses Freud’s 
death drive in relation to the three syntheses of time at length. Against Freud’s interpretation of 
the drive as an instinct in all of life to return to organic matter, which Deleuze interprets as a 
brute, bare, nude, mechanical, scientific, objective or ‘material’ repetition, the repetition of the 
death instinct must be understood in relation to its doubling.126  
Death does not appear in the objective model of indifferent inanimate matter to which the 
living would ‘return’; it is present in the living... it is not a material state; on the contrary, 
having renounced all matter, it corresponds to a pure form – the empty form of time... 
Death is, rather, the last form of the problematic, the source of problems and questions, 
the sign of their persistence over and above any response. (DR 148/112) 
 
Personal death is something that happens to me or that I encounter as an external and violent 
accident. Impersonal death, the death of the ‘one dies,’ has no relation to me and yet is internal to 
me; it persists even after I die, and frees the individuating singularities from the form of my Ego, 
self or individual organism.127 It is thus, for Deleuze, another thought of Freud’s death instinct. 
As I have shown, both Heidegger and Derrida reject any philosophy of life which views death as 
a simple external accident. Certain interpretations of Deleuze’s Spinozism have nonetheless 
focused on the ‘overrated’ nature of death in such analyses. But Deleuze’s position is much more 
subtle; indeed, one might argue that what Deleuze means by immanence is completely elided in 
such readings. Every death is double: “there is a necessary non-correspondence between death as 
an empirical event and death as an ‘instinct’ or transcendental instance. Freud and Spinoza are 
both right: one with regard to the instinct, the other with regard to the event.” (DR 333/259e) 
How then, to think these foldings of inside and outside without collapsing the distinction of this 
double death? One should be careful not to let Deleuze’s language in Difference and Repetition 
confuse them; what he will later call the event will always and only concern itself with 
impersonal death and the Outside. In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze distinguishes between the 
event and its spatio-temporal actualization into a state of things. Aiôn, as the time of the event, is 
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precisely the time of the ‘on meurt,’ the time of becoming, as opposed to the Living Present, 
Chronos, the time of Being, and the time of empirical and accidental death. Double affirmation 
affirms both in the Eternal Return, the two temporalizations of death are complementary, and the 
question is thus more complicated than opposing Freud’s internal death drive to Spinoza’s 
unhappy accidental, external death. Blanchot’s ‘personal’ death determines the ego just as much 
in its internal destructive drives as it does in the violent blows it suffers from the outside, “but 
also the impersonal and infinitive death, which ‘distances’ the ego, causing it to release the 
singularities which it contains and raising it to the death instinct on the other surface, where 
‘one’ dies, where one never succeeds in, or finishes, dying.” (LS 259/222) 
 For Deleuze, the fact that every event is one of plague, war, wounds and death testifies to 
the double structure of any event. On the one hand, every event becomes incarnated into a state 
of things; this is the empirical, accidental side of death I showed developed in Spinoza. On the 
other hand, there is the impersonal and pre-individual event beyond any present or state of 
affairs. In the former case, Deleuze explains, my life has become too weak and slips away from 
me, while in the case of the event, I am too weak for life, and life scatters my individuation back 
into its singularities. Returning to Blanchot, Deleuze writes, “death and the wound are not simply 
events among others. Each event is like death, double and impersonal in its double.” (LS 
178/152) But to think pure immanence as A LIFE and nothing more also seems to mean to think 
of it as “liberated from the accidents of internal and external life, that is, from the subjectivity 
and objectivity of what comes to pass.” (DF 361/386) To liberate an unformed matter, a life all 
the more intense in being machinic and anorganic also entails that “a life should not have to be 
enclosed in the simple moment where individual life confronts universal death.” (DF 362/387) 
The singularities and events of a life coexist with its accidents, he writes, but arrange themselves 
wholly otherwise.  
A wound is incarnated or actualized in a state of things and in lived experience. A wound 
itself, however, is a pure virtual on a plane of immanence which leads us to a life. My 
wound existed before me... not a transcendence of the wound as some higher actuality, 
but its immanence as a virtuality always within a milieu (a field or a plane). (DF 363/389) 
 
As Deleuze and Guattari write, the field of immanence is neither interior to the ego, nor does it 
come from an external ego or a non-ego. “Rather, it is like the absolute Outside that knows no 
Selves because interior and exterior are equally a part of the immanence in which they have 
fused.” (MPl 194/156) The Outside as immanence is both what cannot and yet must be thought, 
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that which is most interior and most external to thought; it thus testifies to a certain 
powerlessness, which Deleuze invokes as Blanchot’s ‘Passion of the Outside,’ “a force that tends 
towards the outside only because the outside itself has become ‘intimacy,’ ‘intrusion.’”128 (F 
127/120) But to think this powerlessness and its imperative can be read precisely as Deleuze’s 
understanding of double affirmation and the Eternal Return in the conclusion of Difference and 
Repetition: “one must live and understand time as out of joint.” (DR 381/298t) This ‘one must’ 
disjoins the Living Present; the necessity for a body to think and to live what is impossible for it: 
the inside condenses a past by confronting it to a future that can only come from the outside, 
which enjoins one to “think the past against the present and resist the latter, not in favour of a 
return, but ‘in favour, I hope, of a time to come’ (Nietzsche).” (F 127/119) To think this, Deleuze 
and Guattari suggest, is nothing less than “the creation of a new earth to come,” “thinking 
consists in stretching out a plane of immanence that absorbs the earth (or rather, ‘adsorbs’ it).” 
(QP 89/88) 
 
§4.3: Animmanence in Bataille and Blanchot 
As I mentioned in the introduction, my hunch is that immanence, at least as it operates in 
Deleuze’s discourse, is as curiously named as the Will to Power and the Eternal Return of the 
Same if one takes seriously what he writes on double affirmation, resistance, the Outside and 
double death. But given that Bataille also radically rereads the Will to Power and the Eternal 
Return in terms of immanence, I think we have to take into account Derrida’s understanding of 
general economic concepts with respect to their sliding into non-sense (particularly the classical 
concepts of experience, interiority, sovereignty and materiality).129 This is what is at stake for me 
in thinking animmanence, which doesn’t really do anything but resist the completion of 
immanence, asking something else of it. Blanchot likewise reads the Will to Power as the 
Passion of Difference and the Eternal Return of the Same as the Perpetual Detour of Difference, 
deploying precisely the passivity necessary to think the affirmation of life on earth in its 
powerlessness, beyond the differantials of force that would enframe all its living and nonliving 
matter in view of its calculability and use-value. If, as I’ll show in my section on Derrida, 
Heidegger attempts to rescue Nietzsche from a biological theory of life culminating in Nazism 
only to enclose him in a metaphysics of life culminating in the technological and objectification 
of everything on earth, one senses a risk of the worst, of radical evil in any interpretation of 
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Nietzsche. This is not, for Bataille and Blanchot, accidental; when Bataille reads Nietzsche as a 
philosopher of evil, one must understand this in the context of the sovereign affirmation that 
breaks with all calculability to open itself onto the impossible; an impossible that can be 
anything whatsoever, the worst or the best. (For Bataille, National Socialism was itself a war of 
transcendence against immanence.)130 Blanchot reads the Eternal Return as the disaster itself.131 
But this disaster and evil are themselves, as impossibly difficult to think as this is, the condition 
of the gift, the promise and affirmation in the first place, an unconditional affirmation 
paradoxically bound to selection, inheritance and filtration in its reaffirmation. 
Let me begin with Bataille’s reading of Nietzsche and its implications of immanence. A 
general economy of energy, Bataille recalls, relates objects of thought to an unusable expenditure 
of energy that is not transcendent but immanent.132 The very definition of energy for him is the 
destruction of limits, the immanence of the impossibility of accepting a limit, and thus its 
overflowing.133 In chapter 1, I proposed Bataille and Blanchot’s shared thought of experience as 
an authority that expiates itself precisely as a Nietzschean transvaluation. As the experience of 
the impossible, sovereign affirmation is to be thought beyond all activity, project, knowledge or 
truth, all of which belong to the domain of transcendence for Bataille. Transcendence here refers 
both to transcendent objects and the transcendence of God, both implicating one another.134 The 
world of transcendent, known objects weaves a network of exteriority through me, within which 
my activity annihilates me. I survive this, however, by weaving relations of indefinite 
immanence that tear through the transcendent domain of activity and objects as its ‘sumptuous 
doubles,’ beyond all hierarchy, valuation and production.135 Immanence refers one to a non-
object, an aneconomic end and value in itself that is precisely unproductive expenditure. 
Sovereignty is the self-destruction of transcendence, and it also corresponds to powerlessness for 
Bataille.136 While dialectics thinks the coincidence of immanence and transcendence by thinking 
the latter as an accomplishment and possibility, immanence becomes neutralized in the language 
of the possible. For dialectical phenomenology, “the key point slips away (the marriage, however 
secret, of life and death). Nietzsche alone places himself on the side of glory and laughter.” 
(OC5 542t) How does the sovereign affirmation of Nietzsche’s laughter relate to his concepts of 
Will to Power and Eternal Return? this marriage of life and death? 
 In On Nietzsche, Bataille specifically positions himself against any practical or political 
interpretation of the Will to Power, the overman and the Eternal Return.137 Insofar as the Will 
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relates to activity and certainty, it belongs to transcendence. The Will only risks something it can 
calculate, of which it is certain and capable. Death, on the other hand, is the contrary of certainty, 
and the Will therefore a negation of death.138 The Will is suspended over the infinite opening and 
abyss of time, but neutralizes its nothingness through action, neutralizes life itself. And while the 
horror and risk of death are certainly painful, these are the condition of any chance or future. 
Nietzsche loves this non-knowledge of the future, Bataille explains, and does not posit the simple 
acceptance of suffering and the tragic, which would come down to a transcendent imperative, 
rather, he implores us to love suffering, the worst, a demand proceeding from the passive 
presence of the abyss within Nietzsche himself.139 Nietzsche is less the philosopher of the Will to 
Power for Bataille than the philosopher of ‘evil’ [mal]. “For him the attraction and value of evil... 
gave significance to what he intended when he spoke of power.” (OC6 16/n xxii) The Will to 
Power is precisely ‘the love of evil’ for Bataille, beyond any utility or calculability of its stakes, 
in a sense “the will to evil, amounting to the will to expenditure or risk (which Nietzsche 
stressed).” (OC6 169/n 144) The sovereign affirmation of an expenditure without return not only 
opens onto the worst, but the impossible itself; “the Will to Power is at bottom the will to the 
impossible.” (OC6 480t) 
 As this opening to the impossible, one thus understands for Bataille what makes 
Nietzsche both laugh and cry in thinking the Eternal Return, since it bares the impossible and 
unknowable depth of everything.140 Bataille thus insists on inverting its usual sense: 
It’s not the promise of infinite repetitions that lacerates but this: that the instants caught 
up in the immanence of return suddenly appear as ends. One must not forget that in every 
system these instants are seen and designated as means: every moral system says ‘may 
each instant of your life be motivated.’ Return unmotivates the instant and frees life of 
ends, and thereby ruins it in advance. (OC6 23/n xxixt) 
 
The Eternal Return is a time that questions life itself, exposing whatever sense life may have to 
its sliding into non-sense.141 This is what Bataille calls Nietzsche’s inner experience; the sliding 
towards the impossibility of time that is the Eternal Return.142  The Eternal Return lays the 
conditions through which life accesses the impossible, but the impossible can only be accessed 
by way of the possible. Possibility is the leap, the Overman and the Will to Power and it is within 
these that the impossibilities of inner experience, Eternal Return and Zarathustra’s laughter 
reveal themselves.143 Immanence is in this sense Eternal Return, a time beyond time, an instant 
removed from the time of the project and action.144 States of immanence are beyond good and 
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evil; tragedy and comedy coincide within them and open onto every risk and chance in the 
experience of the impossible. “Upon reaching immanence, our life has finally left the stage of the 
masters behind.” (OC6 170/n 146) 
It seems that everything Bataille writes about powerlessness, sovereignty and 
impossibility as immanence is refigured as transcendence in Blanchot, who is unsure that 
Nietzsche’s negation of transcendence must result in a dogmatic affirmation of immanence.145 
Blanchot identifies two forms of speech in Nietzsche: one belongs to philosophical discourse, the 
other is the ‘parole de fragment,’ fragmentary speech. These correspond to two pluralisms in 
Nietzsche; one of philosophical ambiguity and another beyond the opposition of plurality or 
unity that affirms difference and the Outside.146 It is necessary that the human and the world 
become a philosophical totality so that, in the perishing of the human and its liberation from the 
values of its philosophical knowledge (the categories of transcendence/immanence, world/non-
world, God/man), the Outside can be affirmed. The reason Nietzsche’s affirmation thus cannot 
do without the negation of God is because  
transcendence haunts him, as what he must endlessly surmount to be free. Freedom is to 
God what Ariadne is to Theseus and Dionysus: first, it annihilates him, as Ariadne 
annihilates Theseus: ‘That is the sign of my supreme love, to reduce him to nothing.’ But 
then, Ariadne needs Dionysus, the god torn apart, who tells her ‘I am your labyrinth.’ 
(BPF 287/296-7t, e) 
 
A spectral transcendence welds the wedding ring of double affirmation, and this transcendence is 
what I showed Deleuze call the passion of the Outside. It designates for Blanchot a Levinasian 
ethical relation to the other that absolutely limits my power and mastery and turns it into an 
impossibility.147 Impossibility is itself the passion of the Outside; it is the ethical resistance posed 
by the powerlessness before suffering and death I share with all living beings. As I showed in 
chapter 1, Blanchot wishes to distinguish a thought of death from that bound to power and 
possibility: an impersonal death before which I am powerless, a death impossible to die, which is 
not an external accident but comes from a time without present to which I have no relation.148  
Blanchot comes close to the Zusage in his thought of affirmation, ‘parole’ and the ‘panic 
question,’ opening The Infinite Conversation by defining its single law as an originary 
acquiescence posed against the question of Being and its gathering.149 This accord is beyond 
Being and anterior to the ontological difference, referring thought to an invisibility anterior to the 
opposition of visibility and invisibility, anterior to the determination Being as idea, I’d add.150 If 
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Nietzschean transvaluation for Heidegger simply exchanged idea for perceptio, the latter’s 
thought itself remains in this metaphysical privilege of sight for Blanchot, thus within the 
discourse of power and possibility. Blanchot’s affirmation, however, exceeds the power to 
question, denotes the impossibility of questioning.151  
This thought of an impossible affirmation comes to designate the Eternal Return precisely 
as an impossibility and un-power over and against perspectivism, valuation and what I’ve called 
technobiopolitical enframing. The return of time escapes the order of possibility, and its 
impossibility “signifies the defeat of the overman as will to power... eternal return is not of the 
order of power. The experience of the Eternal Return ruins all perspectives.” (BEI 224/149t) 
Transvaluation thus in no way substitutes perspectival valuation to ideal, transcendent value but 
brings one to an order beyond the notion of valuation itself.152  Against the technoscientific 
project of planetary dominion, human mastery and its insatiable preservation-enhancement in 
and as the Will to Power, transvaluation strikes classical nihilism with a weakness and a 
powerlessness that “lays waste in one stroke to our attempts to dominate the earth and to free 
ourselves from nature by giving it a meaning, that is, by denaturing it.” (BEI 225/149) At stake 
here is nothing less than the affirmation of Return, “the affirmation that, in passing from the No 
to the Yes, refutes nihilism, but does nothing other than affirm it, and henceforth extends it to 
every possible affirmation.” (BEI 225/150) This affirmation without power belongs to the time 
without presence of suffering and death, and thus affirms only by excess and in its 
impossibility.153 Impossible death exceeds our force, power and activity, and while affirmation 
certainly on the one hand affirms the immanence of death in life, on the other 
this immanence is not given; it is to be achieved. It is our task, and such a task consists 
not only in humanizing or in mastering the foreignness of our death by a patient act, but 
in respecting its ‘transcendence.’ We must understand in it the absolutely foreign, obey 
what exceeds us, and be faithful to what excludes us. (BEL 130/127)  
 
Affirmation for Blanchot comes from an absence of time, a time without present, which he 
follows Levinas in calling time as patience; “it is the time when nothing begins, when initiative 
is not possible, when, before the affirmation, there is already the return of the affirmation.” (BEL 
20/29) Affirmation does not issue from a past that would be a modification of presence but from 
the always already past time of Return, ruining in advance any authority, consistency or 
knowability. It must be understood as an originary and perpetual detour and neutrality; it cannot 
be grasped in a traditional thought of affirmation any more that it can be refused in negation, it 
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cannot be questioned or offered as a response. Blanchot writes of the Eternal Return as “the 
detour of all thought.” (BEI 222/148) This is perhaps why, he suggests, Zarathustra announces 
the overman “enthusiastically and with categorical clarity,” while “anxiously, hesitatingly, 
fearfully, he announces the thought of eternal return.” (BEI 222/148) But this detour must be 
thought as immediacy; a non-dialectical, non-phenomenological and non-ontological immediacy 
to be sure, resisting both transcendence and immanence as metaphysical concepts. For Blanchot, 
the immediate corresponds to what I’ve shown Derrida, Levinas and Deleuze call a relation 
without relation, a relation beyond mediation and immediacy excluding all fusion, visible or 
sensible contact and finally its own immediacy. It relates for Blanchot to an impossible relation 
beyond power.154  
If the Eternal Return is to be thought as powerlessness, despite the fact that it is where 
everything that can be affirmed affirms itself eternally, it is because it repeats itself as the 
thought of fragmentation; the doubling of speech that always comes from the other, as I cited in 
epigraph. “The eternal return says time as an eternal repetition, and fragment speech repeats this 
repetition by stripping it of any eternity... withdraws it from everything that has the power of 
repeating.” (BEI 238/159) As concerns temporality, the affirmation of the future is itself doubled 
in the Eternal Return. On the one hand, the future presents itself as a temporal instance, open to 
repetition within the ring of Return. On the other, Blanchot writes, “there is the future itself of 
‘Everything Returns’ – the to-come [l’à-venir] now carried to the greatest power of lack.” (BEI 
417/280) This ‘Everything Returns’ in the affirmation of return is beyond Being and the 
temporality of time; it is the Outside itself.155 This is why the affirmation of Return, in the very 
attempt to make of the instant of its affirmation that within which time turns, ruptures entirely 
with the sovereignty of its affirmation, carried away in the detour of its own exteriority. “There is 
no moment – no instance – for the affirmation of all affirmation, any more than for he who 
would affirm it since its presence means: a lack whose lack no mark could indicate without 
thereby annulling itself.” (BEI 418/280-1) Eternal Return is also what Blanchot calls the disaster, 
a suffering in thought, as he follows Nietzsche, a non-human passivity, an impure loss, excess 
and torment, but also a gift of time without contemporaneity, synchronicity or community. 
Following Derrida and Heidegger, the Eternal Return that is the disaster gives both life and death 
in the passivity of an ex-appropriation. In Bataille, this gift is that of an expenditure, 
transgression and impossible loss in a general economy beyond utility. In Levinas, the 
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transcendence of the other obligates towards a giving as disinterest (transcendence and 
disinterest for Levinas being precisely the contrary of the conatus and immanence).156 Disaster 
gives the time of survival itself. While Nietzsche targets personal and religious immortality and 
the desire for eternal life, ‘as if my survival were something necessary,’ Blanchot remains 
suspicious of a corrective that would desire life in the ephemerality of the instant.157 Rather, the 
life that the disaster of Return gives is without any sur-vival, temporal necessity, presence or 
duration: 
This is what best exposes time: pure difference, the lapse of time, the unbridgeable 
interval which, crossed, becomes limitless by virtue of the impossibility of any crossing 
(it is impossible to cross, inasmuch as it is already crossed). The transcendence that living 
is, and that cannot be satisfactorily expressed as sur-vival (a surpassing of life), is rather 
the pressing demand of an other life, the life of the other. From this life everything 
comes, and turned to it, we cannot turn back. ‘as if survival [sur-vival] were necessary to 
life.’ (BED 163/105)  
 
If survivance is the most intense life possible for Derrida, the exteriority of Return also exposes 
it to an infinite process of ‘disintensification.’158 When Blanchot writes of the Eternal Return in 
terms of the affirmation of difference and repetition, he also cites Derrida and Deleuze in his 
discussion of force and the Will to Power.159 For the latter two, force cannot be thought in the 
singular; only in a differential relation to other forces. Blanchot here recalls Derrida’s point in 
“Force and Signification” that the beginning of Greek philosophy constituted a shift from force 
to eidos, a visible form for the metaphysical eye.160 Metaphysics will have always attempted to 
separate force from its sense by enclosing it within the play of light and darkness. For Derrida, 
however, both force and weakness cannot be understood in terms of clarity or obscurity. As the 
differential element between forces, Blanchot concludes, nor can the Will to Power; it does not 
impose itself as the power of a dominating violence; force itself in its exteriority is beyond the 
opposition of light and dark, indeed any optical reference point. 161  The Will to Power, he 
concludes, is “the passion of difference.” (BEI 241/161) A pathos, as he follows Nietzsche, an 
affect and passivity that ruins in advance all perspectivism, every point of view, the visibility of 
every form, the fascination for form and organic contour, and thus situates us in the neutral 
passivity within which to let life live-on. As evaluation, the Passion of Difference does not 
constitute the world as an object of interpretation; in its originary doubling and multiplicity, it 
yields a thought of the earth and and as its outside, what I’m calling animmanence here. “The 
world is its very outside: the affirmation that exceeds every power to affirm and, in the 
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endlessness of discontinuity, is the play of its perpetual redoubling – will to power, eternal 
return.” (BEI 245/164) 
 The Will to Power, to anticipate the discussion of Derrida, might be thought precisely as 
the transgression, transcendence of the pas au-delà.162 Transgression, Blanchot writes, “is not a 
simple letting go, not that it decides, and, there where it had no hold on anything, by chance and 
sovereignly, would go beyond the power to do anything even to the impossible. Transgression 
transgresses by passion, patience and passivity.” (BPA 162/119) As the passion of difference, 
one can read the Will to Power as that which transgresses immanence towards a beyond it 
immediately nullifies, leaves incomplete, and this holds just as well for life’s relation to death as 
life death and sur-vivance, in its passivity and powerlessness. “Transgression: the inevitable 
accomplishment of what is impossible to accomplish – and this would be dying itself.” (BPA 
147/107) What transgression transgresses is the law that states that death is impossible to die in 
the present; it thus breaks with the time of the present and opens onto the time of un-
accomplishment, “the time of difference in which this would always take place because it has 
always already happened: dying, returning [revenir]... ‘Thus a time without present would be 
affirmed, according to the demand of the return.’ – ‘This is why even transgression does not 
accomplish itself.” (BPA 147/107-8t) To think the Passion of Difference and the Perpetual 
Detour of Difference in their perpetual redoubling, then, incompletes immanence. Even if 
Eternal Return seems to propose time as an accomplished circulation, “inasmuch as it breaks the 
ring in its middle, it proposes a time not uncompleted, but, on the contrary, finite, except in the 
present point that alone we think we hold, and that, lacking, introduces rupture into infinity, 
making us live as in a state of perpetual death.” (BPA 22/12) Only Nietzsche, Blanchot writes, 
was able to think both the accomplishment of time as the present and the absolute destruction of 
the present in the Eternal Return, and to carry this incompleteness to its impossible, infinite 
affirmation. “The ‘re’ of the return inscribes like the ‘ex,’ opening of every exteriority: as if the 
return, far from putting an end to it, marked the exile, the beginning in its rebeginning of the 
exodus. To return [revenir] would be to ex-center oneself anew, to wander. Only the nomadic 
affirmation remains.” (BPA 49/33) Allow me to now pursue these reflections on double 
affirmation in my respective renaming of the Will to Power and Eternal Return as the 
transgression to powerlessness and the infinitely finite revenance of différance in Derrida’s work 
on Heidegger and Nietzsche.  
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§4.4: Derrida, the Double, the Transgression to Powerlessness, the Infinitely Finite 
Revenance of Différance 
§4.4.1: Doubling Heidegger’s Nietzsche 
In his seminar La Vie la mort, Derrida explains that Heidegger, in his own lectures devoted to 
Nietzsche, had attempted to rescue the latter’s thought from its appropriation by Nazism by 
insisting that Nietzsche, far from proposing a biologistic theory of life, was in fact developing 
the concept of life metaphysically. As I’ve shown, Heidegger situates Nietzsche’s thought on the 
crest of metaphysics as its accomplishment in the Will to Power. Whether discussing the concept 
of chaos in the Eternal Return, Nietzsche’s alleged biologism or the Will to Power as knowledge, 
Heidegger’s readings always operate in the interest of gathering Nietzsche’s thought into a unity 
and an accomplished system for Derrida.163 In this sense, the latter writes, Heidegger’s move 
always implies a certain decision concerning the values of gathering and unicity, one which 
Derrida recalls ought to be entered into relation with everything Heidegger says about 
authenticity and thus of course with everything I covered concerning the ex-appropriation of 
authentic temporalization, death as one’s ownmost propriation and so on.164 What I read in terms 
of the Ent-fernung in my previous chapter will find itself engaged in Derrida’s “Pas” on 
Blanchot, the non-negative pas au-delà as the key to thinking double affirmation in Derrida’s 
sense. I explained above that Heidegger sees the Eternal Return and the Will to Power as 
forming a single thought, saying a single thing; in naming beings as such and as a whole, this 
unity effaces the ontological difference and the thought of Being as a question. As Derrida puts it 
in Spurs, however, a certain dehiscence operates in Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche every time 
the question of Being is related to this value of propriation, the valorization of valorization itself, 
the preference for preference that orders the entire existential analytic of death in Being and 
Time. As I showed in chapter 3, Derrida agrees in Aporias that this ordering is irrecusable, 
except perhaps in the case of death, since the latter is beyond the system of possibility and order. 
Questions concerning death as a possibility are themselves made possible by life death.165  
In deciding on this value of unity, Heidegger relegates Nietzsche’s statements ‘ich kenne 
beides, ich bin beides’ (I know both, I am both) and ‘I am living I am dead’ to something 
inessential before the essential unity and unicity of the latter’s philosophy. 166  For Derrida, 
Heidegger wishes to save the unity of Nietzsche’s thought and name against the equivocity, 
duplicity and ambiguity of his life and work. In The Ear of the Other, however, he suggests that 
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Nietzsche’s name itself says the double; insofar as he is his father, he is dead, and as his mother, 
he is living, surviving; the two, he adds in the seminar, is life death.167 In “Ulysses gramophone,” 
the structure of double affirmation is precisely what marks the impossibility of gathering 
Nietzsche’s philosophy into the signature of his proper name. The two yeses “sign yet prevent 
the signature from gathering itself together. They can only call up another yes, another 
signature.” (UG 143/308) When Nietzsche writes that one can only understand the Zarathustra if 
one has a foot beyond life, one must understand this in the syntax of Blanchot’s pas au-delà.168 
The non-dialectical step/not beyond, this pas de sur-vie is more important than the question of 
life and/or death, the difference between the autobiographical and autothanatographical, even the 
biopolitical and thanatopolitical. Both names are bound within the ring of the Eternal Return and 
double affirmation, which can never be understood in the time of the present, but as “a certain 
affirmative re-petition (yes, yes) of a certain re-turn, restarting and reproducing, in a certain 
manner, the affirmation of the Eternal Return, and guarding it as the eternal return of the same.” 
(L2, 13t) Beyond the economy of the proper,  “the contradiction of the ‘double’ goes beyond the 
tearing negativity that could be contained in a dialectical opposition. What counts in the final 
accounting is beyond the account, it is a certain pas au-delà.” (OA 32/19t)  
As Derrida explains, both of Heidegger’s targets in the interpretation of Nietzsche 
concern life; on the one hand, those who read him as a philosopher of life (let’s recall 
Heidegger’s polemic against Lebensphilosophie in chapter 3), and on the other Nietzsche’s 
alleged biologism. In contrast to Heidegger’s preference for gathering Nietzsche’s thought into a 
totality, Derrida recalls the fragment I showed Heidegger cite from the notes to The Will to 
Power, wherein the world was said to be the ashes of countless living beings, ‘and even if the 
animate seems so miniscule in comparison to the whole,’ everything has already been converted 
into life. The translation Derrida proposes says “si peu de choses soit le vivant par rapport à la 
totalité.”169 (L9, 1t) For him, this fragment alone is sufficient to discredit Heidegger’s reading; 
Nietzsche’s thought is not a thought of totality; 
if the living being is smaller than a whole that has nonetheless wholly been and will 
wholly be converted into life, if the living being is thus more and less than the whole that 
it is, and if this must be said in the same stroke of the dead, is it not the case that this 
thought of life death does not submit itself in any case to a univocal sense of totality, to a 
univocal sense of the relation whole/non-whole, and that consequently the thought of the 
eternal return that, of course, runs through this statement is not a thought of totality?170 
(L9, 1t) 
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If Nietzsche’s thought thus implies something other than the metaphysical totality of beings as 
such and as a whole, is Nietzsche something other than a thinker of beings and of the question? 
Life and death would no longer be determinations of beings if life death is originary; “the value 
of totality finds itself deprived of any authority, as soon as the whole is, according to the eternal 
return, more and less than itself. What of life death if they no longer belong to a thought of 
totality?”171 (L9, 2-3t) When Heidegger then engages the second aphorism from The Gay Science 
concerning life as a rare kind of death as in contradiction with the previous fragment, Derrida 
wonders what might happen if the dialectical logics of contradiction, opposition, and so on, no 
longer hold exclusively, particularly with respect to life and death; the very contradiction 
between the two fragments would be an effect of life death.172  
In a sense, Derrida suggests, the difference between Being and beings is perhaps 
suspected by Nietzsche in a nonmetaphysical sense. Heidegger understands both a biologism and 
a metaphysics of life to come down to one another; biology does not understand that it has 
always already taken a metaphysical decision concerning its interpretation of life and death; both 
metaphysics and biologism are effects of the same contradiction. But Derrida sees Nietzsche 
suggest that both Being and beings are effects of life, which would mean that a metaphysical 
determination of life in terms of totality or beings as a whole would in fact be the principal target 
of his philosophy.173 With respect to time, the thought of Return would be a non-metaphysical 
temporalization, one that might even anticipate, Derrida suggests, Heidegger’s own displacement 
of the relation between Being and Time towards Time and Being. 174  With respect to 
humanization, Nietzsche’s thought of Eternal Return would constitute the radical ex-
appropriation of the human and a dehumanization of all organic and inorganic life. It might also 
displace Being as a question, anticipating the Zusage in the doubling of its affirmation; an 
originary response, a ‘yes’ anterior to the question.175 
 What Heidegger cannot abide for Derrida, whether in reading Nietzsche or anywhere 
else, is a thought of the contamination of the propriety of the question, death and authentic 
temporalization. Heidegger’s move is particularly important here, because to save the unity and 
authenticity of Nietzsche’s thought from Nazism, he encloses him in a metaphysics culminating 
in the absolute domination over the earth by human beings in technology, objectification and 
calculability. It is as if the entirety of Heidegger’s reading operates in the différance between 
these two facets of the worst, with both biologism and metaphysics indeed coming down to one 
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another. The complicity between the two operates along what Derrida calls a “terrifying logic of 
contamination.” If Heidegger can only break with Nazism by spiritualizing or metaphysicalizing 
life, Derrida wonders which is worse; a metaphysics or a biologism of race?176 If the Rector’s 
Address constitutes Heidegger at his most diabolical, it is because the risk of contamination is 
not just a risk run; “it is because, without there being anything fortuitous in this, it capitalizes on 
the worst, that is, on both evils at once: the sanctioning of Nazism, and the gesture that is still 
metaphysical.” (DE 54/40) If the Nietzsche lectures constitute Heidegger’s most direct critique of 
Nazism, the passage towards Gelassenheit and the Zusage away from the authenticity of the 
question, this is all the more reason to take his readings extremely seriously; to refuse the 
contamination of Nietzsche’s thought, to read the affirmation of any thought in the singular, as 
pure expenditure without restriction, is itself the worst. One cannot save a thought by denying 
contamination,  
on the contrary, it must consist in assuming this law, in recognizing its necessity, in 
working from within the machine, by formalizing how contamination works and by 
attempting to act accordingly. Our very first responsibility is to recognize that this 
terrifying program is at work everywhere and to confront the problem head-on; not to flee 
it by denying its complexity but thinking it as such. (NII 236)  
 
As Derrida recalls in Of Spirit, Heidegger attempts to shelter the propriety of the question from 
its contamination by technology. To posit an originary reactive technicity as irreducibly 
structuring the question is precisely what gives way to the Zusage and the doubling of 
affirmation for me. How might one understand contamination by the worst to save from the 
worst? Let me recall from chapter 3 that the possibility of an animal Dasein is refused since 
Dasein is defined by its access to the ‘as such’ of a being and thus to the possibility of the 
question. As early as Of Spirit, however, Derrida wonders if Dasein itself can question properly 
beyond its vital interests.177 The difference between Heidegger and Nietzsche is that the latter 
would answer this question in the negative.  
Everything is in a perspective; the relation to a being, even the ‘truest,’ most ‘objective,’ 
that which respects most the essence of what is such as it is, is caught in a movement that 
we’ll call here that of the living, of life, and from this point of view, whatever the 
difference between animals, it remains an ‘animal’ relation. (AS 219/160)  
 
The relationship to the question of Being, the ontological difference, death as such, the capacity 
to let beings be, all of these would involve some mechanical and reactive ruse of life; a structural 
rather than subjective ruse.178 As I showed in chapter 1, one of the fundamental metaphysical and 
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anthropocentric axioms for Derrida opposes the power of the free, active, ethical and responsible 
response of the human subject to the passive mechanical reaction and reactivity of nonhuman 
life. To think mechanicity as originary entails an entire rethinking of responsibility and the 
relations between life, death, the mechanical and the technological.179  
The originary acquiescing of the Zusage, in its address to the other, must promise to 
repeat itself. Derrida joins Heidegger’s thought of the Zusage with that of double affirmation in 
“Number of yes,” in which he attempts both a quasi-transcendental and quasi-ontological 
analytic of the yes.180 The time of the yes, one might say, overruns both the transcendental, 
Husserlian Living Present and the ontological, Heideggerian auto-affection of time, and requires 
another thought of time to think it. The ‘yes’ for Derrida makes possible both circular 
reappropriation and holds this circle open.181 Double affirmation thus thinks both the cyclical 
propriation of time in the Living Present, auto-affective temporalization and also the ‘perhaps’ of 
the promise of the earth, perhaps as the cyclical return and the instant of Eternal Return. Any 
transcendental or ontological statement presupposes this ‘yes,’ but it is precisely through 
ontological-transcendental questioning that the ‘yes’ that exceeds and ruins their discourse in 
advance can be uncovered. Derrida defines Heidegger’s Zusage precisely as a ‘yes,’ a pre-
engagement presupposed by every question, language and speech. It is explicitly connected for 
Derrida to Heidegger’s notion of Gelassenheit, which the former renders as a non-willing within 
willing. 182  Everything Heidegger associates with the words subjectivity, objectivity and 
calculability in the metaphysics of the Will is overrun by the ‘yes,’ which gives and promises the 
incalculable itself.183 The ‘yes,’ for Derrida, is structured in a dimension of originary repetition. 
The first yes, the Zusage, promises, acquiesces but is also originarily a response. “It is first 
second, coming after a demand, a question, or another yes.” (P2 247-8/239) It is mechanically 
doubled in advance, ‘yes, yes,’ contaminated by its very fatality;  
assigned in advance to its repetition. Since the second yes inhabits the first, the repetition 
augments and divides, splits in advance the arche-originary yes. This repetition, which 
figures the condition of an opening of the yes, threatens it as well: mechanical repetition... 
Between the two repetitions, the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ there is both cut and contamination. 
(P2 248/240)  
 
As Derrida puts it in “Nietzsche and the Machine,” 
A single ‘yes’ is, therefore, immediately double, it immediately announces a ‘yes’ to 
come and already recalls that the ‘yes’ implies another ‘yes’... This immediate 
duplication is the source of all possible contamination, of that of the movement of 
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freedom, of decision, of declaration, of inauguration, by its technical or technical double. 
(NII 247)  
 
Derrida’s development of the ‘yes’ and its double appears in Life Death and its the 
contemporaneous collection of essays on Blanchot collected in Parages, which introduce the 
concept of survivance itself. Here, Derrida links what one could call the event and machine of the 
yes, its saying and (re)-citation, its instant and cycle. In “Pas,” the yes-event is read to affirm 
‘come’ [Viens], preparing a space to let the other come, ‘come in.’ However, the ‘come’ is 
always already a citation, a repeated affirmation in its first event. This is not due to any loss of 
authenticity of purity in the saying of yes, but rather engages “the force of affirmative repetition, 
on the self-affirming affirmation, that produces itself as the unique call [appel] to the to-come 
only as the will to repeat itself, to ally itself with itself in what it affirms, eternally. Another 
thought of the eternal return.” (P 23/13e) This joyful affirmation of the ‘yes,’ ‘come,’ must 
nonetheless admit an “immeasurable unhappiness [malheur sans mesure].” (P 23/13) Because 
the ‘yes’ dislocates the space of any ‘as such,’ is not said to any subject or object, it can only be 
said “to what/whom is to come again, again that the eternal repetition will have always called 
from.” (P 24/14) It says yes, Derrida puts it elsewhere, for the whole of life, but this ‘whole of 
life’ must be radically distinguished from any thought of totality or totalization, from beings as a 
whole, I’d add; it overflows both the logic of the whole and the logic of life.184 It is furthermore 
impossible to distinguish between on the one hand the eternal repetition of the affirmation as 
Derrida reads it in Blanchot; double affirmation, Eternal Return, a new thought of citation, and 
on the other hand what one might call repetition and citation in the narrow sense, along a 
metaphysical concept of time.185 The contamination between the event and machine of the yes is 
the risked and threatened structure of affirmation.186 In ‘Ulysses Gramophone,’ after recalling 
that the yes names and describes nothing, Derrida writes that the ‘yes’ must be taken as a 
response to a request or question of the other, one that even detours through me.187 In its address 
to the singular other, the repetition of the yes might be seen as necessarily escaping the forms of 
mechanicity and servility. But this contamination, again, is not accidental.  
In order for the yes of affirmation, assent, consent, alliance, of engagement, signature, or 
gift to have the value it has, it must carry the repetition within itself. It must a priori 
confirm its promise and promise its confirmation. This essential repetition lets itself be 
haunted by an intrinsic threat, by an internal telephone which parasites it like its mimetic, 
mechanical double. (UG 89/276)  
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This threat is indeed the condition for any life to live-on at all: if the possibility of the 
mechanical repetition of the ‘yes’ is refused, “there is no risk, and, if there is no risk, there is 
only death. If we refuse to take a risk, one is left with nothing but death.” (NII 248) As such, he 
writes elsewhere, “the affirmation of life doesn’t occur without the thought of death, without the 
most vigilant, responsible, and even besieged or obsessive attention to this end that does not 
happen – to happen.” (PM 393/158) In the ring of the Eternal Return, the reaffirmation of life in 
the ‘yes, yes’,  
The yes, which says nothing, describes nothing but itself, the performance of its own 
event of affirmation, repeats itself, cites itself, says yes to itself as (to an-) other in 
accordance with the ring, re(-)cites a commitment that would not take place outside this 
repetition of a performance without presence. This strange ring says yes to life only in the 
overdetermining ambiguity of the triumph de [‘of,’ ‘over’] life, sur [‘over,’ ‘on,’ etc.] 
life, the triumph marked in the on of living on [le sur d’un survivre]. (P 149/130) 
 
Between the unconditional affirmation of the other, the infinite, joyful and rejoicing light, solar 
and airy affirmation of the eternal return, and the affirmation of radical evil, the repetition of the 
Christian donkey in Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, overburdened with memory, there is only a 
difference of forces, in other words, it is the différance between the finite and infinite ‘yeses’ that 
is originary, designating the unstable stricture by which the force of the repetition of one yes can 
and must always haunt the other. The ‘yes’ of reactivity and repetition doubles the ‘yes’ of 
affirmation, the gift and the promise.188 The double affirmation held together in the ring of 
Eternal Return for Derrida thus thoroughly problematizes Heidegger’s interpretation; it is no 
more a new metaphysics of time than it is of the totality of beings. The doubling of Nietzsche’s 
signature means that “the Eternal Return always involves differences of forces that perhaps 
cannot be thought in terms of being, of the pair essence-existence, or any of the great 
metaphysical structures to which Heidegger would like to relate them.” (OA 65/46) And in this 
differantial of forces, one can read the originary possibility of contamination for Derrida as the 
place of Nietzsche’s arche-ethics. In the law of inversion, not only can a reactive weakness 
become the strongest force, and vice versa, but force is itself revealed as a weakness. In this 
sense, “Nietzsche is coming to the aid of weakness, of an essential weakness.” (NII 226) One can 
thus perhaps think in it the powerlessness necessary to think survivance and life death against the 
completion of immanence.  
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§4.4.2: The Transgression to Powerlessness 
Let me engage this law of inversion in more detail, as it explicitly ties together the question of 
powerlessness I’m attempting to think here in relation to a certain blindness; one which alone 
can resist the technobiopolitical enframing I read in Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche and its 
grounding in the unification of perceptio and appetitus by which life secures the conditions of its 
preservation and enhancement. Inversion or conversion are not accidental for Derrida; “one 
cannot, any more than one must not, have done with it. This is not a surpassable moment. It 
remains the structural condition of that which it must survive in making it possible: the sentence, 
the decision, the responsibility, the event, death itself.” (PA 78/59) Ultimately, double 
affirmation and the co-contamination of the yeses overrun not only the transcendental and the 
ontological but all dialectics of propriation. Weakness, as Derrida writes, is perhaps what offers 
the greatest resistance to dialectics.189 As I’d mentioned above, a structural, non-subjective ruse 
of life originarily contaminates the question of Being, as is the case with truth, objectivity and 
science – all of which are effects of life death for Derrida. On the one hand, life seeks truth to 
protect and to conserve itself, while on the other, and for these very reasons, it flees it. “There is 
therefore a truth that conserves or serves life, a truth that threatens or loses or kills it, there are 
therefore truths, and as soon as life is just as much what wants truth as what flees truth, there are 
lives, different and heterogeneous levels, qualities, forces of life, which guard, lose, or destroy 
themselves.” (L7, 5t) Derrida here invokes Nietzsche’s concept of dissimulation as a 
conservation instinct; beyond good and evil, truth and falsity operate in an extra-moral sense for 
life. The act of dissimulation attains its peak in the human for Nietzsche; lacking horns or the 
jaws of a beast of prey, dissimulation is a strategy by which the weakest become the strongest, it 
is “that by which life (the weakest... but force always being finite, force is always weakness 
somewhere)... defends and conserves itself: against truth, then, but also by way of truth.” (L7, 6t) 
Dissimulation does not supervene upon life or a subject but constitutes it as the strategy of its 
sur-vival, all the way down to nature itself; “life here, physis, is not natural, a nature that 
dissimulates is not natural, even less so a nature that dissimulates dissimulation, it is a nature 
beyond the oppositions nature/artifice, nature/technology.” (L7, 7t)  
In the third session of Life Death, Derrida turns to two fragments from Nietzsche’s Will to 
Power entitled ‘anti-Darwin.’ Darwinism for Nietzsche posits the survival of the fittest and 
strongest, while for his part claiming to see the average and sub-average dominate; it is in fact 
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the weakest that triumph in their championing of transcendent values.190 “A very enigmatic 
possibility,” Derrida writes, “how can force be stronger than itself? How can the weak be 
stronger than the strong?” (L3, 12t) This logic implies that a force of death is at work in and 
indeed as life itself, in the processes of the forces of life. Nietzsche criticizes Darwin for his 
blindness to “this transgression by life of its own law, to this strange logic of the Will to Power 
that selects in favour of the weakest, to this transgression of the law by itself, this transgression 
of the law being the law, making law (...) (the step/not beyond the law).” (L3, 12t) The debate is 
thus framed as a struggle for sight; Darwin and his school see and want to see natural selection 
operate in favour of the strongest, but are blind before the law as the inversion of the law. When 
Nietzsche argues that the ruse of life of the weak substitutes, replaces or supplements [supplée] 
the force of the strong, “this substituting relation [rapport de suppléance] of the least strong to 
the strongest, of the dead to the living, this relation between the most fecundity and the most 
mortality or destructibility are relations for which the usual logic of the relationships between life 
and death would have difficulty accounting.” (L3, 14-5t) However, this blindness to the law’s 
own inversion and transgression as its very principle is in fact an effect of the law itself as life 
death, “and finally of the law of the Eternal Return, insofar as it is blinding. Blinding in its 
brightness, but a brightness such that one can only blind themselves, wish to blind themselves 
before it.” (L3, 14t)  
“I am my father who is dead and my mother who is alive, announces Nietzsche at the 
mid-point of his life, in Ecce Homo, after passing through blindness.”191 (P 137/120) I’d shown, 
in Blanchot’s reading of “Force and Signification” that since Plato, the metaphysics of form has 
always operated by limiting force, separating force from its sense in view of the eidos, while 
Derrida refuses to think force and weakness in terms of clarity and obscurity.192 The eidos, I’ve 
also shown, dominates the entire epoch of metaphysics in determining phusis as idea, the logic 
that Heidegger holds responsible for the total dominion over the earth in its Nietzschean 
inversion into perceptio. I’d shown Blanchot imagine two types of invisibility, the simple 
inversion of the visible and an invisibility irreducible to its opposition to the visible. This radical 
invisibility, I argue, corresponds to a powerlessness within force itself. Force is precisely “not a 
power,” but a ruse of life, it enjoins one “always to put oneself on the side of the weakest,” in a 
passivity before which the word ‘force’ itself would be misleading. (NII 36) It is a necessary 
condition of the event, the arrivant and the future that we not see it coming; our experience of it 
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must necessarily be passive. Perspectivism, Derrida explains, means that things are always seen 
from a point of view, “according to an interest, in cutting out an outline of organized, 
hierarchized vision, an always selective outline that consequently owes as much to blindness as 
to vision.” (PV 64t) A finite being is always blind to what is excluded from its perspective, it 
“can only see in a perspective, thus in a selective, excluding, framed manner, inside a frame, a 
border that excludes. Consequently, one must surround the visible placed in perspective by an 
entire zone of blindness.” (PV 64t) The question of enframing seems irreducible here. Of course, 
however, this description corresponds to what I defined above as the restricted ecology of life; 
analogical appresentation in the restricted sense, a restricted autopoiesis, a dialectic and 
reciprocal immanence of form and norm, etc. Derrida even relates this precisely to the values of 
proximity, immediate presence, and interiority at stake in the form of the Living Present, indeed 
to a discussion of pure intuitionism running through Husserl, Bergson and Maine de Biran. There 
is a sight or vision that relates to an object present before me, according to the eidos, the contour 
of a visible form, but there is also an experience that is overflowed by someone or something in a 
visibility or invisibility infinitely exceeding the opposition of subject and object.193 Beyond the 
oppositions of sensible and intelligible, active and passive, this ‘a-perspectivism’ would refer, 
following Blanchot and Levinas, to a passivity “more passive than passivity itself, ... this 
patience, this passion which delivers me over to what I receive renders me responsible for it.” 
(PV 76-7t)  
There is a moment of absolute weakness and disarmament [that] ultimately means 
exposing ourselves to what we cannot appropriate... And this relation to the event or 
alterity, as well as to chance or the occasion, leaves us completely disarmed; and one has 
to be disarmed. This ‘has to’ says yes to the event: it is stronger than I am; it was there 
before me; the ‘has to’ is always the recognition of what is stronger than I. (TS 63)  
 
I think this explains well why on the whole Derrida finds himself very suspicious of certain 
interpretations of the Will to Power, preferring like Foucault to speak of a Nietzschean 
differential force rather than Power with a capital P.194 But the Will to Power appears to maintain 
a residue of voluntaristic metaphysics for Derrida, and even the term ‘force’ is one with which he 
feels uncomfortable.195 The terms of force and power should only be used on three conditions for 
him: a) if there are only differences of force and power, b) if this differantial of force entails the 
possibility of the conversion of the strongest into the weakest, indeed into non-violence, and c) 
“that one takes into account, consequently, all the paradoxes and ruses of force, of power, of 
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mastery, as traps in which these ruses cannot avoid being caught up.”196 (LI /149) Even if one 
thinks a quasi-transcendental privilege of a drive to mastery, a Will to Power or domination 
[emprise] as he puts it in The Post Card – such as the economy of reappropriative immanence I 
showed in Derrida’s account of the death drive – the structure of différance shows its essential 
vulnerability, its origin and limit.197 What resists in the differantial structure constituting the Will 
to Power and the death drive, as Derrida closes the Life Death seminar, “would be the 
affirmation of life rather than the aspiration to return to the inorganic.” (CP 436/408) To 
negotiate differantial relations of force and power indirectly, by way of a detour, as he puts it, 
instils a radical discontinuity within them that opens onto the ethical. The affirmation resulting 
from this detour would be beyond the death drive, power and sovereignty, “it comes then from a 
beyond the beyond, and thus from beyond the economy of the possible. It is attached to a life, 
certainly, but to a life other than that of the economy of the possible, an im-possible life no 
doubt, a sur-vival”. (WA 276) In this detour lies a passive affirmation and acquiescence that, I 
argue, would trans-gress, indeed trans-cend the oikos of economy and ecology itself; one must 
think resistance as this Transgression to Powerlessness. To think any différance of force or 
power is to think these as always incalculably in excess of themselves, but this indestructible 
‘redoubling’ of force is also an “‘incapacity,’ the strange passivity of an unpower [impouvoir] 
proceeding from this, that force is given, from the other received, received from the other to 
whom force is also given, whence the eternal ring [anneau], the endless annulment restarting an 
alliance without debt, a gift without credit.” (P 24/13-4t) It is in the double bind of the two yeses 
that one is led to the space of the ethical that is “both disarmed and disarming.” (NII 226) 
 
§4.4.3: The Infinitely Finite Revenance of Différance 
Let’s recall that the originary ruse to dissimulation in life and nature by which all differential 
force inverts into weakness, physis-in-différance itself corresponds to the sameness of difference 
and repetition in the Eternal Return for Derrida.198 In the Life Death seminar, he develops both 
its clearest definition and most difficult implication; both as the repetition and selection of 
becoming. To think repetition as selective, he adds, is as difficult as its contrary, how can a 
repetition not be selective?199 The Eternal Return does not repeat the identical but operates 
selectively within a differential of forces. 
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That which returns is the constant affirmation, the ‘yes, yes’... that which signs here is in 
the form of a return, which is to say it has the form of something that cannot be simple. It 
is a selective return without negativity through affirmation, through alliance or marriage 
[hymen], that is, through an affirmation that is also binding on the other or that enters into 
a pact with itself as other. (OA 64/45) 
 
The condition for anything in life to be affirmed, and particularly the eternal repetition of this 
affirmation, is a detour through the other at the heart of my self-relation. If I will that something 
returns to me eternally, my self-presence is no longer assured; “there is the necessity of this 
detour through the other in the form of the eternal return of that which is affirmed, of the 
wedding and the wedding ring, of the alliance... this ‘yes, yes’ has to be thought beginning with 
the eternal return.” (OA 120/88) What does Derrida mean by this detour through the other? The 
passion of transgression I just mentioned is irreducible to any concept of the decision that would 
ground itself on subjective activity, calculation or will. 200  The Zusage, itself interpreted by 
Derrida as a non-willing within any willing, intersects here with Nietzsche’s ‘perhaps’ 
[Vielleicht]. The perhaps opens up and keeps open any question, response or affirmation; I think 
it precisely resists the completion of immanence, “a perhaps of what remains to be thought, to be 
done, to be lived (to death).” (PA 58-9/38) The ‘perhaps’ is both a promise and fatality, implied 
in the coming of any event, arrivance or future that arrives as the impossible, beyond any 
horizon of predictability, and thus constitutes the only possible event. “This ‘perhaps’ is 
necessarily allied to a ‘yes’: yes, yes to whatever (whoever) arrives [(ce) qui vient]. This ‘yes’ 
would be common to the affirmation and the response; it would even come before any question.” 
(NII 344) Furthermore, the ‘perhaps’ ensures the sur-vival of the response or question, keeping it 
alive. As he adds in a footnote, to think the impossible possible of the ‘perhaps’ and all its risks 
opens onto a thought of spectrality “neither living nor dead, but living and dead.” (NII 399n2)  
This spectrality must itself be thought in the temporality of Return, precisely as a 
revenance. Derrida engages the notion of revenance in Parages alongside the questions of 
survivance and double affirmation in his readings of Blanchot. The triumph of life that structures 
the equivocity of the –sur of survivance overflows both life and death; life death oscillates 
indeterminately between survivance and revenance. 201  In Spectres of Marx, Derrida draws 
attention to the multiple temporalities of the revenant; “no one can be sure if by returning it 
testifies to a living past or to a living future, for the revenant may already mark the promised 
return of the spectre of the living being.” (SM 162/123) I’ve shown in Bataille and Blanchot that 
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the Eternal Return structures the possibility of affirmation on the condition it risk absolute evil, 
the disaster. This absolute evil for Derrida is itself an absolute life that does not know death. 
When I wrote in chapters 1 and 2 that the disjunction at the heart of the Living Present is the very 
condition of justice, it is because it allows for a temporalization that is hospitable to revenants as 
arrivants, and this would be precisely for me the temporalization of revenance hinted at in 
Derrida’s readings of the Eternal Return. Furthermore, these seem to me to precisely structure 
Derrida’s difficult concept of selective inheritance; if the unconditional affirmation of life were 
not bound to this condition of selection, radical evil would not simply be a risk run but precisely 
that which every affirmation would come down to. Even in the cycle of return, I’d say,  
inheritance is never gathered together, it is never one with itself. Its presumed unity, if 
there is one, can consist only in the injunction to reaffirm by choosing. ‘One must’ means 
one must filter, sift, criticize, one must sort out several different possibilities that inhabit 
the same injunction. And inhabit it in a contradictory fashion. (SM 40/18) 
  
Life, Derrida says in For What Tomorrow, ought to be thought from this dual condition of 
inheritance and selection, “from this formal and apparent contradiction between the passivity of 
reception and the decision to say ‘yes,’ then to select, filter, interpret and therefore transform; not 
to leave intact or unharmed, not to leave safe the very thing one claims to respect before all else.” 
(DQ 16/4) As I’d shown in chapter 1, this dissymmetry in inheritance is the condition of letting 
life live-on at the heart of biocultural sustainability.202 
A selective reaffirmation of what returns is only possible on the condition of finitude; the 
infinite and eternal does not select. The injunction to select what returns is structured in the 
differing and deferral of différance, which I’ll recall from chapter 2 is infinitely finite for 
Derrida. Différance is precisely the condition of a just affirmation; “deferring not what it affirms 
but deferring just so as to affirm, to affirm justly, so as to have the power (a power without 
power) to affirm the coming of the event, its future-to-come itself.” (SM 41/19) The affirmative 
transgression to powerlessness and the infinitely finite revenance of différance might just be the 
double necessary for thinking the promise of the Earth, the passivity and humility of its 
affirmation. “Every revenant seems here to come from and return to the earth... to return to it as 
to the lowest, towards the humble, humid, humiliated.”203 (SM 154/116-7) 
Let me return to the line from Celan that has preoccupied my last two chapters; the world 
is gone away, I must carry you. I’d mentioned in a note that even Levinas, in his book on 
Blanchot, seems to warn against reading the ‘carrying’ therein as that of a beast of burden. But 
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the donkey that infinitely repeats ‘yes’ is intimately bound to the structure of double affirmation; 
the possibility that the ‘yes’ fall into its mechanical repetition is the very condition of possibility 
of the coming of the other, the event, the future. Derrida evokes a possible Nietzschean ruse of 
life at the heart of acting as if we shared a world. If the world has gone away, either I must carry 
you in the void or act as if there were a world, bring the world to life and give birth to it so that I 
may give it to you.204 To give the world would not issue from a transcendent imperative, the 
alleged ‘infinitization’ therein would still belong to the economy of a ruse; another thought of 
infinity is called upon. “One would have to think the dissymmetry of a gift without exchange, 
therefore an infinite one – infinitely disproportionate, in any case, however modest it may be, 
from the vantage point of terrestrial finitude. From under its horizon without horizon.” (PA 
318/286) Zarathustra does not give a gift in just any economy, “he gives a world, he gives all, he 
gives that in which all gifts may appear, and, like all gifts, this gift of the world must 
nevertheless be determined: it is this world, a completed world.” (PA 319/287) The economy of 
reciprocity and its values of completion, finitude, homology and immanence – nonetheless 
necessary so that the gift of the world appear – themselves give way to the infinite, 
incompleteness, the dissymmetrical, heterology and transcendence. 205  To think this rupture 
within immanence, one is again returned by Derrida to Bataille, Blanchot, Levinas and also to 
Nietzsche, “although we are already invited to think a proximity of the distant to which 
Zarathustra called us... and always under the neutral and non-dialectizable law of the ‘pas’ and 
the ‘X without X.’” (PA 328/296)  
The ‘without,’ as I’d covered it in Parages, is infinitely passive and originarily affected 
by the wholly other. I’d argued that it operates as the condition of any community or ecology, 
calling it a relationality without relationality where the other remains absolutely transcendent.206 
As originary forms of repetition, “the pas or the trans – always already have the form of the 
return. It begins by returning, in tending towards the annulment of its own process. As is the 
progress of the proper that lets itself be enmeshed by this circular ring.” (CP 424/397t) The 
double logic of the pas, he adds in Parages, operates “according to the eternal return of the 
passive transgression and of the repeated affirmation.” (P 59/46) The event of any affirmation or 
‘perhaps’ is thus structured through the originary detour of the other, what Derrida calls a passive 
decision in The Politics of Friendship, an originarily affected decision without any activity, 
willing, subjectivity or freedom, within which I am “exposed, sensitive, receptive, vulnerable.” 
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(PA 87/68) The detour of time in the Eternal Return is thus the very condition of the affirmation 
of life since it affirms both the death that circulates within discourses of possibility and power, 
the death that my personal life survives, the cycle of life and death and the impossible instant of 
my death, the impersonal death that is impossible for me to die and that I share differentially 
with all living beings. This is precisely Derrida’s point in Demeure: Fiction and Testimony. The 
detour in the turning of time structures the instant of death for any living being as an 
unexperiencable experience, an experience of the impossible. In this co-passion before death lies 
the ground of compassion with other mortals. The ring of Eternal Return binds the possible, 
cyclical, repetitive time of death to the impossible time of the selective instant of my death. It 
engages affirmation of life in its lightness, gaiety and beatitude, but a life without life; 
survivance, revenance. Blanchot’s logic of the ‘spectral’ without binds double affirmation.  
‘to live without living [vivre sans vivant],’ ‘to die without death [mourir sans mort,’ 
‘death without death,’... Life has freed itself from life; one might just say as well that life 
has been relieved of life. A life that simply stops is neither weighty nor light. Nor is it a 
life that simply continues. Life can only be light from the moment it stays dead-living 
without being freed, that is to say, released from itself. A life without life, an experience 
of lightness, an instance of ‘without,’ a logic without logic of the ‘X without X,’ or of the 
‘pas.’ (DB 120-1/89) 
 
This is precisely where Ariadne returns, weaving together both the carrying of the other and the 
passion of affirmation in the powerlessness and vulnerability we share with all living beings. A 
passion holding “for everything from which the tissue of living experience is woven, through and 
through. A weave of survival, like death in life or life in death... they live and die, they live to 
death as the very inextricability of this weave... Groundless ground of this quasi-
transcendentality of living to death or of death as sur-vivance.”207 (BS2 195/132) 
 I’d begun this chapter by taking very seriously, as does Derrida, the necessity of a 
passage through Heidegger that Derrida faults Deleuze and Foucault for avoiding. Despite the 
value of propriation Derrida sees as ubiquitous in Heidegger’s work, the fact that the 
metaphysical thinking of life in Heidegger’s reading of the Will to Power and the biologistic 
thinking of life in Nazism end up being two species of the same contradiction gives one so much 
to think concerning any affirmative theory of life grounded in “pure ‘transcendental life,’ 
‘absolute immanence’ ‘(...) the pure life of the ‘living,’ (...) the immanence of ‘feeling oneself 
alive.’” (FF 16-7t) Particularly if one takes seriously, as I do, the essential complicity these 
concepts share with the objectification, calculation and mechanization of all living and nonliving 
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matter on earth in view of its use-value, and all the biopolitical implications this would have. 
With Deleuze and Bataille, however, I had come to see a thought of immanence structured by 
double affirmation, the Outside, a resistance anterior to the opposition of activity and passivity, a 
double death and the expenditure without reserve exceeding all economic propriation. 
Particularly through Blanchot and Derrida’s readings of the Eternal Return, I’d thus tried to 
develop double affirmation as essentially selective. But even whatever mechanical ruse may lie 
at the heart of this selectivity always affirms itself through the detour of the other in its infinite 
transcendence. This is why animmanence can’t frontally oppose any classical philosophy of 
immanence but only protest gently against its completion, resisting differentials of force and 
power from the transcendence of a survivance beyond the beyond. To let life live-on, to let the 
earth be the earth. How then, might one think beyond the epoch of what Lawlor calls the bio-will 
to power and its complicity with planetary domination? Precisely through thinking life in its 
passivity and powerlessness, as he suggests, but in the incompleteness of animmanence, in the 
doubly affirmative deconstruction of biopolitics. 
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“To see death in life [voir dans la vie la mort].”  
Michel Foucault, Birth of the Clinic, 237/170. 
 
Five: Biopolitics and Double Affirmation v5.01:  
Step/Nots Beyond an Ecology of the Commons 
 
Let me begin by recalling Lawlor’s suggestion of a similarity if not identity between Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Nietzsche’s Will to Power and Foucault’s biopower.  
First, both occur in the modern epoch, which is the epoch of anti-Platonism. Second, both 
conceptions, being modern, imply a transformation of vision into positing and constant 
presence. Third, biopower and will to power are commanding, meaning that the will in 
each conception super-enhances the power it already has; bio-will to power is the will to 
more and more power (super abundant life). Finally, both Heidegger and Foucault 
associate the phenomenological concept of Erlebnis with bio-will to power.2 
 
I showed that Heidegger reads the Will to Power as culminating in the total technological 
enframing, calculation and objectification of the Earth and its living and nonliving beings in 
view of their and use-value. As Mick Smith argues in a rare conjunction of biopolitical thought 
and environmental philosophy, the ecological implications of biopolitics must be interpreted “in 
terms of parallels between the biopolitical reduction of people to bare life and the biopolitical 
reduction of more-than-human nature to resource, to ‘standing reserve.’”3 “It is the reduction of 
the world to a standing reserve that threatens to reduce humans to the status of ‘bare life.’ This 
threat is not just a dystopic possibility but ... already constitutes the ‘hidden matrix’ of 
contemporary (bio)politics.”4  
 For Heidegger, the metaphysical determination of life and the human as animal rationale 
and the Nazi biologization of life are mutually constitutive possibilities. One could say a similar 
concern underlies the critique of the concepts of human rights and personhood as a resistance to 
biopower, and also the extension of such rights to nonhuman living beings. Such extensions, the 
argument goes, are merely reiterative of the conceptual scaffolding responsible for their 
domination. While expressing sympathy for their intentions, animal rights are fundamentally 
unworkable for Derrida since the concept of rights is itself structured on the logic of a human 
subject as the bearer of rights and duties, bound to a logic of representation.5 In environmental 
ethics, the moral considerability of nonhumans has also problematically been premised on 
revealing similarities in shared characteristics and purposes between humans and nonhumans. At 
worst, Smith writes, “our self-concern becomes the basis for a (supposedly) ethical concern for 
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others deemed sufficiently like us.”6 Other trends in environmental philosophy have tried to 
counter this extensionist logic by thinking the ontological and the ethical as bound up one with 
the other. Similarly, certain areas in biopolitical literature have attempted to think the ‘form’ and 
‘norm’ of life together in their resistance to biopower, rather than submitting life to the 
transcendence of a norm or axiologically extending a logic of rights to non-human beings. 
 However, how one thinks this ‘together’ as I’ve argued, can result in two quite different 
streams of interpretation. In this chapter, I’ll contrast ‘affirmative biopolitics’ with another 
thought of resistance to biopolitics along the selective and differentiating lines of double 
affirmation.7 However, I’ll do this less by developing double affirmation itself, seeing these 
reflections in close conversation with those in chapter 4, and using the term more to flag both the 
risk of its continuity with affirmative biopolitics and what it resists therein. While affirmative 
biopolitics emphasizes the reciprocal immanence of the form and norm of life, affirming 
biopolitics itself as the active and creative production of new subjectivities and events, I follow 
Derrida in thinking the relation between the descriptive and normative, constative and 
performative along a wholly other logic as the passive invention of the other: the experience of 
the impossible. Affirmative biopolitics, I’ll show, at worst biopolitically and ecologically 
replicates the Nietzsche Heidegger criticizes, proposing a metaphysics (or at least an ontology) 
of life against a biologism of life that ultimately come down to one another, an inverted 
Platonism where the affirmation of the immanent powers of this world become indistinguishable 
from and indeed complicit with the flows of biopolitical and technoscientific capitalism.8  In this 
chapter, I emphasize the interplay between sovereign power, the power to let live and make die, 
and biopower, the power to make live and let die, both of which can be deemed figures of 
biopolitical sovereignty culminating in Nazism.9 The space for an affirmative response to these 
structures, I argue, lies in Foucault’s concept of resistance, but it is unclear for now if or why this 
resistance ought be called ‘biopolitics,’ unless one were to radically reinscribe its sense by way 
of its ‘impolitical’ underside. The thought of the impolitical I’m interested in developing here 
has more to do with the ‘Politics After!’ approach Derrida discusses regarding Levinas in Adieu, 
a beyond-within of (bio)politics, a thought of (bio)politics to be invented, a peace of the living 
overflowing the political that does not come down to the non-political.10 Foucault and Esposito, 
particularly in their works on Bataille and Blanchot on the questions of transgression, the 
Outside and community do precisely this.11 If biopolitics undergoes such an inversion, I’d feel 
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justified in arguing for a biopolitics of double affirmation. If affirmative biopolitics concerns 
itself with the creative actions, activities, capacities, capabilities, forces, possibilities and powers 
of the living, double affirmation engages the radical passivity of a mortal finitude shared across 
the living in general, a non-power at the heart of power beyond the opposition of activity and 
passivity. If affirmative biopolitics thinks the active resistance of life to biopower as a counter-
power, double affirmation thinks resistance as what Deleuze calls a third term outside the 
traditional opposition of power and resistance, force and counter-force, affecting and being 
affected. 12  If affirmative biopolitics thinks making live otherwise, the biopolitics of double 
affirmation calls forth a letting live-on, anterior to the oppositions of making and letting live and 
die structuring sovereign power and biopower. It thus proposes an ethics and an ontology of life 
that breaks from the conceptual complicity between Nazi biologism, a metaphysics of life and 
ecological domination towards a more just thought of life death on earth.13   
On the ecological front, the danger with much of affirmative biopolitics is its culmination 
within what Smith calls a hybrid panpsychism inattentive to the differences between living 
beings. 14  The same critique holds in Cary Wolfe’s reading of Esposito, whose affirmative 
biopolitics result in a biocentric ‘dedifferentiating discourse of life,’ “a sort of neovitalism that 
ends up radically differentiating the field of ‘the living’ into a molecular wash of singularities 
that all equally manifest ‘life.’”15  Affirmative biopolitics and biocentrism are thus similarly 
problematic; like the axiological extensionism based on a discourse of rights and the person, 
Smith writes, “these purportedly biocentric approaches change the content but retain the form, 
the same anthropocentrically self-obsessed locus, of the dominant ethical field.” 16  The 
affirmative biopolitics posited by Hardt and Negri, even within what they call an ecology of the 
commons, remains fundamentally human-centered. Conversely, “posthuman politics must avoid 
dissolving individual ethical and political responsibilities in amorphous hybrid systems or 
networks.”17 What is needed in resisting biopolitics is an ethics of difference; “an ecological 
difference ethics... potentially offers a radical alternative to all attempts to enclose the nonhuman 
in an economy of the Same.”18  
 When Lawlor writes that both Heidegger’s critique of Nietzsche and Foucault’s biopower 
are directed at a concept of life as Erlebnis, positing the mutual phenomenological immanence of 
transcendental and empirical life, the reciprocal immanence of the form and norm of life together 
in ‘le vécu,’ Foucault draws from Canguilhem in proposing a thought of ‘le vivant’ that 
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maintains a hiatus between the empirical and the transcendental. This is more or less what I 
discussed as the ultratranscendental concept of life in chapter 2. I’ve tried to show organic life as 
existing in differentially structured worlds via what I called their auto-hetero-transcendences in 
temporalization, alterity, materiality and death, carrying over from the most elementary lifeforms 
to the most complicated epistemological, linguistic and affective-creative relations of the human 
and beyond. Wolfe speaks of the living being as constituted by a double finitude, “not just the 
finitude of being an embodied, mortal being, of ‘being toward death,’ but also a second kind of 
finitude – the radical exteriority and technicity of any semiotic system – that makes the first form 
of finitude inappropriable and unavailable to us.”19 This double finitude, he writes, traverses the 
life-death relation, and is correlated to the Zusage and the ‘yes, yes’ of double affirmation I 
covered in chapters 3 and 4.20 Smith also writes of Gelassenheit as the only possible resistance to 
biopolitics. 
to let something be is to hold open the possibilities of beings appearing in ways that are 
significant while not simply conforming to our expectations, desires, or definitions. It is 
to recognize that a being has such potential significance because it transcends (goes 
beyond) what we would otherwise make of it... To let be, then, is not necessarily to leave 
alone but to be in community with.21 
 
At stake here will be precisely this thought of ecological community and the relations of 
passivity, powerlessness and finitude that make relationality impossible; a transcendence within 
immanence that interrupts absolute relationality and affirms an ethics of radical differentiation of 
all life on earth; an ecological relationality without relationality.  
 In §5.1, I situate Derrida’s notion of ethics with respect to the laws and norms structuring 
sovereign power and biopower, but also ethico-politico-juridical performatives and 
technoscientific knowledge, and show how ecological justice must think something irreducible to 
these. Rather, ethics thinks the condition of ecological relationality in terms of a performative 
powerlessness, an event it must let come beyond any modifications of activity and passivity. In 
§5.2, I turn to Foucault, and begin in §5.2.1 by examining the passages between sovereign power 
and biopower and their conjunction within Nazism. How then, is one to think a resistance that is 
not immediately recuperated into these dialectics of life and death? In §5.2.2, I suggest that the 
reconceptualization of life that permitted its entry into biopower also discloses something 
referring knowledge and power over life to their impossibility in Foucault’s readings of 
Canguilhem, Cuvier and Bichat. I then examine the ethical implications of these in §5.2.3 
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through Foucault’s readings of the Eternal Return, Bataille’s transgression and Blanchot’s 
thought of the Outside to uncover a logic of resistance entirely coherent with the movements of 
the pas au-delà, the without and double affirmation. My thesis in §5.3, however, is that Hardt 
and Negri’s affirmative biopolitics propose a thought of life that remains very close to that 
critiqued by Heidegger via Nietzsche, and thus caught up in the dialectics between a biologism 
and metaphysics of life. I show this in §5.3.1 by correlating their understanding of the plane of 
immanence precisely with the inverted Platonism Heidegger reads as entailing human dominion 
over the earth. In §5.3.2, I examine their distinction between power, potestas and biopower on 
the one hand and resistance, potentia and biopolitics on the other. The fact that the latter operate 
totally immanently to the former remains incapable of thinking resistance, I argue, and their 
specific position against deconstruction and Gelassenheit structures these closely to the radical 
killing Heidegger reads in Nietzsche’s thought of valuation. I conclude in §5.3.3 by suggesting 
that what Hardt and Negri propose as living labour within the ecology of the commons bears 
more of a resemblance to the machine economy in which Heidegger sees Nietzsche’s thought 
culminate.  
In §5.4, I turn to the work of Esposito and the radically different affirmative biopolitics 
he proposes. Esposito acknowledges a shift, or rather a progressive superimposition from his 
earlier ‘deconstructionist’ ‘impolitical’ approach towards a more constructive, Deleuzian one of 
constructing concepts.22 Perhaps everything involved in thinking the relation between biopolitics 
and double affirmation reads this progression backwards, grounding the later stage in the former 
via Bataille and Blanchot. I begin in §5.4.1 by examining the break he proposes in the dialectics 
between a metaphysics and biologism of life, sovereign power and thanatopolitics by inverting 
what he calls immunization, the negation of life in its self-protection, into an affirmation of life. I 
then in §5.4.2 argue that if his turn to Spinoza, Simondon and Deleuze bears some similarities to 
Hardt and Negri’s affirmative biopolitics and risks a dedifferentiating discourse of life, Esposito 
also thinks life in its passivity, vulnerability and finitude. In §5.4.3, I show how his earlier 
readings of Bataille and Blanchot radically invert this dedifferentiating tendency towards a 
sharing of the earth with its others while having nothing in common but the impossible relation 




§5.1: Derrida: Performative Powerlessness and the Event of Ecology 
One could say that two logics of the event are at stake between affirmative biopolitics and the 
biopolitics of double affirmation. On the one hand, I’d call affirmative biopolitics ‘performative’ 
in something of a restricted sense, as the enactment of the necessary and sufficient conditions to 
actualize and counteractualize events, the singular affirmation of the immanent powers of life 
enabling the creation of new subjectivities and events. The invention of the other, on the other 
hand, thinks together both the machine and event of the ‘yes,’ the restricted economy/ecology 
between the performative and constative, normative and descriptive, ethical and ontological and 
the event that transcends and exceeds these. In “From Restricted to General Economy,” Derrida 
indeed speaks of the gaiety of an affirmation beyond the economy of life, exceeding 
philosophical logic itself by way of Foucault’s ‘non-positive affirmation’ in “The Preface to 
Transgression.”23 Ethics itself for Derrida comes from a performative powerlessness.  
To this inherited theological fantasy of sovereignty, I would oppose an unconditionality 
without power. And it is there, in this ‘without power,’ that I expose myself to the event, 
to the arrival of an event for which no performative is ready. For which no legitimating 
convention is provided. And it is to this arrival that the ethical question presents itself, 
that the call of the other, the arrival of the other, of an event, is a burden [charge], an 
infinite responsibility. This is not to say that I assume it myself. I cannot assume 
responsibility. I know simply that I cannot assume the responsibility that overwhelms me. 
I am infinitely overwhelmed as a finite being by a responsibility that cannot but be 
infinite – and impossible to assume. But at least I think this impossibility, and it is there 
that I think what my responsibility should be, which is to say, infinite. (PC 468)  
 
Performative powerlessness also resists the sovereignty of the death drive and its attempt to 
reappropriate every material transcendence into the propriety and property of its immanence.24 In 
thinking a beyond of the power principle with  
a death drive that was no doubt not simply alien to the drive for power or the drive to 
mastery (...) to what is most alive in life, to its very living on [survivance],” Foucault 
“would have associated and yet also dissociated, he would have placed back to back, 
mastery and death, that is, the same – death and the master, death as the master.25 (RP 
146/266) 
  
Foucault seems to think something beyond death and power for Derrida. And if, as Deleuze 
suggests, Foucault gets stuck on the possibility of an outside to power, trapped inside something 
he hates, it is in Foucault’s thought of the double, the Outside, and this beyond or the pas au-delà 
of power that one must seek a life’s resistance beyond biopolitical sovereignty.26  
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 Derrida, however, is often quite impatient with “everything that we call today in such a 
confused manner a bio-power,” arguing, as I will explain below, that biopower is an ‘arch-
ancient thing,’ bound up with the very logic of sovereignty.27 (PM2 69t) I think this has to do 
with the structural homology between metaphysical concepts of making and letting. Even if the 
difference between sovereign power and biopower passes through making and letting live and 
die, if both remain committed to a classical determinations of energeia/dynamis, agent/patient, 
act/passion, act/power and the possible, form/matter, then sovereign power and biopower, and 
along with them the affirmative biopolitics that would resist, create and act otherwise would not 
only constantly risk coming down to one another but at worst serve to mutually reinforce one 
another. The following has important ecological implications as well: if it can be shown that 
affirmative biopolitics still grounds itself in the act, in making live and letting die, one ought 
seriously entertain Derrida’s suggestion that every letting die might be a making die.28 This of 
course concerns nonhuman living beings as well; “who can know how many people or living 
beings they will have killed without knowing it throughout their life?” (PM2 114t) What makes 
this making/letting die, whatever its modification, so intolerable, Derrida asks?  
It’s that the death that one thus makes or lets come is not the end of this or that, this one 
or that one, who or what in the world. Each time something dies, it’s the end of the world. 
Not of a world, but the world, the whole of the world, the infinite opening of the world. 
And this is true of any living being, from the tree to the protozoa, the mosquito to the 
human, death is infinite, it is the end of the infinite, the finite of the infinite... It is end of 
the world that is without equivalent, that has so little equivalent that with respect to the 
death of the least living being the absolute end of the world or, if you prefer, the only 
destruction of the earth and of terrestrial humanity changes nothing, aggravates nothing, 
remains in any case incommensurable. (PM2 118-9t) 
 
Making/letting die culminate each time in the end of the world, the destruction of the earth, and 
thus overflows any distinction between a shared earth and different worlds. Derrida writes of the 
socio-economic and techno-scientifico-capitalist machines that condemn these billions of living 
beings to death, both in term of condemning countless species to death unconsciously and in the 
ethico-judicial-political performatives legitimizing these. 29  Capitalist violence, indissociable 
from its technoscientific, biological, genetic, medical and pharmaceutical aspects, 
is the very site where the distinction between the actual and virtual, active and passive, 
intentional and non-intentional, the act and its other, in a word, where this distinction 
becomes blurred, where everything is done so that this distinction is blurred... Where 
there is capital, the distinction between act and non-act, active and passive, actual and 
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virtual, the act and desire, activity and non-activity, labour and non-labour, etc., all these 
distinctions between the act and its others lose all credit. (PM2 268t) 
 
Biocide, zoocide and ecocide thus all rely on this structural homology between sovereign power 
and biopower, making-letting live and die, the thanatopolitical and biopolitical, a homology 
capitalism not only makes possible but seeks to continually reinforce.   
 As I noted above, Lawlor and Wolfe suggest that a resistance to biopower that would not 
immediately be returned to its mechanisms of force and power ought to think the living being 
both in its own mortal finitude and the finitude of the relations in which it structures its 
environment, as I’ve similarly argued throughout. But I have yet to fully flesh out how the 
impossible invention of the other gives itself to think the letting live-on, anterior to the 
opposition of activity and passivity that concerns me here. In “Psyche: Invention of the Other,” 
Derrida suggests that invention only takes place through repetition, but at the same time in 
breaking from this economy in order to let the other come.30 Invention and the event are only 
possible beyond the oscillation between the performative and the constative. As I will show, 
affirmative biopolitics rests on a concept of activity within which the performative, in the 
citation of its conventions, is both the necessary and sufficient condition of the event, the 
invention of new possibilities of life and the production of new subjectivities. The difficulty with 
such an account, however, is its commitment to what Derrida calls a “techno-epistemo-
anthropocentric dimension” linking “within a system of conventions, a metaphysics to 
technoscience and to humanism.” (P1 37/25) As he understands it, the performative is necessary 
but not sufficient to let the event come, since it rests too strongly on political, technoscientific 
and institutional conventions, just as all theories of the performative appeal to some legitimating 
power.31 The performative, as he puts it in Rogues, is “a power for some ‘I’ guaranteed by 
conventions that neutralize the pure eventfulness of the event, and inasmuch as the eventfulness 
of the to-come exceeds this sphere of the performative.”32 (V 123/84) This is the same reason 
Derrida is suspicious of the extension of what he calls juridical performatives such as rights to 
nonhumans. While law, rights and norms belong to the economy of the calculable and possible, 
justice must be thought in the element of non-knowledge, the incalculable and im-possible. 
Rights, in other words, offer a resistance to biopower that remains caught up in its mechanisms – 
“it is one sovereignty set against another. Human rights pose and presuppose the human being 
(who is equal, free, self-determined) as sovereign. The declaration of Human Rights declares 
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another sovereignty.” (V 128/89) Of course, no one is arguing that there should not be norms in 
deciding on ethico-politico-juridical responsibilities, but rather that responsibility itself must also 
involve a certain heterogeneity, indeed an aneconomic relation with respect to the norm. Infinite 
responsibility must be thought as this overloading and overwhelming of the economy of the 
norm. 
One cannot eliminate the overload and control things by norms... When there are norms, 
it’s over, everything is done, everything follows from the norms. There is no more 
responsibility when there are norms. Thus, if one wants to normalize, to norm the ethical 
overload, it’s over, there is no more ethics. There is ethics precisely when I am in 
performative powerlessness. (PC 467) 
  
One must invent norms so that there can be responsibility, but these cannot be reduced to their 
techno-scientific programming and calculability; they must not produce experts.33 The norm must 
be lacking, and this lack of norm is not only the condition of responsibility but all knowledge, 
technoscientific or otherwise.34 This applies not only to biopolitics but also to what I’ll examine 
in science and technology studies, translation studies and ecolinguistics in chapter 6. It will thus 
be necessary to investigate these overlaps between knowledge and power in their complicity with 
the question about dynamis, 
about a force and a power but also about the possible and its limits, about the possible 
and the impossible, about a sovereign ‘I can’ and an ‘I cannot,’ about the potential and 
the virtual; we must let this question resonate wherever what is at stake is the calculable 
and the incalculable in ethical, juridical, and political reason to be sure, but also, 
inseparably, in the technical reason of what is called a bit too quickly today the ‘virtual’ 
in the technosciences, biopolitics, and so on. (V 191/137) 
 
If affirmative biopolitics affirms the creative possibilities of the living, and asks ‘what can a 
body do,’ the double affirmation of life inquires about something else: the experience and 
invention of the impossible and the other.35 Again, what I’m proposing does not oppose itself to 
affirmative biopolitics, which would dialectically return it to its mechanisms, but rather awaits 
the invention of the other beyond any horizon of anticipation or expectation.36 To let the other 
come, however, cannot be thought in the classical determination of activity and passivity; one 
lets it come by getting ready for it.37 Nor can the invention of the other be reduced to a subjective 
or objective genitive: the other’s invention or the invention of the other. “To get ready for the 
coming of the other is what can be called deconstruction. It deconstructs precisely this double 
genitive and, as deconstructive invention, itself comes back in the step [pas] – and also as the 
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step – of the other.” (P1 53-4/39) Decision and affirmation, I showed in chapter 4, are originarily 
passive and affected by the other. 38  In overflowing ethico-juridico-political and bio-techno-
scientific performatives, justice allows no horizon within which to expect it, and this lack of 
horizon is itself the condition of the open future-to-come and the coming of the other.39 Justice is 
beyond a future that would be a mere modification of presence. As I showed in my discussion of 
Nietzsche, justice is committed to this ‘perhaps,’ since the event of justice can only come from a 
future beyond calculation and programmability.40 The non-dialectical negation of the pas and the 
‘perhaps’ intersect in the vulnerability, weakness and passivity of letting the event come. “The 
pas, the movement of a pas that consists in suspending, with a ‘who knows’ (wer weiss) and with 
so many ‘perhaps’s’ (veilleicht), [suspending] the authority of a sure knowledge... All the 
‘perhaps’s’ that multiplied in order to do right by, and justice to, the possibility of the pas and 
advent of the event.” (BS1 374/278-9) While the possible, calculation, law and performativity 
are always of the order of power and sovereignty, Derrida refers to the unpredictable event as a 
weak force. “This vulnerable force, this force without power, opens up unconditionally to what 
or who comes and comes to affect it. The coming of this event exceeds the condition of mastery 
and the conventionally accepted authority of what is called the ‘performative.’” (V 13/xiv) What 
Derrida calls the messianicity of awaiting is not a power, but a vulnerability and absolute 
powerlessness.41 “The one to whom this is happening, the living one – animal or human – must 
not have any mastery over it, whether performative or some other kind.” (FSC 67-8) 
It is important – and this will be essential to thinking the community without community 
of ecological relationality, the pas beyond the ecology of the commons – that what Derrida calls 
the structure of messianicity, the promise of a democracy to-come is not utopian, but rather 
refers “in every here-now, to the coming of an eminently real, concrete event, that is, to the most 
irreducibly heterogeneous otherness.” (MS 69/248) The awaiting of messianicity is an 
“affirmation of an un-predictable future-to-come (or even of a past-to-come again), the 
experience of the non-present, of the non-living present in the living present (of the spectral), of 
that which lives on [du sur-vivant] (absolutely past or absolutely to-come, beyond all 
presentation or representability).” (MS 78/254). As I showed in chapters 1 through 3, Derrida 
sees Freud’s death drive, Husserl’s Living Present and Heidegger’s temporalization as incapable 
of thinking what he calls the promise of the Earth in “Avances.” The vulnerability and weakness 
of performative powerlessness, however, invites us to think this promise, 
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(but also of the threat at the heart of the promise)... [and], at the point of intersection with 
this threatening promise, the horizon of an awaiting [attente] that informs our relationship 
to time – to the event, to that which happens [ce qui arrive], to the one who arrives 
[l’arrivant] and to the other. Invoked with this time, however, would be an awaiting 
without waiting, a waiting whose horizon is, as it were, punctured by the event (which is 
waited for without being awaited). (MS 72/250-1)  
 
The passivity of this awaiting will be the only condition for thinking a letting live-on, irreducible 
to the making-letting-live-die of the play of sovereign and bio-techno-power, and thus also, 
perhaps, the only way to think life in its mortal finitude in an ecology resisting dedifferentiation, 
having the experience of an impossible death as the very condition of a differentiated 
relationality. In this underside to biopolitics, the promise of the earth will not be that of a ‘we’ of 
human subjects, but another ‘we’ that  
can be invented only by the other and from the coming of the other that says ‘come’ and 
to which a response with another ‘come’ appears to be the only invention that is desirable 
and worthy of interest. The other is indeed what is not inventible, and it is therefore the 
only invention in the world, the only invention of the world, our invention, the invention 
that invents us. For the other is always another origin of the world and we are to be 
invented. And the being of the we, and being itself. Beyond being. (P1 60/45) 
 
This ecology-to-come, the step-not beyond an ecology of the commons, “is indeed on the side of 
chance, that is, the side of the incalculable perhaps, and toward the incalculability of another 
thought of life, of what is living in life, that I would like to venture here under the old and yet 
still completely new and perhaps unthought name democracy.” (V 24/5) 
 
§5.2: Foucault: Resistance, Mortalism and the Outside 
§5.2.1: Making and Letting Live and Die 
As is well known, Foucault conceives of the passage between sovereign power and biopower as 
occurring between the right to let live and make die and the norm of making live and letting die. 
Biopower, he argues, consists of nothing less than the entry of life itself into the fields of power-
knowledge. While conceding that life and history had been in contact with one another for 
millennia, Foucault suggests that developments in biology and medicine have allowed mankind 
to place the imminence of death at a distance through a certain mastery over life. For the first 
time in history, life and biological existence becomes something knowledge can control and 
within which power can intervene.42 At what he calls ‘the threshold of biological modernity,’ 
biopower is born: “for millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with 
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the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places 
his life as a living being in question.” (VS 188/143t) As Derrida argues in The Beast and the 
Sovereign, however, these two definitions are perfectly reciprocal and complementary. Not that 
there are no novelties or changes in the mechanisms of power over life, but biopower must be 
understood as far more ancient than modernity and intimately bound to the notion of 
sovereignty.43 If Nazism comes to constitute the unification of sovereignty and biopower within 
what might be called biopolitical sovereignty, the total dialectical interplay of making and letting 
live and die, one wonders how any affirmative biopolitical resistance would not get caught up in 
its mechanisms.  
At a first glance, Foucault seems to posit resistance as operating solely within a 
differential field of forces. Power is not a system of domination or the sovereignty of the state or 
law, nor does it issue from a central sovereign agency but rather everywhere subtends the always 
moving and unstable relations between forces. 44  Cohering with the differential of forces in 
Nietzsche, Freud, Deleuze and Derrida I called a restricted economy or ecology of power, 
resistance is also at work in any power relation. “Where there is power, there is resistance, and 
yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to 
power.” (VS 126/95e) But to understand this implying that power is inescapable and has no 
outside is to misunderstand the relational character of power relations for Foucault. Points of 
resistance are multiple, at work everywhere in relations of power, not as their simply passive 
underside but as an irreducible opposition to power inscribed within its every relation. 
Foucault defines sovereign power as the right to decide the life and death of its subjects.45 
Unlike Derrida, he does not read sovereign power as absolute but conditioned by the defense and 
survival of the sovereign, in turn ensuring the survival of its subjects. The sovereign may ask its 
subjects to expose their lives to death in war, but has a direct power over the lives of those who 
break its laws and are punishable by death. There is an asymmetry in the sovereign power to life 
and death that skews toward the latter; “the sovereign exercised his right of life only by 
exercising his right to kill, or by refraining from killing. The right which was formulated as ‘of 
life and death’ was in reality the right to make die or to let live.” (VS 178/136t) Life and death 
are not to be understood here as the natural phenomena outside political power; the subject’s life 
or death themselves are granted or denied by sovereign power.46 Power is to be understood as a 
‘right of seizure’ on life by which life can then be suppressed.47 It is never a question of making 
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live for sovereign power; its power over life exerts itself only insofar as it can kill. “It is not the 
right to make die or make live. Nor is it the right to let live and to let die. It is the right to make 
die and let live.” (IF 214/240-1t)  
Between the classical and modern periods, Foucault believes to have found what he calls 
a profound transformation in the mechanisms of power. Sovereign power, dedicated to the 
impeding, submission and destruction of forces becomes one mode of power among others 
working to generate and grow forces. The death grounding the sovereign right to kill now 
appears as the complimentary reverse of the social body’s right to manage, ensure and develop 
life through biopower.48 This transformation does not substitute or erase the sovereign power to 
make live and let die but comes to complete it, “penetrate it, permeate it, modify it, and which 
will be a right, or rather the exact inversion of this power: power to ‘make’ live and ‘let’ die.” (IF 
214/241t) 
If the management and prolongation of life become the sole object and function of power, 
death comes to represent its very limit. It will thus be necessary to decrease mortality, extend 
life, stimulate the birthrate and optimize the conditions of life.49  While sovereign power made 
use of death in its capacity to kill, in an era increasingly focused on making live and letting die,  
death, as the term of life, is evidently the term, limit, end to all power. It is on the exterior 
side, in relation to power; it is what falls outside its grip... death now becomes, in 
contrast, the moment when the individual escapes all power... Power no longer knows 
death. Strictly speaking, power forgets death [le pouvoir laisse tomber la mort]. (IF 
221/248t) 
 
In this sense, the mechanisms of biopower must be understood as operating in yet another 
counterpoint to the sovereign right and law (droit) to let live and make die. The power to make 
live and let die no longer deals with subjects of law under the threat of death, but with living 
beings, and must take charge of life itself to exert its mastery over them.50 Biopower constitutes 
an increasing reference to what Foucault calls the norm with respect to the law, making use of 
the normativization of life to ensure its continual regularization and correction. Again, he writes, 
his intention is not to say that the normative absolutely supersedes the juridical institution of law 
but rather that law itself increasingly operates as a norm. The law in turn increasingly implicates 
itself into the primarily regulatory apparatuses of medicine, administration and so on. This comes 
to operate both at the level of individual bodies and at that of the population itself; power in this 
sense has taken control of life in general for Foucault.51   
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This passage from sovereign power to biopower also constitutes a certain shift in the role 
of warfare. Coinciding with a decrease in the use of the death penalty, wars after the 19th century 
are increasingly bloody precisely because the sovereign power over life and death comes to 
operate in a complementary manner to what Foucault calls State racism. Racism becomes what 
legitimates a putting to death within the normativity of biopower. While ancient and classical 
warfare had the function of ensuring the survival of the sovereign and in turn protecting the life 
of its individual subjects – the juridical power to kill in order to live – biopower takes as its 
object the biological survival of the population and the human as a living species. Genocide in 
this sense is not a return of the sovereign right to kill but rather the exercise of power at the level 
of life, species, race and population. Massacres thus become ‘vital’ in the management of the life 
and survival of the race.52 Biopower permits the killing of those who constitute a biological 
threat, and racism operates to introduce a cut within the biological continuum of the human 
species between who must live and who must die. The sovereign injunction to kill one’s enemies 
so that one may live now takes on a biological dimension no longer concerned with the survival 
of the individual; “the death of the other, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the 
degenerate, or the abnormal) is something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and 
purer.” (IF 228/255) The elimination of the danger to the purity of the race thus also passes 
through the sovereign power to kill, but also does so indirectly, by increasing the risk of death 
and disease for those perceived as threats. 53  The death of the other assuring the biological 
reinforcement of the self finds its culmination within Nazism, and I think one can read Nazism as 
the total dialectical overlap between making live and letting die. As Foucault puts it, 
[Nazism] is a society that has absolutely generalized biopower, but which has, at the 
same time, generalized the sovereign right to kill. The two mechanisms – the classical, 
archaic one that gave the State the right of life and death over its citizens, and the new 
mechanism organized around discipline and regulation, or in other words, the new 
mechanism of biopower – coincide exactly. We can therefore say this: the Nazi State 
makes the field of life it manages, protects, guarantees, and cultivates in biological terms 
absolutely coextensive with the sovereign right to kill anyone, meaning not only other 
people, but also its own people. (IF 232/260t) 
 
§5.2.2: Rethinking Life and Death in Cuvier and Bichat.  
In chapter 4, I’d shown with Derrida’s reading of Heidegger that the Nazi biologization of life 
and the metaphysical thought of life responsible for the objectification of the earth and all its 
organic and inorganic matter came down to two effects of the same contradiction. It biopolitical 
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sovereignty culminates in the dialectical co-implication of sovereign power and biopower, 
making and letting live and die, one wonders how a thought of life’s affirmative resistance still 
premised on a dialectics of activity and passivity could be sufficient to break with its 
mechanisms. However, I think something else is at stake in Foucault, since the shift from 
sovereign power to biopower coheres not only chronologically (from the classical to the modern 
period) but conceptually with other important reconceptualizations of life and death in biology 
and in medicine, which I will now explore in his discussions of Cuvier in The Order of Things 
and Bichat in Birth of the Clinic. In the 19th Century, life itself becomes the point of political 
resistance to the mechanisms of biopower.54 But for life to not only become an object for power 
but also resist the powers attempting to control it, a total reconceptualization of its structure was 
needed. Foucault goes so far as to suggest that if biology as such did not exist in the classical 
age, it was because ‘life’ did not exist.55 The classical continuum of natural beings becomes split 
in a radical discontinuity between the living and the non-living, organic and inorganic, living and 
dead: “the inorganic is the non-living, that which neither develops nor reproduces; it lies at the 
limits of life, the inert, the infertile – death. And although it is intermingled with life, it is so as 
that element within it that destroys and kills it” (MC 244/252t) Life and death are two powerful 
forces are at work in all living beings, one constantly operating in the destruction of the other. 
This differential play structures the living being in perpetual discontinuity with itself in the 
interplay between its inside and outside.56 The living being maintains itself on the threshold of 
life and death, a death threatening it from without and within: “the animal [la bête] appears as the 
bearer of that death to which it is, at the same time, subjected; it contains a perpetual devouring 
of life by life. (MC 290/302) The same logic, I’ll show, subtends Bichat’s reconceptualization of 
death;  
the death which life, by definition, resists. Bichat relativized the concept of death, 
bringing it down from that absolute in which it appeared as an indivisible, decisive, 
irrecoverable event: he volatilized it, distributed it throughout life in the form of separate, 
partial, progressive deaths, deaths that are so slow in occurring that they extend even 
beyond death itself. (NC 203/144) 
 
This will also come to characterize the refiguration of death and disease at stake in the 
biopolitical problematic: “no longer as a death that brutally cuts down life – as in an epidemic, 
but as that permanent death that slides into life, perpetually gnaws at it, diminishes and weakens 
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it.” (IF 217/244t) How do these reconceptualizations play into the knowledge of and power over 
life? 
In the last piece he wrote before his death, “Life, Experience, Science,” Foucault 
distinguishes between two interpretive strains in French thought following the publication of 
Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations. On the one hand, a philosophy of lived experience, the subject 
and ‘le vécu,’ taken up by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, having its roots in Bergson and Maine de 
Biran and finding its fullest expression in Sartre’s The Transcendence of the Ego. On the other 
hand, a philosophy of knowledge, rationality and the Concept, taken up by Cavaillès, Bachelard 
and Canguilhem focusing on the foundations of formalism and intuitionism in Husserl’s 
philosophy, with an eye towards the infinite task of universal reason.57 As Lawlor puts it, the 
philosophy of lived experience attempts to make the transcendental immanent to lived 
experience; this is the phenomenological immanence that Deleuze and Guattari clearly 
distinguish from their own interpretation of immanence. In contrast to ‘le vécu,’ ‘le vivant’ 
maintains a hiatus between the empirical and the transcendental, one that exposes the human to 
its originary finitude, passivity and powerlessness before death, as well as before the infinite task 
of scientific and investigation. The reconceptualization of life and death in Cuvier and Bichat do 
not signify the triumph of vitalism over mechanism; the vitalist definition of the irreducible 
specificity of life is itself a surface effect of these reorganizations.58 The shift from the classical 
to the modern episteme would in this sense constitute “the affirmation of an impossibility.” (MC 
259/267) In biology, this would be due to something within life that resists its physico-chemical 
explanation.59 That life and death no longer offer themselves to representationalist thought in the 
modern era constitutes, as Foucault interestingly puts it, “this double affirmation – alternating or 
simultaneous – of being able and not being able to formalize the empirical.” (MC 259/267-8e) 
Canguilhem’s recognition of the inherent normativity of any scientific system and thus the 
constitutive failure of any science, culture or interpretation of reason’s claim to universal validity 
consists of nothing less than the return of the enlightenment for Foucault; the dual recognition of 
the limits and possibilities of reason. Canguilhem’s own research into the history of biology and 
medicine situates their internal normativity in an essential relation to the pathological; any 
knowledge of life must take into account the possibility of disease, death, monstrosity, anomaly 
and error. The knowledge of life thus finds itself in a paradoxical situation: the increasing 
precision within physico-chemical descriptions of life at the cellular and molecular level can 
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only elaborate itself alongside the death and disease that radically differentiate the organic from 
the inorganic.60 This does not entail that vitalism is correct but that it constitutes the essential 
concept of the very history of biology, both at the theoretical-epistemological level and the 
moral-ethical level. On the one hand, there is the necessity of understanding the specificity of the 
living being without positing it as something otherwise to the physico-chemical and on the other, 
the moral requirement to avoid certain reductions, “namely, all those which tend to conceal the 
fact that sciences of life cannot do without a certain value assertion that emphasizes 
conservation, regulation, adaptation, reproduction, and so on.” (DE4 773/474) 
The biologist recognizes himself in his very object of study  
since he lives and since he reveals, manipulates, and develops the nature of the living in 
an activity of knowledge that must be understood as ‘a general method for the direct or 
indirect relieving of tensions between man and the environment.’ The biologist has to 
grasp what makes life a specific object of knowledge and, thus, what accounts for the fact 
that among the living, and because they are living, there are beings capable of knowing, 
and of knowing, finally, life itself. (DE4 773/475) 
 
At stake here is nothing less than the work of the Concept in life I covered in Derrida’s reading 
of Canguilhem in Life Death, that by which the living being structures and is structured by its 
environment, but inflected quite differently. Foucault does not appear to see invisibility, error 
and impossibility as things the Concept can simply surmount but as more originary, ineradicable 
conditions. In this sense, I think living resistance can be understood beyond differantials of force, 
dialectics of making and letting, exposing biopolitical sovereignty to its own impossible Outside 
in the quasi-transcendental logic of the necessity and impossibility of any Concept fixing itself 
once and for all.  
Forming concepts is a way of living and not a way of killing life; it is a way to live in a 
relative mobility and not a way to immobilize life; it is to show, among those billions of 
living beings that inform their environment and inform themselves on the basis of it, an 
innovation that can be judged as one likes, tiny or substantial: a very special type of 
information. (DE4 774/475) 
 
As I’ll show in chapter 6, science and technology studies and translation both operate with error 
at the very heart of their processes of coding and decoding, as does life at its most elementary 
levels for Foucault. The human also inherits this originary possibility of error in its knowledge of 
life. If the human is the living being whose existence as living comes into question, I think this 
testifies more to an arch-ancient ex-propriation of the human, one Foucault finds in Nietzsche. 
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Glossing together the latter and Canguilhem, Foucault writes that truth would be the most recent 
error on the calendar of life; it is error that weaves the concepts of value and norm through the 
history of the relations between knowledge and life.61 
It seems to me that this constitutive notion of error, the necessary and impossible 
knowledge of life offers another way to think the resistance of life to biopower in relation to its 
structural passivity, powerlessness and mortal finitude, one I’ll show coheres entirely with the 
ring of Eternal Return binding together the two ‘yes’es of double affirmation. In both The Birth 
of the Clinic and The Order of Things, Foucault distinguishes between the classical age of the 
17th and 18th centuries and the modernity of the 19th century. The classical age is the age of 
representationalist thought: words and things cohere completely; the role of language is to 
transparently and neutrally represent the external world in terms of identities and differences; the 
task of philosophy, science and ontology is to construct a ‘well-made language’ having the 
naming of things as its fundamental task. I mentioned that for Foucault, biology and the notion of 
life itself did not exist at the time: natural history only concerns itself with living beings. Natural 
history exclusively privileges the visible; it ascribes names to things based on their visible 
properties. Its objects are the visible forms of lines, surfaces and reliefs and their measurements 
in quantity, distribution and relative size in number, figure and property. In this sense, every 
observation of the same living being will be identical and the naming of visible things beyond all 
uncertainty.62 The same is true of the medical gaze in the classical age, operating in the fantasy 
of constant visibility: “the region where ‘things’ and ‘words’ have not yet been separated, and 
where – at the most fundamental level of language – seeing and saying are still one.” (NC 8/xi) 
What Foucault calls the ‘tableau’ in biology and medicine stands as the ideal of an exhaustive 
descriptibility of the world, “the great myth of a pure Gaze that would be pure Language: a 
speaking eye.” (NC 163/114) A translatability so total as to make translation itself superfluous.  
The modern age by contrast constitutes a total reorganization of the field of the visible 
and invisible, life and death. Everything involved in situating the resistance of life to biopower 
needs to understand this passage between classical and modern thought not as a dialectical 
passage from the total translatability of a naive realism to the total untranslatability of a naive 
constructivism, but as something else. Certainly such an approach appears fecund for affirmative 
biopolitics; the death of God, truth and transcendent values clears the way for the creation and 
invention of new possibilities for life, new resistances to biopower, a creative concept of life 
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which can just as easily become the object of power (this is, more or less, Heidegger’s reading of 
Nietzsche). Double affirmation, however, must seek an older, arch-ancient logic that makes these 
oppositions possible as it binds them to their absolute Outside, impossibility, finitude, 
powerlessness and death, just as it must engage otherwise this relation between the visible and 
the invisible. Cuvier introduces the privilege of anatomy over classification, the organism over 
its structure, the interior workings of the living being over its visible characteristics, all of which 
consist of nothing less than the discovery of life in biology.63 Rupturing the continuum between 
words and things, life is no longer a characteristic of certain beings in the world, but gains its 
autonomy from the classical system of classification and nomination. Life is now what links the 
surface functioning of organs to their secret, interior workings. Classifying living beings 
becomes a question of relating the visible to the invisible. This passage to the depths of the living 
being dissociates the homologous relation between words and things. The links between the two 
become conditioned in a space beyond that of representation and the immediately visible in what 
Foucault calls a necessary but inaccessible nether-world structuring all knowledge of life.64   
The same logic is at work in Bichat’s reconceptualization of death. Medical experience 
turns itself towards the invisible and mysterious secrets located within the body.65 The age of 
Bichat, as Foucault cites him, opens with the injunction “‘open up a few corpses: you will 
dissipate at once the darkness that observation alone could not dissipate.’ The living night is 
dissipated in the brightness of death.” (NC 206/46) In both Cuvier and Bichat, what is at stake is 
less a total abandonment of classical systems and their absolute values than a mutation and 
reorganization of the relations between the visible and the invisible.66 While the classical age 
understands death and disease as indistinguishable since both ultimately culminate in the 
termination of life, Bichat identifies two series of phenomena in death: “manifestations 
contemporary with the disease and those prior to death.” (NC 198/141) Bichat, as I showed in 
Deleuze’s Foucault, distinguishes between animal and vegetal or organic life in the same body, 
the latter persisting after the personal death of the individual organism: “long after the death of 
the individual, miniscule, partial deaths continue to dissociate the islets of life that still subsist.” 
(NC 200/142). 67  Bichat thus locates a permeability between life and death, multiple and 
dispersed throughout the organism even after its death. It is that to which life exposes itself at 
every instant, but opposes until its very end. But ought one read this as the dialectical 
juxtaposition/opposition/positional logic in Derrida, in exposition; la vie est la mort, in 
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opposition, la vie et la mort, or does the unheard difference here not articulate itself from the 
possibility of a la vie la mort?68 Again, therein lies the difference between affirmative biopolitics 
and the double affirmation of life. Foucault in fact seems to opt for the latter at times: “the 
irreducibility of the living to the mechanical or chemical is secondary only in relation to the 
fundamental link between life and death. Vitalism appears against the background of this 
‘mortalism.’” (NC 204/143) 
 
§5.2.3: Transgression and the Outside 
As I’d shown in Foucault’s readings of Cuvier and Bichat, a necessary but unknowable structure 
of life and death conditions all ulterior oppositions between vitalism and mechanism. 
Recognizing this unknowability brings with it nothing less than the birth of the human for 
Foucault. It is in Kant that he first reads the apprehension of a transcendental field where the 
subject reveals itself as finite. What Foucault identifies as the quasi-transcendental Forms of 
Life, Work/Labour and Language are constitutively beyond representation, at the very exterior of 
our experience and come to entail what he calls the affirmation of an impossibility, the double 
affirmation of the necessity and impossibility of formalizing the empirical. It is in this dual 
structure of an epistemological-ontological-ethical obligation, an infinite task and its 
impossibility that finitude takes precedence over representational thought.69 Ironically, the entry 
of the human into history is concomitant with the recognition of its own mortal finitude;  
man’s finitude is heralded – and imperiously so – in the positivity of knowledge; we 
know that man is finite, as we know the anatomy of the brain, the mechanics of 
production costs, or the system of Indo-European conjugation; or rather, like a watermark 
running through all these solid, positive, and full forms, we perceive the finitude and 
limits they impose, we sense, as though on their blank reverse sides, all that they make 
impossible. (MC 324-5/342) 
 
A finitude not only external and empirical but transcendental; “the death that anonymously 
gnaws at the daily existence of the living being is the same as that fundamental death on the basis 
of which my empirical life is given to me.” (MC 326/343) To say these two deaths are the Same 
is irreducible to the classical logic of identity and difference; within this analytic of finitude, the 
human appears as “a strange empirico-transcendental doublet.” (MC 329/347) This unthought 
underside and exterior older than the human is itself the Other; its double. As near as this double 
may be, it remains completely alien, and the task of thought – and ethics itself – becomes a 
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question of bringing it closer.70 Ethics in modern thought “is advancing towards that region 
where man’s Other must become the Same as himself.” (MC 338/358) 
This finitude of the human and the necessity and impossibility of ethics operates in the 
finitude of time itself. Nietzsche, he notes,  
took the end of time and transformed it into the death of God and the odyssey of the last 
man; he took up anthropological finitude once again, but in order to use it as a basis for 
the prodigious leap of the overman; he took up once again the great continuous chain of 
History, but in order to bend it round into the infinity of the eternal return.” (MC 
275/286) 
 
The double promise-threat of Eternal Return – and with it the overman and the death of God – is 
certainly in this sense coextensive with the age of biopower, just as Lawlor terms modernity the 
age of the bio-will to power (or will to bio-power), but this reading only focuses on Heidegger’s 
critique of Nietzsche, one Lawlor recognizes was held in high suspicion by Deleuze and Derrida. 
It seems to me that an-other thought of the resistance of life in its impossibility and finitude 
opens up in thinking together the Eternal Return, Blanchot’s thought of the Outside, Bataille’s 
transgression and double affirmation. What Nietzsche, Freud, Bataille and others realize for 
Foucault is that the human is originarily articulated upon things it can never master and do not 
have the same time as it. The task of thinking these consists in contesting their origin in order to 
found it, thus opening onto a thought of an origin without origin forcing us to rethink everything 
about time, exposing an a-chronological fault at its heart, its originary dimension of repetition 
and return.71 In this difference where “the Other, the Distant, is also the Near and the Same,” the 
task of modern thought announces itself as the unrealizable unveiling of the Same. (MC 
350/370)  
Now, such an unveiling is not accomplished without the simultaneous appearance of the 
Double, and that hiatus, miniscule and yet invincible, which resides in the ‘and’ of retreat 
and return, of thought and the unthought, of the empirical and the transcendental, of what 
belongs to the order of positivity and what belongs to the order of foundations... is the 
distance creating a vacuum within the Same, it is this hiatus that disperses and regroups it 
at the two ends of itself. It is this profound spatiality that makes it possible for modern 
thought still to conceive of time – to know it as succession, to promise it to itself as 
fulfillment, origin, or return.” (MC 351/370-1) 
 
The promise and threat of Return as the end of man reappears in the final pages of The Order of 
Things where, with Bataille and Blanchot, Foucault begins to define something like an 
experience of the impossible. Experience, he writes,  
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as experience of death (and in the element of death), of unthinkable thought (and in its 
inaccessible presence), of repetition (of original innocence, always there at the nearest 
and yet always the most distant limit of language); as experience of finitude (trapped in 
the opening and the constraint of this finitude). (MC 395/418-9)  
 
Foucault’s work on Bataille in “Preface to Transgression” and Blanchot in “The Thought of the 
Outside” will allow me to tie these threads together. Foucault writes of the passage to the 
Outside as one beyond discourse and representation, shattering and dispersing the subject as its 
opening to its pure exteriority. Again, Foucault finds traces of the experience of the outside in 
Nietzsche, Bataille’s thought of the limit and transgression, Klossowski’s thought of the double 
and Blanchot’s notion of the Outside. Foucault notes the risk in any discourse reflecting on itself 
of returning the experience of the outside and the other to interiority, consciousness, the body 
and the will. What Foucault finds in Blanchot’s usage of negation, as I showed in Derrida’s 
discussions of the pas and the without, is precisely this pure Outside.72 What I explored in 
chapter 1 concerning Blanchot and Bataille’s thought of experience as an authority that expiates 
itself, questioning everything in an experience of the impossible is thought by Foucault as a 
‘non-positive affirmation,’ a ‘limit experience’ in Blanchot’s notion of contestation.  
Contestation does not imply a generalized negation, but an affirmation that affirms 
nothing, a radical break of transitivity. Rather than being a process of thought for denying 
existences or values, contestation is the act that carries them all to their limits and, from 
there, to the Limit where an ontological decision achieves its end; to contest is to proceed 
until one reaches the empty core where being achieves its limit and where the limit 
defines being. There, at the transgressed limit and where the limit defines being. There, at 
the transgressed limit, the ‘yes’ of contestation reverberates, leaving without echo the I-A 
of Nietzsche’s donkey. (DE1 238/74-5t) 
 
Although, of course, the mechanical repetition of the donkey’s ‘ja’ is itself thought in the ring of 
Eternal Return as the condition for anything to be affirmed or promised at all. I think this is how 
one can conceive of the affirmation of life as a resistance to biopower without immediately 
committing it to its mechanism in a differential of forces; a life death making all dialectical 
opposition of making live and die possible as it exceeds them, “not in showing the invisible, but 
in showing the extent to which the invisibility of the visible is invisible.” (DE4 524/153) This 
non-dialectical negation which is also a non-positive affirmation can be read in what Blanchot 
calls attraction; a synonym for Nietzsche’s Force, Artaud’s materiality and Bataille’s 
transgression for Foucault as “the pure, most naked, experience of the outside.” (DE1 525/154) 
Transgression is inseparable from a thought of the limit, just as attraction is inseparable from 
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neglect, a fort-da or pas au-delà opening onto its absolute Outside. “How could attraction not be 
essentially negligent – letting things be what they are, letting time pass and return, letting people 
advance towards it? For it is the infinite outside, for nothing falls outside of it, for it undoes 
every figure of interiority in pure dispersion.” (DE1 528/156t,e) One can read here Eternal 
Return, a letting beings be anterior to any opposition making-letting-live-die as the law of the 
transgression of the pas, all the movements in trans (-cendence, lation, etc) I approached à pas 
de colombe in these chapters. Transgression is neither negative nor positive; it affirms both the 
limit and its unlimited transgression. “Perhaps it is simply an affirmation of division [partage]; 
but only insofar as division is not understood to mean a cutting gesture, or the establishment of a 
separation or the measuring of a distance, only retaining that in it which may designate the being 
of difference.” (DE1 238/74)  
A double affirmation then; “the empty outside of attraction is perhaps identical to the 
nearby outside of the double.” (DE1 534/163) To hesitate a step into my next chapter, I imagine 
here a translation with no attempt to master time, a listening to and awaiting the promise of life-
death on earth, a language that “is only a formless rumbling, a streaming; its power resides in 
dissimulation. That is why it is one with the erosion of time; it is depthless forgetting and the 
transparent emptiness of waiting.” (DE1 538/167) An awaiting, a messianism without 
messianism issued from a past that has never been present which is also paradoxically its relation 
to a future, without force or power: the promise-threat of the Outside in the indefinite oscillation 
between origin and death. 
They immediately flip sides; the origin takes on the transparency of the endless; death 
opens interminably onto the repetition of the beginning. And what language is (not what 
it means, not the form in which it says what it means), what language is in its being, is 
that softest of voices, that nearly imperceptible retreat, that weakness deep inside and 
surrounding every thing and every face – what bathes the belated effort of the origin and 




§5.3: Hardt, Negri and Affirmative Biopolitics 
§5.3.1: The Plane of Immanence and Dominion over the Earth 
Before turning to Hardt and Negri’s affirmative biopolitics and its ecological implications, let me 
note that Foucault posits biopower as indispensible to the development of capitalism. 73 
Capitalism requires the growth of both population phenomena and economic processes, and 
 217 
biopower assures the docility and usability of life in general to these ends.74 In The Order of 
Things, Foucault traces a similar path to that between natural history and biology to that between 
‘the study of riches’ and political economy. It is in the notion of production in work or labour 
that Foucault finds something in modern thought irreducible to representationalist exchange-
value in the classical era. In the study of riches, the earth provides more than is needed by those 
cultivating it, and wealth corresponds to what is not immediately consumed, and thereby entered 
into circulation and exchange.75 Ricardo, playing an analogous role to Cuvier, inverts this logic: 
“the apparent generosity of the earth is due, in fact, to its growing avarice; what is primary is not 
need and the representation of need in men’s minds, it is merely a fundamental insufficiency.” 
(MC 268/279) As the human population increases, available resources decrease and the birth of 
labour thus develops under the threat of death. Consequently, humans must increasingly exploit 
natural resources to sustain their growing population.76 Political economy develops alongside the 
very finitude of man. In this situation of originary lack, “man risks his life. It is no longer in the 
interplay of representation that economics finds its principle, but near that perilous region where 
life is in confrontation with death.” (MC 269/280) Homo oeconomicus is the human who spends 
its life avoiding death, and labour the means through which it triumphs over death by 
overcoming the insufficiency of nature. The more the human proceeds in its possession and 
domination of nature, the more it recognizes its own finitude and mortality. 77  Labour in 
modernity is thus intimately bound with an increasing exploitation of the earth’s resources, and 
my study of Hardt and Negri’s concepts of affirmation and the plane of immanence – through 
very different readings of Deleuze than those I proposed in chapter 4 – ought bear this in mind.   
 To better understand the role of affirmation in Hardt and Negri’s biopolitics, it is 
important to note Hardt’s deep familiarity with Deleuze. 78  In the foreword to the English 
translation of Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy, Hardt presents Deleuze’s concept of 
affirmation in contrast to the dialectical work of double negation destroying and sublating all 
differences. Similarly to what Derrida calls ‘the phoenix motif’ of the dialectic in Life Death, 
Hardt writes of dialectical negation in terms of resurrection, something that preserves and 
maintains what it negates in order to survive it. Non-dialectical negation is more simple and 
absolute, clearing an immanent and materialist ground for Nietzschean transvaluation and 
creation. 79  Negation plays a fundamentally different role with respect to affirmation in 
Nietzsche’s masters and slaves. The slave’s negation is purely reactive, requiring a double 
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negation to bring it to an affirmation. Conversely, negation is merely secondary to the master’s 
pure affirmation. At stake here are two radically different conceptions of power: “on the one 
side, there is power separated from what it can do, Hegelian reflection... or Spinoza’s potestas, 
on the other side, there is power internal to its manifestation... Spinoza’s potentia.” (HD 42) For 
the slave, power is transcendent and exterior to the field of forces. The slave’s understanding of 
power is also manifest in its relation to death, a death it negates in order to reactively affirm life 
in its resurrection. For Hardt however, “when we pose death in general as the condition of life in 
general, we are dealing in terms too imprecise and too abstract to arrive at the singularity and 
concreteness of the difference that defines real life and subjectivity.” (HD 39) The difference 
between dialectical and non-dialectical affirmation can be summarized as follows: “Hegel 
discovers a force reflected back into itself (self-consciousness or interiority), and Nietzsche 
proposes a force that emerges unhaltingly outside itself (the will to power or exteriority).” (HD 
42) However, it is important not to misread the concept of exteriority here; the force constantly 
emerging outside itself rather signals the ground for the creative possibilities of life on the plane 
or field of immanence.80  
Hardt is in no way inattentive to double affirmation and Eternal Return, but reads these 
Nietzschean concepts through a Spinozist lens.81 The Nietzschean affirmation of being becomes 
an ethics of active expression to be taken up in a Spinozist practice of joy in the construction of a 
positive, creative society. Affirmation is not acquiescence but an act of creation, bound up with 
Deleuze’s Eternal Return as selective.82 In this non-dialectical active affirmation, the collapse of 
transcendent values clears the ground for the creation and invention of new possibilities of life, 
carrying forth a strain in philosophy running through Duns Scotus, Spinoza, Nietzsche and 
Deleuze culminating in the Will to Power as love and the production of common subjectivities.83  
It is in thinking this alternative strain that one can better understand the splitting in Hardt 
and Negri’s concept of modernity, crucial to their understanding of biopower and biopolitical 
resistance. In an earlier work, The Labour of Dionysus, recalling that Dionysus is the God of 
affirmation, foregrounding an alternative terrain of critique and living labour, the authors suggest 
that materialism ought not be confused with modernity but rather thought as an alternative within 
it, a freedom of labour subjugated by capitalist modernity. This materialist vis viva [living force] 
was never extinguished. Modernity contradictorily develops between this materialist current of 
productive forces and the capitalist power attempting to dominate them, the potentia (power) of 
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the multitude versus the potestas (Power with a capital P) of the state. 84  While modernity 
attempts to dialectically subsume its resistance, the non-dialectical negation Hardt reads in 
Nietzsche and Deleuze clears a space for a total transvaluation, an affirmation of the immanent 
powers of this world. Between 1200 and 1600, the primary event of modernity occurs in what 
they call the discovery of the revolutionary plane of immanence; “the affirmation of the powers 
of this world.” (HNE 71) With Francis Bacon, Galileo and others, 
knowledge shifted from the transcendent plane to the immanent, and consequently, that 
human knowledge became a doing, a practice of transforming nature, ... the powers of 
creation that had previously been consigned exclusively to the heavens are now brought 
down to earth. This is the discovery of the fullness of the plane of immanence. (HNE 72-
3) 
 
It is in Spinoza that the authors see the plane of immanence and democratic politics completely 
coincide as the new truth of humanity.85 As I showed in Deleuze, Spinoza’s practice of joy 
directs itself against the sad passions, affirms the desire of life against the fear of death. 
Spinoza’s philosophy of immanence, Hardt and Negri write, “transform[s] the world into a 
territory of practice, and affirm[s] the democracy of the multitude as the absolute form of 
politics.” (HNE 77) Death, in this philosophy, is the weapon wielded by state powers to quell 
this desire for freedom.86 Spinoza, on the other hand, bans death from his philosophy. As they 
cite him “a free man thinks about nothing less than of death, and his knowledge is a meditation 
on life, not on death.” (HNE 78) For the authors, the affirmation of the immanent powers of 
social life is the only possible terrain for democracy. Democracy is the affirmation of the natural 
right of the multitude, of singularities acting in common, a matter of organizing encounters, 
maximizing joyful ones, the generative power of the multitude against the sad passions, the fear 
of death, transcendent rules, laws and norms. Spinozist democracy brings forth an absolutely 
immanent government. While Heidegger and even Nietzsche were correct to foresee the end of 
metaphysics in the crisis of modernity, Hardt and Negri argue, their incapacity to read modernity 
as the unfolding of these conflicting currents leaves them unable to posit any alternative.87 
However, I think this uncritical affirmation of the plane of immanence in transforming nature is 
not only problematic for environmental philosophy; it seems to me the Nietzsche critiqued by 
Heidegger and the biopolitics outlined by Hardt and Negri are not far from one another.88 The 
completion of immanence in this sense may much less think an Outside to biopower than serve 
to reinforce its mechanisms. 
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§5.3.2: Biopower and Biopolitical Resistance  
Hardt and Negri, however, maintain a certain distance from Foucault’s division between 
sovereignty and biopower, drawing rather from Deleuze’s “Postscript on Control Societies.”89 
Societies of control operate in the total reduction of any distance between the apparatuses of 
control and social production. Rather than the economy of discipline coursing through society, 
the governmentality of biopower ought to be thought as “a passage within the notion of 
sovereignty, as a transition to a new form of transcendence. Modernity replaced the traditional 
transcendence of command with the transcendence of the ordering function.” (HNE 88) As the 
disciplinary apparatuses come to identify themselves with the very biological dimension of social 
reproduction, the birth of biopower constitutes the realization of modern sovereignty, or Empire. 
Empire is the paradigmatic form of biopower since it attempts to rule over human interactions, 
human nature and social life in its entirety. But Empire is itself sustained by the creative forces 
of the multitude it attempts to suppress, which are also capable of constructing a counter-empire. 
Against the sovereign rule of the classical age and its transcendent power over life and death, the 
transcendent organizing function of biopower becomes more and more immanent to its 
subjects.90 Hardt and Negri thus distinguish between biopower and biopolitics: while biopower 
regulates the production and reproduction of life itself from within, biopolitics “presents power 
with an alternative, not only between obedience and disobedience, or between formal political 
participation and refusal, but also along the entire range of life and death, wealth and poverty, 
production and social reproduction, and so forth.”91 (HNE 26) Governmentality develops the 
plane of immanence as the terrain of biopolitics. “There is no ‘outside,’ dehors; the bios is that 
‘inside’ wherein each one is entirely enveloped.” (NOB 55) 
One of the more troubling aspects of Hardt and Negri’s account of Empire and 
affirmative biopolitics more generally might be identified in their assertion that Empire is good 
in itself (if not for itself), a step forward, better than the sovereign transcendence preceding it. 
This is central to understanding their emphases on alternatives within Empire; “we should be 
done once and for all with the search for an Outside, a standpoint that imagines a purity for our 
politics.”92  (HNE 46) Imperial power is absolute because it is completely immanent to the 
biopolitical machine of social production and reproduction. 93  Modernity is torn between a 
constituted juridical power and the creative, immanent production of subjectivities. As such, they 
argue, when certain thinkers criticize modernity, they are really only attacking the first tradition, 
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that of a sovereign, transcendent biopower over and against the biopolitical affirmation of 
hybridities and differences. However,  
Empire too is bent on doing away with these modern forms of sovereignty and on setting 
differences to play across boundaries... The danger is that postmodernist theories focus 
their attention so resolutely on the old forms of power they are running from, with their 
heads tuned backward, that they tumble unwittingly into the welcoming arms of the new 
power. (HNE 142)  
 
A danger from which their own project is not immune, as they certainly recognize. Because 
Empire depends on and is nothing other than the forces it attempts to control, particularly with 
respect to ecological destruction, I’d argue, Empire at its pinnacle  
represent[s] the continuous possibility of the destruction of life itself. This is an operation 
of absolute violence, a new metaphysical horizon, which completely changes the 
conception whereby the sovereign state had a monopoly of legitimate physical force.... 
Empire is defined here in the final instance as the ‘non-place’ of life, or, in other words, 
as the absolute capacity for destruction. Empire is the ultimate form of biopower insofar 
as it is the absolute inversion of the power of life.94 (HNE 345-6) 
 
Does this absolute inversion not then risk the violence and radical killing Heidegger reads in 
Nietzsche? As Hardt explains, the distinction between two types of power, potentia and potestas, 
is at the heart of Negri’s work on Spinoza.95 In The Labour of Dionysus, the two develop the 
notion of the potentia of the multitude against the potestas of the state in what they call a 
practical critique of violence, but might be better expressed as a critique of non-violence. One 
must not confuse a rejection of violence with a wholesale rejection of power, they caution. The 
discourse of nonviolence seeks a purity from and an outside to a violence always inherently 
correlated to injustice, but culminates in a reactive account of life and an ascetic ideal that 
negates life. Against this, Hardt and Negri invoke what they call the materialist tradition in 
understanding power as a form of violence.96 For Spinoza and Nietzsche, “life itself involves 
violence and it would make no sense to pose any notion of the right, the just, or the good outside 
the context of the exertion of power.” (HNL 292) As they interpret him, Foucault is precisely not 
seeking an outside to power, a society without power relations, which would come down to 
anarchism. 97  Borrowing Foucault’s notion of ‘anarchaeology,’ they attempt to differentiate 
between types of violence rather than positing it as wholly acceptable or inacceptable.98 Again, 
the authors read the multitude as itself always already an imposition of power. Affirmative 
biopolitics, I’d say, consists in “affirming one type of power over another, the constituent power 
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of the multitude against the constituted power of the State.” (HNL 307) The resistance to 
biopower rests on nothing outside it; the search for alternatives within Empire is precisely 
positioned against an outside to power. Liberation “must be achieved within this world, on the 
plane of immanence, with no possibility of any even utopian outside.” (HNE 65) Spinoza’s 
account of the multitude with its affirmation of the creative capacities of desiring bodies 
constitutes the only possible resistance to biopower.  
What is central... in the general concept of Empire, is that a terrain of immanence be 
affirmed. Immanence is defined as the absence of every external limit from the 
trajectories of the action of the multitude, and immanence is tied only, in its affirmations 
and destructions, to regimes of possibility that constitute its formation and development. 
(HNE 373) 
   
The affirmation of this immanent desire and productivity is what the authors call generation; “the 
primum of the biopolitical world of Empire.” (HNE 389) Empire “pretends to be the master of 
the world because it can destroy it. What a terrible illusion! In reality we are masters of the world 
because our desire and our labour regenerates it continuously.” (HNE 388) Biopolitical 
generation is an originary process that allows biopower to regenerate itself, and affirmative 
biopolitics affirms this ‘first’ dimension.99 “If power (pouvoir) presents itself as a dispositif of 
total and full constitutiveness, if the ontological condition is power (puissance), then the political 
is configured not so much as resistance but as generation, no longer as ‘being against’ but as 
‘being for.’” (NOB 60) In this sense, we have reached the end of the politics of Platonic 
transcendence for Negri.100 
 What then are the overlaps with the affirmation of generation and this new concept of 
resistance? Drawing again from Deleuze and Guattari, the authors open Empire with the claim 
that “resistances are no longer marginal but active in the centre of a society that opens up in 
networks; the individual points are singularized in a thousand plateaus.” (HNE 25) Resistance, as 
they follow Deleuze’s interpretation of Foucault, is in a sense prior to power. In their chapter 
“De Corpore I: Biopolitics as Event,” Hardt and Negri return to Foucault in developing 
resistance as “an other to power (or even an other power).” (HNC 56) However, the authors 
hesitate to use Marx’s notion of ‘counterpower’ to define resistance, since resistance is not 
homologous to power. The other power is a production of subjectivity that resists and seeks 
autonomy from power.101 Here the authors recall their distinction between biopower and the 
biopolitical resistance of life: “the biopower against which we struggle is not comparable in 
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nature or form to the power of life by which we defend and seek our freedom.” (HNC 57) The 
political expression of freedom on the plane of immanence, Negri adds, is itself without 
power.102 Biopower is understood as a power over life, and biopolitics a power of life in its 
resistance to biopower and its alternative production of subjectivities.  
However, whatever may be suggested in their passage between another to power and 
another power seems to skew entirely in favour of the latter in their readings of Heidegger and 
Derrida. Hardt and Negri open Commonwealth with a critique of what they perceive as 
‘apocalyptic’ discourses in discussions of biopolitics and their exclusive focus on the concept of 
sovereignty, the rule of exception and its transcendent, even theological power, such accounts 
foreclosing a political engagement with power. By contrast, their project intends to overcome the 
powerlessness entailed by transcendent forms of power with the affirmation of the immanent 
powers of the multitude here on earth, in its active powers of resistance. Heidegger in particular 
is targeted for his alleged fixation on powerlessness and death. 103  Perhaps nowhere is the 
difference between Hardt and Negri’s project and my own more clearly marked than when they 
suggest that “Heidegger’s notion of Gelassenheit, letting go, withdrawing from engagement, for 
example, not only brings back the earlier vitalism and voluntarism by confusing history with 
destiny but also reconfigures them as an apology for fascism.” (HNC 29) The difference between 
our two projects is further solidified when they take on Derrida (along with Agamben and 
Nancy). While these authors accept that biopolitics is ambiguous and conflictual, they see 
resistance “acting only at its most extreme limit, on the margins of a totalitarian form of power, 
on the brink of impossibility... leav[ing] biopolitics powerless and without subjectivity.”104 (HNC 
57-8e) For Negri, deconstruction is not necessarily a return to transcendence (although he 
especially faults the Derrida of Levinasian inspiration). However, deconstruction’s attempt to 
‘shake up’ the fullness and density of the plane of immanence by emphasizing the marginal, 
excessive, disseminative and the ‘partage’ seeks to reintroduce the value of judgement in 
politics. However, in thinking the plane of immanence as a fold, bound with tensions and events,  
it is no longer necessary to define a disseminating margin and, from there, construe a 
development of value: instead, it is the centre of this being that is expressive, not through 
deconstruction but through the constitution of a power, puissance, in the constant 
sequence of the folds and (tenuous yet strong) movements of being. (NOB 59)    
 
Perhaps, as I wrote above, the line between affirmative biopolitics and the resistance of double 
affirmation passes between creation and invention; active creation, the affirmative possibilities of 
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the immanent, creative possibilities of life, and what Derrida calls the invention of the other, the 
impossible experience of preparing a place to let the other, the event come, which can be 
correlated to the notions of awaiting I’d explored in Foucault and Derrida’s messianic promise. 
As I’ve shown, Hardt and Negri do attempt to think a concept of resistance anterior to power and 
which does not get caught up in its structures.105 But this resistance is correlated to what they call 
a biopolitical notion of the event, “different from the conception that events only come ‘from the 
outside,’... those who follow this notion of the event can only wait with a kind of messianic 
fervour for another event to come.” (HNC 178) It then seems that two radically different 
concepts of the event, corresponding to creation and invention, trace the articulation between 
affirmative biopolitics and a double affirmation of life beyond biopolitics. For Hardt and Negri, 
“biopolitical events instead reside in the creative acts of the production of the common. There is 
indeed something mysterious about the act of creation, but it is a miracle that wells up from 
within the multitude every day.” (HNC 178) For Negri, however, this power of life must not be 
understood in terms of 19th Century vitalism, which cannot think events or singularities. The 
roots of what he proposes as a ‘poststructuralist vitalism’ lie in Machiavelli, Spinoza, Nietzsche 
and Marx. Vitalism is a philosophy of power (puissance, potentia), the flow of which is 
structured by events and singularities, and must be reinterpreted as an ontology of practice on the 
field of immanence and in the ‘ecology of the commons.’106 This latter notion is itself drawn 
from Hardt and Negri’s work, and I permit myself a longer citation here. 
Whereas the traditional notion poses the common as a natural world outside of society, 
the biopolitical conception of the common permeates equally all spheres of life, referring 
not only to the earth, the air, the elements, or even plant and animal life, but also to the 
constitutive elements of human society, such as common languages, habits, gestures, 
affects, and so forth... We might call this an ecology of the commons – an ecology 
focused equally on nature and society, on humans and the nonhuman world in a dynamic 
of interdependence, care, and mutual transformation. (HNC 171) 
 
§5.3.3: Immaterial Labour, the Machine Economy and the Ecology of the Commons 
Hardt’s reading of Nietzsche and Spinoza in terms of living labour can be found in his book on 
Deleuze. Against the transcendent, reactive, slave mentality of power, the worker recognizes its 
essence as a force, Will to Power, living labour and creation. The synthesis of Eternal Return 
courses through the mass of workers, a social synthesis, bringing all workers into a powerful and 
joyful assemblage in their working, willing and acting together. 107  After the collapse of 
transcendent values, the affirmation of life must constitute itself in the self-valorization of 
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productive labour, the practical production of bodies and affects. As a pure ‘power to act,’ labour 
brings together the intelligence, passion and affect of the workers into a constituent, affirmative 
and immanent power. In this sense, Hardt and Negri argue that the Spinozist power to act is 
actually Nietzschean, concerned with the destruction of transcendent values and the immanent 
creation of new ones. 108  The authors emphasize the increasingly immaterial, intellectual, 
affective and techno-scientific dimensions of labour; “the labour of the cyborg.” (HNL 9) A 
hybrid of machine and organism, labour comes to stand as the expressive production of the 
ecology of the commons. As they suggest, the biopolitical production of subjectivities must be 
understood as an ecological struggle that came to express itself in immaterial labour.109 Against 
the idea that capital would pursue its accumulation of the non-capitalist environment: humans, 
animals, vegetal and mineral until nothing is left, leading to its starvation, capital “subsumes not 
the non-capitalist environment but its own capitalist horizon – that is, the subsumption is no 
longer formal but real. Capital no longer looks outside but rather inside its own domain.” (HNE 
272) Capital’s real response to the threat of ecological disaster takes place after “mechanical and 
industrial technologies have expanded to invest the entire world... Through the processes of 
modern technological transformation, all of nature has become capital, or at least has become 
subject to capital.” (HNE 272)  
Again, the affirmative biopolitics developed by Hardt and Negri are almost identical to 
the total bio-technological enframing and objectification of the earth in which Heidegger sees 
Nietzsche’s thought culminating. As the authors add in a footnote, however, “we do not mean to 
suggest that capital can perpetually through technological advances reconcile its destructive 
relationship with its (human and nonhuman) environment. What technological advances can do 
is shift the terrain of conflict and defer the crisis, but limits and antagonisms remain.” (HNE 
459n21) Biopolitical reason, they add elsewhere, would  
put rationality at the service of life, technique at the service of ecological needs, where by 
ecological we mean not simply the preservation of nature but the development and 
reproduction of ‘social’ relations... between humans and nonhumans, and the 
accumulation of wealth at the service of the commons. (HNC 125)  
 
This notwithstanding, nowhere else could my hesitations before the ecological potential of an 
affirmative biopolitics be more clearly read. Indeed if, as they suggest, this cyborg, hybrid, 
posthuman nature of labour marks where deconstruction has lost its effectiveness, I instead 
suggest that it is precisely in interrupting the commons, in rethinking community as the ex-
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propriation of the human that deconstruction offers the best way to think sharing a world with 
other living beings, having only in common the radical passivity and finitude in the experience of 
an impossible death. In fact, such steps beyond are precisely what Negri reproaches Derrida in a 
response to Spectres of Marx. For Negri, Derrida’s concept of spectrality perfectly captures the 
new immaterial nature of labour. Deconstruction, however, remains caught in a work of 
mourning; “at this crucial point, deconstruction refers back to a radical questioning of the 
problem of life and death, the opening of an experience of ethics and community.” (NSS 9) 
Ethical resistance unravels in its discussions of the gift, friendship, justice, negative theology, 
‘the inaccessible to man,’ ‘the infinitely other,’ Blanchot and the “paradoxical Nietzscheanism of 
Bataille.” (NSS 13) As Negri asks, “how can protest be effective in a world of ghosts? How can 
ethical resistance become real?” (NSS 13) Since the spectral nature of labour entails that there is 
no longer an outside, one should denounce deconstruction’s concept of practice, and shift from 
passivity to potential towards a new post-deconstructive ontology, a new power “where 
performativity comes to life in practice.” (NSS 14) Such radically different understandings of 
performativity and the event are at stake between Hardt and Negri’s biopolitics and what I’m 
attempting with a double affirmation beyond biopolitics that a debate seems moot. Unless, that 
is, affirmative biopolitics is to rethink life and death, community, the gift, justice, Blanchot and 
Bataille – but also in conversation with Nietzsche, Heidegger, Deleuze and Derrida. A turn to the 
work of Roberto Esposito, who does precisely this, is thus essential here. 
  
§5.4: Esposito: Step/nots beyond an Ecology of the Commons 
§5.4.1: Inverting Biopolitical Sovereignty, Inverting Affirmative Biopolitics  
Esposito’s work takes some important distances from Hardt and Negri’s affirmative biopolitics 
with this question: “if life is stronger than the power that besieges it, if its resistance doesn’t 
allow it to bow to the pressure of power, then how do we account for the outcome obtained in 
modernity of the mass production of death?” (EB 39) At stake here is again a passage between 
the sovereign power to make die and let live and the biopower to make live and let die, both of 
which Esposito sees as occurring in what he calls modernity. If sovereign power has its roots in 
Hobbes’ sovereign ensuring the preservation of life, why do Nazi thanatopolitics turn this 
politics of life into the work of death? Esposito identifies two possibilities depending on how one 
interprets the relation between sovereignty and biopower. If the two are seen as radically 
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discontinuous, biopolitics is “absolutely euphoric,” as in Hardt and Negri’s affirmative 
biopolitics. (EB 8) On the other hand, if biopower and sovereign power are entirely continuous, 
one is “forced to assume genocide as the constitutive paradigm (or at least the inevitable 
outcome) of the entire parabola of modernity.” (EB 43) Such an argument would be more in line 
with the thanatopolitics developed by Agamben and the necropolitics of Mbembe (and, for the 
most part, my own). The continuist hypothesis projects an absolute power over life, while the 
discontinuist affirms an absolute power of life.  
I showed that for Foucault, Nazism constitutes the total overlap of sovereign power and 
biopower. Nazism for Esposito operates in what he calls an absolute normativization of life 
collapsing any distinction or mediation between the subject or person and its biological body. 
The immediate biological given is the absolute truth for Nazism, and this total coincidence of the 
body with itself forecloses the possibility of any transcendence. 110  Nazism excludes any 
mediation between life and politics, resulting in the terrible conclusion that life can be 
immunized, protected and strengthened through the growing production of death. As he explains 
in Bios, “more than a reduction of bios to zoe or to ‘bare life’ (which the Nazis always opposed 
to the fullness of ‘life’ understood in a spiritual sense as well), we need to speak of the 
spiritualization of zoe and the biologization of the spirit,” – race, in a word. (EB 142) Both the 
biological and juridical norms of life become “completely superimposed according to the double 
negation of the biologization of the nomos and simultaneously the juridicalization of bios.” (EB 
138) Biopolitical sovereignty can thus be understood both as the metaphysical spiritualization 
and biologization of life and race I showed in Derrida’s reading of Heidegger.  
Esposito proposes what he calls immunization to think the articulation between 
sovereignty and biopower to see why a politics invested in protecting life reverses itself into a 
work of death. It is in thinking immunization otherwise than as the deadly negation of life that 
Esposito attempts to reverse its thanatopolitical drift culminating in Nazism into an ‘affirmative 
biopolitics.’ Both the sovereign right to kill and Nazi thanatopolitics can be read through 
immunization, and while biopower certainly grows out of older political categories, it is only by 
linking it to the negative protection of life in immunization that it emerges as a specifically 
modern category. “Only modernity makes of individual self-preservation the presupposition of 
all other political categories, from sovereignty to liberty.” (EB 9) Modernity has its roots in 
Hobbes and the sovereign right of life and death in the conservatio vitae and the conatus sese 
 228 
praeservendi, and while Nazism’s absolute conjunction of the biological and the political 
continues to allow death to function in the preservation of life, “it will be produced in growing 
quantities according to a thanatopolitical dialectic that is bound to the condition of strengthening 
life vis-à-vis the ever more excessive realization of death.” (EB 9)  
 Esposito’s notion of immunization must be approached with reference to what he calls its 
true antonym, communitas, since the tensions between the two organize the entirety of modern 
politics for him.111 The common in communitas is ontologically opposed to the proper and 
private: it is public, collective. However, it is the term ‘munus’ to which Esposito turns his 
attention. Munus is traceable to the ideas of obligation, duty and also the gift: a gift that one both 
must and cannot give.112 Communitas is founded on a pledge to give what one does not have or 
possess; a quasi-transcendental lack thus structures all community.113 The cum of communitas 
signals an ex-propriation and an impropriety anterior to any will or subject as “the originary 
munus from which they arise as an uninterrupted expropriation.” (ECI xxix) Communitas ought 
not be thought of as a subject writ large, intersubjectivity, a relation between alter egos, others or 
even an ecology of the commons, I’d add; community is an originary condition of relationality, 
but also its partage, condivisone, both what binds and interrupts relationality.114 By contrast, the 
category of modern immunization can be understood as an immunity from the obligation of 
communal gift giving. The modern individual is ‘absolute’ in that it is absolved from this relation 
and the debt that binds it to others. Contagion from others becomes what threatens the identity of 
the modern individual, and immunization arises in the face of “the potential risk of a world given 
in common – and for this reason exposed to an unlimited indistinction.”115 (EB 66) 
 Hobbes had fully developed immunitary logic for Esposito. Humans share a generalized 
capacity to be killed, and since life’s natural impulses towards acquiring everything makes any 
autonomous self-preservation impossible, life requires a transcendental source by which it 
negates itself in the interest of its self-protection. This transcendental condition has the same end 
as natural self-preservation but operates in an opposite fashion, by negating life. Sovereignty 
thus institutes the modern notion of the subject, the proper subiectum of representation and 
rights. Drawing from Locke, the human has a property over his person, and all other ‘inferior 
creatures’ on earth are given in common to humans. Hobbes’ Leviathan places the conservatio 
vitae at its heart, and sovereign immunization thus circumscribes the entire horizon of biopolitics 
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for Esposito.116 The Leviathan State arises out of the fear of death; it immunizes itself from the 
communal risk of death and an earth given in common.   
Immunization can be thought of both as a biological and juridical protective response to 
the risk of contamination and contagion, overlapping biology, law, politics and communication. 
As Esposito recognizes, the threat of contamination is ineradicable in any individual or collective 
life. However, immunization protects life by negating it, or rather doubly negating life so that it 
may affirm it. In Nietzschean language, it is a reaction, repercussion and counterforce rather than 
an action. Immunization survives the threat of contagion by reproducing it within itself in a 
manageable quantity; it dialectically ensures survival by reappropriating a threat it thereby 
neutralizes.117 Immunization separates life from its communal obligation – indeed from itself – in 
order to preserve and prolong it by deferring the death it interiorizes.118 It thus corresponds more 
or less to what I’ve called restricted ecology throughout, and Esposito indeed confronts “the 
‘restricted economy’ of a conservatio vitae” in his work on Bataille. (EC 18) However, he does 
not propose an absolute break from immunization and its dialectics between the protection and 
negation of life; such a break being no more possible than desirable. Immunity cannot be 
eliminated from community; “to negate the negation through which immunity in its turn negates 
what threatens life would be to repeat the same procedure.” (EI 16) What is needed is rather a 
deconstruction of immunization so as to remove its negative character and affirm it as a partage 
within communitas.  
 Like Hardt and Negri, Esposito reads a certain doubling in modernity. Sovereign law is a 
right to life and death because it utilizes the threat of death in the interest of the preservation of 
life.119 Nazi thanatopolitics, however, makes the norm of biological life the immediate object of 
politics. Not only is death now deployed to protect life, the strengthening of life is itself realized 
in the increased production of death in what Esposito calls a thanatopolitical dialectic. 
Immunization, the internal articulation between sovereign-modern power and thanatopolitics 
thus expresses the dialectical logic by which making and letting live and die, affirmative 
biopolitics and thanatopolitics constantly threaten to reverse into one another, along “the line that 
both separates and unites life and death.” (EI 33-4) I’d shown the relation between la vie et la 
mort (separation) and la vie est la mort (unification) to themselves be dialectical effects of an 
originary dimension of life death, la vie la mort. A double affirmation beyond biopolitical 
sovereignty, a letting live-on must be dislodged therein in this deconstruction of immunization. 
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 For Esposito, Nietzsche had entirely anticipated the immunitary paradigm in determining 
life as Will to Power.120 As he recognizes, the ambiguous interpretability of Nietzsche’s work 
itself mirrors this foresight, and anticipates both 20th Century thanatopolitics and affirmative 
biopolitics.121 The reactive affirmation of life returns life to the death it flees, affirms only by 
negating and negating what it affirms.122 Against the positive character given to immunization by 
the modern conservatio, Nietzsche reads the demand for self-protection as derivative from the 
Will to Power, thereby giving immunization a specifically negative emphasis. The conatus of 
‘consumptive Spinoza’ signifies a life in distress while a healthy life seeks to expand its power 
even at the expense of its self-preservation.123 The reason Nietzsche remains on the crest of 
nihilism for Heidegger is that the substitution of the Will to Power for the struggle for survival 
amounts to a negation of a negation, a mere inversion of Platonism. While this negation of 
immunization on its own would situate Nietzsche squarely within biopower, Nietzsche 
“simultaneously moves in two directions” for Esposito. (EB 99) I noted that Hardt and Negri’s 
affirmative biopolitics can itself be read as representative of Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche. 
The non-dialectical negation of transcendent values reveals the immanent terrain for the creative 
possibilities of life and the techno-machinic enframing of the earth as a whole. This Nietzsche 
seems to propose an immanent, biopolitical Plato for a metaphysical Plato.124 But what of the 
other Nietzsche, the other affirmation? 
Foucault, Hardt, Negri and Esposito all seem to read the passage from sovereign power to 
biopower as one between the transcendent rule of law and the immanence of a norm. I’ve also 
shown that sovereign rule institutes the dispositif of the proper of the person or subject of 
representation as against an earth given in common. Nazi biopolitics eliminates any 
transcendence from the person, and crushes life into its bare biological referent. In fact, Esposito 
argues in Third Person, the failure of human rights after the Second World War happens not in 
spite of its emphasis on the person but because of it. Esposito recalls here Bichat’s distinction 
between two kinds of life operating within the same body, the animal/rational and the 
vegetal/organic. If Nazism attempted to eradicate the animal/rational dimension of life, reducing 
it to its bare organic given, human rights inverts this relation, championing of the rational aspects 
of the person over its animal impulses. “Because of this shared assumption, contrary to first 
appearances perhaps, biopolitical corporealization of the person and spiritualistic personalization 
of the body are inscribed within the same theoretical circle.” (E3 12) For Esposito, both develop 
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from the same Aristotelian definition of man as a rational animal, which Heidegger sees as 
mirror images of one another, as are the metaphysics and biologization of life.125 
Either there is a tendency for human life to be absorbed into animal life, as it was claimed 
in 19th century biophilosophy, along a course brought to its ultimate end by Nazism, or an 
symmetrical relationship is established between them that submits the animal part to the 
unconditional dominion of the other, on the basis of its preliminary character as rational 
or volitional. (E3 90) 
 
This total convertibility is precisely why Derrida rejects any clear, single division between bios 
and zoe or any modern specificity to the biopolitical paradigm. I’ve shown that Heidegger’s 
“Letter on Humanism” and his Nietzsche lectures constitute a confrontation not only with Nazi 
biologism but with the definition of man as animale rationale as insufficiently humanist, too 
biologistic and revealing that “the metaphysics of classical humanism, the metaphysics that is not 
humanistic enough is, deep down, the ally or accomplice of biologism and zoologism.” (BS1 
428/322) As Derrida elaborates,  
when Heidegger on the one hand condemns biologism (and clearly modern biologism), 
and on the other hand denounces as metaphysical and insufficiently questioning the 
zoologism of a definition of man as zoon logon ekhon or, a fortiori, as zoon politikon, he 
is going exactly in the direction of this whole supposedly new configuration that 
Agamben credits Foucault with having inaugurated. (BS1 431/324) 
 
Derrida categorically rejects that the introduction of zoe or bare life into politics founds a modern 
biopolitics. Agamben’s distinction cannot possibly admit that Aristotle had anticipated the 
‘modern’ category of biopower. 126  For Derrida, this explains why Agamben gets stuck on 
Foucault’s claim that the human is no longer an animal with the capacity for politics, but one 
whose politics call its biological existence into question.127 
The specific difference or the attribute of man’s living, in his life as a living being, in his 
bare life, if you will, is to be political. Foucault’s ‘with the additional capacity’ indeed 
echoes this..., seeming to oppose with an ‘in question’ two possibilities that I for my part 
find to be perfectly reciprocal or reciprocable or complementary. (BS1 438/330) 
 
This is why, to return to Esposito, Nazi bio-thanatopolitics and the personalist biopolitics of 
liberal individualism are the mere reversal of one another; both remain bound to the same 
imperative: “to manage life productively: in the first case, to benefit the racial body of the chosen 
people; and in the second, to benefit the body of the individual subject who becomes its master.” 
(E3 91) If the metaphysics and biologization of life, personalism and Nazism, sovereignty and 
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biopower all come down to the same logic, how is anything like an affirmative biopolitics 
possible or desirable? 
For Esposito, both sovereign law and the biopolitical norm presuppose the life of the 
subject in Foucault, and “it is this structural homology that maintains the disciplinary norm in the 
immune circle of the law. (EI 142) However, Esposito sees in Canguilhem something that resists 
the dialectics welding together making and letting live and die. Canguilhem differs from 
Foucault by thinking the norm as intrinsic and immanent to the living being, removed from the 
transcendental condition of the law.128 I’ve shown that for the former, the organism furnishes its 
own norm of life and that the abnormal is structurally anterior to the normal. As such, the norm 
of life must be understood in  
its tendency towards perpetual self-deconstruction. Since every norm can only establish 
itself through the infraction of, or deviation from, the one that precedes it, it follows that 
the organism that is most ‘normal’ is able to break and change its own norms more often. 
The norm for any organism, in short, is the ability to change its own norms. This means 
first that biological normativity coincides with normativity, or the power to create new 
norms, and second, that normativity, far from being reducible to a form of preventive or 
even subsequent normalization, is a measure of the vital force of existence.” (EI 143) 
 
Risk, exposure to possible contagion and contamination in the ecology of the commons are all 
functions of the healthy organism. It is the unhealthy one that negates itself in the immunitary 
dialectic of the conatus sese praeservendi and the conservatio vitae.  
 It is important to go slowly through Esposito’s argument since this reference to a ‘vital 
force of existence’ seems contrary to much I’ve been developing. As this argument develops in 
reference to Canguilhem, Simondon, Deleuze and Spinoza in the final pages of Bios, it can 
certainly appear much closer to the affirmative biopolitics of Hardt and Negri. As I mentioned 
above, this is why Wolfe argues Esposito’s conclusion in Bios ends up endorsing an unworkable 
egalitarian biocentrism long familiar to readers of environmental philosophy. Wolfe’s points are 
of the utmost importance here, especially since he reads affirmative biopolitics as engaging only 
the first part of an aporia (I’d say the first part of an affirmation).129 But much of Esposito’s 
earlier work, especially in Categories of the Impolitical and Communitas outlines a way to think 
the form and norm of life together without having recourse to this dedifferentiating discourse of 
life. This is how I read Deleuze’s accounts of Spinoza and Simondon in chapter 4 through the 
logic of the pas au-delà, the Outside and double affirmation. I’ll now attempt to read this in 
Esposito to develop life as its structural differentiation and ex-appropriation, its interruption of 
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relationality in an ecology without symbiosis, a partage, a step/not beyond the ecology of the 
commons. 
 
§5.4.2: Individuation, the Impersonal and the Impolitical  
How ought one read in Esposito an impolitical underside to biopolitics? The impolitical traces 
the finite limits of the political, he writes, but its negation is paradoxically affirmative; it affirms 
that “there is no political but the political.” (ECI xviii) The impolitical is thus not so much 
beyond the political as it is its impossibility, one preparing a space for the deconstruction of the 
political’s categories. I’ll attempt here to transpose this into the category of biopolitical 
immunization to imagine an affirmative resistance to its negation.130 Esposito goes very far in 
theorizing the impolitical precisely as the radical passivity, powerlessness and finitude necessary 
to thinking a resistance to biopower. As he argues, there is nothing outside of power: power 
“encompasses the entirety of represented reality.” (ECI 12e) Representation, I showed with 
Heidegger, can be said to be the political category that binds metaphysical humanism to 
biopolitical biologism. This fullness of power, however, “allows the nonpower of that which is 
not to show through; not from outside reality, but from behind it, as its reverse side... it is in this 
absence – the unexpressed, the unthought, the forgotten – that the impolitical gathers.” (ECI 12) 
The subiectum of representation is inextricably bound to the political categories of power and 
possibility, and Esposito engages the powerless underside to this structure. Although he keeps 
the word power, he similarly to Hardt and Negri distinguishes potere from potenza, the latter a 
non-active power corresponding to passion, suffering and patience. The same applies to force; if 
force is everything, the non-force it is not still comes through.131 The other to the force and 
power encompassing all that is possible, real and existing must be thought as otherwise than 
being; the impolitical “remain[s] external to its opposite without ever being anything other than 
it, in transcending [trascendimento] the thing whose opposition defines its nature.”132 (ECI 15) 
Following Bataille, this transcendence will come to express a community of the impossible, 
community as differentiation itself, an affirmation entailing the breakdown of all dialectical 
relations between activity and passivity, force and counterforce, power and counterpower, 
“political and impolitical, life and death, immanence and transcendence.” (ECI 15) The 
impolitical is beyond the political but in a sense irreducible to a metaphysical understanding of 
transcendence; it is part of life itself. The political transcends itself toward its impolitical 
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underside, referring thought to an absence and invisibility beyond the play of representation 
subtending the metaphysics and biologization of life. 
Let me develop this passive potenza further. In a chapter on Elias Canetti, Esposito 
argues that power and antipower come down to one another, and any alternative to the language 
of power is thereby impossible. Canetti presents this as the biological law of life’s ineluctable 
relationship with death; we can no more turn away from life than we can from death, since we 
live off the deaths of other creatures.133 As Esposito asks,  
how is it possible to live without death, if life nourishes itself on death? How is it 
possible to push all the death out of life, if life derives from the indisputable reality of 
death? This [is] the Canettian question. How can one live without doing so by surviving 
others [vivere senza sopravvivere]? How can we achieve the impossible ‘squaring of the 
circle?’ (ECI 113)  
 
To square this circle would require living without growing and growing without eating. For 
Canetti, eating produces growth while growth produces life, and power thus produces the subject 
in a dialectic of power and antipower. One could develop this in conversation with Derrida’s 
“Eating Well” [Il faut bien manger]. The structure of what Derrida calls carnophallogocentrism 
is the ineluctable condition of the subject: a subject of calculation, representation, sovereignty 
and power. The difficult syntax of its French title implies both a description: of course one must 
eat, and a normative prescription: one must eat well. But this is also why Derrida argues that 
vegetarians still eat the flesh of the other; the structure of carnivorous sacrifice belongs to the 
logic of subjectivity. But of course, as an experience of the impossible, deconstruction allows us 
to think this impossibility otherwise. Esposito develops this in the distinction between potenza 
and potere; potere is a limit, end and prohibition bound to consciousness and negation while 
potenza refers to a fluidity, heterogeneity and contingency bound to the body and affirmation. 
Power as potere is the absolute condition of the subject, its capacities and capabilities. However, 
the impolitical reversal of the category of subject reveals what he calls a passive power [potenza] 
correlated to passion, suffering and patience. Only active power, he argues, remains bound to the 
subject of power. To think potentiality as passivity is the only way to undermine power. It does 
not propose an alternative to power and will but rather withdraws from it, not by way of 
distraction but attention.134 The similarity to Foucault’s discussion of attraction and neglect in 
Blanchot’s thought of the Outside are unmistakable. If doing and killing are inseparable and 
while, for Canetti, this thought itself may even kill, “it doesn’t know that. It did not wish that. It 
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does not insist on surviving” but perhaps resists, protests gently, in favour of a letting live-on. 
(ECI 122) 
Esposito comes to read this as a kind of Gelassenheit; not abandoning the world but 
annulling oneself within it. This opens onto a thought of the impersonal and non-action, an 
‘inactive action’ beyond activity and the act. 135  This impersonal dimension, I’ve shown, is 
precisely a critique of the proper and the person, the very ex-appropriation of the human Derrida 
reads in the Zusage and Gelassenheit, (which are themselves so closely bound to double 
affirmation), and opens onto the underside of the biopolitical subject of rights, laws, norms and 
representation. Otherwise than the affirmative biopolitical notion of the creative possibilities of 
life, Esposito invokes a thought of decreation. “Decreation is a self-annulling creation, a creative 
self-annulling. More generally, it is also an act that does not express activity – or rather, it is an 
activity that is not completed in the ‘act’ but rather remains ‘potential’... ‘passive power’... 
decreation as passive activity.” (ECI 133) To paraphrase a distinction discussed by Derrida, 
Benjamin and others, if rights, laws and norms belong to the order of the active, responsible 
human subject, then justice belongs to the impersonal, pre-subjective and the pre- or posthuman. 
Citing Simone Weil, “on this earth there is no force but force. That could serve as an axiom. As 
for the force which is not of this earth, contact with it cannot be bought at any lesser price than 
the passing through a kind of death.” (ECI 154) This kind of death, he concludes, “is justice, 
which resembles death because it is not of this world.” (ECI 154) One can see here the threads 
weaving together the Blanchotian neuter, the impersonal One dies, the interior-exterior doubling 
of death, the experience of the impossible and double affirmation in Deleuze and Derrida. It is 
indeed through a discussion of the pre-subjective transcendental field via Simondon that Esposito 
concludes Bios. 
 Esposito wishes to overturn the thanatopolitical drift of biopolitics from a power over life 
to a power of life, but a power that needs to be read in the context of the above discussion of 
passivity. He wishes to articulate the form and norm of life together in a norm that only survives 
in breaking with itself and a form that structures life as continually pushing beyond itself. This 
will consist in excising the categories of life, the body and birth from their thanatopolitical power 
to convert the immunitary negation of life into an affirmative biopolitics. In this sense, one can 
understand his ‘vitalization of politics’ more in the key of disclosing its impolitical underside, its 
impossibility. Esposito turns to Simondon in addressing the category of birth as the threshold 
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separating biopolitics from itself and pushing it beyond itself. He identifies two relevant points 
of entry into Simondon’s system: a concept of being as becoming and an understanding of 
becoming as process of individuation.136 One can read this logic in terms of double affirmation, 
on the one hand “the trans-individual explosion of the Dionysian,” and on the other “the 
Apollonian principle of individuation.” (EB 90) Every individuation is structurally incomplete, 
arising out of a pre-individual structure and itself constituting the grounds for further 
individuations.137  The subject of will, representation and action is never separated from its 
presubjective ‘living roots,’ its organic materiality and ecological inscription. This entails that 
only a difference of degree passes through the human and other animals, fungi, vegetal and 
minerals. Psychic individuation always preserves a remainder of somatic individuation, and 
every individuation is itself another birth; “to live is to perpetuate a birth that is permanent and 
relative.” (EB 181) Against the conservative fear of death structuring the conservatio vitae, life 
defers death by being continually reborn.138 Affirmative biopolitics must attempt to think this 
‘form of life’ in a relation of reciprocal immanence to its norm, “oppos[ing] the Nazi 
normativization of life with an attempt to vitalize the norm.” (EB 184) It is in Spinoza’s 
philosophy of natural right that Esposito reads the form and norm of life together, understanding 
life as always normalized and the norm as always already vitalized.139 
Admittedly, Esposito’s citing Spinoza’s ‘power to exist and act’ of every living thing 
seems at odds with the powerlessness and impolitical passivity I just discussed. Certain 
resonances with Hardt and Negri’s biopolitics can be traced here; a rejection of the modern 
transcendentalism that assigns rights and obligations to the subjects from without in favour of 
life’s “unrestrainable power to exist,” where Spinoza makes of the norm “the immanent rule that 
life gives itself in order to reach the maximum point of its expansion.” (EB 186) Esposito, 
however, reads Spinoza’s concept of natural right through the Simondonian notion of 
‘transindividuality’ between individual and collective life.140  On Esposito’s reading, Spinoza 
reads the juridical norm as reproducing the individuating mutations of the biological norm.141 
This vitalization of the norm stands precisely against any attempt to absolutize it; the norm of life 
and its individuations in creation, science, literature and art are structurally metastable, logically 
posterior to the abnormal; it is the break with the norm that is originary. But this break, I’ll show 
below, cannot be grasped in immanence; it is the auto-hetero-transcendence of the living on an 
epistemological-ontological-ethical scale. This brings me back full circle not only to Derrida’s 
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discussion of Canguilhem in chapter 1 but Foucault’s as well. For Canguilhem, Esposito writes, 
the living always exceeds the concepts and parameters through which it organizes life. “The 
logic of the living is capable of introducing a powerful semantic in the juridical norm against the 
immunitary normalization of life that is able to push beyond its usual definition.” (EB 191) It is 
with Deleuze’s “Immanence: A Life” that Esposito concludes Bios, an essay bringing together 
the pre-subjective transcendental field and Blanchot’s impersonal death. The impersonal, as 
Esposito draws from Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, is the flow of a single matter traversing humans, 
animals and plants beyond the limits of their individuations. But I’d also shown that it structures 
life in its double finitude, one also underlying what Foucault reads in Bichat.142  
 Let’s recall that the impersonal, neuter and third person comes to designate the Outside 
itself in Deleuze, Blanchot and Foucault. As Esposito writes in Third Person, the impersonal 
exists at the limits of the personal as the site of resistance to immunitary negation. 143  The 
impersonal is an exteriority that traverses individual and collective life, both pre- and trans-
individual. For both Deleuze and Foucault, the third person “passes via the outside – along that 
‘oceanic line’ which skirts the abyss of death while resisting it.” (E3 17) As I’ve shown, Foucault 
follows Bichat in grounding vitalism upon mortalism, as he follows Blanchot’s double in 
thinking an Outside more exterior than any exteriority, more interior than any interiority.  
Life, one might say, is a biological structure that, for Foucault, is never coextensive with 
subjectivity because it is always caught in a dual, simultaneous process of subjection and 
subjectification: it is the space that power lays siege to without ever managing to occupy 
it fully, even generating continuously new forms of resistance. (E3 18)  
 
In other words, life gives itself over to the split between thanatopolitical subjection, the power 
over life, and biopolitical subjectification, the resistance of life to this power. Here, “we can 
make out the still hazy outlines of an affirmative biopolitics.” (E3 18) 
 
§5.4.3: Par(t)ages, or Terra-che-si-ritira  
It is in Deleuze’s thought of immanence, however, a thought of life as “not that which resists 
death, arising out of this struggle, but rather that which separates death from itself, unfolding it in 
a continuous process of change,” that Esposito pushes affirmative biopolitics more in line with 
my intentions here. (E3 18) On the plane of immanence, whatever may be called the subject is 
endowed with the ability to counteractualize events, to free them from any expectation or 
determination.144  But let me recall from chapter 4 the revenance of Eternal Return permits 
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selection in an ethical thinking of the event; indeed structures what one inherits precisely as the 
injunction to let live-on otherwise. As in his discussion of Simondon, Esposito appears here to be 
leaning closer to the affirmative biopolitics of Hardt and Negri, affirming the creative 
possibilities and power of life against the transcendent norms of biopower. Furthermore, 
according to Esposito, Deleuze’s emphasis on folding rather than exteriorization thinks 
immanence not, as Foucault does (again, for Esposito) “through the transcendence of 
transcendence or the externalization of the external... Immanence is nothing but the fold of being 
onto itself, its declension into becoming.” (E3 18) But again, the relations between transcendence 
and immanence are perhaps infinitely complicated here. For Esposito, Levinas’s emphasis on the 
transcendence of the person must be inverted onto the immanence of the impersonal, a reversal 
the latter allegedly cannot effectuate without sacrificing the absoluteness of the other. However, 
Esposito sees Blanchot as realizing the ‘step beyond,’ the pas au-delà that Levinas allegedly fails 
to take.145 Citing Blanchot, “the greatest transcendence, the transcendence of transcendence, is 
finally immanence, or the perpetual referral of one to the other. Transcendence within 
immanence.” (E3 130) Let’s recall this beyond-within from my discussion of Derrida’s Adieu in 
chapter 1, a transcendence in immanence older than their metaphysical opposition, but also how 
this notion intersects with the pas au-delà. How might we think this step/not beyond structuring 
any community and ecology? 
 As I noted above, Esposito believes that Nietzsche had completely anticipated the split 
between thanatopolitics and affirmative biopolitics. The Will to Power, let’s recall, is posited in 
opposition to the conservatio vitae and the conatus sese praeservendi; life knows no other 
condition than its own preservation, strengthening and enhancement, which is also to say its 
exteriorization and alteration. For Esposito, this amounts to nothing less than a deconstructive 
account of life.146 Life can be both a violent process of appropriation and overpowering as it can 
be, citing Nietzsche, “the feeling of fullness, of power that wants to overflow, the happiness 
associated with a high state of tension, the consciousness of a wealth that wants to make gifts and 
give way.” (EB 88) Of the utmost importance in thinking the gift is this structural element of 
non-knowledge. As with Canguilhem, for whom the norm only exists in breaking with itself, 
Esposito’s reading of Bataille will attempt to think community as this essential incompleteness 
and impossibility. For Esposito, Bataille breaks with Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche by 
proposing the latter less as a philosopher of the Will to Power than of the Eternal Return.147 
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Bataille, I’d shown, thinks the instant as the grounds a sovereign affirmation open as much to 
chance as to evil.148 Esposito reads this as the impolitical underside of power reversing the 
restricted economy of the conservatio, reversing “the discourse of Completion in order to 
relaunch it and reorient it towards the future (or better, the possibility of its transcendence).” 
(ECI 184) As I also showed, this instant of the decision and the affirmation of life must be 
understood in the key of the Zusage or the passive decision here. The decision does not come 
from the Will to Power but from the opening of the instant in the Eternal Return.149 This decision 
holds open the ring of return in its incompleteness, binds together the double affirmations of 
chance and necessity, instant and cycle. For Esposito, one must thus understand the decision as 
transcendence’s laceration of the affirmation of the world of pure immanence. Transcendence is 
“the empty light against which the fullness of immanence appears in silhouette.” (ECI 187) In 
this sense, Bataille puts transcendence to death as a metaphysical category,  
but what this really illuminates is that immanence must constantly transcend itself, 
internally. Immanence is constituted – not only surrounded – by the cut that separates it 
from what it is not, from its own difference from itself. Without this transcendence – 
which no longer refers to a super-essential substantive entity but precisely to that entity’s 
death – immanence would be made absolute, and that would restore the metaphysical 
identity that the entirety of Bataille’s thought aims to contest. (ECI 187)  
 
The resistance to biopower lies not in the completion of immanence but precisely in its 
incompleteness, as the transcendence of a life death that holds the ring of Eternal Return open, 
binding together the restricted ecology of the conservatio to its absolute outside in the double 
bind of double affirmation. A transcendence that comes down to nothing less than the mortal 
finitude we share with all living beings in the experience of the impossible; an impossible 
community for Esposito, an impossible ecology for me. Life’s transcendence in death, Esposito 
writes, opens onto a community of death.  
It is death that liberates the community from its immanence to itself; but in a way that is 
entirely unlike traditional transcendence (which requires an external higher being)... A 
community is the means by which that finitude can become constitutive of the beings 
who, in their difference, compose it. They compose a community not through a bond... 
but through an alterity in common, an alterity that is shared. As such, what is shared is 
not a presence, but an absence of being, in the sense that any lack can be empowered only 
by a lack in the other (the other as lack. (ECI 195) 
 
Community is therefore impossible; it is structured not on sameness but the difference between 
its subjects, indeed in their difference from themselves. Death is the element of this binding non-
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knowledge, interrupting any dialectic of recognition, since the death of the other is as 
unknowable and impossible as one’s own death.150  Community is rather the sharing of this 
impossible experience Esposito reads in the French ‘partage,’ at once a cut, division, partition 
and sharing, what I’ve called the constitutive interruptibility of ecological relationality. 
Transcendence is precisely this cut: “not the opposite of immanence, but rather its interruption, 
or its exposure to its own ‘outside.’ It is the transcendence of immanence, not from immanence.” 
(ECI xxviii) Esposito translates partage as ‘condivisone,’ “a continuum that is taken out of the 
dialectical difference of subjective identity, returned to absolute difference (a difference that is 
no longer in the service of presence).” (ECI 164-5) Community is also opposed to any notion of 
intersubjectivity or dialectic of recognition since it shares and partitions out something utterly 
unknowable. The other in this sense “is the ‘self’s’ transcendence of itself: not an external 
transcendence, but immanence’s resistance to itself – immanence’s transcendence. This 
interiorization of alterity is what makes intersubjectivity impossible, along with any notion 
whatsoever of recognition or representation.” (ECI 196) It resists the logic of representation 
binding a metaphysics of the animal rationale to thanatopolitical biologism and with it the 
Heideggerian metaphysics of the proper and of authenticity. As a structurally constitutive 
expropriation, community partitions out an impossible, impersonal death.151 Beyond the notions 
of making and letting live and die, Esposito says in Heideggerian terms that an inauthentic, 
anonymous and impersonal community allows one “to ‘let the other be’ in its alterity from itself, 
which is to say, in its authentic inauthenticity, or most proper impropriety.” (EC 97e) A letting 
beings be, a letting life live-on older than the opposition between transcendence and immanence, 
life and death, activity and passivity, the affirmation of living-on in its tra(nscenden)ce, 
res(is)tance and ex-appropriation, and the infinitely finite revenance of its différance.  
 It is only in this impolitical Outside, beyond or underside of biopolitics that a sharing the 
earth more justly in the face of having nothing in common becomes possible, in the partages in 
the parages of a structurally incomplete translation between two shores, in the absence of a 
world, terre sans terre, “a withdrawal from a land, a land that withdraws [Terra-che-si-ritira].” 
(EC 106)  
The sea withdraws, and in this withdrawal it is actualized not in two distinct passages but 
within one movement: it withdraws giving itself as a gift to others, and it gives itself as a 
gift as it withdraws. The sea’s withdrawal leaves the land to be. Isn’t this the very same 
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figure of community, its originary munus, by which I mean what gives us a ‘common 
name’ only through the lack of ‘our own name’?152 (EC 108-9) 
 
Esposito concludes, again with Nietzsche, that this impossible return is precisely the gift of the 
future, what I called the posthuman promise of the earth. The affirmation of community, beyond 
transcendence and immanence, frees the Eternal Return and the instant from the Will to 
Power.153 This is how to understand the pas au-delà of double affirmation, “this ‘beyond’ refers 
not to whatever lies past its outer borders, but rather the penetration by these borders of its 
internal void, opening the impolitical to a sovereign affirmation.” (ECI 197) But the sovereignty 
of this affirmation, the decision of the sovereign instant, all of these are to be understood in the 
radical passivity of a letting live-on, without force, without sovereignty, as Esposito cites 
Blanchot, a non-power that is not the simple negation of power, but excessively affirms more 
than can be affirmed, affirms affirmation itself.154 
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Can one, other than by way of metaphor, condemn to death a language (languages are killed, in a 
thousand ways, I have no doubt on that score and there are hundreds of languages that have 
disappeared in colonial or commercial, capital, techno-capitalist capitalist [sic] violence in recent 
years). 
Jacques Derrida. The Death Penalty Volume I, 42/252. 
 
The fact that languages appear strictly uncountable does not prevent them all from disappearing. 
In this century they are sinking each day by the hundreds, and this perdition opens the question 
of another rescue, or another salvation. How do we save a language, a language that is alive and 
‘intact,’ by doing something other than archiving idioms (which we sometimes do scientifically, 
if not sufficiently, in a matter of urgency that is becoming more and more pressing)?  
Jacques Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other, 55-6/30. 
 
To translate humanity back into nature; to gain control of the many vain and fanciful 
interpretations and incidental meanings that have been scribbled and drawn over that eternal 
basic text of homo natura so far; to make sure that, from now on, the human being will stand 
before the human being, just as he already stands before the rest of nature today, hardened by the 
disciplines of science... This may be a strange and insane task, but it is a task – who would deny 
it! Why do we choose it, this insane task? Or to ask it differently: ‘Why knowledge at all?’ – 
Everyone will be asking us this. And we who have been prodded so much, we who have asked 
ourselves this same question a hundred times already, we have not found and are not finding any 
better answers... 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 123.1 
 
 
Six: Translation as Material-Semiotic In(ter)vention 
 
In my previous chapter, I contrasted an affirmative biopolitics with what I’d risked calling a 
biopolitics of double affirmation. Crucial to this distinction was a further one between an 
affirmation of the active, productive and creative powers of life and subjectivity which, I wrote, 
risked an indistinguishability with the technocapitalist enframing of the earth that Heidegger 
reads in Nietzsche’s philosophy, and a passive invention of the other, preparing a place to let the 
other come, more akin to the promise of the Earth I’ve discussed since chapter 1. I showed 
Derrida argue that the deaths of an incalculable number of living beings, and, as I cite in 
epigraph, languages, are made unrecognizable by certain machinations of technoscientific 
capitalism working to blur the distinction between making die and letting die. To recall the 
primary stakes of this dissertation, biocultural diversity, “the diversity of life in all its 
manifestations – biological, cultural, and linguistic – which are interrelated within a complex 
socio-ecological adaptive system,” is critically threatened today.2 The invention of the other I 
discussed in chapter 5, by contrast, engages a notion of letting life live-on – anterior to the 
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opposition between activity and passivity, and, what comes down to the same, the erasure of this 
opposition – more amenable to biocultural sustainability.  
 Through Foucault, I pursued my investigation of the overlaps between science, 
biopolitics and translation in fuller detail. Foucault explains that the sixteenth century ought to be 
understood as the age of resemblances, within which nature gives itself to be thought in marks 
and signatures, as writing or the “primary Text.” (MC 93/88)  
In its raw, historical sixteenth-century being, language is not an arbitrary system; it has 
been set down in the world and forms a part of it, both because things themselves hide 
and manifest their own enigma like a language and because words offer themselves to 
men as things to be deciphered. The great metaphor of the book that one opens, that one 
pores over and reads in order to know nature, is merely the reverse and visible side of 
another transference, and a much deeper one, which forces language to reside in the 
world, among the plants, the herbs, the stones, and the animals. (MC 49-50/38-9) 
 
The classical age of the seventeenth and eighteenth Centuries would split apart words and things, 
language and the world, the sayable and the visible according to the logic of representational 
thought. Foucault importantly distinguishes representation from translation: representation is so 
coextensive with classical thought that language itself becomes invisible, or at least totally 
unproblematic. As with natural history, the task of general grammar is to construct a perfectly 
analytical, ‘well-made’ language. Because general grammar and logic are completely 
superimposed, the difficulties encountered in translating between languages are more the result 
of incompatible sequences of words than any fundamental difference in their sense. 3  The 
scientific discourse subtending these surface differences is universal: knowledge and language 
totally overlap in the classical age. “They share, in representation, the same origin and the same 
functional principle... The sciences are well-made languages, just as languages are sciences 
laying fallow.” (MC 101/95-6) Both science and language have as their task the univocal 
ascribing of names to the things of the world. 
 The modern age by contrast heralds the retreat of representationalist thought. 
Analogously to the role of natural history with respect to biology, general grammar yields its 
place to philology. Like the organization of the living being, the flexional system of a language is 
extrinsic to the logic of representation, referring thought to a deeper, inaccessible dimension.4 
Just as natural history gives way to the original force and striving of life itself, language becomes 
understood in terms of a speaking people; “so language, in the whole architecture of its grammar, 
makes visible the fundamental will that keeps a whole people alive and gives it the power to 
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speak a language belonging solely to itself.” (MC 303/316) Following Humboldt, also of 
importance to ecolinguistics on this point, Foucault identifies language not as an ergon, an 
instrument or a product, but the activity of an energeia. But this new condition also promises 
language to its finitude, recognizing its limits before the infinity of its task: if language remains a 
necessary mediation for any scientific objectivity, it is bound to the finite knowing subject.5 It is 
instructive to inquire into the relations between scientific knowledge, language and ethics, and 
those between an organism and its environment. Ethics for Foucault does not come from a 
transcendent prescription: “any imperative is lodged within thought and its movement towards 
the apprehension of the unthought.” (MC 338-9/357) This law of thinking the unthinkable is 
what I will attempt to develop here with language and translation, itself a way for the living 
being to structure and be structured by its environment resisting any simple division between 
inside and outside, realism and constructivism, the material and semiotic. Translation exposes 
language to its own impossibility; more than an exoticism or othering, although this risk is 
always present, another language brings with it “another system of thought, is the limitation of 
our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that.” (MC 7/xvi) 
For this concluding chapter, I want to bring back Derrida’s notion of general text I’ve 
discussed throughout, particularly since the notion of pro-gramme therein resists a humanist, 
logocentric and teleological account of science. As I argued in chapter 1, to think life as 
originary repetition or re-production is to think it as originarily inscribed in a network of 
differences that can be called arche-writing or general text. In any scientific investigation, the 
knowing subject, their object of study and whatever concept, metaphor or analogy by which the 
latter is analyzed are all to be understood as effects of the general text of life death. “The text is 
not a third term in the relation between the biologist and the living being, it is the very structure 
of the living being as the structure common to the biologist as a living being – to science as the 
production of life, and the living being itself.” (L4, 5t) The difference between the so-called 
‘natural’ and ‘human’ sciences loses its rigour, as do – for my purposes – any fixed distinction 
between the biological, the cultural and the linguistic. Derrida likewise sees translation as 
irreducible to the opposition between (mechanical) production and (organic) reproduction, as I 
noted from his seminar on Benjamin. Life and translation, life in translation are textualized in 
their originary repetition and re-production. A text begins in translation, and this is the very 
condition of its living-on; it negotiates total translatability and total untranslatability. The text 
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and the living being, he adds, “not only reproduces itself but induces itself as re-production, its 
repro-translation.” (L6, 2t)  Organic and inorganic life can thereby no more be reduced to an 
ergon than energeia; beyond any metaphysical notion of essence, the principle of their re-
production is outside them, in their environment, and inscribes itself within.  
It is because alterity is irreducible therein that there is nothing but text, it’s because no 
term, no element is sufficient or even has an effect if it does not refer to the other and 
never to itself that there is text, and it’s because the text-set cannot close in on itself that 
there is only text, and that the so-called ‘general’ text (an evidently dangerous and only 
polemical expression) is neither a set nor a totality: it can neither comprehend itself nor 
be comprehended [il ne peut ni se comprendre ni être compris]. But it can write and read 
itself, which is something else. (L6, 4t) 
 
For Derrida, one could say that translation does not take place between two pre-existing 
languages, but is rather the condition of possibility of any language in the first place. While there 
may be effects of language, message, information or communication, “information does not 
inform about something, communication does not communicate anything, the message does not 
emit something that would not itself already be a message, communication or information.” (L6, 
4t) What then appears as a limit to scientific objectivity is the very condition of any scientificity 
for Derrida. Error, nonknowledge and death are not external accidents supervening upon a 
system but the structural inscription of its outside within: “supplementarity is inscribed in the 
very definition of every system, and even of every living or non living system.” (L6, 13t) 
General ecology, let’s recall, thinks both the play of translatability and untranslatability that 
keeps an organism, language, text or worldview alive as it does the aneconomic, the wholly 
other, the untranslatable and ultimately the expenditure without reserve of death. This is the 
salient point of thinking another language in translation: to think something that does not have 
the same time, life death, ecology, world or matter as me or us; this is what I will call translation 
as the impossible invention of the wholly other, making no attempt to master time, the other or 
the earth, but lets the other come or perhaps return, and lets the other live-on on earth. 
 It is with Antoine Berman, founding figure in ‘the ethical turn’ in Translation Studies, 
that I will develop the notion of translation as a material-semiotic in(ter)vention. In Translation 
and the Letter, Berman claims translation must be thought as an experience in Heidegger’s 
sense: “to undergo an experience with something – be it a thing, a person, or a god – means that 
this something befalls us, strikes us, comes over us, overwhelms and transforms us.” (GA 12 
149/57) But this experience is to be distinguished from any usual sense of activity:  
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when we talk of ‘undergoing’ [‘machen’] an experience, we mean specifically that the 
experience is not of our own making; to undergo here means that we endure, suffer it, 
receive it as it strikes us and submit to it. It is this something itself that comes about, 
comes to pass, happens. To undergo an experience with language, then, means to let 
ourselves be properly concerned by the claim of language by entering into and submitting 
to it. (GA 12 149/57)  
 
To reflect on translation as experience, Berman argues, is to open up the totality of its field to its 
dimension of transcendence. Translation, transcendence and transgression all interrupt economy 
for Derrida, and Berman similarly calls for a shift from a ‘restricted translation’ – translation as 
communication between languages – to the ‘generalized translation’ one finds in Novalis, 
Roman Jakobson, George Steiner and Michel Serres.6 “Not only in the aesthetic domain, but also 
in that of the sciences and, finally, in human experience in general... translation is always much 
more than translation.”  (BE 292/183) This surpassing of the usual sense of translation – a 
‘dépassement de sens’ akin to the pas de sens I discussed in Bataille and Blanchot –  “announces 
the experience of what one could call the other translation, the other translation which, so to 
speak, dissimulates itself in every translation.” (BT 21) I’d shown that transgression for Blanchot 
always operates through passion, patience and passivity. Berman understands the über in 
übersetzung precisely along the logic of a “passage au-delà.” (BA 148) Within the ‘passages’ 
between languages in translation is hidden “a whole series of other ‘passages’ concerning the act 
of writing and, more secretly still, the act of living and dying.” (BT 21) A passive experience of 
the impossible other, a shift from restricted to general translation, translation as transcendence 
and the passage of a pas binding together the secrecies of life death all come together in the 
articulation between the ethics of translation and what Berman calls the letter, and I’ll call 
materiality.7 
 Berman draws from Steiner in evoking a sadness accompanying any experience of 
translation, a suffering in both the translator and the translated text.8 Berman also takes his cue 
from Derrida in elaborating the mourning resulting from cutting apart the materiality of the letter 
and its meaning. In chapter 1, I showed how materiality constitutes the very impossibility of 
translation for Derrida.9 Matter, nonetheless, bites back. “What is denied – materiality – has its 
revenge. Translation discovers at its expense that letter and sense are at once dissociable and 
indissociable.” (BT 42) Berman calls a metaphysical or Platonist theory of translation one 
seeking to uncover the idealities subtending the deformations of material finitude, an argument I 
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showed echoed in Husserl’s Living Present and his philosophy of science. Translation here is 
absolutely possible. On the other hand, the inextricability of the letter and its sense configures all 
translation as betrayal and impossibility.10 If matter and meaning are thought in terms of their 
mutual immanence, the simple reversal of Platonism, translation is absolutely impossible. 
Translation for Berman is “one of the sites where Platonism is simultaneously demonstrated and 
refuted.” (BT 42) Both options, I’ll show, are structured within a metaphysics of 
representationalism. The materiality of the letter grounding the work’s untranslatability 
expresses the work’s resistance to translation, but it also paradoxically calls for translation, 
attracting translation the more it resists it.11  
Its im-possibility therefore demands to be thought otherwise. Berman follows Derrida in 
thinking translation as necessary but impossible or faulty.12 The entanglement of matter and 
meaning, the material and semiotic, reiterates this complexity. This is what Berman takes as 
essential in Benjamin’s task of the translator; not “a ‘choice’ between two possibilities of 
translation – sense or the letter... it speculatively thinks the relation between sense and the letter 
in translation.”13 (BA 177) Meaning does not disappear in translation, but finds itself re-ordered 
in relation to the letter. 14  It is in this sense of re-ordering that I will explore an ethical 
accountability entailed by the cuts and exclusions inherent to any translation. If translation 
necessarily deforms the materiality of the letter, the other thought of translation calls for a 
relationship that saves and maintains this materiality. Berman’s ethical interpretation of 
translation draws from Levinas in framing its task as the recognition and reception of the other as 
other: fidelity to the letter of the text is coextensive with how one relates to the other, the world 
and existence, all of which are for Berman carnal, corporeal and tangible bodies.15 One can 
extend Berman’s interpretation of the work (l’œuvre) to any language or living being from the 
elephant to the protozoa, the work “opens on to the experience of a world,” and not only a world 
but the world, as Derrida might put it. (BT 70) This is why Berman follows Benjamin in 
breaking with the notion of translation as communication towards one of manifestation, I’d say 
invention; to open a space, to prepare a place for the other is the manifestation of a 
manifestation, “because the only possible definition of a work can only be made in terms of 
manifestation. In a work, it is the ‘world’ that, each time in another manner, is manifested in its 
totality.” (BT 76) The text, a living being, language or species, along with their systemic, 
evolutionary and ecological relations to others, are also “pure newness, pure irruption 
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[surgissement].” (BT 76) The task of translation for Berman is thus “to manifest in one’s 
language this pure newness in preserving the face of its newness.” (BT 76) And this is where one 
must think of translation as a material-semiotic in(ter)vention; translation cuts apart and re-enacts 
the entanglement of matter and meaning anew and otherwise. These cuts inevitably entail 
exclusions, and must be able to be called into account in an ethics of biocultural sustainability. 
This is what Derrida and Cixous develop with the word ‘voile’: [veil, but also vois-le, see it] both 
the word and the thing, the semiotic and the material as heralding a language-to-come, an event 
of language capable of making and letting events come. What lets this language come is where 
the idiom resists translation but does not forbid it. Rather, the event of translation occurs when it 
keeps something of the untranslatable, something resisting the economy of semiotic equivalency. 
Translation itself becomes a material-semiotic veil, “it lets one see and it conceals at the same 
time. Therefore translation – itself as an event that is a different event than that of the language 
of origin, or the so-called original text – makes something come about by reproducing or 
multiplying veiling effects with all the ambiguity this word can have.” (LV 40t) 
Commenting on the French title of Foucault’s The Order of Things [Les Mots et les 
choses; Words and Things], Derrida writes, that 
the and of the title, Words and Things is wholly otherwise than any and that would 
simply connect words among themselves or things among themselves. Between words 
and things, there can be no conjunction or homogenous collection, no enumeration or 
simple addition, etc. Words and things neither add themselves together nor follow one 
another in a same series. (ETC 22t)  
 
In fact, one could say that the material-semiotic neither juxtaposes/opposes (et) nor identifies 
(est) the material and the semiotic, such relations are effects of a material-semiotic la vie la mort. 
This discussion carries over to Derrida’s reading of Novalis, who he sees as breaking from the 
classical metaphor of the book of nature. Beyond the dialectics of juxtaposition or opposition, ‘le 
livre est la nature’ and ‘le livre et la nature,’ the graphic of supplementarity overflows, in fact 
doubles any science or literature that would rest on an already constituted sense; physis-in-
différance relates the identity of any material-semiotic event, any communication to its dé-pense; 
its ex-penditure, its un-thinking.16 Derrida elsewhere calls this the intervention of writing as 
dissemination.17  
 In this chapter, I will begin in §6.1.1 by introducing several problems within and 
common to Science and Technology Studies (STS), Translation Studies (TS) and ecolinguistics. 
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§6.1.2 will develop the notion of translation in STS and the ethics and politics of the material-
semiotic and naturecultures of Donna Haraway and Bruno Latour. §6.2 will explore 
nonrepresentationalist accounts of science in a general ecological context; Arkady Plotnisky, 
Karen Barad and Vicki Kirby’s readings of complementarity in §6.2.1 and Cary Wolfe’s account 
of autopoiesis in §6.2.2, to better develop the groundwork needed for a thought of translation 
more amenable to biocultural sustainability. I will build on systems theory through Sergey 
Tyulenev’s application of Niklas Luhmann to Translation Studies in §6.2.3 in framing what I 
will call ecosystemic translation: an articulation between what I identify as two translational 
issues in ecolinguistics, the translation of ecology and the ecology of translation. §6.3.1 develops 
the translation of ecology via the ecolinguistic notion of the language of environment: the 
material-semiotic engagements through which different languages construct their relations to the 
world – some more sustainably than others – which prompts the question of what thought of 
translation might be needed to learn from the lessons of traditional ecological knowledge in a 
non-appropriative way. §6.3.2, however, builds on the ecolinguistic notion of the environment of 
language – the ecological, ethico-political and linguistic relations a language has with its others – 
to situate a necessary contextuality of any translation of ecology within an ecology of translation, 
which I develop through key thinkers in the ethics and politics of translation, particularly 
Berman, Michael Cronin and Lawrence Venuti. In §6.4, I conclude my discussion of 
ecosystemic translation, and argue for a posthumanist thought of translation to come, rethinking 
the promise of the earth I began with as the promise of biocultural diversity. 
 
§6.1: Language, Ecology and Science in Translation 
§6.1.1: Between Ecolinguistics, Translation Studies and Science and Technology Studies  
Let me suggest that a thesis of total translatability between languages operates in complicity with 
traditional scientific realism: if languages, like scientific investigation, are understood to 
adequately map the same external reality, then translation must consist in uncovering the 
linguistic universals underlying surface-level differences between languages. One could argue 
that such frameworks are inherently conservative in appealing to nature as a fixed referent, in 
dislodging translation and science from socio-culturo-political constraints and in reifying the 
objects of their analyses as discrete, self-identical and non-relational. Shared concerns over this 
conservativism have motivated myriad turns to constructivism alongside which, at the risk of 
 250 
generalizing, a thesis of total untranslatability has been adopted. Each language constructs a 
different reality and translation rendered impossible, just as every practice of scientific 
investigation undermines any claim to pure objectivism. While it is not my intention to dispute 
the political value of these approaches, there is a sense in which constructivism remains bound to 
the logic of representationalism it targets in traditional realism, and is thus just as ill-equipped in 
addressing the irrecoverable loss of the world’s biocultural diversity. 
 Despite both their shared theoretical and ethico-political concerns, very little has been 
undertaken in the way of reading the insights of Translation Studies and Science and Technology 
studies (STS) through one another. Donna Haraway’s work provides an early point of 
convergence; just as Derrida had explored the biological account of the elementary processes of 
the living cell as arche-writing, pro-gramme and general text, she identifies a common move 
between communication sciences and modern biologies: “the translation of the world into a 
problem of coding, a search for a common language in which all resistance to instrumental 
control disappears and all heterogeneity can be submitted to disassembly, reassembly, 
investment, and exchange.”18 A similar concern is voiced by ecolinguist Peter Mühlhäusler, who 
argues that the general trend in globalization has been one towards total inter-translatability with 
what he calls Standard Average European (SAE) languages, with even the constructions of many 
new languages undertaken with the precise intent of their total translatability with the languages 
of the West.19 This globalatinization, rooted in humanist and colonial conceptions of science and 
technology, works to silence and exclude minority voices, languages and ideas that would 
interrupt its trend towards total homogenization, interrupt the global mechanisms of techno-
capitalist biopower and their complicity with the degradation of the earth’s biological, cultural 
and linguistic diversity.  
 It is on this point that Haraway invokes her infamous idea of the cyborg, which serves as 
an important illustration of the necessity of a posthumanist theory of translation, complicating 
any assured opposition between the organic and technological, natural and cultural, non-human 
and human. As she writes, the codification of the world as quantifiable elements of information 
“allows universal translation, and so unhindered instrumental power (called effective 
communication).” 20  Science itself “has been about a search for translation, convertibility, 
mobility of meanings, and universality... when one language (guess whose) must be enforced as 
the standard for all the translations and convergences.”21 What Haraway calls the frameworks of 
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situated knowledges and cyborg politics will engage “the struggle for language and the struggle 
against perfect communication, against the one code that translates all meaning perfectly.”22 
Such a struggle involves a new concept of science invoking responsibility at its heart in its 
capacity for being called into account for translations: 
decoding and transcoding plus translation and criticism; all are necessary. So science 
becomes the paradigmatic model not of closure, but of that which is contestable and 
contested. Science becomes the myth not of what escapes human agency and 
responsibility, but rather accountability and responsibility for translations and solidarities 
linking the cacophonous and visionary voices of the knowledge of the subjugated.23  
 
Translation Studies and Science Studies share this belief in the ethical and political potentials of 
interrupting fluent communication. As I will show with ecolinguistics, debates between realism 
and constructivism, translatability and untranslatability may themselves be short-circuited by 
understanding how languages differentially materialize relationships to the environment over 
long periods of ecological adaptation. I argue here that to think the relationship between 
translation and materiality through such an insight proposes important consequences for 
biocultural sustainability. For Mühlhäusler,  
languages are strictly speaking not translatable, as each of them suggests a different 
perspective on reality. It is the diversity of perspectives constructed that is of ecological 
importance. Not only are languages well adapted to the environmental conditions they 
developed in, linguistic diversity is also a resource of environmental knowledge.24  
 
Conversely, if all languages were totally translatable, the loss of linguistic diversity would 
merely represent a decrease in the superficial surface structures of fundamentally identical 
languages. The relative ease with which we can translate between different SAE languages is not 
an endorsement of total effability since these languages share almost total conceptual and 
structural overlap for Mühlhäusler.25 
 On my reading, this untranslatability implies that language and matter are originarily 
entangled, and this paradoxically but necessarily ethically obligates translation to work for the 
preservation and sustainability of minority languages, as much for their own sake and that of 
diversity itself as for their capacity to expose the destructive blind-spots of our own SAE 
ecological materializations. It is commonly understood in ecolinguistics that languages, much 
like species, cannot be individually preserved outside of their ‘ecological support systems,’ 
which includes considerations of factors such as other languages from which to borrow and 
internal dialect variation; their ecological relationality without and within.26 Citing the general 
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lack of success in preserving languages through their documentations in grammars and 
dictionaries, as Derrida echoes in my epigraph from Monolingualism of the Other, an ecological 
theory of linguistic preservation must ask “what is the support system that sustains a language 
economy over time?” 27  For David Harmon, one must preserve ecological processes of 
speciation, linguistic and biological.28 Many ecolinguists now refer to ‘linguistic speciation’ as 
their key object of inquiry. To put it otherwise, our obligation in preserving biocultural diversity 
would seem not to lie within an inherent individual right to life itself, but rather of providing the 
ecological conditions of life through which organic and anorganic life; archaea, bacteria, plants, 
fungi, animals, cultures and languages can all live and die at their own rhythms. 
 What is ecolinguistics, and how ought languages be considered ecologically? 
Ecolinguistics has its beginnings in a 1972 paper by Einar Haugen entitled “The Ecology of 
Language.” Haugen adopts the following definition of ecology from Haeckel; “the total science 
of the organisms’ relations to the surrounding environment in which we can count in a wider 
sense all conditions of existence.”29 For Haugen, the ecology of language is defined as “the study 
of interaction between any given language and its environment.”30 In other words, ecology in 
this sense refers to the relationships a language has to other languages, its socio-historico-
political context: the environment of language. A 1990 paper by M.A.K. Haliday, “New Ways of 
Meaning,” brought the question of environmentalism into the study of linguistic structure itself: 
the language of environment. Halliday criticized SAE languages for reducing processes to 
objectified nouns, which he argues plays an important role in the ecological crisis. The notion 
that ‘the environment’ is an object apart from humanity is an example of this grammar. This 
critique of linguistic structures goes hand in hand with a critique of the language these structures 
make possible and impossible in discourse about the environment, referred to alternatively as 
‘eco-critical discourse’ or ‘critical ecolinguistics.’ Of course, ecolinguist Alwin Fill notes that 
these two branches – the environment of language and the language of environment – are 
complementary.31 If understanding languages ecologically offers us an alternative methodology 
for preserving languages with differently encoded constructions of ecological relationality, and 
we can learn from these languages by contrasting their structures against our own to reveal the 
blind spots of the latter, not only are we in a better position to talk about environmental issues in 
progressive and constructive ways, we are constantly developing our awareness of how to 
preserve the earth’s biocultural diversity. 
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 Similarly, it is surprising how little work has been done on ecolinguistic issues in 
Translation Studies. Important theorists like Lawrence Venuti and Michael Cronin have engaged 
the notion of a translational ecology or an ecology of translation, and I will build on these 
insights below. If there is an ethical imperative, an ought that must be entered into relation with 
the very is of biocultural diversity, it seems that the ethics of translation would have a key role to 
play for the following reasons: ecological relations between languages can be thought of through 
translation, the capacity to learn from a pool of diverse ecological knowledge is impossible 
without translation (however aporetically untranslatable this knowledge may be), and also 
because Translation Studies and ecolinguistics equally share an important concern: the protection 
of minority languages. As Cronin argues, “the issue of minority languages is not a peripheral 
concern for beleaguered fans of exotic peoples gabbling in incomprehensible tongues, but the 
single most important issue in Translation Studies today.”32 Translation allows us to recalibrate 
the dominant paradigms of majority languages by challenging their self-identity and revealing 
their ecological blind-spots. Finally, translation, as an ethics of reading (like deconstruction) can 
be closely aligned with a concept of ecolinguistics and environmental ethics as ecological 
literacy. For Frans Verhagen, “the first and basic challenge of the ecolinguistic community is to 
be Earth literate... to engage in the political formulation of an ecological identity, where the 
ecological consciousness is translated into the rough and tumble of the value-systems that are 
still predominantly human-centered and mechanistic.”33 But again, this is not to posit nature or 
the environment as the pure textuality within which Foucault reads the pre-classical age. Rather, 
it ought to be thought as where general ecology intersects with arche-writing, where the 
articulations between inside and outside, reading and writing, realism and idealism, system and 
environment find themselves thoroughly implicated and complicated.  It is in this sense that the 
concept of ecosystemic translation I will develop will serve as an articulation between the 
ecology of translation – the study of the social, political and historical contexts between 
languages that any translation must undertake to promote the survival of minority languages – 
and the translation of ecology – the material-semiotic in(ter)ventions through which other 
linguistically constructed patterns of living with others – are translated into our dominant 
paradigms, interrupt their hegemony and reveal their destructive blind spots.  
The relationships between languages and reality must be rethought if translation is to play 
a role in sustaining the earth’s minority languages and local knowledges, as must the very 
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concept of ecology. In this sense, translation has much to gain from being thought as a material-
semiotic (to use Haraway’s term), or material-discursive (Barad’s) in(ter)vention.34 But while 
much work in STS, particularly for important feminist concerns, emphasizes a recalibration of 
the concepts of activity, agency and performativity (as is also the case in Translation Studies), 
there are other important reasons to remain suspicious of an extensionist logic which would 
return agency to a materiality once denied it. At its worst, this seriously risks the recuperation of 
these emancipatory discourses into the very logics of sovereignty it targets; one does not have to 
venture too deeply into in high-tech versions of posthumanism, affirmative biopolitics, and 
object-oriented ontology to find discourses entirely complicit with the technocapitalist enframing 
of the earth.35 I propose Derrida’s term ‘in(ter)vention,’ his own intervention into invention 
itself, as evoking a posthumanism not so much concerned with returning to the nonhuman what it 
was once denied but interrogating a shared material-semiotic passivity and finitude across 
organic and inorganic life. More ethically binding than the turn to a (restricted) concept of 
immanence in the literature, such a thought would engage the material-semiotic as a 
transcendence without a contrary, to borrow Latour’s phrase. 
One will find little support for an ecological and material conception of language along 
classical models of science. An important starting point for any comparative analysis of 
ecolinguistics and Translation Studies is their shared rejection of the positivism, dualism, 
objectivism and reductionism of traditional science, and their emphasis on the invariably 
normative, contextual and sociopolitical dimensions of observation and inquiry. As I will show, 
claims to objectivity go hand in hand with an individualism of discrete entities incompatible with 
ecological thinking and the ethics of translation for many of these theorists. The idea that 
individual languages can be abstracted from the ecological contexts of the communities that 
speak them has proven unsuccessful in attempts to preserve biocultural diversity, as noted above. 
As Cronin writes, the natural and social sciences continue to be dominated by a reductionist 
Newtonian paradigm, the universalist claims of which “provide a powerful underpinning for 
pretensions to Western cultural superiority.” 36  Another theorist adds that “the claims of 
philosophy and science to universality are false claims disguising the imperialistic tendencies of 
a master narrative shot through and through with Eurocentric bias.”37 Venuti is equally critical of 
what he calls “linguistic-oriented approaches... promot[ing] scientific models of research,” as an 
impediment to Translation Studies.38 “By repressing the heterogeneity of language, the scientific 
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model prevents translators from understanding and evaluating what their practices admit and 
exclude, and what social relations those practices make possible.” 39  Linguistics-based 
approaches to translation “restrict its role in cultural innovation and social change,” “reinforc[e] 
dominant domestic values,” and “block the ethical and political agenda” of translation.40 
Alwin Fill argues for a participatory, I would say situated, scientific approach to 
linguistics emphasizing Humboldt’s concept of ‘wechselwirkung,’ or networked mutuality of 
observer and observed. Rom Harré, Peter Mühlhäusler and Jens Brockheimer echo this in 
claiming that both environmental and language studies should reject any claim to a separation 
between observer and observed, precluding the possibility of wholly objective knowledge.41 
Proponents of ‘dialectical’ linguistics Jørgen Christian Bang and Jørgen Døør note that 
ecolinguistics ought not be understood as a branch of linguistics among others, but “a genuine 
alternative to traditional, positivist linguistics and its paradigm of and for the sciences.”42 The 
idea that a language is a self-enclosed, self-identical entity that can be studied in itself, free of 
external factors and value judgements in fact constitutes an important part of the ecological 
crisis, while what they identify as a properly ‘dialectical’ theory of language ought to reverse this 
destructive trend. In isolating language from its external factors, linguistics can only remain mute 
regarding ecological destruction and language death. The model they pose instead suggests that 
“philosophy, linguistics, and science only achieve their true raison d’être when they aim at 
increasing our understanding of ourselves, our relations to others and our environment, and when 
these relationships work toward greater democracy, greater ecological sensibility, and more 
peaceful means and goals.”43 Mühlhäusler similarly writes that the ‘independency hypothesis of 
linguistics,’ or the positivist framework through which languages are reified as self-contained 
isolated objects that can be counted and named is a reflection of Enlightenment ideals and 
European political practices, and constitutes the greatest problem of linguistics as well as a major 
obstacle to understanding language change and preserving endangered languages.44 “Far from 
being an act of objective description, [this approach] can constitute a very serious trespass on the 
linguistic ecology of an area.” 45  Recalling Heidegger, linguistics ought therefore sever its 
atomistic and Cartesian-rooted practice of ‘thinking the world to bits’ if it is to play a positive 
role in the environmental crisis.46 
Several theorists in environmental ethics have postulated a direct connection between a 
Cartesian-Newtonian worldview and the liberal individualism through which free-market 
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capitalism justifies environmental destruction.47 Similarly, it can be argued that the traditional 
dualisms of Western translation such as fidelity and betrayal, original and translation, source and 
target texts are complicit with a colonial and imperialistic program as well as the ever-increasing 
extinction of languages worldwide. Harmon argues that romantic individualism is anathematic to 
ecological thinking and the valuing of biodiversity. “Ecology teaches us that all things are bound 
together in overlapping biotic communities – and the Byronic hero is no part of that kind of 
community.”48 Venuti also writes that the desire for fluency in translation is linked to these very 
same romantic conceptions of subjectivity and the values of humanism and individualism. 
The translator’s invisibility is also partly determined by the individualistic conception of 
authorship that continues to prevail in Anglo-American culture. According to this 
conception, the author freely expresses his thoughts and feelings in writing, which is thus 
viewed as an original and transparent self-representation, unmediated by transindividual 
determinants (linguistic, cultural, social [and ecological]) that might complicate authorial 
originality.49 
 
The result of this individualism is, he argues, a concern of translation and relations with cultural 
others that is “imperialistic abroad and xenophobic at home.”50 Against this, Venuti posits a 
relational concept of identity more conducive to ethico-political pursuits. 51  To deny this 
relational dependency, Cronin adds, “leads to the fetish of autonomy and an obsessive concern 
with unconditional freedoms.”52 
It is important to note, however, that the individualistic transparency of the translator is 
not a universal ideal.53 As Judi Wakabayashi and Rita Kothari argue in their collection of non-
Western approaches to translation, bilingual and multilingual cultures are likely more 
accustomed to experiences of ‘living in translation.’ Consequently, “monocultural cultures are 
more likely to be aware of translation as a distinct act.”54 What I am attempting to think as 
ecosystemic translation must thus be reconceptualized beyond traditional oppositions of 
objectivity and subjectivity, description and normativity. Calling to mind Derrida, proponent of 
linguistic human rights Tove Skutnabb Kangas argues that we tend to divide the disappearances 
of languages between language murder, in which a language is actively killed, ‘making a 
language die,’ and language death, in which a language ‘naturally’ lives out its life, passively 
‘letting a language die’ through ‘unsupported coexistence.’ On the framework of liberal 
individualism rooted in representationalist models of science, only language murder is seen as 
linguicide, she argues. However, there is nothing ‘natural’ about the kind of language death the 
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world is currently facing; letting die comes down to making die. The same argument of course 
holds for species extinction.55 Conversely, and building on the insights of my previous chapters, 
I will argue that the ethics posed by ecosystemic translation comes down to letting life live on, 
irreducible to this opposition of activity and passivity, making and letting. Such an account will 
be difficult to develop through the traditional models of science targeted by Translation Studies 
and ecolinguistics. Harré, Muhlhausler and Brockheimer state exactly that Western scientific 
discourse as it stands is insufficient for understanding the environment.56 However, theorists in 
both Translation Studies and ecolinguistics have begun to search for alternative models within 
quantum physics, while others have explored possibilities in systems theory.57 I’ll turn to these in 
§6.2, but will first examine how the notion of translation plays into Science and Technology 
Studies in developing the ethics and politics of the material-semiotic and the natural-cultural. 
 
§6.1.2: Naturecultures and the Material-Semiotic  
One should be careful to distinguish what I’ll explore as the material-semiotic from a simple 
return to a ‘premodern’ textualization (in the narrow sense) of nature. The material-semiotic does 
not express the reciprocal immanence of matter and meaning, nature and culture but calls for a 
wholly other logic. The situated nature of knowledge in science and language by definition 
rejects a pure immediate gaze prior to all intervention that sees a world where words and things 
are not yet separated.  
It is in the vein of similar anxieties concerning the concept of modernity that Latour 
situates We Have Never Been Modern.58 His project attempts to render thinking accountable to 
what he calls the hybrids of nature and culture that weave together our world in a “seamless 
fabric [tissu sans couture],” the keys to which are the synonymous notions of ‘translation’ and 
‘network.’59 Latour explains modern thought as characterized by a series of paradoxes playing on 
the transcendence and immanence of nature and society, where the transcendence of either 
explains their existence prior to human construction, while their immanence denotes the action of 
our own construction; constructivism in the narrow sense. What thereby allows modern thought 
to say and do anything, by way of this simultaneous play of transcendence and immanence, is 
enshrined in the guarantee of Latour’s ‘modern constitution’ stating that Nature and Culture must 
be absolutely distinct.60 Modern thought is based on two separate and distinct sets of practices; 
one of translation, mediation or network that produces natural-cultural hybrids, and one of 
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purification that attempts to keep humans and non-humans apart across an ontological divide.61 
While both translation/mediation and purification require one another and would be impossible 
or irrelevant without one another, modernity insists on considering them separately and works to 
make translation invisible. To consider purification and translation together is to cease to be 
modern. But, as the title of his book implies, we have never been modern when we realize that 
the two have always already been at work. In fact, Latour’s hypothesis can be read along the 
lines of the logic of ex-appropriation that I developed in my chapter on Heidegger; the more the 
work of purification attempts to keep nature and culture separate, the more it facilitates the 
proliferation of their hybridization and contamination. What one could call a dialectics between 
transcendence and immanence renders modern thought invincible and absolutely sovereign by 
making translation invisible and unthinkable.62 Modernity is thus able to assure both the total 
separation between the human and its other in the same move as it cancels out this separation [la 
vie et la mort = la vie est la mort].63 To put it otherwise, modernity makes use of both translation 
and purification while only representing the work of the latter.  
As Latour would later argue in Politics of Nature, ‘political ecology’ must abandon the 
very concept of nature; the ecological crisis is a crisis in objectivity, grounded in the naturalistic 
separation between fact and value, ontology and politics, a common world and the common 
good. To think the work of translation together with that of purification corresponds exactly to 
what I’ve developed as general ecology; we have never been modern because what makes the 
dialectical interplay of transcendence and immanence, realism and idealism, nature and culture, 
ontology and ethics possible binds them to their absolute outside, what Latour calls a 
‘transcendence without contrary,’ the unthinkable and impossible underside of this dialectic. 
Perhaps the wholesale abandonment of ‘nature’ is not what is necessary for political ecology, but 
rather to think nature as originarily de-naturing itself. Latour insists that the non-modern 
constitution must preserve ‘deconstruction’ and ‘denaturalization’ from the ‘postmoderns.’ But 
the nonmodern constitution is no more a return to the premodern than a turn to the postmodern, 
even if it insists on keeping the non-separability of signs and words and the transcendence 
without contrary from the former.64 Haraway outlines the ethico-political possibilities of such a 
refiguration of nature and its potentials for translation. To think nature as what she calls the 
coyote, the coding trickster, as the ground of these necessary and contradictory combinations 
“can show us that historically specific human relations with ‘nature’ must somehow – 
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linguistically, ethically, scientifically, politically, technologically, and epistemologically – be 
reimagined as genuinely social and actively relational; and yet the partners must remain utterly 
inhomogenous.” 65  To politicize the grammar of our relations with nature enables Western 
discourses to  
come to linguistic terns with the non-representability, historical contingency, 
artefactuality, and yet spontaneity, necessity, fragility, and stunning profusions of 
‘nature’ [and] help us refigure the kinds of persons we might be... and inescapably these 
refigurings must acknowledge this permanent condition of our fragility, mortality, and 
finitude.66  
 
If the ecological crisis is indeed a crisis in objectivity, Haraway shows that objectivity must be 
rethought as “taking risks in a world where ‘we’ are permanently mortal, that is, not in final 
control.”67  
 For Latour, the ‘Great Divide’ between humans and nonhumans in modernity gives way 
to another, that between Us and Them; the West and everyone else. Modernity homogenizes the 
infinite differences between all non-humans and all non-Westerners.68 This asymmetry between 
nature and culture also carries over to one between past and future, the premodern and the 
modern; “the past was the confusion of things and men; the future is what will no longer confuse 
them.”69 Modernity is precisely this attempt to escape an age that confuses fact and value, matter 
and meaning, ontology and ethics towards a science that does not. Only in our society, he writes, 
“an unheard-of transcendence has manifested itself: Nature as it is, ahuman, sometimes inhuman, 
always extrahuman... there has been a total asymmetry between the cultures that took Nature into 
account and those that took into account only their own culture or the distorted versions that they 
might have of matter.”70 However, the concept of culture is itself the artefact of our own attempt 
to separate ourselves from nature; to cease to be the modern we have never been, to recognize 
that there have only ever been nature-cultures and to consider together the work of purification 
and translation, causes us to realize that “the moderns do not separate humans from nonhumans 
any more than the ‘others’ totally superimpose signs and things.”71   
 The grounds for translation as an ethical, material-semiotic in(ter)vention requires what 
Haraway calls situated knowledges: a thought of all knowledges as embodied and partial, as 
resistant to the pure gaze of a detached view from nowhere as it is the subsumption of their parts 
into a holistic relationality, contradictorily attentive to both the constructivist aspects of our 
semiotic systems and a commitment to the materiality of the ‘real’ world.72 Haraway understands 
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ethics as being accountable to this partiality, while irresponsibility is conversely the inability to 
be called into account. I would call irresponsibility the universal translation (and universal 
untranslatability) posed by representationalist models of science, both in their naive realist and 
constructivist forms. Conversely, accountability for the local knowledges in minority cultures 
and languages that interrupt universal translation is what I would call an ethics of translation. As 
Haraway is fully aware, however,  
here lies a serious danger of romanticizing and/or appropriating the vision of the less 
powerful while claiming to see from their positions... the standpoints of the subjugated 
are not ‘innocent’ positions. On the contrary, they are preferred because in principle they 
are least likely to allow denial of the critical and interpretive core of all knowledge.73   
 
Positioned against the militarized science and technology of perfect communication and perfect 
languages, the feminist objectivity Haraway argues for entails an interpretive, critical and partial 
understanding of translation in the science and politics of interpretation.74 Science becomes a 
question of accountability for difference within material-semiotic fields of meaning: 
“accountability and responsibility for translations and solidarities linking the cacophonous 
visions and visionary views that characterize the knowledge of the subjugated.”75 To return this 
to my questions in chapter 5, accountability is also a responsibility for how the boundaries of 
bodies are semiotically materialized within which what she calls techno-biopolitics;  
bodies as subjects of knowledge are material-semiotic generative nodes. Their boundaries 
materialize in social interaction, ‘objects’ like bodies do not pre-exist as such... perhaps 
our hopes for accountability in the techno-biopolitics in postmodern frames turn on 
revisioning the world as coding trickster with whom we must learn to converse.76  
 
To lean to converse with the differential material-semiotic codings of nature, to be accountable 
for the exclusions our practices enact and responsible for translations involves, for me, what 
Latour calls a transcendence without contrary, one that extracts transcendence from its modern 
dialectic with immanence, and which lets translation to produce both natures and cultures.77 This 
letting, again, is fully conversant with the thought of invention I outlined above. As Latour asks, 
“who told us that transcendence had to have a contrary? We are, we remain, we have never left 
transcendence, that is, the maintenance in presence by the mediation of a pass [par la médiation 
de l’envoi].”78 While the modern practice of purification only concerned itself with stabilized 
essences, the translations and mediations at play therein deployed unstable events, processes; “a 
movement, a passage – literally a pass [une passe]... we start from a continuous and hazardous 
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existence – continuous because it is hazardous – and not of an essence.”79  In other words, 
translation, the non-dialectical mediation of the ‘pas,’ its transcendence without contrary make it 
so that, beyond any dialectics of transcendence and immanence, realism and idealism, total 
translatability and total translatability, it lets something finitely remain and live-on.80  What 
Latour calls the Parliament of Things – the Parliament of the Living as I borrowed from Wood – 
calls for a rethinking of democracy; biocultural sustainability as democracy-to-come, I would 
say; a democracy that can represent biocultural hybrids. In Latour’s Politics of Nature, political 
ecology abandons the fact/value distinction, as well as that between the common world and the 
common good, towards what he calls a new exteriority. “For political ecology there is another 
transcendence, another externality, which owes nothing either to nature or to the arbitrariness of 
the Sovereign.”81 This transcendence and exteriority divides the powers of political ecology 
between the capacity to take into account and to put into order, and the ontological-ethical 
question becomes concerned “with the simple difference between stopping and continuing the 
movement of the progressive constitution of the good common world.”82 Nature in this sense 
gives way to a collective that is surrounded, indeed threatened, by the entities the collective 
externalizes and for which it is incapable of being held accountable. What the power to put into 
order excludes literally haunts the power to take into account.  
Such is the feedback loop of the expanding collective, a loop that makes it so very 
different from a society endowed with its representations, in the midst of an inert nature 
made up of essences whose list would be fixed once and for all, expecting from moral 
values a selection from on high so that it can extricate itself from mere matters of fact. 
All the transcendence one needs, in practice, to escape from the straitjacket of 
immanence is found there, on the outside, within reach.83  
 
But I think we have to read this idea of within reach precisely as just always out of reach, 
structurally so; not as an Idea in the Kantian sense, but as the im-possible, even im-political 
outside of political ecology. Because the Parliament of Things – like every living thing and every 
translation – structures itself by its externalizations, no process of accountability can ever be 
completed once and for all. In this sense for Latour, the fact-value distinction, and even that 
between putting into order and taking into account, must give way to a deeper difference, 
“between, on the one hand, the short-circuit in the composition of the common world and, a 
slowing down that is made possible by due process, which I have chosen to call 
representation.”84 The goal of political ecology must be understood as “represent rather than 
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short-circuit.”85 But is there not a way in which short-circuiting the common world is itself an 
ethical-ecological gesture, as Haraway seems to suggest? Perhaps short-circuiting the good 
common world is precisely the logic by which to slow things down, to let life live-on and be 
accountable for translation in its material-semiotic in(ter)ventions. As I’ll show, many are critical 
of the corrective of a democracy that merely extends citizenship to the nonhuman and their 
hybrids, of “a new representationalist form of government,” as Barad puts it, noting that 
“representationalist governments have a long history of shoring up their ‘own’ borders while 
raiding and ravaging other lands.”86 I’ll examine the need to go through this impasse in my 
discussions of complementarity and autopoiesis. 
 
§6.2: Non-Representationalist Ecologies of Knowledge 
§6.2.1: Complementarity and Posthumanism 
In this section, I will draw from two approaches discussed in contemporary science studies – 
complementarity and autopoiesis – to develop the ethical and political potentials of thinking 
translation and the material-semiotic. Arkady Plotnitsky’s analysis in Complementarity: Anti-
Epistemology after Bohr and Derrida is particularly helpful in this regard as he develops Bohr’s 
notion of complementarity by way of Bataille and Derrida’s general economy, noting the 
influence of quantum physics on Bataille’s own development of the concept. As he suggests, 
complementarity and general economy are themselves part of the same oikonomia in différance. 
Plotnitsky argues that classical science ought to be understood in terms of a restricted economy: 
a restricted economy of science takes the relations between its objects as always meaningful and 
controllable, privileges consciousness, meaning, presence and truth and aims at the development 
of a fully coherent and unified system of knowledge beyond error, loss or contingency. General 
economy relates these to non-sense, unproductive loss and multiplicity. 
Bohr proposes complementarity to account for certain conflictual aspects of quantum 
systems, specifically both the heterogeneity and mutual exclusivity of these aspects and the 
necessity of their interaction in the description of any quantum phenomenon. For example, light 
can be represented as either a wave or a particle depending on the configurations of the 
measuring apparatus used. For Bohr, quantum physics must employ both incompatible systems 
of representation to give a complete description of its data without resolving these in a classical 
synthesis, dialectic or otherwise. As such, complementarity can be understood as a question of 
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general economy since it relates any of its descriptions to an ineluctable and ineradicable loss of 
sense. Far from considering this loss as an external accident befalling the description of a system, 
it must be considered as its very condition of possibility. The irreducible loss introduced by 
complementarity – always already affecting the representation of any quantum system – 
paradoxically provides the only possible completeness of its description.87  In fact, this loss 
“prohibits one from assuming that there is somewhere a complete or unified system, existing in 
itself or by itself, concerning which system some information is lost in the process of 
observation, measurement, and interpretation.”88 In other words, complementarity fractures in 
advance any attempt to control or master the objects of one’s investigation. The structure of 
general economy, however, allows complementarity to relate to this impossible loss of meaning. 
As Plotnitsky cites Derrida, recalling that general economy is indeed a scientific writing, “it is 
not the loss of meaning, but... the ‘relation to this loss of meaning.’ It opens the question of 
meaning. It does not describe unknowledge, for this is impossible, but only the effects of 
unknowledge.” (ED 397/270) Complementarity breaks with restricted-economic accounts of 
‘knowledge-gathering’ sciences, yet must of course incorporate their best possible knowledge. It 
could not prepare a place for the invention of the other or the radically unknowable without this. 
To think complementarity as general economy is thus a matter of taking into account this alterity 
and heterogeneity but without appropriating it into a system of knowledge. Beyond the 
oppositions of the representable and unrepresentable, the fully translatable and fully 
untranslatable that would return it to a restricted economy, complementarity engages a general 
economic relation to this unrepresentability and unknowability.89  
For Plotnitsky, this structure engages a deconstruction of the classical concept of the 
event, or rather, engages a complementary relation between description and event that will be 
essential to thinking translation as invention. As I showed, the performative immediately 
neutralizes the eventfulness of the event it brings about in still presupposing too much mastery 
and technoscientific convention. One can read the traditional notion of the performative in terms 
of classical causality; the relationship between cause and effect Plotnitsky calls efficacy. By 
contrast, ‘efficacity’ describes the possibility of effects without causes, and is better suited to 
understand quantum events.90 Efficacity, he adds, is alterity itself. “All the effects described via 
such terms, including the effects of various closures, are produced by this alterity-efficacity, 
making all our interpretation and theory, and all our approaches to this alterity itself, depend on 
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these effects.”91 It is precisely this thought of an effect without cause through which I will 
attempt to think material-semiotic entanglement in its restance and event. 
For Plotnitsky, Bohr’s complementarity entails a materialist deconstruction of the 
classical oppositions between inside and outside, subject and object. To think general economic 
loss or distortion as originary at the quantum level necessitates a rethinking of matter and 
causality: matter can no longer be understood as a self-present identity preexisting or prefiguring 
its quantum effects. “Bohr was perhaps the first to grasp fully that we can no longer speak of 
matter as an independent reality existing by itself... even though, at the same time, this ‘matter’ 
affects and constrains all observation, measurement, interpretation, and theory.”92 Building on 
Derrida’s comments in Positions I examined in chapter 1, Plotnisky refigures complementarity 
as a general economy of matter. Matter becomes understood as its own alterity, heterogeneity 
and supplementarity in the efficacity of its event: I’d say matter becomes its own originary 
(material-semiotic) translation.93 According to this logic, complementarity allows one to think of 
matter neither as a word nor concept but as its own dissemination and différance, along with its 
remaining or restance by which any system is overflowed.94 But as Plotnitsky is careful to note, 
material resistance does not to posit an absolute alterity or exteriority, a total untranslatability 
that would return its logic to a restricted economy. There is no absolute exteriority or beyond if 
beyond means beyond the closure of arche-writing. The material remainder implied by 
complementarity is rather beyond the opposition of the absolutely knowable and unknowable: “a 
very different relation – if it is even a relation – is at stake that is contradictory or impossible 
from the classical point of view.”95  
It is in this relation without relation that we must think this material restance and its 
implications for translation. Again, the radical alterity of this matter cannot be accessed by way 
of the opposition between the representable or the unrepresentable, the translatable or the 
untranslatable. “The ‘remainder’ at issue must be seen as productive of further interpretive 
iterability at any point, or after any ‘cut,’ but not in the sense that there is anything that can exist 
as undisturbed at any point and then be disturbed or differently observed, measured, or 
interpreted.” 96  However, no cut can ever be done once and for all, and its arbitrariness is 
precisely what articulates the shifting complementarity between inside and outside at the core of 
Bohr’s thought of matter. It is in this cut that one can begin to think in(ter)vention: the cut 
interrupts both pure translatability and pure untranslatability, but its structural necessity obligates 
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general economy to be accountable to what restricted economies exclude. This has important 
political and ethical implications: “that which is left in the margins and claimed to be reducible 
or treated as contamination by classical theories... is not only incapable of being marginalized or 
reduced, but is in fact constitutive of that which is unequivocally opposed to these contaminating 
forces and supposed to be purified of them.”97  
 Karen Barad investigates the ethical and political implications of quantum entanglement, 
where loss is refigured as the constitutively exclusionary nature of every material-semiotic 
practice, and ethics and accountability become a question of what possibilities these exclusions 
admit or, evidently, exclude. One finds many similarities here to discussions in Latour, Haraway 
and Plotnitsky, but it is Barad’s commitment to a materialist justice-to-come, and her recent 
elaboration of these issues in an ecological – indeed eco-deconstructive context that confirms my 
hunch that translation has everything to gain from a more thorough engagement with matter.98 
As Barad explains, Bohr’s complementarity breaks with representationalism in claiming that “we 
are a part of the nature that we seek to understand.”99 Complementarity rejects the notion that 
scientific measurement and language mediate an independent reality by way of representation.100 
Word and world, words and things, matter and meaning are inextricably and complementarily 
entangled, as are natural and scientific matters of fact with cultural matters of concern, value and 
care, all of which ought be understood as “ethico-onto-epistemological matter[s].” 101  Bohr 
understood this and accordingly emphasized the material and semiotic nature of practices, 
proposing what Barad calls a proto-performative account. Her own theory of performativity is in 
her words posthumanist, in that it attempts to go beyond theories of performativity that focus 
exclusively on the human and its language, and rather attempts to take into account what she 
calls matter’s dynamism. She elaborates on this insight in shifting questions concerning 
linguistic and technoscientific representation to ones of discourse; in other words, from questions 
of descriptions and representations of reality to ones asking what realities and our practices make 
both possible and impossible given this entanglement.102 
 In affirming the independent existence of words and things, representationalism goes 
hand in hand with an ontology of metaphysical individualism, the idea that the world is 
composed of discrete and non-relational individual entities.103 Recalling that it is precisely a 
conception of languages as self-identical and non-relational that ecolinguists argue must be 
rejected if the preservation of minority languages is to be successful, such ontological 
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considerations are essential to my project. Barad follows Bohr in proposing phenomena as the 
primary ontological units, but in a sense that must entail a general-ecological displacement of the 
restricted economy of phenomenology. Phenomena “do not merely mark the epistemological 
inseparability of observer and observed, or the results of measurements, rather, phenomena are 
the ontological inseparability of agentially intra-acting components.”104  Barad uses the term 
‘intra-action’ in contrast to interaction, which envisions relationality as always between 
previously existing relata. Phenomena, by contrast, designate an originary relationality through 
which the relata themselves emerge. 105  Barad’s framework thus “rejects the notion of a 
correspondence relation between words and things and offers in its stead a causal explanation of 
how discursive practices are related to material phenomena.”106 In other words, phenomena are 
themselves material-discursive. Barad thus refigures the entanglements between the two to 
propose a more robust account of the processes of materialization through which both discourses 
and matter come to matter: epistemologically, ontologically and ethically. What Barad calls 
‘agential separability,’ a notion that rejects both questions of absolute interiority or exteriority as 
they do oppositions between determinism and free will, realism and constructivism, observer and 
observed, refigures exteriority as exteriority within material-discursive phenomena, a beyond-
within as I’d put it. 
Agential separability is a matter of exteriority within phenomena... since phenomena are 
material-discursive, no priority is given to either materiality or discursivity; neither one 
stands outside the other. There is no geometrical relation of absolute exteriority between 
a ‘causal apparatus’ and a ‘body effected,’ or an idealistic collapse of the two, but rather 
an ongoing topological dynamics of enfolding whereby the spacetimematter manifold is 
enfolded into itself.107 
 
Barad thus extends the concept of the scientific measuring apparatus to social material-discursive 
or naturalcultural practices of mattering. Apparatuses configure the world by differentially 
enacting cuts, constraints and exclusions that thereby differentially materialize boundaries, 
properties and meaning. “Apparatuses are the material conditions of possibility and impossibility 
of mattering; they enact what matters and what is excluded from mattering.”108 In this sense, the 
ethical political implications of this logic and, she adds, deconstruction more generally, “lies not 
simply in recognizing the inevitability of exclusion but in insisting on accountability for the 
particular exclusions that we enact and in taking up the responsibility to perpetually contest and 
rework these boundaries.” 109  A deconstructive practice is “a practice of reading for the 
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constitutive exclusions of ideas we can not do without.” 110  Of course, her concepts of 
accountability are indebted to Haraway’s ideas of situated knowledges and the material-semiotic 
I detailed above, and pose important refigurations of the ethical and political resistances local 
knowledges pose to universal translation. Knowing for Barad is “a direct material engagement, 
cutting-together-apart, where cuts do violence but also open up agential conditions of 
possibility.”111 To ask what knowledges the cuts enacted by any material-semiotic translation 
make possible and impossible is to allow oneself to be called into account for their constitutive 
violence. Ethical concerns and questions of responsibility are at the very core of scientific-
translational practices, with real, differential effects on the world’s materializations. 112 
“Questions of ethics are always already threaded through the very fabric of the world. They are 
not an additional concern that gets added on.”113 
Barad’s deconstructive leanings force one to think the notions of ‘agency’ and 
‘enactment’ otherwise. Dislodged from any humanist or classical concept of activity, 
responsibility becomes a matter of an ability and inability to respond. “Listening for the response 
of the other and an obligation to be responsible to the other, who is not entirely separate from 
what we call the self. This way of thinking ontology, epistemology, and ethics together makes 
for a world that is always already an ethical matter.”114 Again, this listening coheres closely with 
the thought of invention I have been elaborating here; to prepare a place to let the other come is 
of course the ethical task of translation as a material-semiotic in(ter)vention. An important 
consequence of these insights for translation is that it thus becomes dislodged from the 
humanism grounding its marginalization. More difficultly, it allows us to think a posthumanist 
thought of translation entailed by complementarity (a posthumanism as much after humanism as 
it implies the situation of the human in its ecological context, no more post-modern than pre-
modern) which implies that “meaning [itself] is not a human-based notion; rather, meaning is an 
ongoing performance of the world in its differential intelligibility... The world articulates itself 
differently.”115  
For Vicki Kirby, this displacement of traditional humanism is a direct consequence of 
quantum entanglement. If entities do not preexist their relationality but rather emerge through 
this involvement, scientific inquiry or interpretation does not originate from a human inquirer.116 
Rather, these experimentations and translations might constitute nature’s own investigations, 
readings and rewritings of itself.  
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By studying the workings of language we are not merely looking at a model of the 
world’s ‘intra-actions’ that, by dint of being detached from the world’s palpable reality, 
will inevitably prove mistaken... we may be investigating and witnessing of a more 
general articulation and involvement whose collective expression we are.117 
 
As with Barad, Kirby resists the idea that thinking a posthuman assemblage of nature and culture 
can somehow evade the ecologically destructive aspects of humanism. Latour’s work in Actor 
Network Theory, while important in attempting to account for nonhumans, maintains the 
nature/culture divide by simply extending agency and inventiveness to matter and nature. 
Instead, Kirby develops the quantum implications of Derrida’s notion of general text and 
grammatology as ecology, one that “open[s] the text, or any individual identification, to an 
interiority whose articulating energy is the entire system.”118 In other words, Derrida’s famous 
idea that ‘there is no outside-text’ must be understood as suggesting that there is nothing outside 
of Nature; culture and nature are two expressions of the same phenomenon. This has profound 
implications for thinking translation as a material-semiotic in(ter)vention in the preservation of 
biocultural diversity, avoiding 
the naiveté that refuses the question of matter, here also, the question of language, by 
simply adding their presumed differences together, [which] marks a lack of rigor whose 
complacency appears time and again when the puzzle of relationality, difference, and 
implication is ‘resolved’ through terms that evoke conjunction, aggregation, assemblage, 
and connection.119 
 
Against this notion, Kirby suggests all individuations and speciations reinvent the scene of arche-
writing that is the general text of ecology.120 Species and languages “might be likened to a 
‘restricted writing’ which the general bodies forth.”121 Against any reading of deconstruction 
proposing that there is nothing outside of language, language is refigured as nature’s own 
internal torsion, which again means that there is nothing outside of nature for Kirby.122 This 
thought of ecology as life’s own reading and writing of itself suggests the constitutive failure of 
both univocity and equivocity, I’d say total translatability and untranslatability, marking the 
project of both with an essential finitude within which “‘the system’s falling out of/with itself is 
the stammer of language.”123 If the entire system is thus its own decipherment, communication 
cannot be said to take place between two pre-existent identities and must therefore be 
rethought.124 What might such a rethinking entail? Recalling Berman’s rejection of translation as 
communication and, as Derrida writes in Life Death, “communication does not communicate 
anything, the message does not emit anything that is not in itself already a message, 
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communication, information,” (L6, 4t) similarly to Luhmann, who suggests only communication 
– not humans – can communicate, what if only an originarily ahuman translation can 
translate?125 
 
§6.2.2: Autopoiesis and Double Finitude 
The turn to systems theory in this chapter will be recognized by readers of Translation Studies as 
significant since the 1970’s with the Tel-Aviv/Leuven school and the polysystems theory of 
Itamar Even-Zohar, and as more recently expertly developed in Sergey Tyulenev’s Applying 
Luhmann to Translation Studies. As I noted for Barad and Kirby, complementarity ought not be 
understood as implying the material and the semiotic in terms of their assemblage or 
hybridization in mutual immanence, rather, hybridity itself requires a certain reconceptualization 
(this is how I read, for example, Latour’s account of a transcendence without contrary). At stake 
here is the necessity for any epistemological-ontological account of translation to enact cuts and 
exclusions, but also the deeper ethical question of being accountable to what these cuts make 
possible and impossible, and of being open toward their more inclusive, ecologically sensitive 
reiterations. What I wish to show here is that if we think of languages as autopoietic systems, 
then refiguring the paradoxes of communication between these as translation – translation being 
precisely the boundary-event of both organic and inorganic life – can have important 
implications for Translation Studies, Ecolinguistics and STS. 
For Cary Wolfe, systems theory affords a more rigorous theorization of the hybrid and 
cyborg networks of Haraway and Latour in mobilizing both a continuity across previously 
distinct phenomena (nature/culture, nonhuman/human) and revealing the ultimately contingent 
nature of any language or scientific interpretation. 126  Wolfe’s engagements with biologists 
Maturana and Varela’s autopoiesis and Luhmann’s abstraction of this concept to nonliving 
systems – languages in my case, but of course also biopolitical machines and any other 
epistemological-ontological-ethical interpretation – will be my guide here. Autopoiesis literally 
means self-producing; an autopoietic system produces itself according to its internal rules and 
operations; one could say the conventions legitimating its performativity.127 Autopoietic systems 
are closed and self-referential at the level of their internal organization while structurally open to 
their material environment. However, this relationship between openness and closure is more 
complicated than their simple hybridization, as Wolfe explains: “environmental ‘triggers’ and 
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‘perturbations’ [...] take place on the level of structure, but what may be recognized as a 
perturbation or trigger is specified by the entity’s organization and operational closure.”128 
Autopoietic systems do not pick up information from their environments in a representationalist 
sense but “bring forth a world by specifying what patterns of the environment are perturbations 
and what changes trigger them in the organism.”129 This is not to say that they create a material 
world in an idealist or constructivist sense, but that what a system perceives as identity and 
difference is internal to the logic of its own structural differentiation from its environment. This 
requires rethinking identity and difference beyond their role in the play of representation 
Foucault sees in the classical age towards another logic, beyond any thought of the world as pre-
given, whether internally (constructivism) or externally (realism). This originary difference 
allows Wolfe to bring Luhmann and Derrida together in what he calls the ‘openness from 
closure’ principle. Citing Luhmann, “the concept of a self-referentially closed system does not 
contradict the system’s openness to the environment. Instead, in the self-referential mode of 
operational closure is a form of broadening possible environmental contacts.”130  
 For humans, the bringing forth of and reflection upon the world occurs through language. 
And yet, language itself evolves from structurally ahuman processes of social life in which the 
interactions between certain organisms acquire a recurrent nature. As Derrida, Maturana and 
Varela echo, human language must be understood in a difference of degree from the signifying 
processes of other living beings.131 To think the autopoietic structure of language forces us to 
think a certain decentering of the human, yielding “a posthumanist and transdisciplinary theory 
of the relation between the species, ethics, and language, conceived in its exteriority and 
materiality.”132 To take seriously the material and embodied structure of language is less for 
Wolfe a question of understanding our place in Latour’s Parliament of Things than it is a call to 
situate an originary ex-propriation of the human.133 It is in this sense that posthumanism as he 
interprets it is both before and after humanism, before in that it names the human’s originary 
ecological and technological embededdness, and after, not just in decentering the human, but in 
changing the nature of thought and language itself in the ways that deconstruction, 
complementarity and autopoiesis entail.134 I find this fully conversant with ecolinguistics: “your 
theory of language matters, and it matters not just epistemologically [...] or methodologically [...] 
because all sorts of consequences, both ontological and ethical, follow in its wake.”135 A post-
humanist theory of language and translation, I suggest, will require “an increase in the vigilance, 
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responsibility, and humility that accompany a world so newly, and differentially, inhabited.”136 
Wolfe suggests that we be “extraordinarily – indeed philosophically – attuned to how ‘forms of 
language’ (what we say, what we write, how we ask philosophical questions) opens up certain 
lines of thought – indeed, the imagining of whole worlds – and forecloses others.”137  
 Important parallels with complementarity emerge here, particularly in terms of the loss 
entailed by every general ecology and the contradictory injunction to engage incommensurable 
systems in order to be accountable to the excesses, elements of non-knowledge and blind-spots 
constituting them. The shift from first-order to second-order systems theory – from observing 
objects and events to observing observations – harmonizes neatly with Barad’s proposed shift 
from observing entities to asking what our material-semiotic practices make both possible and 
impossible. From the point of view of a language’s internal organization, its ‘environment’ does 
not exist: it says all it can say.138 However, one can also consider a language in the history of its 
structural ecological relations. 
Neither of these two possible descriptions is a problem per se: both are necessary to 
complete our understanding of a unity... The problem begins when we unknowingly go 
from one realm to the other and demand that the correspondences we establish between 
them (because we see these two realms simultaneously) be in fact a part of the operation 
of the unity... If we are able to keep our logical accounting in order, this complication 
vanishes; we become aware of these two perspectives and relate them in a broader realm 
we establish.139  
 
The question is indeed one of a general economic/ecological accounting with the restricted 
ecology of a system and its blind-spot. As Wolfe explains, the blind spot is “not merely [an] 
ideological bias or the distortion of a pre-given reality knowable by ‘science,’ but rather the 
inevitably partial and paradoxical precondition of knowing as such.”140 Languages, like all acts 
of knowing and interpretation, differentially bring forth worlds, since how we are and how the 
world appears to us are inseparable. However, this entails that “all systems... are constituted by a 
necessary ‘blind spot’ that only other observing systems can see.”141 I think an imperative behind 
biocultural sustainability is then to preserve a diversity of observing systems. It is only in an 
encounter with other semiotic materializations of the environment by other languages that we 
can address the ecologically destructive blind-spots of our own. Translation is the structure of 
this encounter, and the more languages continue to disappear, the worse the chances are for the 
plurality of interruptions these might offer. Wolfe puts forth an ethical argument wonderfully 
amenable to ecosystemic translation on the basis of the contingency of all knowledge, entailing 
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“the necessity of the observation of others: it is only in the mutual observations of different 
observers that a critical view of any observed system can be formalized.” 142  As I’d put it, 
biocultural sustainability rests precisely on keeping open the possibility of the observation of 
others, to let the other come and interrupt me. This could be why he argues that Derrida’s most 
radical ecological claim is that not a single living being shares the same world. And while this 
separation connects us to the world,   
the very thing that makes the world available to us – the grille or gramme or machinalité 
of semiotic code or program in deconstruction, the ‘blind spot’ of the contingent self-
reference of observation in systems theory which dictates that ‘reality is what one does 
not perceive when one perceives it’ – is also and at the same time what makes the world 
unavailable to us.143 
 
Recalling Celan’s die Welt ist fort ich muss dich tragen, “this fact – that ‘the world is gone,’ and 
not just for non-human life but also for humans, thus linking human and non-human life in their 
shared finitude (indeed, in the finitude of their finitude) – is precisely where ethics and 
ecological responsibility begin.”144  
 Wolfe’s central ethical point as I take it is that even if humans share the exteriority of the 
trace-structure of language and communication with other animals, “what they do not share 
equally is the power to materialize their misrecognition of their situation and to reproduce that 
materialization in institutions of exploitation and oppression whose effects are far from 
symmetrical in species terms.” 145  The same is the case, of course, with languages; many 
indigenous languages according to certain ecolinguists have had disastrous effects on their 
relationships to their environments, but did not manifest this misrecognition on a global scale as, 
the argument goes, have SAE languages. What any analysis of second-order systems, and with it 
ecosystemic translation, must take into account, is that “some observers enjoy more resources of 
observation than others.”146  Here is entailed, as Wolfe cites Maturana and Varela, “an ethics we 
cannot evade” concerning those “with whom we want to remain in existence.”147 This ethics is 
engaged by the infinitely finite trace structure of life and all its material-semiotic enactments. 
Just as the system’s operational closure separating it from its environment in fact connects them, 
Wolfe reads Derrida’s notion of the retentional trace at the heart of the Living Present as its 
relation to its outside and exteriority in general. The trace, I showed in chapter 2, engages a 
relation to a past that has never been present, akin to what I called above a transcendence without 
contrary. It covers the entire field of life death as it does language. This is why Wolfe engages a 
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thought of two kinds of finitude: both the radical passivity and vulnerability we share with the 
living in general and that of every semiotic system.  
That second form of finitude drives from the fundamental materiality of meaning and 
communication itself, of any form of semiotic marking and iterability to which both 
human and nonhuman animals are subject in a trace structure that, as [Derrida] puts it, 
exceeds and encompasses the human/animal difference, and indeed ‘the life/death 
relation’ itself.148  
 
Biocultural diversity might thus be understood in this structure of originary mourning, not only 
for the deaths of the countless species, languages and individual living beings, but also of any ‘I’ 
or ‘we’ in the estranging operation of language, the materiality and exteriority in which 
knowledge and language constitute the human and its others. As Wolfe puts it, therein lie two 
kinds of vulnerability and passivity.  
The first type (physical vulnerability, embodiment, and eventually mortality) is 
paradoxically made unavailable, inappropriable, to us by the very thing that makes it 
available – namely, a second type of ‘passivity’ or ‘not being able,’ which is the finitude 
we experience in our subjection to a radically ahuman technicity or mechanicity that has 
profound consequences, of course, for what we too hastily think of as ‘our’ concepts, 
which are therefore in an important sense not ‘ours’ at all.149 
 
Biocultural diversity is itself structured in this dual finitude. How, then, might a posthuman, 
ecosystemic thought of translation help one think its sustainability? 
  
§6.2.3: Eco-systemic Translation 
Sergey Tyulenev’s Applying Luhmann to Translation Studies allows me to build on Wolfe’s 
deconstructive account of autopoiesis in developing my notions of translation as eco-systemic 
and as a material-semiotic in(ter)vention. In tracing the history of the intersections between 
Translation Studies and the Social Systems Theory of Luhmann, Tyulenev recalls that the need 
to recognize translation in a broader context than the verbal mediation from one language to 
another had been thoroughly developed by Roman Jakobson in his tripartite distinction between 
intralingual, interlingual, and intersemiotic translation.150 The Polysystems theory pioneered by 
Itamar Even-Zohar and the Descriptive Translation Studies of Gideon Toury have themselves 
been the source of some controversy regarding their claims to scientific objectivity. Even-
Zohar’s idea of a value-neutral study of the norms through which translated literature gains its 
acceptability has garnered criticism – from Berman, notably – who writes that “in translation, 
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one cannot, one must not be neutral. Neutrality is not the corrective of dogmatism,” who adds 
that a science of translation, if there is to be one, must break from its scientistic, positivistic and 
objectivist roots. (BD 63) However, Even-Zohar replies that what such criticisms abhor is not so 
much science itself as an imaginary, popularized account of science. Polysystems theory presents 
itself as a shift from a positivist collection of data to a study of relations. Furthermore, Even-
Zohar is quick to distinguish his framework from the fixed and static systems of structuralism 
that exclude diachrony and systems-external factors. Rather, the polysystem must be understood 
as a dynamic open system characterized by heterogeneity and complexity. “No ‘objectivist’ 
program, in the naive sense of the word, is preached here... the study of cultural norms lies at the 
very core of any functional stratification theory.”151 Many laud the relativism vis-à-vis norms 
adopted by Even-Zohar and Toury as constituting a break with linguistics-based approaches to 
translation, and the theory itself for moving Translation Studies beyond Eurocentric 
presuppositions.152 Nonetheless, an important gap appears to form between a descriptive account 
of the normative systems through which translations are produced, a first-order observation, and 
another relation that might read the descriptive and the normative, the constative and the 
performative in a much more complex relationship. Similarly, while Tyulenev identifies in the 
work of Theo Hermans the best application of Luhmann to Translation Studies, Hermans’ own 
hesitation on whether or not to consider translation as a system forces him to “separate ontology 
and epistemology.”153 Conversely, the thought of ecosystemic translation I will develop here 
must refigure ontology, epistemology and ethics, the material and the semiotic as originarily 
entangled, not in a relation of mutual immanence, but in the general textuality or arche-writing 
sustained by general ecology. 
 Tyulenev prefers to think of translation as a subsystem of the larger social system, more 
precisely as what he calls a ‘boundary phenomenon.’ Translation both separates and connects the 
overall system with the environment. Whether between verbal intra- or inter-lingual transfers, or 
mediating between socio-cultural world-views in intercultural communication, translation is the 
meeting point not only between a system and its environment, but other systems in its 
environment: it opens the system and the environment to one another. 154  The function of 
translation as a boundary phenomenon “is to increase the system’s environmental sensitivity.”155 
Tyulenev’s account of translation as a boundary phenomenon avoids many of the obstacles I’ve 
discussed in STS, Translation Studies and ecolinguistics; translation and communication are 
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dislodged from the notion that sees these as occurring between ‘rational actors,’ as well as any 
atomistic or individualistic account of social, and indeed ecological relations. Translation further 
becomes distanced from its miring in anthropocentrism; humans become mere elements in the 
autopoiesis of social systems. As he explains, “systemic macroparadigms are often criticized for 
disregarding human conscious volition... yet they have at their advantage of better describing 
unintended effects of human activity.”156 Tyulenev recalls that for Luhmann, both living and 
nonliving systems can be autopoietic in that they exhibit self-referential closure. Translation may 
thus be compared to the ears, eyes and feelers of living organisms insofar as it mediates between 
the system and its environment. But as this – assumedly non-dialectical – mediation, translation 
operates by observing observations rather than observing events. In this sense, translation can be 
held accountable for what its self-referential closure leaves out.157 
Translation is at the heart of the system’s self-reference. Translation straddles the 
boundary between the system and its environment. This allows translation to manifest 
two contradictory facets: on the one hand, it supplies the system with options which 
allow the system to develop contradictions; on the other hand, translation is summoned to 
resolve conflicts.158 
 
As Tyulenev explains, this is because translation sees both sides of what he calls the Form. Here 
one can recall Deleuze’s distinction between exteriority and the Outside for Foucault: exteriority 
can be said to be the forms of ‘the visible’ and ‘the utterable’ that effectuate a cut upon the 
impersonal and anonymous Outside or environment. Drawing from George Spencer Brown’s 
laws of form, form splits the world into two parts for Tyulenev: “a notion, which is the focus of 
our contemplation, and all the rest.” 159  But as with organic autopoiesis, this closure and 
selectivity is not accidental: the boundary phenomenon of translation both unites and 
separates.160 As he elaborates,  
drawing a boundary between itself and its environment is vital for the system in order to 
differentiate itself. An adequately determined boundary allows the system to attribute 
events as belonging to the inside or outside of the boundary by using its own means... the 
formation of the system’s boundary interrupts the continuity of the connecting process 
between system and environment.161 
 
In other words, ecosystemic translation binds the restricted ecology of a linguistic system to its 
impossible environment, the Outside. It is the stricture, the relation without relation, the pas au-
delà, the interruptive logic by which any boundary phenomenon both enacts a cut and relates to 
its environment, by which this boundary transgresses, transcends itself.  
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 To adapt Tyulenev’s argument, one can never know another language, world-view, 
human or fungus... one can only know what is communicated in translation by applying the 
categories of one’s own language and epistemological-ontological-ethical framework. This 
operation invariably selects some information as important and puts aside everything else. It 
facilitates the passage of texts from the outside in, but also fully or partially closes the system in 
filtering and selecting. However, the relation by which a system appropriates information from 
the environment, crossing its boundary in translation from the outside-in, can also operate from 
the inside-out. In both cases, it does not do so indiscriminately, “rather, translation always 
filtrates: it renders certain things and puts aside or changes other things. In the latter case, 
translation closes, if only partially, the system to its environment.” 162  In explaining how 
information crosses the boundary of the system, Tyulenev distinguishes between exchange and 
mediation, the former a crossing without returning and the latter both a crossing and returning. 
Translation is a special case of such mediation: one side of the form must not only “cross the 
boundary and see what is out there, on the other side, but also... return to itself and juxtapose its 
own value and the value of the opposite side.”163 This is what allows translation to observe 
observations. Since its primary function is to increase environmental sensitivity, it must see both 
the inside and the outside of the system/environment form. “Translation, then, re-enters the form 
‘system/environment’ in each of its mediations. In other words, each translated text (of whatever 
semiotic nature) reflects the relationship of the system with its environment.”164 Translation thus 
shuttles between source and target, system and environment.165 Depending on the direction of 
this shuttling, Tyulenev distinguishes between experience and action.  
If the direction is from the environment into the system, that is, a meaning selection of 
options, provided by translation, is attributed to the environment, what happens is 
described as the system’s experience. If the direction is from the system into the 
environment, then we deal with the system’s action... within translation, the environment 
may cause the system to have an experience; within translation, the system can act on the 
environment.166 
 
One can correlate this to what I was saying above in terms of ecosystemic translation, between 
the translation of ecology, the system acting on its environment, enacting epistemological-
ontological-ethical and material-semiotic cuts, and a (restricted) ecology of translation, the 
system’s experience of the environment; language and translation in their ecological contexts. 
System and environment mutually implicate and explicate one another in a certain restricted 
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ecology. What is more difficult to think here is the ecology of translation at the deeper level of 
arche-writing; this will disclose the outside-in of a passivity anterior to the opposition of act and 
experience. Translation can here be refigured as an experience of the impossible Outside, one 
within which it structurally and inevitably in(ter)venes (“translation ‘stitches’ the system and its 
environment”) but also tears through this stitching, ter-s through in(ter)vention itself to prepare a 
place for the in[  ]vention of the wholly other, to let the other come.167 If translation as mediation 
implies both the crossing of the boundary and a returning, one ought rather to think of this tres-
pass along the logic of the pas au-delà, as a crossing that begins by returning.  
Tyulenev again draws from Spencer Brown in identifying the law of crossing as the law 
of all translation; “the value of a crossing made again is not the value of a crossing... this means 
that if the intention is to cross a boundary and then to make another cross, the value of the two 
crosses put together is the value of none of them.”168 Again the strange non-dialectical negation 
of the pas au-delà. Translation, he continues, “crosses the boundary from one side to the other, 
yet it does not stay on the other side, it returns to the first side. Its crossing is always for 
recrossing. In this sense, translation presents its crossing as not crossing. Translation presents the 
absence of the same value of the crossings as the absence of the crossing.” 169  But in this 
crossing, translation brings back something new; if the repetition of this return is originary, then 
the possibility for the event and the invention of the radically other is lodged in this very 
repetition. 
 
§6.3: Translations of Ecologies, Ecologies of Translation 
§6.3.1: The Translation of Ecology and the Language of Environment 
In this section, I will show how the notion of translation is at play in both branches of 
ecolinguistics, the language of environment in §6.3.1 and the environment of language in §6.3.2. 
Mühlhäusler describes the reality-constructivist hypothesis of language as follows: “human 
beings at best see reality through a number of filters. Of these, language is the most important. 
Language does not describe reality, but shapes, creates, and perpetuates group-specific 
perceptions of reality.”170 Through their lexicons, metaphors, grammars and discourses, different 
languages bring different conceptions of sameness and difference into being. Mühlhäusler 
defines grammar as “the ecological principles which account for the fact that the whole is more 
than the sum of its parts.”171 This definition opposes traditional understandings of grammar as 
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the predictable and regular rules of phonology, morphology and syntax. Mühlhäusler draws his 
inspiration from Halliday, who argues that grammar is both a theory of human experience and a 
principle of social action, “in both these functions, or metafunctions, grammar creates the 
potential within which we act and enact our cultural being.”172 Halliday’s theory of grammar is 
linked to the reality-construction view: our reality is actively constructed through language, and 
language evolved through and as this construction. A language’s grammar both enables meaning 
and makes it impossible, setting limits on what can be meant.173 In other words, Mühlhäusler 
writes, the lexicon provides the building blocks of a language, and grammar the instructions as to 
how these blocks can be arranged or rearranged. It is always possible to use the same material to 
build different ‘spiritual homes,’ but this possibility can only arise from a deep awareness and 
sensitivity to the nature and constraints of the lexico-grammar of our own language. Mühlhäusler 
and Halliday’s descriptions of the co-implied possibility and impossibility of going beyond 
grammar are quite consonant here with what I’ve examined in deconstruction, complementarity 
and autopoiesis. To make a language foreign to itself, more ‘environmentally’ sensitive, in all 
senses of the word, by intervening within its constraints opens the possibility for new material-
semiotic rearticulations and inventions, and this in(ter)vention, I argue, occurs through 
translation. As I mentioned, the consequence of a reality-construction hypothesis of language for 
Mühlhäusler is that languages are not intertranslatable. However, if we ought to seek inspiration 
from other languages in the interest of “transforming anthropocentric language and its metaphors 
of dominance, hierarchy, and boundary drawing,” how can these insights be conveyed outside of 
translation? 174  Steiner approaches this question in After Babel, and despite the humanistic 
aspirations of this work, I feel it can contribute in an important way to fleshing out a 
posthumanism in the translation of ecology. 
 Steiner writes that “different languages are different, inherently creative counter-
proposals to the constraints, to the limiting universals of biological and ecological 
considerations,” “that is to say in the face of death.”175 The homogenizing forces of majority 
languages and monolingualism are suspected by the author to go hand in hand with Chomsky’s 
theory of the universal deep structures of grammar. The argument he elaborates here is close to 
Mühlhäusler’s. On the universalist framework, translation is invariably realizable and merely 
consists in locating the deep-seated universals underlying the surface dissimilarities of every 
language. On what Steiner calls the extreme ‘monadist’ framework, translation is impossible, or 
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rather “what passes for translation is a convention of approximate analogies, a rough-cast 
similitude, just tolerable when the two relevant languages or cultures are cognate, but altogether 
spurious when remote tongues and far-removed sensibilities are in question.”176 However, he 
wonders, if the Humboldt-Sapir-Whorf, or reality-construction hypothesis is correct, how is it 
that we can and do communicate interlingually? I think the response can be thought in terms of 
the invention of the other in a language’s experience of the impossible. For Steiner, the invention 
of hypotheticals, counter-factuals and grammars of futurity constitute the origin of language. 
“Language is the main instrument of man’s refusal to accept the world as it is,” in other words, 
“to articulate possibilities beyond the treadmill of organic decay and death.” 177  Given the 
capacity of language to articulate different materializations of the world, “each different 
language offers its own denial of determinism, ‘the world,’ it says ‘can be other.’”178 For Steiner, 
the death of a language is the death of a possible world, but I prefer, in adapting Derrida, that it is 
not only the end of a possible world, but the end of the world.179 Steiner argues that the creative 
and inventive functions of language evolved from a framework of survival rather than 
morality. 180  For me, a concern with imagining our language otherwise in the interest of 
biocultural sustainability is thoroughly entangled with ethical considerations. But it is also a 
question of biological survival, since the destructive patterns through which we constitute our 
world may soon make it quite uninhabitable. If survival and ethics are no longer opposed, one 
can understand language as always already ethically potentialized from the first breath of its 
inventing the world otherwise – inventing the other – and this in a sense anterior to or beyond the 
human. As Harmon quotes William James, “the whole process of life is due to life’s violation of 
our logical axioms.”181 The same is true of translation’s experience of the impossible.  
Both Mühlhäusler and Halliday argue that the restructuring of a SAE linguistic ecology 
must occur through processes of borrowing and learning from other languages and cultures. 
However, the former warns that the introduction of foreign concepts into a new linguistic 
ecology must be treated with great care if they are to endure. Thus, a critical examination of the 
grammatical structures and processes of SAE languages must be undertaken. Halliday challenges 
the “nominalizing, metaphorical grammar of late 20th Century prestige varieties of English” as 
becoming dysfunctionally “abstract, objectifying, and determinate,” and complicit in framing the 
demands which have exceeded the resources of the Earth.182 He illustrates these problems with 
the following four examples 1) English distinguishes between countable and uncountable 
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entities; ‘air,’ ‘oil,’ and ‘water’ are understood as ‘unbounded’ – existing without limits – 
making it difficult to conceive of these resources as finite. 2) Our grammar arranges quality and 
quantity together; “the grammar of ‘big’ is the grammar of ‘good,’ while the grammar of ‘small’ 
is the grammar of ‘bad.’ The motif of ‘bigger is better’ is engraved in our consciousness.” 3) The 
transitivity of English grammar organizes human beings as the most active and agential while 
inanimate objects are the least. Such a construct “makes it hard for us to take seriously the notion 
of inanimate nature as an active participant in events.” 4) Our grammar introduces a sharp 
dichotomy between conscious and unconscious entities that is manifested in our pronoun system. 
“Conscious things are he/she while unconscious things are it.” This imposes a strict disjunction 
between us and other living beings, most notably for Halliday our relation to Gaia, the idea of the 
Earth as a living being popularized by Lovelock.183 
 Moreover, SAE grammar has constructed a reality that subordinates processes to objects. 
This occurs through the nominalization of processes into objectified entities: “a nominalized 
form represents qualities and processes as ‘abstracted’ from things and time respectively.”184 
One need only consider the reification processes through which ecologically and relationally 
situated systems of communication are objectified into ‘language,’ or the processes of factories 
churning out greenhouse gases objectified into ‘pollution,’ the quantities of which can then be 
bought and sold. Mühlhäusler is also critical of the patterns of marking in SAE languages.185 An 
example of anthropocentrism in English would be the ‘unmarked’ status of ‘humans and 
animals’ contrasted with the marked ‘animals and humans.’ Similarly, control and ownership of 
individuals over objects, resources and nonhuman living things is unmarked in English, in 
opposition to the passive construction. The marked construction sticks out as awkward and 
interrupts the fluency of our reading patterns. For Halliday, the at once constraining and 
liberating role of grammar can serve to reverse our established conceptions of linguistic marking: 
“redefining growth as failure to shrink” is an example of this process.186  
However, the most important feature of linguistic structure regarding the environmental 
crisis might be the ways in which different languages encode temporal dimensions. Harré, 
Mühlhäusler and Brockheimer write that temporal concerns are not one topic among others in 
this respect, but are “woven into the very fabric of environmental discourse.”187 Steiner explains 
that “our views of time are mainly generated by the grammar of the verb... different cultures 
operate with and within different conceptualizations or, at the very least, different images of 
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time.” 188  The Western understanding of the three-dimensional, past-present-future, arrow 
metaphor of time is organized through the Indo-European verb system. Saroj Chawla suggests 
that the three-dimensional conception of time “encourages a world view in which existence is 
perceived as fragmented rather than as holistically or relativistically interrelated.”189 This linear 
conception of time, the argument goes, prevents adequate considerations of futurity and is thus 
complicit with the wasteful here-and-now attitude of capitalist consumerism. In contrast, other 
time systems uphold a ‘neutral or zero time preference,’ “meaning that a moose in the future (or 
a good run of salmon) does not have lower value than a moose in the present. This is very 
important. A neutral or negative time preference expresses long-term values, and makes 
decisions different from the short-term preference for the present.”190 While SAE languages 
objectify and abstract nouns from subjective experience, Chawla notes the two-tense structuring 
of certain Amerindian systems into ‘earlier’ and ‘later,’ closer to the duration of time as 
subjectively experienced.191 
Steiner points to a difference between Indo-European and Semitic constructions of 
temporality: future events lie before us in the former, and come after us in the latter. 
Furthermore, “the notion of recurrence coincides with that of duration” in Semitic time 
constructions.192 This image for him coheres with the concepts of ‘present absence’ and ‘self 
erasure’ in deconstruction, which he deems “itself a variant on Talmudic-Kabbalistic speech 
speculations.”193 The incorrectness of this claim regarding deconstruction notwithstanding, let 
me recall from chapter 1 the unquestionable influence of Walter Benjamin on Derrida’s readings 
of translation and survivance. Reading the two in an ecolinguistic context can be instructive here. 
In an attempt to preserve Sanskrit translations outside the oppositions of original and translation, 
Christi A. Merrill draws from Benjamin’s concept of afterlife to “examin[e] the temporal 
constitutions of [these] narratives – beyond living to dead, past to present, plural to singular – 
allows us to think of these loops of rhythmatic interpretation as cyclical rather than linear.”194 In 
this sense, she writes, we can conceive of translation as a kind of ‘justice across future births.’ 
The concept of translation as this originary rebirth across repeating cycles of time might allow us 
to reconceptualise our own established frameworks of temporality and intergenerational justice. 
As Samuel Weber also notes regarding Benjamin, “as something that neither ‘comes to be’ nor 
‘passes away’ ... the origin is an event involving both singularity and repetition ... what [this] 
entails is less a self-contained phenomenon than a complex relationship that is described as a 
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‘rhythm,’ thus emphasizing both its repetitive and temporal aspect.”195 This originary rhythm, he 
adds, is implicit in Benjamin’s understanding of translation. One wonders, then, if thinking 
translation as rhythmically-oriented might increase its environmental sensitivity, its fidelity to 
the materiality of the text, its ability to listen to the lessons of traditional ecological knowledge, 
or TEK, in a way that resists objectification and appropriation. As Mühlhäusler notes, “the desire 
to live in harmony with the rhythms of nature is contradicted by a control-ful way of 
speaking.”196 In a sense, one can see something coming together here with respect to the end of 
Life Death, where Derrida writes that rhythm counts even more than the affirmation of life. But 
this is not a question of arguing that a linguistic construction more in tune with the cyclical and 
rhythmical processes of nature is somehow better, but rather one of interrogating this rhythm as 
it interrupts the linearity our own, inheriting its eternal recurrence as the grounds for selection in 
translation. Rhythm in ecosystemic translation would make no attempt to master time but leaves 
to the other its most proper time, and lets biocultural diversity live-on.  
It is essential to emphasize that no theorist working on these issues partakes in an 
uncritical valorization of indigenous cultures and knowledge systems or deems them more in 
touch with ‘nature,’ a danger Haraway also highlights. The naive and romantic view of the 
‘noble savage’ is rejected across the board as culturally imperialistic.197 Mühlhäusler adds that 
the knowledge contained in such languages is not “necessarily better or more conducive to the 
long-term survival of humans than SAE languages,” but that a diversity of perspectives ought to 
be valued in itself. “It is useful to have a number of different maps, a number of conceptual 
systems to serve as a corrective against particular assumptions about the world.”198 Darrell Posey 
notes that many indigenous languages internally embody a concept of sustainability and an ethic 
of conservation through a long period of adapting their language to a particular ecosystem. TEK 
is also said to stand in total opposition to the dualism of Western science, and to have “almost 
completely internalized the evolutionary give-and-take between nature and culture.”199 In this 
sense, Posey adds, “concepts of biodiversity and conservation are ... alien to indigenous peoples. 
This does not mean that they do not respect and foster living things, but rather that nature is an 
extension of society. Thus biodiversity is not an object to be conserved.” 200  Luisa Maffi 
elaborates on this line of thought with the following:  
There is a tendency among indigenous peoples toward a holistic, non-individualist 
approach to the cultural as well as the natural world. A tendency to think not just in terms 
of parts or components, but in terms of a whole and of the relationships among the 
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elements of the whole – in other words, to think ecologically in both nature and 
culture.201  
 
However, Maffi is quite clear that “local knowledge does not easily ‘translate’ into the majority 
languages to which minority language speakers switch.”202 In fact, dominant ethnocentric and 
individualistic conceptions of translation pose several problems to ethical translations of 
traditional ecological knowledge. For Maffi, TEK is usually the result of a communal process of 
creation, and thus cannot be ascribed to an original author or event. It thus facilitates colonial 
practices of appropriation without proper compensation to its indigenous owners. Conversely, 
the sacred and secret nature of some traditional knowledge resists the Western notion of public 
domain.203 Many are critical of the colonial logic structuring the ‘bioprospecting’ of TEK in 
Western circles, a framework cohering with traditional understandings of the relationship 
between authorship and translation.204 The frameworks of copyright law are thus as ineffective in 
adequately compensating TEK as they are for translations.205 It is clear that the preservation of 
species and languages ought to be approached outside these appropriative frameworks: the main 
goal is not to “translate all this diversity into the one global language of science and international 
commerce for the benefit of those who control it.”206 However, did I not introduce and launch the 
notion of ecosystemic translation precisely against the technoscientific networks of global 
capitalism responsible for environmental destruction? The central issue here, as another 
researcher puts it, is that indigenous knowledge be “understood, respected, and synthesized with 
global knowledge in a balanced, humane way.”207 
This synthesis is admittedly non-dialectical and the site of an interminable negotiation. 
Posey suggests that our ultimate goal should be to “harness the totality, rather than the 
components, of TEK systems in sustainability strategies, so that the quality of indigenous 
management can benefit the wider society.”208 In fact, Harré, Mühlhäusler and Brockheimer 
warn that it is problematic to selectively ransack particular insights from traditional knowledge 
systems. Since linguistic concepts develop over a long period of interaction with their 
environment, Mühlhäusler cautions that borrowing from the vast pool of indigenous knowledge 
cannot consist of the simple transfer and addition of single elements, but must constitute “the 
reconstruction of a linguistic ecology,” translation being precisely the cut that allows for this 
rearticulation.209 Maffi adds that the real task is thus that “indigenous heritage be protected as 
bodies – bodies of knowledge, bodies of folklore, bodies of language – and as living, constantly 
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developing bodies, not as dead bodies from the past.”210 As Posey points out, the oral character 
and communal creation of much TEK is what allows it to maintain itself as a living process, as 
“holistic, inherently dynamic, constantly evolving through experimentation and innovation, fresh 
insight, and external stimuli.” 211  Especially in oral cultures, Cronin explains, “material is 
constantly modified as part of the dynamic relationships that exist between the tellers of the tales 
and their audiences.”212 It is in this sense that Maffi evokes the necessity of protecting a right to 
orality if TEK is to be preserved as a process and as a living body. 
Translation, I’ve argued, engages precisely such a living-on in its concern for materiality, 
but of course no living-on is possible without mourning. These aporetics of translation structure 
everything at stake in ecolinguistics, and only a  “case-by-case examination – within the 
framework of an evolved, hybrid, integrated flexible system for the protection of indigenous 
peoples’ rights – may lead to an appropriate system solution.”213 Such is the task of the ecology 
of translation; to assess the context – ecological, sociopolitical, linguistic – for the translation of 
ecology. 
 
§6.3.2: The Ecology of Translation and the Environment of Language 
Insofar as Translation Studies and ecolinguistics have recognized the need for a shift from an 
objectivist study of fixed, static, discrete and individual entities to a situated intervention within 
fields of relations processes, networks and open systems with emergent, conflictual and 
contradictory properties, one can see that the protection of biocultural diversity must concern 
itself more with sustaining the ecological support systems through which life emerges rather than 
any individual notion of ‘life itself.’ However, more needs to be said about what constitutes such 
contexts of life for biocultural diversity, and what kinds of obligations we have towards its 
sustainability.  
Harmon argues that the destruction of biological and cultural diversity represents the 
destruction of “the fundamental processes that generated the conditions of life that we (‘we’ 
meaning all species) are at home in.”214 These conditions of life are what he understands as the 
biocultural presence, “nothing less than the entire complement of biological and cultural 
diversity now existing, bestowed upon the Earth by millions of years of evolution.”215 I argued 
above that our ethical stance towards preserving this biocultural presence is best directed towards 
sustaining the formative processes of ecosystemic speciation. Our interventions, Harmon 
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suggests, would do well to “mimic these patterns in nature.”216 For Bang and Døør, an ecological 
point of view necessitates an attempt to understand other cultures and species, and my argument 
here is, again, that the aporetics of this understanding can be expressed through those of 
translation.217 As I’ll show, however, to do so involves an apprehension of the conflictual and 
contradictory dynamics through which ecosystems flourish. Steffensen points out that the goal of 
ecological linguistics is thus not to stand outside a conflictual structure, but to emphasize a 
notion of “impermanent harmony in conflict.”218 Embracing diversity for Harmon entails an 
appreciation of conflicting values “as part of a larger ethical landscape whose overall diversity 
should be preserved.”219 One finds similar arguments in one author’s adaptation of Bateson’s 
theory of metacommunication in formulating their approach to translation; “the condition for a 
successful relationship between... interactants is not their similarity but the mutual recognition of 
difference.”220 Likewise, physicist Fritjof Capra explains that “ecological literacy includes that 
both sides of a conflict can be important, depending on the context, and the contradictions within 
a community are signs of its diversity and vitality, and thus contribute to the system’s 
viability.”221  
 Cronin defines translation ecology as “a translation practice that gives control to speakers 
and translators of minority languages of what, when and – perhaps more urgently... how texts 
might be translated in and out of their languages.”222 One of the ends of refiguring translation as 
‘transmissive’ rather than ‘communicative’ is its contribution to biocultural diversity. 223 
Translation relationships need to be constantly reassessed since the conflictual and asymmetrical 
dynamics of hegemony between languages are constantly in states of flux. “Moving away from 
foundational notions of translation, it will be in a conception of translation as ‘a world of 
continued relational adjustments’ that minority languages will finally have a role to play in the 
discipline of Translation Studies.”224 Communities attempting to preserve minority languages 
find themselves in a double bind regarding translation. Cronin argues that Venuti’s famous 
ethical framework of foreignizing or minoritizing translation can in fact be counterproductive in 
translating from a major language. But what is foreignization, and how do its relations with 
domestication conflict in translation ecology? 
 For Berman, I showed, a logic of the same has more often than not hijacked the true 
ethical aim of translation; to receive the other as other within one’s language. However, Venuti 
supplements an originary violence to this Levinasian framework. 
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[there is a] violence that resides in the very activity of translation: the reconstruction of 
the foreign text in accordance with values, beliefs, and representations that pre-exist it in 
the target language, always configured in hierarchies of dominance and marginality... The 
aim of translation is to bring back a cultural other as the same, the recognizable, even the 
familiar, and this aim always risks a wholesale domination of the foreign text.225 
 
For Venuti, translation can never rid itself of this fundamental ethnocentrism. However, it can 
limit its violence through the work of foreignization, which challenges the hegemony of the 
major, target language by interrupting the fluency of its readability in the target text; a 
foreignized translation looks and reads like a translation. “Foreignizing translation signifies the 
difference of the foreign text, yet only by disrupting the cultural codes that prevail in the target 
language. In its effort to do right abroad, this translation must do wrong at home, deviating 
enough from native norms to stage an alien reading experience.”226 Foreignizing or minoritizing 
translation operates through what he calls the ‘remainder,’ the variables of non-standard forms of 
language (dialects, for example) that reveal a language’s self-heterogeneity and interrupt its 
hegemony. Since English is by far the language the most translated from and yet very little 
translated into, foreignizing translation into English can serve to challenge “ethnocentrism and 
racism, cultural narcissism and imperialism,” and I’d add anthropocentrism here, too.227 
But for Cronin, revealing the self-heterogeneity of a minority language can in fact place 
this language in greater danger of extinction. Conversely,  
a domesticating strategy which is perceived as regressive, ethnocentric, and appropriative 
in the case of a major language does not necessarily carry the same meanings for 
minority languages. In the context of minority language[s], naturalizing strategies can 
indeed preserve rather than endanger the planet’s linguistic ecosystem.228 
 
In other words, the need for a certain restricted ecology of openness and closure must be taken 
into account in formulating the general ecology of ecosystemic translation. It may even be 
necessary for ecosystemic translation to contextually and strategically allow for a restricted, 
static conception, even objectification of language where the conditions of life simply cannot be 
met, notably in such situations of extreme asymmetry where translation from major to minor 
languages threaten the survival of the latter. In other words, an understanding of language-in-its-
environment can necessitate the deployment of a fictional or metaphorical ‘language-in-itself.’ In 
the case of protecting biodiversity, this would be analogous to protecting an individual species 
rather than its ecological conditions in extremely dire cases. Similarly, it would contextually 
deploy a thinking of similarities with other living beings rather than the ethics of difference I’ve 
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argued for throughout. Derrida sees Nietzsche as anticipating something similar; the strong are 
those who impose their language, either upon someone who does not speak it, or impose a 
manner of speaking within a language itself. This is force itself, Derrida writes, “and since there 
is no language without hierarchies, laws, rules, normativity, or grammar, there is no language 
without force of law and therefore without an imposition of the colonial type.” (LV 45t) And 
even if this force can always invert itself into a weakness, powerlessness and passivity, Derrida 
notes that sometimes humans are worth saving more than their languages. “Today, on this earth 
of humans, certain people must yield to the homo-hegemony of dominant language. They must 
learn the language of the masters, of capital and machines; they must lose their idiom in order to 
survive or live better. A tragic economy, an impossible counsel.” (MAP 56/30) 
An apprehension of the context of the minor language in question is paramount in 
Cronin’s translation ecology, “attach[ing] due importance to particularism and place, without a 
reactionary retreat to ethnocentric smugness.”229 As such, Cronin follows Latour in explains the 
network as a new paradigm of translation. 
A network is by definition open ended and therefore capable of being extended 
indefinitely... as a result, new elements can lead to restructuring without collapse. 
Secondly... the potential openness of the network does not mean it is open to all... 
Thirdly, the logic of the network is greater than the power of its individual nodes... in 
other words, the connectedness of nodes is what permits their flexible and dynamic 
response to changing situations but it is shared goals, values, and ends which allow for a 
level of structural coherence in the network itself.230 
 
Countless papers in environmental ethics, Translation Studies and Science and Technology 
Studies have become mired in a difficult debate on striking the right balance between 
universalism and particularism, care and rights, holism and individualism, perhaps more recently 
resurrected between processes and objects. In chapter 5, I followed Derrida and Esposito in 
arguing that the language of individual human rights evolved from the political philosophies of 
traditional liberalism. It can therefore be closely correlated with the attitude that individual 
species and languages ought to be protected rather than the ecological processes and relations 
that bring these about and sustain them. However, as James A. Nash puts it, a comprehensive 
ethic of bioresponsibility involves considerations of both individualistic and holistic poles, 
individual life-forms and ecosystemic wholes as complementary. 231  Tove Skutnabb-Kangas 
presents an account of linguistic rights that does not neatly fit into the universal/particular, 
care/rights binaries. As she argues, linguistic human rights, particularly in education, “play a 
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decisive role in maintaining and revitalizing languages and in supporting linguistic and cultural 
diversity and through them, also biological diversity on Earth.”232 Human rights themselves must 
be understood as the rights of future generations to biocultural diversity.233 While most human 
rights are framed in terms of individual persons, linguistic human rights are also collective, and 
as such constitute “essential tools through which minorities can get access to those rights 
majorities are granted through individual rights.”234 The UN’s focus on individual rights has 
been to the detriment of minority groups and has contributed to the invisibility of the plight of 
endangered languages for Skutnabb-Kangas. 235  She also claims that human rights become 
completely insufficient in the face of asymmetrical power relations; “human rights approaches 
are naive if they disregard power relations – and many of them do. Some of them are themselves 
well on their way to rather becoming part of the oppressive system rather than a solution... 
Linguistic human rights are true and beautiful, but futile in a negotiated situation of unequal 
power.”236 This concern is echoed by Maffi, who wonders whether the Western discourse of 
rights is really the best option in the preservation of biocultural diversity, rather than 
understanding sustainability in terms of “obligations of the human community to earth and the 
other species on it.”237 One finds another similar argument in the dialectical linguistics of Bang 
and Døør, who distinguish between what they call the ‘rights universe of discourse,’ framed in 
terms of ‘right-duty-obligation justice,’ and a ‘love discourse,’ characterized by “love, peace, 
wisdom, compassion, friendship, co-joy, sharing, caring, and natural harmony.”238 And if this 
seems to clash a little too optimistically with the notions of interruption and resistance I’ve been 
developing here, the authors flesh it out in relation to a further distinction in their work between 
vital and essential needs; “instead of the concept of ‘vital needs’ we can work with a distinction 
between vital needs which concern survival, and essential needs which are about living and 
blossoming.”239 General ecology accounts for both a restricted ecology of survival, a delay and 
deferral of death [vital needs] and the absolute element of non-knowledge, the impossible event 
of the other; and in this repetition prepares a place to let the other come, blossom, flourish and 
die at its own rhythm. Restricted and general ecology are precisely complementary in this sense: 
considerations of preserving biocultural diversity ought wherever possible to be concerned with 
preparing the conditions to let life live, effloresce and die. But when the ecological, political and 
cultural asymmetries are such that providing these conditions – however well intentioned – is 
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impossible, attention may be directed to an urgent life-or-death battle for the survival of the 
organic or inorganic life in question.  
 
§6.4: Foreignizing the Human Geschlecht 
To think translation as a material-semiotic in(ter)vention and the role I see it playing in 
biocultural sustainability, I began by contrasting Derrida’s notion of life death as general text 
with Foucault’s notion of the pre-modern ‘textualization’ of Nature where words and things were 
not yet split apart. General text is the consequence of thinking life in its originary repetition, re-
production and translation, and this applies to science, language, biopolitics and any other 
epistemological-ontological-ethical framework. The other translation Berman sees dissimulated 
in every ‘restricted’ translation corresponds to a transcendence, one that opens onto the infinite 
inappropriability of the other, manifesting the manifestation of a singularity that is each time 
uniquely the birth and death of the world, whether a species, culture or language, a carp, seaweed 
or a bee. The materiality of the other, of the world itself is both what resists and paradoxically 
calls for translation. In fact, as Berman draws from Benjamin, it is the very corporeality of the 
work “that makes it alive and able to survive.” (BT 25) As a material-discursive in(ter)vention, 
translation re-orders the entanglement of matter and meaning, and must be accountable for the 
resulting cuts. But these cuts are never made once and for all, and remain indefinitely open for 
and to their more ethical reiteration. The general text of biocultural diversity is nothing other 
than this reading and writing of itself along these lines, and translation passes no more through 
two self-identical languages than does communication pass between two individual human 
interlocutors; both notions thus require rethinking. What Latour calls the world of translation 
“does not start from human beings, those latecomers, nor from language, a more recent arrival 
still.”240 
 As I’d shown in chapter 1, Benjamin’s interest in the sacred text in translation rests 
precisely on the inextricability of its letter and its sense, and I’d extended this not only to every 
literary and poetic text, but to every material-semiotic event in the arche-writing of general 
ecology. The sacred, as Henri Meschonnic puts it, is “the fusional of human and cosmic, 
including animal. Hence the sacred is anterior to human language.” 241  Berman’s notion of 
translation as experience and transcendence led him to posit the secret passages between life and 
death at play in the other notion of translation, what Derrida follows Bataille and Blanchot in 
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thinking as a pas de sens, where experience is an authority that expiates itself. Benjamin’s 
concern with the life and afterlife of works was read by some to introduce an originary 
dimension of repetition and cyclical, rhythmic temporality at the heart of any translation. For 
Weber, translatability must thus be expressed as a relational concept, “and relations, Benjamin 
warns, should not necessarily be judged in exclusively human terms, such as the needs of human 
beings to understand works written in a foreign language.”242 This is perhaps why translation’s 
primary aim for Benjamin is not to communicate but rather to promise a reconciliation and 
kinship among languages, a language to come that ought be distinguished from any teleological 
utopianism. As I mentioned above, Cronin suggests that the shift from thinking translation as 
transmissive rather than communicative has as its aim the fostering of genuine biocultural 
diversity on earth.243 Listening to the rhythms of life death of biological, cultural and linguistic 
diversity on earth – without any attempt to master or control these – is the very task of 
ecosystemic translation. In the oikos of general ecology, “what counts is less the telos than the 
rhythm of différance and the speed of the step [pas]” (CP /361) ... “what counts in the final 
accounting is beyond the account, it is a certain pas au-delà.” (OA 32/19t) 
 In my discussion of ecosystemic translation, I’d emphasized translation as a boundary 
phenomenon in its crossing for re-turning in Tyulenev’s analysis. To think translation as, in a 
sense, this originary re-crossing from the impossible environment or Outside of the form, from 
its underside, spoke to me precisely in the syntax of the pas au-delà. The fact that translation 
observes observations rather than observing events makes it accountable for a system’s blind-
spots while increasing its environmental sensitivity, in all senses of the words.  
Translation ‘stitches’ the system and its environment,... which makes a full foreignization 
in verbal translation impossible. But, since translation unites the sides of the form by 
demonstrating their distinguishability, a full domestication is rendered equally 
impossible. Any translation is neither or both. It is a matter of degrees... In any case, 
translation supplies options for enriching the system’s meaning horizon and thereby, to 
this or that degree, challenges and influences the dominant discourse.244 
 
Certainly, I mentioned above, a certain restricted economy of openness and closure, 
foreignization and domestication is at stake in any translation ecology. However, foreignization 
for Venuti involves a different kind of subjectivity than that grounding the opposition between 
author and translator, original and translation at stake in the humanist aspirations of 
domestication. “Neither the foreign writer nor the translator is conceived as the transcendental 
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origin of the text... Rather, subjectivity is constituted by cultural and social determinants that are 
diverse and even conflicting, that mediate any language use, and that vary with every cultural 
formatting and every historical moment.”245 If foreignization can challenge ethnocentrism and 
racism in a major language, can it in a sense serve to make the human foreign to itself, to 
interrupt the mechanisms through which we make the degradation of biocultural diversity 
ungrievable? This would be the task, as I take up my epigraph from Nietzsche, of translating 
humanity back into nature, without any assured knowledge, precisely in the pas de sens, 
nonknowledge and im-possibility onto which general ecology opens. It is a precisely 
posthumanist task, which Wolfe elegantly summarizes as follows: 
Posthumanism can be defined quite specifically as the necessity for any discourse or 
critical procedure to take account of the constitutive (and constitutively paradoxical) 
nature of its own distinctions, forms, and procedures... That can only be done, as we have 
seen, by another observer, using a different set of distinctions – and that observer, within 
the general economy of autopoiesis and iterability, need not be human (indeed, from this 
vantage, never was ‘human’).246 
 
The promise of the reconciliation of languages Benjamin reads in translation, and what I 
introduced in chapter 1 as Derrida’s posthuman promise of the earth, might then be thought 
together as the promise of biocultural life death on earth. In chapters 1-3, I’d outlined the 
temporalities Derrida found incapable of thinking this promise; the death drive, the living 
present, and the auto-affection of time, all of which remained too bound to an ecology of 
propriety, immanence, self-presence, the teleology of science and history, the proper of the 
human, its powers, capacities and forces. The Eternal Return however is precisely an unpower, 
expressing the detour of all thought for Blanchot and the ruin of our attempts to dominate the 
earth. The condition for the promise of biocultural sustainability to be affirmed is precisely this 
detour of thought that passes originarily through the other.  As an originary form of return, the 
pas of ecosystemic translation, translation itself and all other movements in tr- begin by 
returning. And this is how ecosystemic translation can listen to the rhythms of the earth (which 
are anything but calculable) with no attempt to master them or to keep time with them. 
 In the foreword to a recent anthology on non-Western concepts of translation, Ganesh 
Devy writes that “if the earth is to be saved from the ecological ravishment that it has been 
repeatedly encountering all over, words, texts, and cultures must return to nomadism, must get 
translated forever.”247 Translation, however, may in a sense have never been anything other than 
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nature’s own denaturing of itself; a history of trans-lational spaces, Berman writes, would have 
to rest on “a history of migrations, and a ‘theory’ of the human being as migrant-being 
(migration is the foundation of translation) and, furthermore, mutant-being (all migration is 
mutation).” (BD 56) Such an understanding would wholly overflow the very logic of translation 
as anti-natural: “assimilation of translation to the absurd imitation of human language by parrots, 
to the infra-human verbiage of monkeys... In truth, we still lack an anthology [florilège] of 
translation metaphors; this anthology would teach us more on the act of translating than many 
specialized treatises.” (BT 45) Indeed, beyond even these animal metaphors, as Michael Marder 
recalls the etymology of ‘florilège’ or anthology, “‘a collection of flowers’ (from Greek anthos, 
‘flower’ + logos, derived from legein, ‘to gather’).”248 But a gathering that, along the logic of 
general ecology, would find itself ex-propriated across the field of the living, undoing and 
reinscribing the oppositions between the human and its others, the organic and the inorganic, 
species and languages, to think life death on earth with others more justly.  
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Seven: In-conclusion 
How does one conclude a project that has attempted at every turn to resist any process of 
completion, stressed the necessity of open-endedness as a condition of living-on? The question is 
itself somewhat problematic, as nothing lives-on without being cut from its source, and as 
painful as this cutting is at the moment, this quasi machine-like cut alone assures the possibility 
of this work’s survival. The structure of general ecology itself ex-propriates this work from me, 
and the mechanical cut  
at the same time detaches from and reattaches to the family (heimisch, homely), to the 
familiar, to the domestic, to the proper, to the oikos of the ecological and of the 
economic, to the ethos, to the place of dwelling... at the same time ex-propriates and re-
appropriates, de-racinates and re-enracinates, ex-appropriates. (FS 78/64) 
  
This ex-propriation is itself the condition for its new articulations, the work’s rearticulation into 
new contexts, new ecologies, new translations, new readers. And I hesitate with every word I 
type as I know, with this section concluded, that General Ecology: Life Death on Earth in 
Derrida and Others will no longer belong to me, and if it ever did, it was at least never mine to 
keep, and I anticipate as much an ecstatic, affirmative gaiety as I do a nauseating postpartum 
depression. Or elsewhere along the time of life, I feel as if my kid is going off to college, leaving 
the family dwelling, off to make her own way in the world, leaving me to the retirement projects 
I’d put off in raising her.  
 What new contexts will general ecology articulate itself in? Of course, I’ve come at 
everything here as what might be called a Derridean, and as a-perspectival as the abyss 
hollowing out its point of view may be, deconstruction demands, or rather necessitates a certain 
reading, certain theoretico-practical frameworks, certain openings. I’d be delighted and terrified 
to see how this gaze-less gaze looks when mirrored from the other side; what would a Husserlian 
or Heideggerian, a Deleuzian or Foucauldian, a Blanchotian or Bataillian think in reading these 
pages? Or even further, a biopolitical theorist, someone working in STS, a Translation Studies 
scholar or an ecolinguist, an environmental activist? I expect to get a glimpse of this at the 
defence a few short weeks. For now, I’d like to propose certain possible future directions for 
general ecology. 
 First of all, I think reading the insights of general ecology in close conversation with 
other strains in environmental ethics and environmental philosophy proper would provide for 
some important and timely work, and not only for the fact that the biocultural paradigm is not 
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often addressed in these fields of study. The phenomenological notions of the flesh and the body 
are ones where my discussions of materiality, particularly in chapter 2, would find an interesting 
new articulation. Husserl’s Ideas II on the constitution of material, animal and spiritual nature 
would be a great place to start, as would Derrida’s reading of this text in On Touching, as well as 
the reading he proposes therein of Merleau-Ponty. 1  The work of Jean-Luc Nancy himself, 
particularly as concerns ecotechnics, would be a fruitful new context within which general 
ecology can deploy itself. With respect to Heidegger, it would be interesting to read some of the 
texts Derrida himself does not cover, particularly the Beiträge and the related Mindfulness and 
The History of Beyng and see how these fit in to the difficult investigations I’ve put forth here.2 
I’d also be curious to see what an eco-deconstructive reading of the work of Max Scheler looks 
like, a philosopher once counted among the top three phenomenologists (along with Husserl and 
Heidegger), but rarely heard from today. To bring many of the propositions of this dissertation 
into a closer engagement with the work of Simondon would be fascinating as well, especially 
given his recent surge in popularity. I also wonder how Deleuze’s work, which itself does not 
often talk about ecology proper, both lines up with and separates itself from Guattari’s ecosophy, 
not only in The Three Ecologies but in the massive, recently published Qu’est-ce que 
l’écosophie?3 I wonder if what I developed in my chapter on biopolitics will find itself better 
received by those interested in problematizing affirmative biopolitics, or by those of the 
Agamben-ian persuasion, and it will be very interesting to me to see what kinds of conversations 
develop there. I’m also excited to see how these ideas get picked up or engaged in other 
posthumanist discourses such as new materialism, new vitalism, process philosophy and 
particularly the more ecologically oriented aspects of object-oriented philosophy. Although I 
haven’t been particularly taken by ooo, and for what I feel are important reasons, I don’t want to 
foreclose a deeper engagement with something because it’s new, trendy or controversial. I can 
think of so many smart academics I know who never bothered reading Derrida due to the 
caricatures of his thought that often circulate, and have always found this most unfortunate for 
them.   
 Speaking of Derrida, general ecology will be able to further graft itself into new contexts 
for a long time to come given the wealth of unpublished material still being edited and translated. 
As I write this, I’ve returned from a translation workshop on his 1975-6 seminar Theory and 
Practice (on Althusser, Gramsci and Heidegger – particularly on the latter’s “Letter on 
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Humanism” and “The Question Concerning Technology”). So many of the questions brought up 
in this dissertation find important complementary expressions therein, ones that challenge the 
injunction to put general ecological theory into practice and think the two as bound up much 
more closely. I’ve had the chance to study the 10 unpublished sessions of Given Time (1978-9), 
the first two years of La Chose: Heidegger/Ponge (1975-6), Heidegger/Blanchot (1976-7), as 
well as discovering a fall 1977 seminar La Chose 3, “La Voie de la langue” on Blanchot 
exclusively, and am already thinking of working these and the other trajectories outlined above 
into General Ecology Volume II. One could also engage Derrida’s earlier seminars on Husserl 
and Bergson, the two years of seminars following The Politics of Friendship (Rhetorics of 
Cannibalism and Eating the Other). All these seminars and countless more will provide so many 
opportunities to rethink and rearticulate the claims and stakes of general ecology, its living-on 
through the Derridean corpus and beyond. And for this, I feel nothing but excitement. 
 Finally, what will mean the most to me is to hear from the readers of this text, the others I 
share life death on earth with. Given that general ecology both stresses a responsibility in the 
deployment of programs of action, by way of norms and rules, and a responsibility before the 
incalculable invention of the other, I wonder what programs and events the others reading and 
rewriting this text will invent for themselves in responding to the loss of biocultural diversity. If 
this text of differences is to make a difference, or let a difference come about, this is what would 
give me the most joy, not in economically reimbursing me for years of work, but in 




                                                        
Notes to Epigraph 
1 The notes to the poem also provide an earlier version that reads “La mort saisit le vif/ et l’oiseau/ ferme la 
marche.” (OC 4 360/n.a.) Note the change from the earlier ‘la mort’ (death) to ‘le mort’ (the dead [one]). Translated 
in English as “The Earth”: “The dead man/ catches the quick/ and the bird brings up the rear.” I’d prefer “The dead/ 
seizes (or grips, takes hold of) the living” in anticipating the life death on earth at stake here. Translating “ferme la 
marche” is more difficult; “brings up the rear” is certainly adequate, as would be “comes in last place.” But with all 
the talk of the paths, Wege and steps to follow, I’d also like to hear in this ‘marche’ the ambiguity of a ‘pas,’ in the 
double syntax of Maurice Blanchot’s ‘pas au-delà,’ both the step beyond and its negation. In the September 2nd 
defence of this dissertation, I mentioned that this poem would be the last addition to this dissertation, a grafting that 
would ‘ferme le pas,’ but would also plead ‘ferme-le pas!’ ‘don’t close it!,’ a final, but ultimately futile epigrafting 
so that the work might live on just a little longer. Montréal, September 14, 2016.      
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Fordham University Press, 2007), 264-287. 
14 See in the latter my “Is it Ecologically Just to Be? Antinatalism in Eco-Deconstruction” Oxford Literary Review 
38, no. 1 (2016): 99-126. 
15  Readers interested in a closer engagement of both are encouraged to read Matthias Fritsch’s “An Eco-
Deconstructive Account of the Emergence of Normativity in ‘Nature,’ in Eco-Deconstruction: Derrida and 
Environmental Philosophy eds. Matthias Fritsch, Philippe Lynes and David Wood, currently under review by 
Fordham University Press, and also the editors’ introduction to the volume. 
16  Timothy Morton independently posits a ‘general ecology’ in his Ecology Without Nature: Rethinking 
Environmental Aesthetics (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2007), 109. Morton has also explored the relations 
between deconstruction and ecology on several points, and has been immensely influential in bringing ecological 
thought to a wider public. The notion of ‘general ecology’ is not, however, developed by Morton therein, and I’m 
not sure that, given my reservations with respect to object oriented ontology, it would correspond very closely to 
what I’ll be developing here. I reserve a deeper engagement of a debate between eco-deconstruction and OOO, as 
well as a closer reading of Morton’s work, for another project. 
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Notes to chapter one: Survivance and General Ecology 
1 For more on the ‘affirmative turn to life,’ see Cary Wolfe’s reading of Claire Colebrook and Roberto Esposito in 
Before the Law: Humans and Animals in a Biopolitical Frame (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2013), 63. 
2 I will develop this at length in my studies of Deleuze, Foucault and Esposito in chapters 4 and 5, particularly with 
respect to the notion of double death these thinkers all draw from Blanchot.  
3 On originary survivance, see AVE, 26/26. For deconstruction as an experience of the impossible, see P1, 27/15. 
4 Différance, as he will put it in Positions, is “the concept of economy, and since there is no economy without 
différance, it is the most general structure of economy, given that one understands by economy something other than 
the classical economy of metaphysics or the classical metaphysics of economy.” (PE 17/8t) 
5 CP, 373/352. 
6 AS, 173/126. 
7 Iterability for Derrida designates “the space of the alteration of the originary iteration (iterum, anew, does it not 
come from the Sanskrit itara, other?); of repetition, reproduction, representation; or also in space as the possibility 
of iteration and the exit from life placed outside itself.” (DG 297-8/209) “This iterability (iter, once again, comes 
from itara, other in Sanskrit, and everything that follows may be read as the exploitation of the logic which links 
repetition to alterity.” (MP 375/315) 
8 Derrida specifies that an event ought above all happen to a living being that experiences it, but it is the automatic, 
inorganic and dead repetition of the machine that opens the possibility for the inscription of the event onto organic 
matter. Such is, Derrida writes, the im-possible figure of the event-machine, which is to say the only possible event. 
WA, 72-3. 
9 In ED, 293-340/246-291. 
10 “To Speculate: On ‘Freud’” in CP, 275-438/257-410. I will return to Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche at length in 
chapter 4.  
11  As Laplanche and Pontalis define these terms, the pleasure principle is “one of the two principles which, 
according to Freud, govern mental functioning: the whole of physical activity is aimed at avoiding unpleasure and 
procuring pleasure. Inasmuch as unpleasure is related to the increase of quantities of excitation, and pleasure to their 
reduction, the principle in question may be said to be an economic one.” ... The reality principle, for its part is 
“coupled with the pleasure principle, which it modifies: insofar as it succeeds in establishing its dominance as a 
regulatory principle, the search for satisfaction does not take the most direct routes but instead makes detours and 
postpones the attainment of its goal according the conditions imposed by the outside world.” J. Laplanche et J.-B. 
Pontalis, Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse (Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1976); trans. Donald Nicholson-
Smith as Language of Psycho-Analysis (London, Karnac Books, 1988), 332/322, 336/379. One could, anticipating 
my discussions of double affirmation in chapter 4, say that a second yes guards against the unconditional affirmation 
of the first. As with Freud’s conservation drive, which comes to economically limit the unconditional affirmation of 
the pleasure principle, Jacob structures the reproductive logic of the living as something originarily selective. An 
economy of dissemination operates in the tension between the forces at play in the solidary logics of reproduction 
and selection. In a genetic mutation, Derrida writes, “the self-relation of auto-affection is the general form of what 
comes to limit the gap or the mutation by giving it in that same stroke the chance to breathe.” (L4, 13t) Life must be 
on the one hand open enough to “integrate the newness of programs, which must be sufficiently new, disseminating 
to ensure the maximum of propagation, but also sufficiently near to itself and repetitive so that dissemination is not a 
pure dissemination, that is to say a loss without return into the unique.” (L4, 13t)  
12 MP, 19/18. 
13 ED, 302/203. As Derrida will say, la vie la mort is neither la vie est la mort (life is death) nor la vie et la mort (life 
and death)  
14 CP, 338/317. 
15 BS2, 365/264. 
16 “Does not everything that Freud ventures on the subject of time in these environs [parages] have to be related to 
the auto-affective structure of time (that which there gives itself to receive is no present-being) such as it is 
described in Husserl’s Lectures on Internal Time Consciousness or Heidegger’s Kantbuch?” (CP 382/359) Derrida 
indicates in a note that this will be explored in a later publication, Given Time, although these arguments will not in 
fact appear in the published version. Given Time constitutes the first five sessions of a seminar given in 1978-9, and 
again in 1991. Derrida only compares Husserl and Heidegger’s temporalizations in the 13th session, and I reserve an 
analysis of this for another project. As Derrida writes in “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” Freud’s concept of 
Nachträglichkeit, [deferred action] is irreducible to both Husserlian and Heideggerian temporalization and their 
concepts of world; the present is not originary but constituted, there is no purity of the Living Present in Freud’s 
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account. (ED 134/266) In “Différance,” he adds that the structure of nacthräglichkeit “forbids that one make of 
temporalization (temporization) a simple dialectical complication of the living present as an originary and unceasing 
synthesis.” (MP 21/21) Death, he writes, “is bound to life and to the living present which it repeats originarily.” (ED 
336/286) In referring to the trace of a past that has never been present, the trace, arche-writing, “erases the 
transcendental difference between the origin of the world and being-in-the-world. Erases it in producing it: medium 
of the dialogue and of the misunderstanding in the Husserlian and Heideggerian concepts of being-in-the-world.” 
(ED 315/267) 
17 Derrida anticipates the dramatis personae of the La Vie la mort seminar in Of Grammatology writing on the trace 
“as it appears in both Nietzschean and Freudian discourse. And finally, in all scientific fields, notably in biology.” 
(DG 103/70) One ought to recall that the originary technicity of arche-writing Derrida speaks of in the introduction 
to this text ought to be understood “in this sense that the biologists speaks today of writing and the pro-gram with 
respect to the most elementary processes of information in the living cell... Even before being determined as 
human... or nonhuman, the grammè – or the grapheme – would name the element.” (DG 19/9) Jacob’s own 
introduction to The Logic of Life is entitled ‘programme,’ which is also the title of Derrida’s first lecture in La Vie la 
mort. 
18 This move is also hinted at by Canguilhem, and would become very important to Foucault. See also Leonard 
Lawlor’s Implications of Immanence: Toward a New Concept of Life (New York, Fordham University Press, 2006). 
19 “The essence itself, the proper of the living, livingness [vivance] itself, its ousia and its aitia, its being alive, its 
essence-existence, the moving and final cause, the becoming final of the moving cause.” (L4, 10t) I will show 
Derrida challenge this Aritotelico-Heglianism of biology in his discussion of Canguilhem as well. In citing from La 
Vie la mort, the first number refers to the session, while the second corresponds to the page number from Derrida’s 
typescript.  
20 One could develop here a comparison between the notion of free and bound energies in the detour between the 
economic principles of the pleasure and reality principles in Freud. 
21 L5, 13. 
22 The machine, Derrida writes, is both dead and death itself, “not because we risk death in playing with machines, 
but because the origin of machines is the relation to death.” (ED 335/285) 
23 “The –itself [le se-] erases in a way the difference between producing and reproducing. In self-reproduction [le se-
reproduire] neither the self [le se-] nor the re supervenes upon a producing that would precede them, a product that 
would pre-exist them.” (L5, 2t) 
24 Bataille, I’ll show in §1.2.1, argues something similar. 
25 Derrida suggests that the belief in the value of the immanence and appropriability of death to life in Freud’s death 
drive, as well as Heidegger’s being-towards-death, may been nothing other than a consolation before the constitutive 
ex-propriation of the transcendence of death. I will have the chance to discuss Heidegger’s thought of death at length 
in chapter 3.  
26 This is perhaps how one might read Derrida when he says that “the exappropriating structure is irreducible and 
undecomposable... it always prevents reappropriation from closing in on itself or achieving itself in a circle, the 
economic circle or the family circle. No progress, no progressivity of man.” (CP 385/362) As impossible to think as 
the différance between restricted economy and the expenditure without reserve will be the structure bringing 
together this repetition of the mechanical with the organic, living, singular event. The mechanical, in this sense, “at 
the same time detaches from and reattaches to the family (heimisch, homely), to the familiar, to the domestic, to the 
proper, to the oikos of the ecological and of the economic, to the ethos, to the place of dwelling... at the same time 
ex-propriates and re-appropriates, de-racinates and re-enracinates, ex-appropriates.” (FS 78/64)  
27 On the monstrosity of the event-machine, see WA, 73, and §1.3 below.  
28 David Wills, Inanimation: Theories of Inorganic Life (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2016), xi, 17, 
27. 
29 ‘Pas’ in Parages, 19-116/10-101. All the essays in Parages deal with the work of Blanchot. For more on this 
death that is impossible to die, see PM1, 174-5/119-20. 
30 See AVE, 26/26, OA, 161/122, P1, 214/202-3, WC, 25 for various elaborations on this distinction. 
31 BS2, 194/131. 
32 P, 121/, 129/ . 
33 AVE, 26/26.   
34 Cf. CU, 326/n.a. 
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35 “As something that escapes all use and all end, and more, as that which escapes our very capacity to undergo it, 
but whose trial we cannot escape. Yes, as though impossibility, that by which we are no longer able to be able, were 
waiting for us behind all that we live, think, and say.” (BEI 308/207t) 
36 BEI, 65/46. 
37 In the second session of La Vie la mort, which would later be collected in The Ear of the Other as “Logique de la 
vivante,” Derrida elaborates; “once again, the destruction of life is only an appearance: it is the destruction of the 
appearance of life. One buries or burns what is already dead so that life, the living... will be reborn and regenerated 
from these ashes.” (OA 41/26) 
38 I will, of course, return to this at length in chapter 3.  
39 DB, 22/30. 
40 “Suffering is suffering when one can no longer suffer it, and when, because of this non-power, one cannot cease 
suffering it.” (BEI 63/44) 
41 BEI, 310/209. 
42  The conjunction of necessity and impossibility, I’ll show, will come to structure all of Derrida’s quasi-
transcendental arguments, including his thought of translation. 
43 As Blanchot elaborates, “time is as though arrested, merged with its interval. There, the present is without end, 
separated from every other present by an inexhaustible and empty infinite, the very infinite of suffering, and thus 
dispossessed of any future: a present without end and yet impossible as a present. The present of suffering is the 
abyss of the present, indefinitely hollowed out and in this hollowing indefinitely distended, radically alien to the 
possibility that one might be present to it through the mastery of presence. (BEI 63/44) 
44 DB, 60/49, 129/95-6. Here, one might say, is where the space for the affirmation of life in its lightness and gaiety 
arise: “at this moment both inescapable and improbable, the arrival of death at itself, this arrival of a death that never 
arrives and never happens to me – at this instant lightness, elation, beatitude remain the only affects that can take 
measure of this event as ‘an unexperienced experience.’” (DB 83/65) 
45 DB, 83/65. 
46 See also Derrida’s ‘Afterword’ in Limited Inc., “Plenitude is the end (the goal) but were it attained, it would be the 
end (death). This non-end is not an extraneous vestige of the teleological essence of intention, it belongs to it as its 
most intimate and most irreducible other, as the other itself in it. It lasts as long as there is life, intention, language, 
or, as I prefer to say in general, the mark (or vice versa) (I take the liberty here of referring to what I say elsewhere 
of the finite infinite of the différance, in Of Grammatology and in Speech and Phenomena.” (LI /129) 
47 DB, 89/69. 
48 CU, 327/n.a. 
49 See my discussion of Nietzsche, and Bataille’s reading of the former in §4.3. 
50 Bataille returns to this conversation throughout Inner Experience, see Œuvres complètes V, 67/i 53, i 120/102. In 
Guilty in Œuvres complètes V, Bataille again returns to this discussion of Blanchot. See also Derrida’s reference to 
this in §1.4 below.  
51 See Derrida’s Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas on this discussion of transcendence in immanence. I will engage 
Bataille and Deleuze’s difficult concepts of immanence in §§4.2 and 4.3 below.  
52 OC5, 60/i 46. 
53 OC5, 101/i 85, 98/i 83. 
54 OC5, 337/i 93. 
55 For the necessity of a materialist reading of Derrida in thinking eco-deconstruction, see David Wood’s “Spectres 
of Derrida: On the Way to Econstruction.”  
56 Derrida notes, however, that he is not sure that there can be a ‘concept’ of an absolute outside. This is perhaps 
because the concept would still belong to a logic of restricted economy. But general economy must engage a relation 
between the classical concept and its loss of sense. What this means, as Derrida puts it in “From Restricted to 
General Economy,” is that the concepts of matter or materialism, borrowed from classical philosophy, must be 
exposed to a certain sliding of their sense. However, he adds, “if the play of difference is indispensable for the 
correct reading of the general economy’s concepts, and if each notion must be reinscribed within the law of its own 
sliding and must be related to the sovereign moments, one must not make of these requirements the subordinate 
moment of a structure. The reading of Bataille must pass through these two dangerous straits.” (ED 401/345) 
57 PE, 69/50, WA, 128. 
58 LD, 10-11/4-5, 210/168-9. 
59 OC7, 22/a 13, 31/a 23. 
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60 For the overlaps between growth and possibility, see “L’Économie à la mesure de l’univers,” in OC5, 11. One 
could, I believe, propose an entire ecology as aqualogy based on the thoughts of the sea in Derrida’s Parages, the 
bridges and shores that populate the second year of La Chose on Heidegger and Blanchot, all the way through to 
Esposito’s Categories of the Impolitical.  
61 OC5, 154/i 133. 
62 OC7, 29/a 21. 
63 As I showed Blanchot write “less in saving everything from the flood than, on the contrary, in plunging all things 
into a deeper flood where they disappear prematurely and radically.” (BEL 143/139) 
64 FF, 26. For more on this ‘au-delà dedans,’ see Derrida’s discussion of Levinas in Adieu, and §1.3 below. 
65 PE, 56/41. 
66  ‘Relève’ is a translation Derrida uses for Aufhebung. It will be of huge importance to my discussions of 
translation, particularly in Derrida’s “What is a Relevant Translation.” 
67 “Perhaps, simply, into writing itself.” (MP 21/19) 
68 Derrida often uses the term ‘stricture’ in relation to the double bind in general economy. The word is more 
common in English than in French, but both derive from the Late Latin ‘strictura’ from ‘stringo’ (tighten or 
compress). In French, it refers to the narrowing of an airway or other bodily passage, as it does in English, where the 
alternate meaning of a restriction or tightening is more common. 
69 ED, 376/323. 
70 I am grateful to Matthias Fritsch in helping me formulate this argument on the basis of his in “Deconstructive 
Aporias: Quasi-Transcendental and Normative,” The Continental Philosophy Review 44 (2011): 439-468. 
71 ED, 378/325, 400/344. Derrida points to an affinity between Bataille and Blanchot on the transgression of the 
neutral; the impossible experience of the sovereign operation, he writes, is one of transgression. (ED 402-3/346-7) 
72 ED, 397/342, 380/327. 
73  In systems theoretical terms, one might say that general economy enters the system into relation with its 
unknowable environment. I will return to this latter discussion in my reading of autopoiesis, systems theory and 
translation theory in §6.2.2 and §6.2.3.  
74 ED, 388/334, 400 n1/440-1 n39. 
75 As he puts it in “Ja, or the Faux Bond II; “the ungraspable – remain(s) (“the skidding that forces a certain letting 
go” [“Dissemination”], a certain de-clinging of the dual or dialectical unity) is the relation without relation of the 
two columns or colossi or bands; it is what sets the gap... in motion.” (PDS 25/17) 
76 As Derrida puts it, “this ‘already’ exceeds the thinking of production toward an ‘unproduction’ that would not be 
its negative either, but rather an ‘oblivion’ that no economy... can get the better of.” (PDS 45/38) At stake in Glas is 
an unlivable impossibility, “capable only of overturning, paralyzing, or exceeding any system and history, of 
interrupting the life of the concept, of cutting off its breath, or better, what comes down to the same thing, of 
supporting it from outside or underneath a crypt.” (G 232/166) 
77 G, 47/34. 
78 G, 187/134. 
79 CP, 426/399. 
80 Cf. “One Two Three – Speculation without Term” in CP, 303-311/283-291.  
81 As Derrida puts it, pushed to its extreme, in the calculation of the alleged risk of welcoming too many others into 
itself, the organism dies, “it’s an organism that wishes to protect itself by blocking all its orifices: death is assured,” 
but to open oneself to the incalculable alone itself comes down to death. (MH 137t) 
82 L1, 4. Derrida here is playing on the French homophony of et [and] and est [is]. 
83 CP, 428/401. 
84 CP, 278/260. 
85 P, 38/ , 51/. 
86 See CP, 415/389 on bindinal economy.  
87 In suggesting that the Concept is life itself, Canguilhem indeed finds himself very close to Aristotle, proposing 
more than a simple correspondence between the logical principle of non-contradiction and the biological principle of 
specific reproduction. 
88 CC, 108/61, 126/73. 
89 Canguilhem distinguishes between the proper, scientific Concept and the improper, non-scientific metaphor in 
understanding life as communication, message, coding and decoding. Canguilhem turns to Claude Bernard, who 
proposes his thought of life across two axioms: life is death, and life is creation. Of these, only creation is properly 
vital: the physico-chemical functioning of an organism is that by which the organism destroys itself; death. Since 
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one can understand and calculate these physical phenomena, one mistakes them for life. Truly vital, organic 
creativity, however, operates according to form-giving morphological syntheses already at work in the chemical 
syntheses in the protoplasm. These morphological syntheses are, for Bernard, not yet a purely chemical substance, 
but rather the hereditary continuation of another protoplasmic ancestor whose origin escapes us. Bernard refers to 
this as “‘the primitive action of an instruction [consigne] that nature repeats after having regulated it in advance.’” 
(CE 358t) In his thought of life as creation, Bernard had thus anticipated for Canguilhem the notion of biological 
heredity as occurring through the transmission of coded information. All the terms used in his work, “instruction 
[consigne], guiding idea, vital design, vital pre-scription [préordonnance], vital plan, sense of phenomena” are for 
Canguilhem metaphors used in the stead of an adequate philosophical and scientific concept. After Watson and 
Crick referred to a code of instruction, information and programme in describing DNA, contemporary biology began 
to change its language, grounding itself in the language of communication. Along with those of message, code and 
decoding, these terms would form the new concepts of life. But these, he writes, are not metaphors in the way 
Bernard’s were. Cf. also CE, 360. 
90 Again, how one understands this resistance will be very important in Foucault’s reading of Bichat I’ll engage in 
§5.2.2, who indeed develops the notion of a personal and impersonal death quite closely to Blanchot, which would 
be picked up by Deleuze and Esposito. 
91 “It is as absurd to seek in biology a justification for a politics and economics of exploitation of man by man as it 
would be to deny the truth of functional hierarchies in the living organism and the integration of functions of 
relations at ascending levels (Sherrington) simply because one is a partisan, for reasons of social justice, of a 
classless society.” (CC 125/73)  
92 On Derrida’s reading of Heidegger’s Nietzsche, see §4.1.  
93 CC, 184/111. Canguilhem draws from the work of Jakob von Uexküll here, of fundamental importance to the 
questions of autopoiesis I’ll discuss in §2.1 and §6.2. Cf. Jakob von Uexküll, A Foray into the Worlds of Animals 
and Humans, with a Theory of Meaning (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2010). 
94 This is what Esposito will develop as the reciprocal immanence of the ‘form’ and norm of life. Such a conception, 
however, would have to distinguish its use of ‘form’ from that of eidos, morphe, ideality, etc., although the 
unification of ‘form’ and norm indeed corresponds to the Concept that fixes everything by way of Form. To put it all 
to quickly, it is this belief in the lack of any spacing in the immanent ontology of the organism that poses formidable 
ethical and biopolitical problems: every difference between what I will later call affirmative biopolitics and a doubly 
affirmative deconstruction of biopolitics could play itself out here; perhaps aided by a questionable translation of 
The Normal and the Pathological, “health is the possibility of transcending [dépasser] the norm, the possibility of 
tolerating infractions of the habitual norm and instituting new norms in new situations.” (CN 130/196-7) 
95 In the social order, however, things become different. As he puts it, “if social norms could be perceived as clearly 
as organic norms, men would be mad not to conform to them.” (CN 194/259) Social norms are not to be observed, 
but to be invented. It is in this sense that Canguilhem proposes the concept of error as a new concept in pathology. 
While error used to be simply metaphorical, with the advent of the concept of life articulating itself in terms of 
information, code and message, it has now shifted to the domain of analogy. (Derrida, of course, proposes a 
thorough deconstruction of this ‘three-step waltz’ between the concept, the metaphor and analogy in La Vie la mort.) 
In this sense, “to know is to inform oneself, to learn to decipher or decode. There is then no difference between the 
error of life and the error of thought. Between the errors of informing and informed information. The first furnishes 
the key the second.” (CN 209/277) Canguilhem here recalls the proximity to Aristotle one reads in “Le Concept et la 
vie,” “on the condition, of course, that Aristotelian psychobiology and the modern technology of transmission not be 
confused.” (CN 209/278) The author refers here in a footnote to the work of Gilbert Simondon, also of huge 
importance to Deleuze and Esposito.  
96 CN, 132/199. 
97 CC, 187-8/113. 
98 See Nietzsche’s critique of ‘consumptive Spinoza.’ One ought be careful to think the action/reaction difference in 
Deleuze otherwise than Derrida’s distinction between mechanical reactivity and the self-presence of response, 
although many secondary readings of Deleuze would invite a critique of the former on the basis of the latter. See 
also, in §5.4, Esposito’s positioning of Bataille against “the ‘restricted economy’ of a conservatio vitae.” (EC 18) 
99 Health and disease “are not distinct entities which would quarrel over the living organism like a battle field... there 
are only differences of degree between sickness and health: the exaggeration, disproportion, disharmony of normal 
phenomena constitute the morbid state.” (L3, 17-8t) Derrida indeed remarks being surprised that Canguilhem never 
cites Nietzsche. (L3, 17t) 
100 I will return to these discussions, particularly with reference to Spinoza and Nietzsche, in chapters 4 and 5. 
 302 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
101 See on this “Psyche: Inventions of the Other” in P1, 27/15. 
102 The relationship between Derrida and Levinas has been the focus of a wealth of scholarship to which I cannot do 
justice here. Allow me to refer to some of the key texts. Robert Bernasconi, “The Trace of Levinas in Derrida,” in 
Derrida and Différance, David Wood and Robert Bernasconi, eds. (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1988), 
13-30; Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas, Third Edition (Edinburgh, Edinburgh 
University Press, 2014) and Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas & Contemporary French 
Thought (London, Verso, 1999); John Llewelyn, Appositions of Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas 
(Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2001). For a dissenting opinion on the relationship between Derrida and 
Levinas, see Martin Hägglund, Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 
2008). For something of a middle-ground between the two, see Fritsch, “Deconstructive Aporias: Quasi-
Transcendental and Normative.” 
103 L1, 22. 
104 This operative value of the concept is also, as Canguilhem writes in “Aspects of Vitalism” what gives vitalism its 
due: its contribution towards progress in science. 
105 See also on this Derrida’s “White Mythology” in MP, 323/270-1. 
106 L3, 24. 
107 FF, 8. “Form and Fashion” is the preface to Alain David’s Racisme et antisémitisme: Essai de philosophie sur 
l’envers des concepts. (Paris, Ellipses, 2001). 
108  But Heidegger, I’ll show in §3.1.2, actually says something similar about the reduction of beings to their 
economic use-value and of nature to a standing reserve in the translation of morphè to eidos or idea. 
109 This is why, I believe, one ought to take Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche so seriously, and Derrida’s reading of 
these two as well. See §4.1 and §4.4.1 below. In fact, Derrida and David’s critique of form is not so different from 
Heidegger’s, see again §3.1.2.  
110 WA, 73. 
111 One could, space permitted, provide a thorough comparison of this concept of enframing with that developed by 
Judith Butler in Frames of War (London, Verso, 2010), and elaborated by Cary Wolfe in Before the Law: Humans 
and Other Animals in a Biopolitical Frame (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2013). 
112 This will structure everything Derrida will say about Heidegger’s Zusage in my chapter 3 and double affirmation 
in chapters 4 and 5. 
113 Derrida also mentions Lacan here. 
114 In Existence and Existents, Levinas writes of an experience “si ce terme n’était pas impossible dans une relation 
qui va au-delà du monde – de l’altérité d’autrui.” (in FF 26) 
115 “But we have just seen how that at-home... what properly belongs to an economy, someone’s own economy, is 
anonymously dedicated, divides itself and submits to the other who was waiting there for him already, without 
waiting for him.” (P 204/178) 
116  In both, I argue, Levinas provides an immensely important step/not beyond these ecologies and, in both, points 
towards the remaining of an arche-materiality of life death and survivance that resists its reappropriation in 
Husserl’s Living Present and in Heidegger’s question of being, and along with it all the anthropocentric 
presuppositions structuring the epistemology, ontology and ethics of both. In Husserl, this will be the trace, I will 
say the tra(nscenden)ce of a past which has never been present, which interrupts the dialectic of the Living Present 
to let the other come, whatever it may be. In Heidegger, this will be the remaining, I will say res(is)tance of the 
Zusage, a response in a ‘yes’ anterior to all questioning, which ex-propriates everything Heidegger had wished to 
reserve to the human and denied to the nonhuman. (Derrida returns to both these points in Adieu: Emmanuel 
Levinas. For Husserl, cf. 113-5/61-2, for Heidegger, cf. 51-3/22-5, 63/31. See also my discussion on the remainder 
above in §1.2.2). 
117 AEL, 15/4, 96-7/61. See also HJR, 81.  
118 “Relation without relation, passivity without passivity, ‘passivity more passive than every passivity.’” (AEL 
58/28) 
119 AEL, 138/78, 128/70. See my chapters 4 and 5. 
120 AEL, 173/99. 
121 AEL, 168/96. 
122 The equivocal sur- of survivance is also, he writes, that of a passage by trans-lation, both the transgression and 
reappropriation of the economy of any language. P, 130-1/113. Of course, an attention to the differences between 
how a living being and a text or a language live-on ought also be taken into consideration. 
123 P1, 214/203, OA, 161/121-2. 
 303 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
124 As Derrida suggests in this seminar, however, Benjamin’s ‘profound vitalism’ could really only consider the 
relation of translation as one between two spoken languages, the immediate co-presence of life to the voice could 
not really engage written texts. Replaying a famous concern of Derrida’s in Of Grammatology, Voice and 
Phenomenon, Dissemination and elsewhere, Derrida recalls that Benjamin’s proximity to Husserl here is not by 
chance, the latter’s philosophy of language also being guided, he writes, “by a vitalist spiritualism, finally a 
valorization of the living [du vivant], of the voice and of the word as a living spiritual body [corps].” (B3, 4-5)   
125 P1, 207/196, 214/203.  
126 Cf. MP, 288/241. 
127 OA, 159/120. 
128 TR, 563/178. 
129 As he puts it in “Living On: Borderlines,” “Übersetzung and ‘translation’ overcome, equivocally, in the course of 
an equivocal combat, the loss of an object.” (P 147/128) 
130 P1, 234/223. 
131 The expression ‘Material-Discursive’ is perhaps more common, but I feel risks the problematic appropriation of 
Derrida’s thinking in the ‘linguistic turn.’ Arche-writing does not entail that everything becomes discourse. Indeed, 
in thinking the resistance of the material-semiotic as anterior to the opposition between force and resistance, we 
could bring Foucault’ discussion of Blanchot in “The Thought of the Outside” as that which “escapes the mode of 
being of discourse.” (DE1 520/148-9) See §5.2.3. 
132 P1, 235/224. 
133 FP, 4, 33. Before the material-semiotic event, as Derrida draws from Heidegger, translation is “an operation of 
thought through which we must translate ourselves into the thought of the other language, the forgotten thinking of 
the other language; we must translate ourselves into it, not make it come into our language but, on the contrary, go 
toward the unthought thinking of the other language.” (OA 152/115t) 
134 TR 574/198, see also ‘Psyche: Invention of the Other’ in P1. 
135 LV, 40. 
136 BCI, 17/7, 21/9, 24/11, 25/12. 
137 See also AEL, 21/20. 
138 DJ, 34. See also, in this respect, Derrida’s discussion of Nancy in On Touching, where one might read ecology as 
an impossible knowledge without knowledge, “the interruption in the contact of continuity with what we have 
learned to call ‘nature.’” (LT 83/68) This relation without relation, or contact without contact, he adds, “is produced 
in ‘nature,’ well before man, and always before the distinction between the beings and the living. And this is enough 
to discredit every opposition fundamentally; nature/culture, nature/mind of consciousness, physis or nomos, thesis or 
tekhne, animality/humanity and so forth.” (LT 83/68) But this interruption must be thought right alongside 
contamination; “contamination then becomes what it is not, it disidentifies itself. It disidentifies everything even 
before it dis-identifies itself. It disappropriates, it disappropriates itself, it attains what it should never signify, an 
interruption of relations and the ex-propriety of the proper.” (LT 90/75) If interruption and contamination precede 
any opposition of the human to its other, “we should then reintroduce the outside itself, the other, the inanimate, 
material nature, the nonliving, the nonphysical in general, language, rhetoric, technics, and so forth – all that this 
phenomenological reduction to the sphere of pure appurtenance of the ‘solipsistic’ body proper tries to keep out. 
Life of the living present and life as ‘transcendental life’ are, as always, the great question, to which we shall not yet 
again return to here.” (LT 206/180) But these will, of course, by my key concerns in chapter 2. 
139 DJ, 20. Again, I will discuss this at length in my next chapter.  
140  This phrase actually appears lifted almost word-for-word from Blanchot’s A Voice from Elsewhere, 
“CONTRETEMPS: that is, differently perhaps, the anticipation of looking back through retrospection that gives the 
illusion of a present that has always been lost, since it never existed.” (BVA 41/27)  
141 A, 75/39. 
142 I refer here, of course, to Judith Butler’s Precarious Life (London, Verso, 2006) and Frames of War.  
143 FSC, 68-9, notice the –tr again.  
144 AV, 22. 
145 The promise of the earth, Derrida writes, “would be just as foreign to the egological horizon that structures a 
phenomenology of time (Husserl) as it would to the order or existential horizon of temporal ek-stases (Heidegger).” 
(AV 29t) I showed Derrida write above, let us recall, the necessity of entering Freud’s thought of the death drive in 




                                                                                                                                                                                  
Notes to chapter two: Transcendence and the Surviving Present 
1 See also my reading of “Avowing: The Impossible” in §1.4.2, especially DJ, 20.   
2 Jean-Paul Sartre, La Transcendance de l’ego: Esquisse d’une description phénoménologique (Paris, Vrin, 1966); 
trans. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick as The Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist Theory of 
Consciousness (New York, Hill and Wang, 1991). On transcendence and immanence in Husserl, see Rudolf Boehm, 
“Les Ambigüités des concepts husserliens d’ ‘immanence’ et de ‘transcendance,’” Revue philosophique de la 
France et de l’étranger 84 (1959): 481-526. The question of what it is exactly that transcends transcendental 
subjectivity will also prove essential to certain discussions of speculative realism. On the one hand, phenomenology 
is understood in these circles as antirealist precisely because it brackets the transcendences of the material world. 
See here Tom Sparrow, The End of Phenomenology (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2014). On the other 
hand, the transcendence of the Living Present as developed by Levinas and Derrida can also mean its ethical relation 
with the trace of an absolute alterity. How these two transcendences, beyond and below the plane of immanence are 
to be articulated, if such oppositions can still be said to hold, remains to be examined. It would be important to 
remark on the similarities and differences with respect to Deleuze’s description of the pre-subjective transcendental 
field as the plane of immanence in Difference and Repetition, The Logic of Sense, What is Philosophy? and his final 
essay “Immanence: A Life.” Precisely at stake for Deleuze is the necessity of going beyond the ‘phenomenological’ 
immanence of transcendental and empirical life towards something else, towards the Outside, as he deems the plane 
of immanence. I will discuss the Outside as the site of a double, Blanchotian relation to death in Deleuze in §4.2.2 
and §4.2.3. One should also note that the Living Present is of fundamental importance to Deleuze’s formulations of 
passive synthesis in Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense. For a rare discussion on Deleuze’s relation to 
phenomenology, see Joe Hughes, Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation (London, Continuum, 2008) and 
Philosophy After Deleuze: Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation II (London, Bloomsbury, 2012).  
3 See also HF, 340-1. 
4 See also, in this respect, Foucault’s introduction to Canguilhem’s Knowledge of Life, “Life, Experience, Science.” 
I’ll take up a reading of this piece in §5.2.2.  
5 Cf. FA, 41/xxxi. For a beautiful account of transcendence in Husserl, see Natalie Depraz, Transcendance et 
Incarnation: Le Statut de l’intersubjectivité comme altérité à soi chez Husserl (Paris, Vrin, 1995). 
6 AEL, 138/76, 146/80.  
7 DG, 91/62. 
8 From within but, Derrida adds in parentheses, “it is precisely a question of the effraction of the within.” PDS, 
278/263. For reasons of temporal and spatial economy, I cannot engage the many important and nuanced critiques of 
Derrida’s reading of Husserl. For a useful summary and evaluation of these, see Martin Hägglund’s “Arche-Writing: 
Derrida and Husserl” in Radical Atheism.  
9 As Derrida adds here, the difficulties of differentiating between the living and the non-living will have also been 
explored in Hegel, Freud, Husserl and Heidegger. I covered the first two in §§1.1.1 and 1.2.2, will examine Husserl 
in this chapter, and turn to Heidegger in the next.  
10 See my discussion on Blanchot and Bataille’s notion of community in §1.4.2.  
11 That phenomenology is a philosophy of life is among the opening claims in Voice and Phenomenon, to which I 
will return below. 
12 Neal DeRoo’s Futurity in Phenomenology: Promise and Method in Husserl, Levinas, and Derrida (New York, 
Fordham University Press, 2013) is one of the best books I’ve read on the relations between the thinkers in its title. 
However, a certain difficulty in his analysis of the passage from passive to active synthesis risks reintroducing 
important anthropocentric presuppositions. Despite acknowledging that animals and humans both have a world, 
animals experience it through the passive synthesis of sense, whereas humans can also do so through the active 
synthesis of meaning. “The gap between these two is a ‘quantum leap,’ a qualitative and not merely a quantitative 
difference.” Ibid., 34. A difference in kind and not a difference in degree. Indeed, DeRoo even concedes that in 
active synthesis, humans recognize things ‘as such.’ The Heideggerean overtones here cannot be overstated (the 
animal has a world, but is poor in world [weltarm]), and I will return to the important technical use of the ‘as such’ 
here and in chapter 3. The distinction between reaction and response, so fundamental to the anthropocentric 
axiomatic, also finds itself drawn along in this distinction between passive and active synthesis.  
13 The same, I’ll note in passing, can be said about auto-affection.  
14 PG, 238 n. 41/209 n. 41. See also NII, 148-9, DDP, 444/2, 117. Husserl’s most in-depth meditations on the topic 
in the so-called C-manuscripts, summarized by Tran Duc Thao here and elsewhere, were unpublished at the time of 
Derrida’s dissertation, have only been published in 2006 as the eighth volume of the Materialen series of the 
collected Husserliana, and remain untranslated in English or French. I am grateful to Matthias Fritsch for his 
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assistance in translating the passages cited herein. Tran Duc Thao’s last published essay was entitled “The Logic of 
the Living Present.” Here I also acknowledge a debt to David Wood’s landmark essay for deconstruction and 
environmental ethics, “Spectres of Derrida: On the Way to Econstruction,” and its assertion that any environmental 
ethics must bear a thorough commitment to materialism. Wood notes that Derrida’s materialism is deeply indebted 
to Tran Duc Thao. As Derrida notes in an interview, it was Foucault who had recommended reading Tran Duc 
Thao’s book to him, “by saying, and I later thought the same thing, that the first half was very interesting while the 
second half was more problematic.” (HF 340)  
15 Derrida in fact devotes a long study of Heidegger’s dislocations of the Husserlian Living Present in his 1964-5 
seminar Heidegger: The Question of Being and History. See §3.2.1.  
16 See on this Derrida’s remarks in “Différance” in MP, 22/21. 
17 Cf. Wood, “Spectres of Derrida,” 285. 
18 Tran Duc Thao, Phénoménologie et matérialisme dialectique (Paris, Gordon & Breach, 1971); trans. Daniel J. 
Herman and Donal V. Morano (Dordrecht, D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986), 139 n1/227 n5 
19 Ibid., 139-40 n1/228 n5.  
20 Husserl, in the C manuscripts, writes that “my standing-streaming life as monad is primordial monad, and in it my 
monad is already implied as one in the universe of monads.” ... “Without it [the living present], nothing at all has 
being, and likewise the others and the world implied in it with human birth and human death.” (HUA M 8 22) 
Further, “My living and moving present, my present in its primordial mode, bears within itself all conceivable being: 
it is the primordially temporal temporality that is supratemporal,” “it [my streaming-living present] is the 
primordially temporal, supra-temporal ‘temporality,’ which bears within itself all time as the temporal order and 
fullness that persists in being.” (HUA M 8 22) Husserl’s Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Synthesis, which 
Derrida never cites, also engage the questions of death, immortality and indeed living-on in relation to time. The 
introduction to this work suggests that even genetic phenomenology is incapable of dealing with death as a 
constitutive disruption of the Living Present. (Hua 11 n.a./xxxiii-xxxiv) Rather, genetic phenomenology insists on 
the immortality of transcendental subjectivity. “Since every transcendental, subjective life is consciousness, 
intentional life, and since everything that we place as a cogito into immanent time itself corresponds to the 
primordial law of consciousness, to the primordial law of time-constitution, then the ‘immortality’ of every 
retentional flux means the same thing as the immortality of every particular consciousness, that is, each temporal 
transformation as temporally modified.” (Hua 11 422/527) In fact, Husserl curiously describes the immortal 
enduring of the present as a living on. Within time-consciousness, “the process of living-on [Das Fortleben], and the 
ego that lives on [das Ich, das fortlebt], are immortal.” (Hua 11 378/467) However, he notes, while the pure 
transcendental ego is immortal, the empirical world-ego is not. “We do not at all deny the latter’s death, its corporeal 
decomposition, and thus the fact that it cannot be found in the objective, spatio-temporal world, its non-existence.” 
(Hua 11 378/467) And later, “birth and death, the emergence of human beings in nature and their disappearance 
from nature, say, through creation or destruction, is quite compatible with the transcendental infinity of life.” (Hua 
11 380-1/471) If one conceives of the Living Present as an “unending immanent time,” from which one can never 
escape, “transcendental life and the transcendental ego cannot be born; only the human being in the world can be 
born. The ego as transcendental ego was eternal; I am now, and belonging to this Now is a horizon of the past that 
can be unraveled into infinity. And this means precisely, the ego was eternal.” (Hua 11 379/469) 
21 “The absolute subjectivity whose very properties cannot be named: Fur all das fehlen uns die Namen. [we lack all 
names for this].” Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism, 141 n1/229 n5. I will return to this in my discussion 
of Voice and Phenomenon in §2.3.1.  
22 Tran Duc Thao, Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism, 143 n1/230 n5.  
23 Ibid., 139 n1/228 n5.  
24  cf PG vii/xv. Cf. also Leonard Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl: The Basic Problem of Phenomenology 
(Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2002), 48. It is important to note that Derrida’s 1954 thesis argues that Tran 
Duc Thao and Jean Cavaillès’s dialectical critiques of the subjectivism inherent in phenomenology do not go far 
enough, as indeed all the great dialectics from Plato to Hegel to dialectical materialism would remain worldly, “they 
are said to have always instituted themselves on the basis of an already formalized ‘secondary’ opposition between 
form and matter, sense and the sensible, and so on.” (PG 8/xxii) It is thus through recourse to a pre-subjective 
transcendental field in Husserl’s phenomenology, one to which Derrida would return to in “Eating Well” (in PDS) 
that the dialectic of the Living Present originarily interrupts itself.  
25 PG, 8/xxi. 
26 But of course, the structure of this ‘beyond’ would resist a simpler analysis, since one could say that such a 
formula corresponds precisely to dialectics. As Derrida cites Hegel’s Jena logic in Glas, “the absolute must be 
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conceived as the ‘identity of identity and nonidentity.” (G 117/83) On how the logic of the ‘without’ ought be 
understood otherwise, see §1.2.2 above. See also “Negotiations,” “But the dialectic (a Hegelian would say) is 
precisely the dialectic of the nondialectic and the dialectic” against which Derrida raises the value of the affirmation. 
Cf. NII, 26. See §4.4 below.   
27 TS, 33.  
28 TS, 33. I’ll return to the question of a non-dialectical weakness in Nietzsche in my fourth and fifth chapters. One 
will also see Derrida refer to the philosophical invulnerability of the Living Present in his 1964-5 seminar on 
Heidegger, anticipating the necessity of its inscription in weakness, vulnerability, and sufferability.   
29 MP, 188/158.  
30 See my discussion of “Form and Fashion” in §1.3.2.  
31 Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge, the Belknap Press 
of Harvard University, 2007). It should be noted that Thompson’s account of autopoiesis is one among many. The 
concept as developed by Cary Wolfe in Critical Environments: Postmodern Theory and the Pragmatics of the 
‘Outside’ (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1998), Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of 
Species and Posthumanist Theory (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2003) and What is Posthumanism 
(Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2010), along with his forthcoming piece in Eco-Deconstruction: 
Derrida and Environmental Philosophy (eds. Fritsch, Lynes, Wood) offers an account of autopoiesis which perfectly 
coheres with the deconstructive logic of supplementarity with which I am attempting to think the living in these 
pages, as something of an auto-hetero-poiesis. See also §6.2.2.  
32 Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life: Towards a Philosophical Biology (Evanston, Northwestern University 
Press, 2001), 4-5. 
33 Ibid., 76, 83, 85. 
34 Or, Jonas adds, “become[] dormant as do certain seeds and spores.” Ibid. 76. 
35  Ibid., 106. The emancipation from the fixed self-identity of matter, for Jonas, is purchased at the price of 
precariousness; matter’s organization into life is “not a success story... intrinsically qualified by the threat of its 
negative, [life] must affirm itself, and existence affirmed is existence as a concern. So constitutive for life is the 
possibility of not-being that its very being is essentially a hovering over this abyss, a skirting of its brink.” Indeed, 
he adds, the fear of death itself arose when matter turned organic, which is perhaps why Derrida identifies Freud’s 
death drive to return to the inorganic with Husserl’s Living Present. See also Thompson, Mind in Life, 155. 
36 Thompson, Mind in Life, 47. Of course, I will be unable to even remotely address the philosophy of Merleau-
Ponty in its complexity in these chapters, despite of course its undeniable importance. See especially Derrida’s LT. 
37 “The organism cannot be compared to a keyboard on which the external stimuli would play and in which their 
proper form would be delineated for the simple reason that the organism contributes to the constitution of that 
form.” Cited in Thompson, Mind in Life, 47. See also Ibid., 67. 
38 Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, 243. 
39 Thompson, Mind in Life, 155, 229-30.  
40 Ibid., 362.  
41 Cf. “Form and Fashion” on this, my discussion of the underside of the Concept of life in §1.3.2, and compare Tran 
Duc Thao’s dialectics of the Living Present: ““a preservation and perpetual conquest of self... the self remains 
identical to itself, while renewing itself constantly; it remains precisely the same only by always becoming another, 
in that absolute flux of an eternal Present.” Tran Duc Thao, Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism, 139 
n1/228 n5. 
42 ED, 244/205. 
43 The terms are almost certainly to be understood in a Heideggerean sense here. As Derrida notes in an interview 
with Dominique Janicaud, “The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Phenomenology was a work that would not have 
been possible without Heidegger. Sometimes I mention it, sometimes I do not, but the questions that I address to 
Husserl, or the type of reading that I venture at that point in time, implied a certain relation to Heidegger.” (HF 339) 
Readers interested in examining Derrida’s philosophical formation from existentialism to an allegedly Christian 
Heideggerianism are invited to see Edward Baring’s fascinating study of Derrida’s student papers in The Young 
Derrida and French Philosophy, 1945-1968 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
44 PG, 30/xl, 30n1/187n48. 
45 “Aller tranzendierenden Voraussetzungen von Existierendem,” as Derrida cites him in The Problem of Genesis. 
46 PG, 119/61-2. See Hua 3 §85. Sensile hylè, Intentional morphè. 
47  Derrida would return to this ‘spectrality’ of the noema in Spectres of Marx, “the radical possibility of all 
spectrality should be sought in the direction that Husserl identifies… as an intentional but non-real [non-réelle] 
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component of phenomenological lived experience. Unlike the three other terms of the two correlations… this 
intentional but non-real inclusion of the noematic correlate is neither ‘in’ the world not ‘in’ consciousness. But it is 
precisely the condition of any experience, any objectivity, any phenomenality… Is not such an ‘irreality’ [irréellité] 
its independence both in relation to the world and in relation to the real stuff of egological subjectivity, the very 
place of apparition, the essential, general, non-regional possibility of the spectre? Is it not also what inscribes the 
possibility of the other and of mourning right onto the phenomenality of the phenomenon?” (SM 216/237-8) 
48 PCM, 79/114. 
49 Thompson explains this as Husserl’s notion of transcendence-within-immanence, of consciousness as intrinsically 
self-transcending; “at a transcendental level, what is really or genuinely transcendent is also phenomenologically 
immanent… External events are really transcendent, nevertheless, they are intentionally immanent.” See 
Thompson’s account of the debate between representationalist and non-representationalist accounts of the noema. 
Thompson, Mind in Life, 446n9. For the non-representationalist, “the noema is the objet itself, but the object 
considered phenomenologically, that is, precisely, in its givenness.” Ibid., 
50 See Hua 3 § 36. 
51 PG, 121/63, see also Hua 10 §36. 
52 Hua 10 §36. This passage will be of huge importance to Derrida’s difficult footnote at the end of Voice and 
Phenomenon, to which I will turn in §2.3.1.  
53 PG 126/66; “subjectivity is time temporizing itself. Time is subjectivity accomplishing itself as subjectivity.” 
54 “‘Urhyle,’ i.e. temporal hylè... as the ‘kernel of the other-to-I’ [noyeau de l’étranger-au-je] (Ichfremde Kern). Cf. 
Group C 6 (August 1930) 6.” (IOG 83n1/86n90t) As Husserl explains it, “The urhylè in its own temporalizing is the 
kernel that is, so to speak, foreign to the I in the concrete present.” (HUA M 8 110) 
55 PG, 38/3. 
56 cf. ED, 246-7, PCM, 82-3/116-117. 
57 Hua 17 §96. 
58 Derrida calls this the ‘archon function’ of commencement and commandment. 
59 IOG, 45/57. 
60 ED, 250/209. 
61 For the justification of this structure, see Derrida’s footnote in PG, 39n1/187n12. I don’t have the space here to 
discuss the first form of the idea from Husserl’s Logical Investigations concerning the infinite becoming of logic. 
62 ED, 242/204. 
63 PG, 158/90. 
64  “Would indeed be inevitably modified by a nullifying of the thing-world, [it] would not be affected thereby in its 
own existence.” (Hua 3 §49) As Derrida cites a note from Ricoeur’s translation, “dans la ruine du monde je serais 
encore conscience intentionnelle mais visant le chaos.” [in the ruin of the world I would still be an intentional 
consciousness but facing chaos.] In PD, Derrida credits Ricoeur for introducing him to Ideas I, as well as Levinas’s 
Totality and Infinity. Emmanuel Levinas, Totalité et infini: Essai sur l’extériorité (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 
1971); trans. Alphonso Lingis as Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 
1979). 
65 FP, 23. 
66 PG, 141/77. 
67 PG, 187/110. 
68 PG, 187/110, 192/113. 
69 The same could be said of Plato, Husserl may be the last great figure of the Platonic idea, eidos, Form, morphè. 
Although, Derrida notes in the Introduction, Husserl’s notion of the Idea is to be differentiated from the eidos, the 
Idea has no essence, “as the invisible condition of evidence, by preserving the seen, it loses any reference to seeing 
indicated in eidos, a notion from which it nevertheless results in its mysterious Platonic focus. The Idea can only be 
understood [or heard: entendre].” (IOG, 156n2/124n170) In “Form and Meaning,” however, he remarks that despite 
Husserl’s attempt to define eidos against Platonism, Form and the morphè, “the force, vigilance, efficacity of the 
critique remain intrametaphysical by means of all their resources.” (MP, 187-8/157) Heidegger, for his part, argues 
that the shift from early Greek thinking occurs in thinking phusis as idea. On the other hand, Heidegger is also 
critical of the Nietzschean reversal of the intelligible into the sensible (a reversal which is itself not so simple), 
which he believes occurs at the crest of Western metaphysics and its determination of being as phusis/idea. The 
danger in so much contemporary thought, however, is that an overcoming of Platonism can only occur in an 
uncritical reversal of Platonism. If pure ideality and pure reality come down to the same thing, however, something 
must be thought otherwise. I will return to this in §3.1.2 and §4.1.  
 308 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
70 Reflecting on his introduction to The Origin of Geometry several decades later, Derrida writes that this text 
“enabled me to approach something like the un-thought axiomatics of Husserlian phenomenology, its ‘principle of 
principles,’ that is to say, intuitionism, the absolute privilege of the living present... to the necessity of recourse, in 
eidetic or transcendental description, to a language that could not itself be submitted to the epochè (to the epoch) – 
without itself being simply ‘in the world’ – thus to a language that remained naive, even though it made possible all 
the phenomenological bracketings and parentheses.” (DDP, 445/117-80) I will recall from my discussion of 
translation in §1.4.1 that materiality is what limits the possibility of translation. 
71 IOG, 64/72.  
72 IOG, 73/79. 
73 IOG, 79n1/83n86. 
74 One might articulate general ecology, the without binding the dialectic of the Living Present to its finitude in the 
homophony of a Terre sans terre = terre s’enterre.   
75 “The primordial streaming is constant primordial constituting; in it, the ‘stream of consciousness’ is constituted in 
its primordial temporality. Certainly this is quite understandable: it is a pre-time… As pre-being, it cannot be 
experienced or said. As soon as that which cannot be said or experienced has been shown—that is, has been 
experienced after all, and made the topic of an assertion—it is simply ontified [or rendered ontic].” (HUA M 8, 269) 
76 IOG, 107/104-5. 
77 “Linked to the theme of intentionality in general, to the idea of a philosophical ‘task,’ it was also implicitly of a 
piece with the infinite idea in all its forms: the infinite becoming of logic, the idea of an infinite totality of lived 
experiences of the pure me, the idea of the world as infinite possibility and infinite foundation of experience, and so 
forth.” (PG 241/148-9) 
78 “Time is perpetual promotion of crises and a leaving behind of them, where the passively constituted moment 
participates in the originary movement of active constitution.” (PG 274/172) 
79 Derrida recalls Husserl’s description of the non-reellity of the noema here; IOG, 33/48, 159/144. 
80 IOG, 35/49. 
81 “The fact does not teach us through its factical content but as an example. It is due to this after’s own specific 
character, in the necessity of preserving transcendence or reduced factuality as clue, that the particular historicity of 
phenomenological discourse is announced.” (IOG 35n1/50n42) See also Ibid., 161/146. 
82 IOG, 82n1/86n89. 
83 Despite its inclusiveness, a certain eurocentrism in Husserl can be read, as Derrida often cites him, in writing that 
“just as man and even the Papuan represent a new stage of animal nature, i.e., as opposed to the beast, so 
philosophical reason represents a new stage of human nature and its reason.” Cited in IOG, 162/146. Papua New 
Guinea, by the way, is the home of the greatest biocultural diversity on earth. 
84 PCM, 83/117. 
85 IOG, 151n1/138n164. I will of course return to Heidegger at length in chapter 3.  
86 See also BS1, 363/270. 
87 BS2, 370/269. 
88 See §4.1 for my discussion of Nietzsche, Heidegger, perspectivism and value.  
89 Recall here transgression along with all the other tr- movements interrupting economy in §1.2.2.  
90 In describing intentionality as the unconditional hospitality accorded to the face of the other, Levinas would have 
introduced a mutation within phenomenology, “a singular interruption, a suspension or epochè of phenomenology 
itself, even more and even earlier than a phenomenological epochè.” (AEL 95/51) This interruption would not be 
one among others within phenomenology, but rather that by which “phenomenology... interrupts itself.” (AEL 
96/51) However, Derrida adds, a certain interruption of phenomenology had perhaps already imposed itself against 
Husserl’s principle of principles; the transcendence and the other in analogical appresentation. And again, “what is 
said here of the other cannot be separated, as we have insisted elsewhere, from alterity as the movement of 
temporalization. In other words, ‘Time and the Other,’ to cite a title.” (AEL 96/52) Derrida is referring to Levinas’s 
1946-7 lecture here. Emmanuel Levinas, Le Temps et l’autre (Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1983); trans. 
Richard A. Cohen as Time and the Other (and additional essays) (Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 1987).   
91 I will examine this with respect to Heidegger’s Zusage in chapter 3, as well as the concept of affirmation in 
chapter 4. 
92 Derrida will refer elsewhere to the “philosophical invulnerability” of the Living Present (HQ 210/139); “the 
Living Present is the phenomenological absolute out of which I can never exit because it is that within which, 
towards which, and starting from which every exit is effectuated.” (IOG 149/136t) Even as a thought of originary 
difference, the dialectic of the Living Present operates in “the powerlessness to remain enclosed in the innocent 
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undividedness [indivision] of the originary Absolute, because it is present only in deferring itself without respite, 
this powerlessness and this impossibility are given in an originary and pure consciousness of Difference.” (IOG 
171/153t) 
93 “Not pure and simple absence, for there logic could make its claim, but a certain absence.” (ED 133/113) 
94 For a similar interpretation of the place of “Violence and Metaphysics” in the evolution of Derrida’s thought, see 
Bernasconi, “The Trace of Levinas in Derrida.” 
95 See my citation from Paper Machine in the introduction to this chapter. Cf. Levinas’s 1930 Théorie de l’intuition 
dans la phénoménologie de Husserl (Paris, Vrin, 1994); trans. André Orianne as The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s 
Phenomenology (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1995). For a fascinating examination of Levinas’s 
treatment of the Living Present, see John Drabinski’s article “The Hither-Side of the Living-Present in Levinas and 
Husserl,” Philosophy Today 40,1 (1996): 142-150. 
96  Of course, Deleuze is also critical of the subject-object characterization of the plane of immanence, see 
“Immanence: A Life” (in DF) and §4.2.  
97  One could also develop a similar argument with reference to Derrida’s discussion of invention and of 
deconstruction as the preparing of a place “to let the other come, come in.” (P1 53/39) As he writes elsewhere, “for 
there to be an event and a history, a ‘come’ must be open and addressed to someone, to someone else whom I cannot 
and must not determine in advance – not as subject, self, consciousness, or even as animal, God or person, man or 
woman, living or nonliving... The one, whoever it is to whom ‘come’ is said, cannot let him/herself be determined in 
advance.” (NII 94-5e) See Derrida’s study of Levinas’s hesitation as to whether the animal, particularly the snake, 
has a face. As I am always the second one on the scene, after other lives on earth (which is not only a question of 
evolutionary history), “morality, ethics, the relation to the other, is not only coming after the other, helping oneself 
after the other, but after the other whoever it may be.” (BS1 319/239) 
98 ED, 183/155. 
99 Compare, for example, the dual transcendence of the Living Present in the hyletic impression and in originary 
temporalization in §2.1.1. 
100 ED, 180/153, 135/115. Levinas also directs this charge against what he calls ‘ontological violence’ in Heidegger. 
It’s important to recall that the question of Being and history lend their name to Derrida’s seminar on Heidegger 
contemporaneous with the publication of “Violence and Metaphysics.” I will pursue the reflections on history begun 
in “Genesis and Structure” and The Origin of Geometry in §3.2.1 and §3.2.2.  
101 See, for example, Derrida’s remarks on spacing as the becoming-time of space and the becoming-space of time. 
102 ED, 182/154. But, of course, a non-dialectical mediation, as I noted in Derrida’s “Alterities” in §1.3.2. 
103 ED, 158/133. Or absolute evil, as Derrida puts it in Spectres of Marx “which is, is it not, absolute life, fully 
present life, the one that does not know death and does not want to hear about it.” (SM, 278/220) 
104 ED, 184/157, 151/127. Note, of course, my references to tr- movements as those interrupting economy. 
105 See my discussion of “Form and Fashion” in §1.3.2. 
106 The question of writing, as it is developed in the Introduction, however, is much more close to what Derrida 
would later call writing in the narrow sense than what he would later develop as arche-writing.  
107 ED, 147/119. 
108“Infinite différance, God or death,” he would later write Of Grammatology. DG, 191/131.  
109 On the exclusive conferment of Levinasian transcendence upon the human, see PDS 293/279, 298/283, as well as 
AS, passim. 
110 VP, 4-5/5-6, 8/8, MP, 17/16. 
111 VP, 37/29, 111/85. 
112 VP, 5/6. 
113 Recall my remarks on the stricture in Glas in §1.2.2, “constrain[ing] the discourse to place the nontranscendental, 
the outside of the transcendental field, the excluded, in the structuring position. The matrix in question constitutes 
the excluded as transcendental of the transcendental.” (G 340/244) 
114 See my citation of PG, 239/148 in §2.1.1 above. 
115 DG, 91/62. 
116  But of course, the transcendences of Time and the Other and their contamination of the immanence of 
transcendental subjectivity was noted as early as The Problem of Genesis. “The theme of a transcendental 
intersubjectivity setting up transcendence at the heart of the absolute immanence of the ‘ego’ has already been 
called for. The last foundation of the objectivity of intentional consciousness is not the intimacy of the ‘I’ to itself 
but [is] Time or the Other, those two forms of an existence that is irreducible to an essence [and] foreign to the 
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theoretical subject, [two forms] always constituted before it, but at the same time, the only conditions of a possibility 
of a constitution of self and of an appearance of self.” (PG 126/66e) 
117 VP, 40/31. 
118 VP, 92/71. 
119 As Derrida writes earlier, one cannot think the trace “without thinking the retention of difference within a 
structure of reference where difference appears as such... the absence of another here-and-now, of another 
transcendental present, of another origin of the world appearing as such, presenting itself as irreducible absence 
within the presence of the trace.” (DG 68/47) 
120 DG, 98/67, 97/66. 
121 DG, 103/70. 
122 Derrida recalls Levinas here, as well as Freud and Nietzsche.  
123 VP 94n1/72n. 
124 VP, 94n1/72n. 
125 VP, 77/59. 
126 This passage is indeed taken a little out of context, but ties together the questions of pity for suffering beings, 
death, and the human-animal binary in a discussion of Rousseau. The animal for Rousseau, Derrida writes, “cannot 
open itself, by the awakening of pity, to the suffering of the other as other; and on the other hand that it cannot 
exceed itself towards death. Indeed, the animal does have a potential faculty of pity, but it imagines neither the 
suffering of the other as such not the passage from suffering to death. Indeed, that is one and the same limit... That 
which is lacking in what Rousseau calls the animal is the ability to live its suffering as the suffering of another and 
as the threat of death.” (DG 265/187). Of course, it is precisely this suffering as a non-power which would occupy so 
much of Derrida’s discussion in AS.  
127 VP, 44/34. 
128 The quote continues: “Metaphor would be forbidden.” (DG 103/71) This last sentence is a little enigmatic, 
however, one can see in Voice and Phenomenon that Derrida follows Husserl’s description of the constituting flux 
of absolute subjectivity as something for which we lack names through the very concept of metaphor. 
“Temporalization is the root of a metaphor that can only be originary. The word ‘time’ itself, such as it has always 
been understood in the history of metaphysics, is a metaphor that indicates and dissimulates at the same time the 
‘movement’ of this auto-affection.” (VP 95/73) See also the discussion in TS, 68-9 on the difficulty of naming this 
flux. 
129 DG, 441-2/313. 
130 VP, 60/46. See also Tran Duc Thao’s definition of the Living Present as always and irreducibly mine from 
Husserl’s C manuscripts in my discussion above.  
131 Even adding, in a later discussion, “we understand the ‘I am’ from the ‘I am dead.’” (VP 108/83) 
132 DG, 59/39. 
133 DG, 99/68. 
134 DG, 411/291, 88/60. 
135 See especially Chapter 1, note 17.  
136 DG, 236/165. It will be important to contrast this remark with Heidegger’s treatment of auto-affection. If the 
auto-affection of time by itself corresponds to authentic ecstatico-horizonal temporalization, only human Dasein can 
have a relation to time as such. See §3.1.3. 
137 One could also multiply the implications of this discourse with reference to Deleuze’s treatment of Spinoza, 
(Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, and Spinoza: Practical Philosophy) where the ethics of ‘what a body can 
do’ are also determined by its capacity to be affected, its ‘puissance d’agir et de pâtir,’ and its ‘pouvoir d’être 
affecté.’ Indeed, this conjunction of ethics and ontology will serve as an important point of comparison with 
Derrida’s. See §4.2.1 below.  
138 See also VP, 89/68. 
139 MP, 188/158, VP, 70/53. 
140 “Which would have it that the outside be inside, that the other and the lack come to add themselves as a plus that 
replaces a minus, that what adds itself to something takes the place of a default in the thing, that the default, as the 
outside of the inside, should be already within the inside, etc.” (DG 308/315) 
141 This is how, for example, one can also understand différance as “the formation of form. But it is on the other 
hand the being-imprinted of the imprint.” (DG 92/63) 
142 SQ, 131. 
143 SM, 246/193. 
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144 The expression is in fact Derrida’s, see PDS, 282/268, how the post-deconstructive responsibility of the subject is 
to be articulated through the Heideggerean Zusage will be the chief concern of my next chapter.  
145 V, 175/124. 
146 VP, 114/87. 
147 V, 179/127. 
148 Derrida also speaks of unconditional hospitality in terms of the Idea in the Kantian sense. DH, 131/149. 
 
Notes to chapter three: Resistance and Ex-Appropriation 
1 “Das Sein, die φύσις, ist als Walten ursprüngliche Gesammeltheit: λόγος, ist fügender Fug, δίκη.” 
2 See §1.2.2 above. Cf. also NG, 260/25: “the remainder, the remaining (restance) of the remainder, the relationship 
between Being, beings, and the remainder, and a certain irreducibility, it seems to me, of what I have called the 
remaining of the remainder of all ‘ontology.’ This heterogeneity and the law of contamination between the wholly 
other of this heterogeneity and its regular reappropriation (inclusion/exclusion, economic redialectization, and so 
on.)”  
3 For example, when Derrida writes that the mechanical “at the same time detaches from and reattaches to the 
family (heimisch, homely), to the familiar, to the domestic, to the proper, to the oikos of the ecological and of the 
economic, to the ethos, to the place of dwelling... at the same time ex-propriates and re-appropriates, de-racinates 
and re-enracinates, ex-appropriates.” (FS 78/64) With respect to the proper of man, “the ‘logic’ of the trace or of 
différance determines this re-appropriation as ex-appropriation. Re-appropriation necessarily produces the opposite 
of what it aims for. Ex-appropriation is not what is proper to man. One can recognize its differential figures as soon 
as there is a relation to self in its most elementary form (but for this very reason there is no such thing as 
elementary... [Ex-appropriation] no longer closes itself; it never totalizes itself... ex-appropriation does not form a 
boundary, if one understands by this word a closure or a negativity. It implies the irreducibility of the relation to the 
other.” (PDS 283-5/269-270) Ex-appropriation, he writes elsewhere, “applies... to everything, to capital, to the 
economy in general.” (FSC 24) 
4 See §1.3.2 above. cf. also FF, 16 on the ‘survivance’ of formalism in Heidegger’s destruction of ontology. 
5 The passage through Heidegger in my discussions of Deleuze and Foucault will be necessary; Derrida often faults 
the latter two for not sufficiently taking Heidegger’s work into account. See his discussion in NG, 256/21-2, also 
CH, 76-7.  
6 I’ll devote some space to demonstrating this below in §3.2.4, but this discussion should be quite familiar to anyone 
interested in the work of Derrida and the other-than-human. See for example A, AS, BS1 and 2, DE, “The Ends of 
Man” in MP, “Eating Well” in PDS. Excellent secondary literature also exists on the relation of Derrida to animals 
passing by way of Heidegger, see for example Matthew Calarco, Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from 
Heidegger to Derrida (New York, Columbia University Press, 2008), and David Farrell Krell, Derrida and our 
Animal Others: Derrida’s Final Seminar, ‘The Beast and the Sovereign’ (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 
2013) I won’t fully reiterate these discussions, however, and will choose to focus on the questions of resistance and 
ex-appropriation in my title.   
7 See, for example, David R. Keller’s division of the textbook Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions (West 
Sussex,Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), vi-vii into the more axiologically/analytically based part IV, “What is the Scope of 
Moral Considerability” and part V, “What are the Prominent Alternatives to Grounding Environmental Ethics in 
Axiology. Keller further divides this category between traditionalists and progressivists, the latter “took the position 
that the traditional moral categories of mainstream Western ethics, rooted in ontologies of individualism, are not up 
to the task of grounding an environmental ethic and must be abandoned.” Ibid., 9. 
8 See §1.4.2, DJ, 33-4, as well as SM, 16-18/xviii-xx. 
9 GA 9, 353/268. 
10 Heidegger does not say so here. On this, see Michael Marder’s “Ecology as an Event” in Eco-Deconstruction. 
11 As Derrida writes in his 1964-5 seminar Heidegger: The Question of Being and History, “he says nothing else, he 
does not propose another ontology... it’s a destruction – that is, a deconstruction, a de-structuration, the shaking that 
is necessary to bring out the structures, the strata, the system of deposits.” (HQ 34/9) Derrida traces the distancing 
from ontology as occurring from Being and Time, to the Introduction to Metaphysics, to “Nietzsche’s Word: God is 
Dead,” and finally to the “Letter on Humanism.” HQ, 40-48/13-19. With respect to ontology, Derrida writes in “We 
Other Greeks,” “I have nothing against ontology, but I have never had toward what presents itself under this name 
anything but questions, reservations, very conditional hypotheses, interminable parentheses.” (NG 259/24) But what 
Derrida will later develop as ‘hauntology’ with respect to survivance and revenance will exceed these: “this question 
would be a question of life or death, the question of life-death, before being a question of Being, of essence, or of 
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existence. It would open onto a dimension of irreducible sur-vival or surviving [survivance] and onto Being and onto 
some opposition between living and dying.” (SM 235-6/185) I’ll discuss survivance as the returning of a revenance 
in my discussions of Nietzsche’s Eternal Return in §4.4.3.  
12 GA 40, 11/15. 
13 Derrida takes up this point from the “Letter on Humanism” a 1975-6 seminar entitled Théorie et pratique. I 
reserve a detailed examination of this seminar for a later project.  
14 GA 9, 358-9/272. 
15 Derrida also discusses “Building, Dwelling, Thinking” in the second year of his La Chose seminar on Blanchot 
and Heidegger. I’ll be reading this seminar in conjunction with Théorie et pratique in another project.  
16 As I’ve shown, however, Heidegger’s emphasis on death as the possibility of an impossibility, as one’s ownmost 
and proper possibility, is insufficient for Blanchot and Levinas, who intend to think it as the impossibility of a 
possibility. I’ll turn to these discussions in Derrida’s Aporias below. 
17 “If there was a dramatic ‘turn’ of this sort in Heidegger’s career of thought (and I underscore the ‘if’ and embrace 
the subjunctive), then it would be a turn, not from man to Being, but from the neutral designation Da-sein to homo 
humanus, to des Mensch, die Sterblichen; in other words, a turn from Being to Man.” Krell, Intimations of 
Mortality: Time, Truth, and Finitude in Heidegger’s Thinking of Being (University Park, Pennsylvania University 
Press, 1986), 29.  
18  See David Farrell Krell’s exemplary Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy (Bloomington, Indiana 
University Press, 1992), and more recently Scott M. Campbell, The Early Heidegger’s Philosophy of Life: Facticity, 
Being, and Language (New York, Fordham University Press, 2012).  
19 GA 20, 293/214, 303/220. 
20 GA 2, 211/254. 
21 GA 2, 366/418. 
22 As he puts it, “world understanding as Dasein-understanding is self-understanding. Self and world belong together 
in the single entity that is the Dasein. Self and world are not two beings, the subject or the object, or the I and the 
thou, but self and world are the basic determination of the Dasein itself in the unity of the structure of Being-in-the-
world.” (GA 24 422/297) 
23 GA 24, 423/298. 
24 This notion of Dasein as World-Forming [weltbildend] is abysmally separated from the animal, which is poor in 
the world [Das Tier ist weltarm] and the stone, which has no world. Derrida will return to these three theses from 
The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics throughout his engagement with Heidegger, all the way to his final 
seminar, The Beast and the Sovereign.  
25 GA 20, 133-6/97-9. Die Welt ist fort, as I showed Derrida comment on the epokhè above, and will soon bring him 
into direct conversation with Heidegger. (See my discussions in §2.1.2 and §2.3.2, as well as Derrida’s discussion in 
Sovereignties in Question, taken up again in the Beast and the Sovereign seminars.) 
As Derrida writes, “difficult problems that perhaps presuppose a simplification of Husserl’s intentions and 
especially of the methodological meaning of the reduction and of the non-worldliness of the ego. But I cannot and 
do not wish to get into that here.” (HQ 184/121) Derrida refers here to an as-yet unpublished lecture course from 
1963-4 “The Fifth of the Cartesian Meditations,” concerning Husserl and Heidegger’s Mitsein. Moreover, what is 
perhaps also at stake here, so essential for Derrida’s reading of Husserl and Heidegger, and Levinas’s reading of 
these two in “Violence and Metaphysics,” is that Pure Being comes down to Pure Nothingness. (And along with it, 
pure non-violence is pure violence, the absolute other is the same, and so on.) In recognizing, as Husserl does, that 
pure consciousness as pure Being is in fact nothing, has the question of Being not in a sense been raised? Heidegger 
does not seem to think so, remarking that the pure idealism of the epokhe seems to neglect the question of Being.  
26 “Nulla re indiget ad existendum… ‘it needs no res in order to be.’ Res is here understood in the narrower sense of 
reality, transcendent being, that is, every entity which is not consciousness.” (GA 20 141-2/103) 
27 GA 24, 425/299. 
28 “Transcendence is rather the primordial constitution of the subjectivity of a subject. The subject transcends qua 
subject; it would not be a subject if it did not transcend. To be a subject means to transcend.” (GA 26 211/165) 
29 GA 24, 418/295. 
30 GA 20, 335/243. See Derrida’s discussion in FP, 27 and the conclusion to §2.1.2.  
31 GA 9, 31/106. 
32 Freedom, as he puts it in “On the Essence of Truth,” “now reveals itself as letting beings be.” GA 9, 188/144. 
33 GA 40, 11/15, GA 9, 189-90/145. 
34 Note Heidegger’s use of the word ‘Walten’ here. 
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35 GA 26, 246-7/191. Indeed, one imagines the need to move beyond a distinction between reaction and response in 
this passage.  
36 GA 40, 16/23. 
37 GA 9, 190/145. 
38 “The world is the free counter-hold of Dasein’s for-the-sake-of. Being-in-the-world is accordingly nothing other 
than freedom, freedom is no longer understood as spontaneity but as defined by the formulation of Dasein’s 
metaphysical essence.” (GA 26, 248/192) 
39 GA 26, 277/214. See also chapters 6 and 7 in François Raffoul’s The Origins of Responsibility. (Bloomington, 
Indiana University Press, 2010) 
40 See also Derrida’s discussion against the idea of the ‘reste’ as ‘objectalisation’ in PV, 106.  
41 FF, 16, 10-11. 
42 For another discussion of this, see Heidegger’s “On the Essence and Concept of Phusis in Aristotle’s Physics B,1” 
GA 9. 
43 GA 24, 164/116. 
44 FF, 16. 
45 On the question of enframing, see Butler, Frames of War, and for a detailed examination of the biopolitical 
aspects of these questions, Wolfe, Before the Law. I’ll return to this question of biopolitics in chapter 5, where the 
question of biopower as making live and letting die and its opposition in sovereign power, letting live and making 
die, are both superseded in the question of letting live-on, anterior to the opposition of activity and passivity.  
46 An analysis of Heidegger’s Nietzsche lectures on this subject forms the second ‘boucle’ of Derrida’s Life Death 
seminar. I’ll turn to it at length in §4.1. 
47 HQ, 203/134. 
48 GA 24, 230/162. 
49 GA 26, 170/135. 
50 GA 2, 137/176. 
51 GA 2, 137/176. I showed above in Heidegger’s critique of Scheler that “the pressure and counterpressure, thrust 
and counterthrust, of material things can never allow something like a world in the sense of worldhood to come into 
being. Instead, resistance is a phenomenal character which already presupposes world.” (GA 20 304/222) 
52 GA 20, 96/70. 
53 As Heidegger explains, “the so-called epistemological positions of idealism and realism and their varieties and 
mixtures are all possible only on the basis of a lack of clarity of the phenomenon of In-Being.” (GA 20 224-5/166) 
54 GA 40, 106/77, 46/63, 139/195. 
55 GA 24, 149/106, 151/107. 
56 As Derrida writes in “Form and Meaning,” whether the meaning of Being has been limited by the imposition of 
form, in its determination as presence, or whether form has been limited by the determination of Being as presence, 
both in fact come down to the same. But in repeating this circularity, one can “let some elliptical displacement be 
produced in the difference of a repetition... Neither matter nor form, nothing that could be recast by some 
philosopheme, that is, by some dialectics.” (MP 207/173) 
57 See PM, 376/143-4. For the full citation, see the introduction to chapter 2. 
58 As mentioned in note 43 of chapter 2, Derrida credits Heidegger for many of the propositions in The Problem of 
Genesis. See also Edward Baring’s study of Heidegger’s influence on the very young Derrida in Baring, The Young 
Derrida and French Philosophy. 
59 GA 2, 17/38, 250-1/294. 
60 “An external or intrinsic truncation of life, a contingent snipping of the thread.” Krell, Daimon Life, 93. 
61 As Krell explains in Daimon Life, however, the principle of immanent death, in Simmel, Korschelt, Bernstein, 
Weismann and Freud challenges this very notion of death as Verenden, “defeats the very language of inside and 
outside. In fact, it is almost as though Lebensphilosophie here confronts the central difficulty of deconstruction, 
grappling with it long before the domain of deconstruction – to wit, the metaphysics of presence – has been staked 
out by Heidegger’s philosophy. The very opposition of life and death comes to an end in the idea of immanent 
death.” Krell, Daimon Life, 93. This is quite true, but only if the immanence of death is not understood, as Derrida 
shows in “To Speculate...,” according to the reappropriative (indeed restricted) economy and ecology of the Living 
Present as described by Husserl in the Vorlesungen or the auto-affective temporalization described by Heidegger in 
the Kantbuch, as I showed in chapters 1 and 2. See especially chapter 1, notes 16 and 145.   
62 Resolute anticipation, “unlike inauthentic Being-towards-death, does not evade the fact that death is not to be 
outstripped, instead; anticipation frees itself for accepting this.” (GA 2, 263/308) 
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63 On the question of “Choosing one’s Heritage,” in Derrida, see the interview of the same title in DQ, as well as 
SM, and my discussion in §4.4.3. 
64 GA 2, 310/357. 
65 GA 2, 325/372. 
66 GA 24, 377/266. 
67 “Only in so far as Dasein is as an ‘I-am-as-having-been,’ can Dasein come towards itself futurally in such a way 
that it comes back. As authentically futural, Dasein is authentically as ‘having-been.’” (GA 2 325/373) For Derrida, 
resoluteness in Heidegger is not to live the present as in the Pure Form of the Living Present but to constitute the 
present as the past of a future. 
68 GA 2, 326/374. 
69  In his book Intimations of Mortality, Krell writes that “to the self-generating ecstatic unity of temporality 
Heidegger gives the names ‘animation’ and ‘vibrancy’ (Schwung, Schwingung), relating these words to the 
Bergsonian élan and to the Wurf of Geworfenheit and Entwurf.” Krell, Intimations of Mortality, 59. As he adds in a 
footnote, “the reference reminds us how indebted Heidegger’s analysis of ‘ecstatic temporality’ is to Henri Bergson 
– infinitely more so than to the time-consciousness of Husserl.” Ibid., 182, n.7. Of course, there exist many 
similarities between the Husserl of the Lectures on internal time consciousness and Bergson in distinguishing 
between the time of clocks and duration in the Living Present. I will show in §4.2.3 that when Deleuze refers to a 
past that has never been present, he refers to Bergson and not Levinas. Unfortunately, I don’t have the space here to 
examine Bergson’s work at all. Derrida never published anything on him, however, certain lectures that may one 
day be published include a 1960-1 seminar on the Present (on Heidegger, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel and Bergson), a 
1961-2 lecture on entitled Bergson: Introduction to Metaphysics, and a similar 1963-4 course Bergson: Introduction 
to Metaphysics and The Idea of Nothingness.    
70 GA 2, 328/377. 
71 “The existential-temporal condition for the possibility of world lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatical 
unity, has something like a horizon.” GA 2, 365/316. 
72 GA 2, 366/418. 
73 Heidegger here so closely evokes certain passages in Blanchot that will be taken up by Deleuze, Foucault and 
Esposito. See my chapters 4 and 5, passim.  
74 “The distinction between being and beings is temporalized in the temporalizing of temporality.” (GA 24 454/319) 
Earlier in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, he notes that “the transcendence of Being-in-the-world is founded 
in its specific wholeness on the ecstatico-horizonal unity of temporality. If transcendence makes possible the 
understanding of being and if transcendence is founded on the ecstatico-horizonal constitution of temporality, then 
temporality is the condition of the possibility of the understanding of Being.” (GA 24 429/302) 
75 Cf. GA 2, 329-30/378. This question of the dual finitude of life and of experience, knowledge and interpretation, 
which Krell calls the “two voices of finitude” (in Krell, Intimations of Mortality, 42) is also beautifully discussed by 
Wolfe in What is Posthumanism. After recalling the radical passivity and vulnerability in death, Wolfe draws on a 
second kind of finitude from Derrida’s critique of Lacan. “That second form of finitude derives from the 
fundamental exteriority and materiality of meaning and communication itself, of any form of semiotic marking and 
iterability to which both humans and nonhuman animals are subject in a trace structure that, as [Derrida] puts it, 
exceeds and encompasses the human/animal difference and indeed ‘the life/death’ relation itself. For this reason, we 
cannot master and ‘erase,’ in any analytic of finitude or existential of being-toward-death (as in Heidegger), our 
radical passivity in a way that would once again separate us, definitively and ontologically, from nonhuman 
animals.” Wolfe, What is Posthumanism?, xxviii. Wolfe’s analyses are in agreement with my own intentions here, 
and I will especially return to them in my discussion of translation and science in §6.2.2.   
76 GA 26, 256/198, GA 3, 91/62. 
77 Krell, Intimations of Mortality, 51. 
78 PE, 18/9. 
79 Adding, in a 2000 interview in Paper Machine, that “not only am I not a disciple of Heidegger’s, but for forty 
years I have never made a reference to him that was not also questioning, not to say critical or deconstructive.” (PM 
383/149) 
80 IOG, 171/153. 
81 See Heidegger’s ‘The Age of the World Picture’ in GA 5, 75-114/57-85. 
82 HQ, 199-201/131-3. 
83 HQ, 178/116. 
84 GA 2, 382/434. 
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85 HQ, 202/133-4, 184-5/120-2. 
86 HQ, 185/121, 206/136. 
87 HQ, 185/122. “Even in a phenomenology that determines the Being of beings as an object in general for a subject 
in general… the interminable genetic (so-called passive) analyses of the ego, of time and of the alter ego lead back 
to a pre-egological and pre-subjectivist zone. There is, therefore, at the heart of what passes for and presents itself as 
a transcendental idealism, a horizon of questioning that is no longer dictated by the egological form of subjectivity 
or of intersubjectivity.” (PDS 277/263) 
88 QP 50-1/46-7. Of course, Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of immanence also resists that of phenomenological 
immanence; the immanence of the transcendental and the empirical. Indeed, I’ll show in §4.2.2 and §4.2.3, as they 
both draw from Blanchot, it is the Outside itself. It is precisely in this sense that I understand the logic of the 
beyond-within, the pas au-delà I discussed in §1.2.2, so transcendence within immanence in another sense than the 
immanence of the transcendental and the empirical. 
89 HQ, 185-6/122. 
90 “The Living Present is the phenomenological absolute out of which I can never exit because it is that within 
which, towards which, and starting from which every exit is effectuated.” (IOG 149/136t) Even as a thought of 
originary difference, the dialectic of the living present operates in “the powerlessness to remain enclosed in the 
innocent undividedness [indivision] of the originary Absolute, because it is present only in deferring itself without 
respite, this powerlessness and this impossibility are given in an originary and pure consciousness of Difference.” 
(IOG 171/153t) 
91 HQ, 212/140-1. 
92 The determination of Being as presence in classical metaphysics would have rendered the thinking of history 
impossible, and along with it, “the origin and the end, birth and death as such; as such: namely, as being unable to 
appear in the form of presence or appearing as what cannot appear.” (HQ 214/142) 
93 Both Husserl and Heidegger, I showed in §2.1.2, understand appearing and dissimulation are originary and 
complicit possibilities. IOG, 151n1/138n164. “This summation or this reduction of history in the Present... is the 
very form of historialization that is constituted by dissimulating itself in the very presence of appearing. In the 
present, history is erased or summed up and that dissimulation resounds in philosophical discourse qua metaphysics 
of the Living Present.” (HQ 213/142) 
94 MP, 147/123. 
95 HQ, 52/22. 
96  Particularly, Derrida adds here, as concerns the concepts of Schuldigsein and Bezeugung (originary 
guilt/culpability and attestation, witnessing). I unfortunately don’t have the space to devote an analysis to these 
concepts. Derrida himself develops an examination of Schuldigsein in the unpublished seventh session of Donner le 
temps, seemingly inserted into the centre of the lecture after its first rendition. 
97 In classical metaphysics, “man’s being (Menschsein) remains (bleibt) defined by life and life experience [Leben 
und Erleben: experience, then, Erlebnis as experience but, as the word suggests, lived experience of the living 
being].” (BS2 185/124) 
98 HQ, 276/188. 
99 See GA 2, 38/62, and also Derrida’s reference to this in MP, 157n18/131n34. 
100 But, as I showed from the “Letter on Humanism,” both ethics and ontology, as derivative from letting-be, are 
incapable of thinking the poetic Saying [sage], the language that is the house of Being, the Zusage, unless of course 
these terms undergo a total refiguration of their sense.  
101 ED, 118/98. 
102 ED, 146/122, 155/131. 
103 “Calls upon us to depart from Greek site, and perhaps from the site in general, toward what is no longer a source 
or a site... below every Greek origin, towards the other of the Greek... A thought for which the entirety of the Greek 
logos has already irrupted, [humus apaisé non pas sur un sol, mais autour d’un volcan plus ancien]” (ED 122/102) 
104 ED, 123/102. 
105 ED, 144/120. 
106 ED, 132/110.  
107 ED 144/97. 
108 ED, 200/170, 202/172. 
109 “The επεκειμα τες ουσιας (in Levinas’s interpretation) would not lead beyond Being itself, but beyond the totality 
of beings or the beingness of the being (the Being being of the being) or beyond ontic history.” (ED 208-9/177t) 
110 ED, 218/183. 
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111 DG, 103/70. 
112 PV, 105-6. 
113 DG, 103/70, 347/244. “This proper [propre] of man is not the proper of man: it is the very dislocation of... the 
proper in general, the impossibility – and therefore the desire – of self-proximity; the impossibility and therefore the 
desire of pure presence.” The proper of the human will be revealed to be constituted by a logic of supplementarity, 
as I examined in my discussions of life death in Freud and Jacob in §1.1.1, guaranteeing both its condition of 
possibility – its life and thus its desire to purify itself by drawing limits between itself and animality, primitivism, 
childhood, madness and divinity – but also the impossibility of its purity, propriety and self-presence, which it 
threatens as their originary finitude. 
114 As Derrida adds, here “and on the basis of this unfolding of the same as différance, we see announced the 
sameness of différance and repetition in the eternal return.” (MP 18-9/17) I will return to this in §4.4.3. 
115 MP, 29/27. 
116 As I cited in chapter 1, translation as Derrida draws from Heidegger is “an operation of thought through which 
we must translate ourselves into the thought of the other language, the forgotten thinking of the other language; we 
must translate ourselves into it, not make it come into our language but, on the contrary, go toward the unthought 
thinking of the other language.” (OA 152/115t) This will have very important implications for my discussions of 
ecolinguistics and biocultural diversity in chapter 6. On the question of an experience without Erlebnis, cf. PV, 68-
74. 
117 Compare, on this subject, the 6th and 7th sessions of HQ.  
118 Although citing it in a footnote in Given Time, Derrida mentions in the interview with Janicaud, that he read the 
Beitrage but not seriously enough, for which he feels guilty. HF, 351. Cf. also DT, 33/19, P, 36/25 for Derrida’s 
translations. As Derrida cites Heidegger, “Beyng is the appropriating event... Beyng is – that means beyng alone 
essentially occurs its own essence (event) [das Seyn west allein das Wesen seiner selbst (Ereignis)].” (GA 65 470-
473/369-372) Earlier, “Beyng essentially occurs as the event [Das Seyn west als Ereignis].” (GA 65 28-30/25) 
119 “Only as long as Dasein is... ‘is there’ Being [‘gibt es’ Sein].” (GA 2 212/255) 
120 DT, 36/22. 
121 DT, 45/29. 
122  SM 15-6/xviii, see also my remarks on the promise of the earth concerning ontology and auto-affective 
temporalization in §1.4.2, with reference to AV, 29. 
123 SM, 55/32. 
124 Heidegger “skew[s] the asymmetry in favour of what he in effect interprets as the possibility of favor itself, of the 
accorded favour, namely, of the accord that gathers or collects while harmonizing (Versammlung, Fug).” (SM, 
55/32) 
125 SM, 57/34. Cf. also FS, 37 n.11/60 n.15, EA, 20. “‘The relation to others – that is to say justice,’ writes Levinas.” 
(SM 48-9/25) “As soon as justice implies a relation to an-other, it supposes an interruption, a dis-joining, a 
disjunction or being-out-of-joint, which is not negative; an out-of-jointness that is not deconstructible, that is justice 
as deconstruction.” (NII 230) As he writes elsewhere, again against this Versammlung, “at the heart of justice, of the 
experience of the just, an infinite disjunction demands its right, and the respect of an irreducible dissociation: no 
justice without interruption, without divorce, without a dislocated relation to the infinite alterity of the other, without 
a harsh experience of what remains forever out of joint.” (DQ 135/81) 
126 Cf. MPD, 140-1/146. Derrida refers here to Martin Heidegger, Was Heisst Denken (Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio 
Klostermann, 2002); trans. J. Glenn Gray as What is Called Thinking? (New York, Perennial, 2004) and Zur Sache 
des Denkens (Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 2007); trans. Joan Stambaugh as On Time and Being (New 
York, Harper Torchbooks, 1972). 
127 HF, 357. 
128 See on this point Derrida’s contrasting of Heidegger’s image of the bridge in Building Dwelling Thinking with 
the philosophy of Blanchot in the second year of La Chose. I’ll discuss this in a new project. 
129 SM, 58/35. 
130 See Wolfe, Before the Law, 58. 
131 BS1, 90/56. 
132 See my note 6 above. 
133 On time, see AS 42/22, 197/144, see also PV, 90; the other, BS2, 288/204; the material world and death ‘as 
such,’ A, AS, BS2, DE passim; the inability to let beings be beyond its vital design, AS, 219/160. “Transcendence in 
the sense of projecting oneself in order to relate to beings as such, as beings. This is the movement of Dasein’s 
Verhalten... of Dasein relating to beings of such, beyond and transcending what encircles the animal in its drives or 
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its appetites. The animal does not transcend, as does Dasein, and the movement of transcendence is indeed that on 
the basis of which one has a world as totality of beings as such.” (BS2 315/226) 
134 BS2, 387/285. Walten, he writes, produces nothing less than the ontological difference... “i.e. everything that is 
going to organize more or less indirectly this seminar on the difference between man, between human Dasein, and 
the animal: the animal is unable to accede to the as such of beings, i.e. the difference between Being and beings.” 
(BS2 160/105) 
135 BS2, 36/12-3. 
136 Recalling that Dasein’s transcendence is being-in-the-world, Derrida defines the world as “the whole in so far as 
we are this path on the way toward it, but toward it insofar as the path traces itself in it, breaks itself in it, opens 
itself in it, inscribes itself in it.” (BS2 155/101) 
137 BS2, 155-6/101-2. 
138 “The word idea, eidos, ‘idea,’ comes to the fore as the definitive and prevailing word for phusis.” (GA 40 
137/192) 
139 “Ideology (eidos plus logos) and idealism are not innocent, one must recognize their violence. It is through war 
that idealism too imposed its interpretation of Being, a war for the victory of an idea, of the idea of idea, of the 
intelligible as eidos, i.e. as visible object.” (BS2 396/290) 
140 AS, 40/20. 
141 BS2, 105/63. 
142 “Der nächste Weg zu einer ersten Klärung.” (cited in BS2 101/61) 
143 “Not a prevalence or hierarchizing valorization among others, but rather the prevailing of every evaluation and 
every possible hierarchy, the pre-ferring of pre-ferance [pré-férance, with an ‘a’] itself, that is, the pre-archic 
originarity of the proper, the authentic, and the eigentlich.” (A 103-4/56) 
144 AS, 51-2/29-30. 
145 A, 121/68. 
146 BS2, 31/8. 
147 BS2, 160/105. 
148 “Where there is no world, where the world is not here or there, but fort, infinitely distant over there, that what I 
must do, with you and carrying you, is make it that there be precisely a world, if not a just world, or to do things so 
as to make it as if there were a world, and to make the world come to the world, to make as if – for you, to give it to 
you, to bear it toward you, destined for you, to address it to you – I made the world come into the world, as though 
there ought to be a world where presently there is none, to make the gift or present of this as if come up poetically, 
which is the only thing that – during the finite time of such an impossible voyage between two non-shores where 
nothing happens – the only thing that can make it possible that I can live and have or let you live.” (BS2 369-
70/268) 
149 In fact, the first engagement of Celan’s line I can find is in Levinas on Blanchot’s Madness of the Day, warning 
against the interpretation of this carrying where “the other [autrui], the only point of access to an outside, is closed... 
The idea of bearing the other, suffering in him (Celan’s sublime expression, “The world is no more, I shall have to 
carry you”) turns into a comedy in an insane asylum, in which the patients have fun taking rides on the back of the 
narrator, on all fours. The transcendence of the intersubjective is oppression in the highest degree, an altruism 
stultifying. The I suffocates in its dray-horse being.” Emmanuel Levinas, Sur Maurice Blanchot (Montpellier, Fata 
Morgana, 1975); trans. Michael B. Smith as “On Maurice Blanchot” in Proper Names (Stanford, Stanford 
University Press, 1996), 72/169. In other words, a reading that would think ethics as the carrying of a burden, not 
unlike Zarathustra’s donkey, and the repetition of its ‘yes, yes’ I-A, I-A. But must any carrying not risk this 
reactivity? Is this repetition, and the possibility of the repetition of the worst not rather the very possibility of ethics?  
I’ll turn to this in chapter 4.  
150 AS, 49/28. “It is from this compassion in impotence and not from power that we must start when we want to 
think the animal and its relation to man.” BS2, 339/244. 
151 Although, Derrida writes, the Zusage can in fact be understood as running through Heidegger’s entire oeuvre, 
through the concepts of Bezeugung and Schuldigsein I mentioned above, the Gewissen and the Entschlossenheit. FS, 
92/95-6. To this list, he adds the Rufsinn, the Verlässlichkeit, the Versprechen or Verheissen, see DE, 118 n1/133n. 
5.   
152 PDS, 282/268. 
153 DE, 115n1/129n5. 
154 On this non-logical and non-chronological anteriority, see DP /442, HF, 348-9. 
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155 The ‘already’ of the Zusage “say[s] something of the essence of this parole and of what en-gages in it. At the 
moment when, in the present, it entrusts or addresses itself to us, it has already done so, and this past never returns, 
never again becomes present, it always goes back to an older event which will have already engaged us in this 
subscribing to the en-gage.” (DE 120n1/135n6) 
156 “The relation to self, in this situation, can only be différance, that is to say alterity or trace. Not only is the 
obligation not lessened in this situation, but on the contrary it finds in it its only possibility, which is neither 
subjective nor human.” (PDS 275-6/261) 
157 P2, 246/238. 
158 MP, 18-19/17. 
 
Notes to chapter four: Animmanence: Life Death & The Passion and Perpetual Detour of Difference 
1 I’ll return to this in more detail in the introduction chapter 5. Let me simply cite for now Lawlor’s summarization 
of the similarities between Heidegger’s reading of the Will to Power and Foucault’s biopower, “First, both 
conceptions occur in the modern epoch, which is the epoch of anti-Platonism. Second, both conceptions, being 
modern, imply a transformation of vision into positing and constant presence. Third, bio-power and will to power 
are commanding, meaning that the will in each conception super-enhances the power it already has; bio-will to 
power is the will to more and more power (super-abundant life). Finally, both Heidegger and Foucault associate the 
phenomenological concept of Erlebnis with bio-will to power.” Lawlor, The Implications of Immanence, 27.  
2 cited in Lawlor, Implications of Immanence, 43. 
3 Ibid., 3 
4 Lawlor is also quite attentive to the difference between the transcendent and transcendence here.  
5 See Lawlor’s appendix I to Early Twentieth Century Philosophy (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2012), 
“A Note on the Idea of Immanence.” 
6 HJR, 76. 
7 Derrida’s final question in fact also addresses Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the Body without Organs, which 
I’ll examine in §4.2.2.  
8 Several of the sessions on Nietzsche have been published. The second session, “La Logique de la vivante,” can be 
found in Otobiographies: L’Enseignement de Nietzsche et la politique du nom propre (Paris, Galilée, 1984) and OA. 
The entirety of the eighth, “Cause ‘Nietzsche,’” and the first part of the ninth, “Chaos de l’interprétation,” were 
published as “Interpreting Signatures (Nietzsche/Heidegger): Two Questions.” trans. Diane Michelfelder and 
Richard Palmer in Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Derrida/Gadamer Encounter (Albany, SUNY Press, 1989). 
Where possible, this chapter will refer to the published texts.    
9 Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 75. 
10 Cf. NG, 258/24. 
11 To my knowledge, Deleuze makes only one reference to Levinas, and to a rather peripheral text, “Les Cahiers de 
la nuit surveillée.” Cf. QP 92n5/223n5. 
12 As I’ll show below, the total techno-biopolitical dominion over the earth’s organic and inorganic matter and the 
total dominion of humans over one another are mutually reinforcing possibilities. See my discussion of Mick 
Smith’s argument in the introduction to chapter 5. See also Martin Hägglund’s discussion of immortality as ‘the 
worst’ in Radical Atheism, 33. 
13 As Deleuze writes, “we must not forget that the Eternal Return and the Will to Power, the two most fundamental 
concepts in the Nietzschean corpus, are hardly introduced at all. They never did receive the extended treatment 
Nietzsche intended.” (ID 164/117) Blanchot reflects on their ambiguity as well in The Work of Fire: “Nietzsche’s 
positive philosophy, that of the Will to power as well as that of the Overman, without speaking of the Eternal 
Return, remains constantly suspended... In principle, the Overman replaces God. But, finally, what does Nietzsche 
say about the Overman? Exactly what he says about the gods... And of the Eternal Return? ‘Perhaps there is nothing 
true in that – let others fight about it.’ And of the Will to Power? ‘Power makes one stupid... power is tiresome... 
Would we want a world in which the action of the weak, their freedom, their reserve, their spirituality, their 
adaptability would be lacking?” (BPF 284/293t) 
14 Keith Ansell Pearson’s Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition of Deleuze (London, Routledge, 1999) deals 
with the question of life in Deleuze in far more detail than I could ever hope to here. My reading of Deleuze owes 
much to his study.  
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15 As Derrida writes, however, “for me, Spinoza is someone I have never understood at all. I have taught him, I 
know something about him, I can give a course on Spinoza. But – even though he was a Portuguese Marrano, like 
myself – he is a thinker whose philosophical enterprise is to me the most ‘foreign.’” (FSC 25) 
16 On the Eternal Return as the Perpetual Detour of Difference and the perpetual neutrality of the detour, see BEI, 
413/277. On the Will to Power as the Passion of Difference, see BEI, 241/161. “But then what is the Will to Power? 
“Not a being, not a becoming, but a pathos”: the passion of difference.” 
17  See Heidegger’s interview in Der Spiegel, “‘Only a God Can Save Us Now’: An Interview with Martin 
Heidegger,” trans. David Schendler, Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 6, no. 1 (1977), 5–27.  
18 See David Farrell Krell’s analysis in his translations of Heidegger’s Nietzsche. Also Intimations of Mortality, op. 
cit.   
19 GA 6.1, 156/1, 154. 
20 GA 6.1, 380-1/2, 162. 
21 GA 6.2, 14-5/3 168. 
22 GA 6.2, 16/3 170, 295/219. 
23 GA 7, 113/2, 222. 
24 GA 5, 232/175-6. 
25 GA 6.1, 33/1, 37. 
26 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power (New York, Vintage Books, 1968), §702.  
27 GA 5, 237/177. 
28 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §582. 
29 Ibid., §493. 
30 GA 6.1, 516/3 86. 
31 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §710. 
32 Cf. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §490. 
33 GA 6.1, 223/1, 219. 
34 GA 6.1, 579/3 143, 555/122. 
35 Beings as a whole, for Heidegger, designates “basically everything that is not simply nothing: nature (animate and 
inanimate), history (what it brings about, the personages who fill it, and those who propel it), God, the gods, and 
demigods. When we speak of things that are in being, we are also referring to what comes to be, what originates and 
passes away. For it already is no longer the nothing, or not yet the nothing. When we allude to things that are in 
being, we are also referring to appearance, illusion, deception, and falsehood. If all such things were not in being 
they could not delude us and make us err. All these things too are named in the phrase ‘beings as a whole.’” (GA 6.1 
245/2 25-6)  
36 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 110.  
37 “Human beings, resolutely open to what is to come and preserving what has been, sustain and give shape to what 
is present. The thought of Eternal Return of the Same, spawned by such temporality and grounded in it, is therefore 
a ‘human’ thought in a distinctive sense – the supreme sense.” (GA 6.1 318-9/2 99) 
38 GA 6.1, 270/2, 50. 
39 GA 5, 223-4/167-8. 
40 GA 6.2, 292-4/3 217-8. 
41 Cf. for the ‘business transaction,’ GA 6.1, 583/3, 148. “Eine Gerechtigkeit, die es auf den Vorteil absieht, das 
klingt befremdlich und zugleich deutlich nach Nutzen, Ubervorteilung und Berechnung, wenn nicht gar nach 
Geschäft.”  
42 GA 6.2, 309/3 231. 
43 Gilles Deleuze, “Remarques” in Nos Grecs et leurs modernes, edited by Barbara Cassin (Paris, Seuil, 1992), 249-
50. It’s unclear to me in the French whether Deleuze is saying something apparently uncharacteristic of his thought 
(that Spinoza and Nietzsche remain Stoic Platonists) or that Spinoza and Nietzsche are philosophers of pure 
immanence (which seems more likely, but is not suggested in the text as presented): “Toute réaction contre le 
platonisme est une restauration de l’immanence en sa pleine extension. La question est de savoir si une telle réaction 
abandonne tout projet de séléction des rivaux, ou dresse au contraire, comme le croyait Nietzsche, des méthodes de 
sélection tout à fait différentes (éternel retour). Seul peut-être les philosophies de la pure immanence échappent au 
platonisme des Stoïciens, à Spinoza et Nietzsche.” 
44 Deleuze’s main works on Spinoza are Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza and Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. 
His key works on Nietzsche are Nietzsche and Philosophy and ‘Nietzsche,’ the latter published on its own in French 
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as Nietzsche, and included in the English collection Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life. Not to be confused with 
Nietzsche: Colloque de Royaumont, ed. Gilles Deleuze (Paris, Minuit, 1967). Deleuze’s contribution to the latter 
text, “Conclusions on the Will to Power and the Eternal Return” was collected in Desert Islands (ID), which I’ll also 
examine here.  
45 See the note on Heidegger’s philosophy of difference in Difference and Repetition, 89-91/64-66. 
46 NP, 7/6. 
47 As Deleuze puts it in Desert Islands concerning this world of impersonal individuations and pre-individual 
singularities, “that’s what Nietzsche means when he says: ‘neither God nor man,’ it’s anarchy triumphant... 
Nietzsche was trying to uncover something that was neither God nor Human, trying to give voice to these 
impersonal individuations and these pre-individual singularities... that’s what he calls Dionysus, or also the 
overman.” (ID, 190-2/137-139)  
48 NP, 1/1. 
49 ID, 188-9/136. 
50 NP, 203/177. 
51 NP, 90/79, “What does it want, this will without which the Earth itself remains meaningless? What is its quality, a 
quality which also becomes the quality of the Earth? Nietzsche replies: ‘the weightless’ [La légère].”  
52 NP, 3/3; Deleuze adds “the force which appropriates the thing, which exploits it, which takes possession of it or is 
expressed in it.” 
53 Deleuze writes of transcendence as the ‘poisoned gift’ of Platonism, giving way to the aporias of the irreducibility 
of the immanence of the Earth in the Timaeus. Cf. Deleuze, “Remarques,” 250. Perhaps it would be a question here 
of thinking transcendence as pharmakon.  
54 NP, 4/3. 
55 NP, 7/7. 
56 NP, 26/22, 45/40. 
57 NP, 60/53. 
58 NP, 64/57. 
59 NP, 70/62. 
60 In the English translations of both of Deleuze’s monographs on Spinoza, ‘puissance’ (potentia) and ‘pouvoir’ 
(potestas) are rendered as ‘power,’ in keeping with Edwin Curley’s translation of Spinoza’s Ethics. As Martin 
Joughin, translator of Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza cites this translator, while some French scholars have 
attempted to differentiate between ‘puissance’ and ‘pouvoir’ in Spinoza’s work, “it is unclear that a systematic 
examination of Spinoza’s usage would confirm even a prima facie distinction.” (SPE n.a./408) If such a 
differentiation were to be accounted for, might it explain certain English-language readings of Deleuze as posing 
exclusively an ontology of force and power? Of course, the Will to Power has itself always been rendered as “la 
volonté de puissance” in French. Nonetheless, this difference between potentia and potestas, puissance and pouvoir 
will come to structure much at stake in biopolitics for Hardt and Negri, as well as Esposito.  
61 Deleuze does not elaborate on this characterization of the conatus as reactive in this text, but allow me to keep this 
insight in the background as I develop these readings. I will later in §5.4.1 show Esposito refer to the ‘restricted 
economy’ of the conservatio vitae. (EC, 18) 
62 SPE, 82/93. 
63 It is important to distinguish ‘suffer’ here from the suffering involving physical pain, mortality, and finitude. In 
the same translation, Martin Joughin renders ‘pâtir’ as ‘suffer’ with the following note: “a passion is something one 
suffers or undergoes passively (if not necessarily impassively, nor necessarily passionately). We suffer what is done 
to, or happens to, us; and our passions are opposed to our actions, what we ‘do’ to something else, as agent rather 
than as ‘patient.’ English does not have (as does French) a complex of cognate terms with which to render all the 
Latin cognates of passio, but the relations between these various aspects of ‘passive’ suffering should be kept in 
mind.” (SPE n.a./421)  
64 SPE, 198-199/218-219. 
65 SPE, 203/223. I note here the difficult exclusion of a more sustained treatment of Leibniz’s philosophy in these 
chapters; one could weave a thread through Husserl’s own problematization of the monadology in the Fifth 
meditation, but also through Heidegger’s 1928 lecture course on logic and transcendence in our previous chapter, 
which itself begins with a long discussion of Leibniz’s logic. One could also follow these through to one of 
Deleuze’s late pieces, Le Pli, which importantly engages questions of materiality of relevance to my analyses, and 
these also through Heidegger’s own notion of the Zweifalt. One would also have to read Deleuze’s opposing of 
Leibnizian equivocity to Spinozist Univocity, Leibniz’ thought of the Baroque to Spinoza’s pure philosophy of light. 
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What might a Derridean monadology resemble? I reserve this for another possible project. Cf. Gilles Deleuze, Le 
Pli: Leibniz et le baroque (Paris, Minuit, 1988); trans. Tom Conley as The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (London, 
Continuum, 1993). 
66 Deleuze refers to this as Spinoza’s immoralism, “a devaluation of all values, and of good and evil in particular (in 
favour of ‘good’ and ‘bad’).” SPP, 3/22. 
67 SPE, 217/238, NP, 34/22. One could problematize this opposition between poison and remedy at length through 
Derrida’s treatment of the pharmakon in Dissemination. 
68 SPE, 248/269, SPP, 35/23. 
69 SPE, 237-8/258-9. 
70 SPP, 37/25. 
71 SPP, 58/41. 
72 SPP, 132/100. 
73 NP, 9-10/8-9. 
74 NP, 204-5/178. 
75 Let’s recall, as I mentioned in note 149 of chapter 3, that Levinas warns precisely against a reading of the Tragen 
in Celan’s line as the carrying of a beast of burden. But the Zusage, acquiescence, must necessary risk this 
contamination if it is to affirm at all, which seems to be precisely Deleuze’s point with respect to double affirmation.  
76 NP, 27/23. A possible source of complication here would engage Heidegger’s critique of Nietzsche’s reading of 
Heraclitus.  
77 NP, 55/48. 
78 N, 36/87, NP, 40/91. 
79 NP, 55-6/49-50. As he elaborates in Difference and Repetition, “Eternal return cannot mean the return of the 
Identical because it presupposes a world (that of the will to power) in which all previous identities have been 
abolished and dissolved. Returning is being, but only the being of becoming. The eternal return does not bring back 
‘the same,’ but returning constitutes the only Same of that which becomes. Returning is the becoming-identical of 
becoming itself. Returning is thus the only identity, but identity as a secondary power; the identity of difference, the 
identical which belongs to the different, or turns around the different. Such an identity, produced by difference, is 
determined as repetition.” (DR 59/41) 
80 DR, 52/35. The question of univocity has a long tradition in medieval philosophy; Spinoza develops the concept 
out of a critique of the notions of analogy and equivocity between God, the creator and his creatures. For Spinoza, 
God’s expressions are univocal, “constituting the very nature of God as natura naturans, and involved in the nature 
of things or natura naturanta which, in a certain way, re-expresses them in its turn.” (SPE 41/49) Both naturing and 
natured nature stand in a relationship of mutual immanence and thus posit a fundamental equality among all beings. 
Cf. also SPP, 115/92. 
81 SPE, 44/53. 
82 “A cause is immanent... when its effect is ‘immanate’ in the cause... its effect is in it – in it, of course, as in 
something else, but still being and remaining in it.” (SPE 156/172) 
83 SPE, 157/173-4. 
84 Deleuze defines this (non)being as the being of the problematic, the being of problems and questions. This will be 
very important to my discussion of individuation in §4.2.3.  
85 SPP, 162/123. 
86 SPP, 163/124. 
87 SPP, 162/123, 169/128. 
88 Cf. PDS, 277/263. 
89 DF, 360/385. 
90 SPE, 257/278. 
91 SPE, 257n15/393n15. 
92 Deleuze summarizes the question thusly: “is there an Animal in itself or an Idea of the universal animal – or do 
the sub-kingdoms introduce impassable gulfs between the types of animals?” (DR 278/215) 
93 “Cuvier thus takes analogy to the scientific stage, making it an analogy of proportionality. The unity of the plane, 
according to him, can only be a unity of analogy, therefore a transcendent unity that cannot be realized without 
fragmenting into distinct branches, according to irreducible, uncrossable, heterogeneous compositions.” (MPl 
311/254) 
94  “Pure plane of immanence, univocity, composition, upon which everything is given, upon which unformed 
elements and materials dance... a fixed plane of life upon which everything stirs, slows down, or accelerates. A 
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single abstract Animal for all the assemblages that effectuate it. A unique plane of consistency or composition for 
the cephalopod and the vertebrate... Plication. It is no longer a question of organs and function, and of a 
transcendent Plane that can preside over their organization only by means of analogical relations and types of 
divergent development. It is a question not of organization but of composition; not of development or differentiation 
but of movement and rest, speed and slowness. It is a question of elements and particles, which do or do not arrive 
fast enough to effect a passage, a becoming or jump on the same plane of immanence.” (MPl 312/255t) 
95 MPl, 53/48. That Derrida places the Body without Organs right alongside the concept of immanence as the last 
two things on which he would have questioned Deleuze is important to bear in mind here.  
96 MPl. 199/161. “The body is never an organism. Organisms are the enemies of the body.” (MP 196/158t) 
97 MPl, 197/159.  
98  But to cease to be an organism does not mean to kill oneself, as they explain, but rather “inventing self-
destructions that have nothing to do with the death drive... you have to keep enough of the organism for it to reform 
each dawn.” (MPl 198/160) 
99 One can frame this, as the authors imply, as a discussion between total translatability and total untranslatability. 
The irreducibility of these fixed forms, for Cuvier, “do not admit of translation or transformation. But the problem 
poses itself wholly otherwise as soon as it is recognized that a code is inseparable from a process of decoding that is 
inherent to it.” (MPl 69/53t) This is relevant to my discussions of translation, at the material-physical, biological and 
ecological level, and at the epistemological-ontological-ethical level, to recall Karen Barad’s term, and my 
discussions of translation as material-semiotic. Further, the authors write that, recalling Uexküll here, in opposition 
to the animal Umwelt, the distribution of affects, resistances and formless materialities on the plane of immanence, 
the classical scientific Welt “is the translation of all the flows, particles, codes, and territorialities of the other strata 
into a sufficiently deterritorialized system of signs, in other words, into an overcoding specific to language.” (MPl 
81/62) Indeed, they argue, the theory of biological mutations precisely illustrates how every process of coding 
operates within a supplement of decoding, even at the viroid level, which, as the authors cite Francois Jacob’s The 
Logic of Life, are precisely not the translation from one fixed code to another, “but a singular phenomenon we call 
surplus value of code, or side-communication.” (MPl 70/53) The first part of Derrida’s Life Death seminar precisely 
deals with the question of viral translation, fascinated as Derrida is by the definition of a virus as neither living nor 
dead (see also AS 61-3, PV 21) and famously recalling, in another essay series of essays involving both Blanchot 
and double affirmation: “a text lives only if it lives on [sur-vit], and it lives on only if it is at once translatable and 
untranslatable (always ‘at once...and...’: hama, at the ‘same’ time).” (P 148/128) To think translation as necessarily 
involving logics of supplementarities and ‘plus-values’ already bring us on the path to thinking general ecology in 
and as translation. Due to reasons of economy, I cannot go into the fascinating work of Gilbert Simondon and its 
importance for Deleuze’s philosophy; his critique of the ‘hylomorphic’ schematic of what the authors call “royal 
science” and its socio-political implications (one might again say its epistemological-ontological-ethical difficulties) 
and his theory of individuation. As cited in A Thousand Plateaus, “form corresponds to what the man in command 
has thought to himself, and must express in a positive manner when he gives his orders: form is thus of the order of 
the expressible,” to which Simondon opposes “a dynamic schema, that of matter endowed with singularity-forces, or 
the energetic conditions at the basis of a system. The result is an entirely different conception of the relations 
between science and technology.” (MPl 457n28/555n33) see also Simondon’s recently published complete 
dissertation: L’Individuation à la lumières des notions de formes et d’information (Grenoble, Millon, 2013). A 
comparative study of Derrida and Simondon would be a fascinating area for future research. The two were aware of 
each other’s work, and corresponded on Derrida’s GREPH. 
100 F, 51/43.  
101 Power for Foucault, “is not essentially repressive (since it ‘incites, induces, produces’)... it passes through the 
hands of the mastered no less than through the hands of the masters (since it passes through every related force). A 
profound Nietzscheanism.” (F 78/71) 
102 F, 95/89. 
103 DF, 238/255. 
104 DF, 238/255, PP, 133/97. 
105 The double, Deleuze writes, “is never a projection of the interior; on the contrary, it is an interiorization of the 
outside. It is never a doubling of the One, but a redoubling of the Other. It is not a reproduction of the Same, but a 
repetition of the Different. It is not the emanation of an ‘I’, but something that places in immanence an always other 
or a Non-self. It is never the other who is a double in the doubling process, it is a self that lives me as the double of 
the other: I do not encounter myself on the outside, I find the other in me.” (F 105/98) 
106 PP, 150/84. 
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107 Cf. also F, 98/92. 
108 F, 98/92-3. 
109 Deleuze cites Foucault here from The Birth of the Clinic. “Bichat relativized the concept of death, brining it down 
from that absolute in which it appeared as an indivisible, decisive, irrecoverable event: he volatilized it, distributed it 
throughout life in the form of separate, partial, progressive deaths, deaths that are so slow in occurring that they 
extend even beyond death itself... vitalism appears against the background of this mortalism.” (NC 146/144-5) I’ll 
return to Foucault’s readings of Bichat and Blanchot in §5.2.2 and §5.2.3.  
110 DR, 4/xxi. 
111 LS, 120/98-9. As Deleuze adds, “The foundation can never resemble what it founds. It does not suffice to say of 
the foundation that it is another hi/story [histoire] – it is also another geography, without being another world.” This 
relation between the ground and the without-ground, (le fond and le sans-fond) might be entered, en-terred into a 
thought of the terre sans terre I imagined in chapter 2. See also my closing note to this chapter, note 207. 
112 QP, 50/46-7. 
113 Or the Flesh, Deleuze and Guattari add; possibly referring to Levinas and Merleau-Ponty here. 
114 QP, 51/47. 
115 DR, 317/246. 
116 DR, 317/246, ID, 122/87. 
117 Although this notion is developed through Bergson rather than Levinas and Blanchot. I’ll again acknowledge in 
my project the unfortunate lack of attention to Bergson in developing Deleuze’s philosophy of life and materiality. 
Another point of comparison on the questions of transcendence and immanence might engage a comparative study 
of Bergson and Levinas’s understanding of ‘the past that has never been present.’  
118 DR, 97/71. 
119 DR, 107/78. 
120 DR, 107/78. 
121  But interestingly, Deleuze speaks here of a transcendence of questions and problems with respect to their 
responses and solutions; adding later that “the problem is at once both transcendent and immanent in relation to its 
solutions.” (DR 212/163) I remain unsure of how to interpret this in Deleuze’s logic.   
122 DR, 109/80. The second synthesis allows Deleuze to account for several paradoxes in the passage of time that 
would certainly merit further examination, and perhaps also a few complications, given its confusing elaboration as 
alternatively active and passive. 
123 “At once that which cannot be thought and that which must be thought and can be thought only from the point of 
view of the transcendent exercise... Imperatives in the form of questions thus signify our greatest powerlessness.” 
(DR 257/199e) 
124 DR, 258/200. 
125 “Pure Saying [pur dire] and pure event... neither active nor passive, univocal being is neutral. It is itself extra-
being, that is to say this minimum of being common to the real, the possible, and the impossible... univocal being is 
the pure form of Aiôn.” (LS 211/180) 
126 DR, 352/277, 17/18. 
127 DR, 149/113, 333/259. 
128 “We will say that THE plane of immanence is, at the same time, that which must be thought and that which 
cannot be thought. It is the nonthought within thought... It is the most intimate within thought and yet the absolute 
outside.” (QP 52/59) 
129 This isn’t to say something like “of course, Deleuze and Bataille couldn’t possibly mean what they say when they 
use the word ‘immanence.’” Nor is it to assimilate their discourses to what I find worthwhile in Derrida and 
Blanchot. But Deleuze’s notion of immanence is so otherwise than the immanence of the transcendental and the 
empirical, form and norm, ethical and ontological as would be traditionally understood that I can’t help but feel 
something else, something ‘secret’ as Derrida puts it is going on there, as immanence slides into nonsense in the 
framework of general ecology. “If each notion must be reinscribed within the law of its on sliding and must be 
related to the sovereign operation, one must not make of these requirements the subordinate moment of a structure. 
The reading of Bataille must pass through these two dangerous straits. It must not isolate notions as if they were 
their own context, as if one could immediately understand the content of words like ‘experience,’ ‘interior,’ 
‘mystic,’ ‘work,’ ‘material,’ ‘sovereign,’ etc.” (ED 401/345)  
130 OC6, 175/n 150.  
131 Blanchot’s The Writing of Disaster is, as Derrida puts it in his eulogy to Blanchot, “haunted by the unnameable 
incineration that was the holocaust, the event of which we know, like another name of the absolute disaster, 
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immediately became the center of the most insistent gravity of his work. As it will indirectly be everywhere else, the 
holocaust is recalled at the opening of the book. Which designates the ‘the burn of the holocaust, the annihilation of 
noon’ and ‘immobile forgetfulness (memory of the immemorable)’” that constitutes the disaster. Even if this 
disaster, he says again, ‘we know [it] by other names’ [BED 15/6].” (CU 328/n.a., t) Of course, Blanchot also lists 
the disaster as more or less synonymous with the Outside, the Neutral and Return, and it’s this terrifying logic of 
contamination I want to flesh out here, while realizing this can pass for the most brutish insensitivity, and I’m not 
sure I even have the courage to do so here.  
132 OC5, 472. 
133 OC5, 479. 
134 OC5, 462. 
135 OC5, 206/u 86. 
136 OC5, 464, 482. 
137 OC6, 107/n 85. “Seen from the standpoint of action, Nietzsche’s work amounts to failure [un avortement].” (OC6 
22/n xxviii) 
138 OC5, 319/g 77. 
139 “L’Unwissenheit um die Zukunft.” (OC5 260/g 25)  
140 OC5, 178/e 154.  
141 OC5, 449-50. 
142 A double impossibility, in fact; “the impossible in the common representation of time is met only at the extremes 
of antecedent and future eternity. In the eternal return, the instant itself is one impossible movement projected 
towards these two extremes.” (OC6 312/u 24) 
143 OC6, 313/u 25. 
144 OC5, 466.  
145 BPF, 284/293.  
146 BEI, 232/155. 
147  In The Politics of Friendship, Derrida writes that Levinas would be the third reliable friend, joining the 
friendships of Bataille and Blanchot from the very beginning. (PA 326/293) See also note 206 below.  
148 BEL, 160/154. 
149 “That everyone, be he separated from or united with others, be he speaking or silent, receives, bears, and 
sustains through an intimate accord anterior to any decision, an accord such that any attempt to repudiate it, 
promoted or willed always by the very will of discourse, confirms it.” (BEI xxiv-xxv/xxii) 
150 BEI, 11/10. 
151 As I have shown, Heidegger gathers Nietzsche’s thought into metaphysics – the unity view of beings as such and 
as whole – which cannot think beings in their difference from Being, thus ignores the question of Being and cannot 
let beings be. For Blanchot, however, the question of Being and the dialectical question of the whole come down to 
one another. The question of Being Heidegger wishes to show in its difference from the totality of beings – 
dialectically and metaphysically thought as a whole – becomes ‘immobilized’ in several points for Blanchot. Even 
when Heidegger posits a ‘hearing’ as anterior to the question in The Principle of Reason, this hearing is itself 
understood in terms of vision and sight, reiterating a preference running through all metaphysics, ontology and 
phenomenology within which everything that is can be thought in terms of light or its absence. Most glaring for 
Blanchot is that this play between hearing and seeing would always refer itself to the One; “the question of being 
that dies away as a question is a question that dies away in hearing the One. The One, the Same, remain the first and 
the last words.” (BEI 34n1/440n3) To think beyond the ontological and dialectical gathering of being in terms of 
light, unity and wholeness, Blanchot writes, one must escape this reference to the One towards the other question, 
the question of the Other. In the dialectical and ontological thoughts of mastery, the question always refers to the 
Same and to the whole. Blanchot, in its stead, imagines a ‘panic question,’ a ‘question profonde’ within which “the 
whole is with regard to the other – not content with being everything, but designating the other than the whole (what 
is absolutely other and has no place in the whole), thus affirming the Wholly Other where there is no longer any 
return to the same.” (BEI 25/19t) This other question, a questioning anterior and foreign to the question, engages an 
order of invisibility irreducible to the opposition of the visible and the visible. In its passivity, neutrality and 
powerlessness, it opens onto a dimension that “questions everything by way of what would be outside of everything, 
questioning the ‘world’ by way of a ‘non-world’ where the question no longer has a question’s value, dignity, or 
power.” (BEI 25/19) Indeed, Blanchot writes, we question more than we can question; something within this 
question-affirmation necessarily exceeds the power to question, “the question as the impossibility of questioning. In 
the profound question, impossibility questions.” (BEI 27/20) 
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152 BEI, 224/149. 
153 “A being without being in the becoming without end of a death impossible to die... an affirmation that affirms 
more than can be affirmed. This more itself is the experience: affirming only by an excess of affirmation and, in this 
surplus, affirming without anything being affirmed, finally affirming nothing.” (BEI 310/209) 
154 BEI, 53-4/38. Philosophy, Blanchot explains, will have always sought to mark either a space of discontinuity, 
interruption or rupture (as in Heraclitus, Nietzsche, or Bataille) or the plenitude and density of a field gathering all 
differences in their tensions, a thought of continuity, finding its fulfillment in the dialectical inclusion of the 
discontinuous within the continuous. The continuous, to recall Derrida’s discussion in La vie la mort, risks coming 
down to a simple thought of a development from one opposition to an other, La vie est la mort. Discontinuity, for its 
part, risks coming down to a simple juxtaposition, La vie et la mort. But in the unheard difference between the 
continuity and juxtaposition of life death, almost inaudibly, imperceptibly whispers a wholly other relation. On the 
one hand, continuity-juxtaposition, and on the other, something wholly otherwise, what Blanchot calls a double 
contradiction; the necessity to think the other, to think life death I’d say, “once as the distortion of a field that is 
nevertheless continuous, as the dislocation and the rupture of discontinuity [restricted ecology] – and then as the 
infinite of a relation that is without terms and as the infinite termination of a term without relation.” (BEI 105/74) 
The discontinuity between the two moments is not the simple opposition of their continuity. Discontinuity for 
Blanchot does not arrest becoming; Nietzsche’s great thought was to recognize that “becoming is not the fluidity of 
an infinite (Bergsonian) durée, nor the mobility of an interminable movement. The first knowledge is a knowledge 
of the treating apart – the breaking up – of Dionysus.” (BEI 235/157)  
155 BEI, 417/281. 
156 Cf. Emmanuel Levinas, Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), 15; 
trans. Alphonso Lingis as Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), 4-5. 
157 BED, 141/89-90,168-9/109-10, 162/104.  
158 BED, 94/57. 
159 BEI, 242/162, 410/275. 
160 ED, 45/32. 
161 BEI, 240-1/160-1. 
162 See my discussions in §1.1.2 and §1.2.2 on the relations between transgression and transcendence. 
163 L8, 2. 
164 L10, 2. In this session, Derrida indicates a desire to engage this question of authenticity in relation to Heidegger’s 
thought on being-towards-death and authentic temporalization, but cannot for lack of time. (L10, 2) He would take 
these questions up much later in Aporias.  
165 A, 86-7/45-6. 
166 L10, 1. 
167 “Survivance is the name of the mother. This survival is my life which she overflows, and the name of my death, 
of my dead life, there is the name of my father.” (OA 29/16t) As he puts it in the seminar, “Ich kenne beides ich bin 
beides, I know both, the two, one should rather say, I am the two and the two here, it’s life death (beides)... the two 
as death life, the dead [le mort] the living [la vivante].” (L2, 11t) 
168 “One foot beyond life... mit einem Fusse jenseits des Lebens,” (L2, 13t) 
169 “notre monde tout entier est la cendre d’innombrables êtres vivants, et si peu de chose soit le vivant pas rapport à 
la totalité, il reste que une fois déjà tout (alles) a été converti en vie (is alles schon einmal in Leben umgesetzt) et 
continuera de l’être ainsi.” (L9, 1t) 
170 Cf. Derrida, “Interpreting Signatures,” 69-70. 
171 Cf. Derrida, “Interpreting Signatures,” 71. 
172 The thought of totality that regulates the relation between species and genera similarly finds itself ‘dislocated’ 
here; in opposing life to death as “the species of the opposite genera or the genera of a larger set, the part of its 
opposition, [...] opposition is no longer at play, nor juxtaposition, but a strange inclusion without possible 
totalisation.” (L9, 3t) Derrida examines Heidegger’s critique of the Eternal Return in more detail in these lectures. It 
should be noted, however, that the typescript of Life Death on these points displays some serious anxiety on several 
levels; the pages are riddled with things crossed out, question marks, arrows and so on. What I’ve covered so far in 
the eighth and ninth sessions was republished as “Interpreting Signatures.” The following reading of the ninth 
session in this note should be approached with this in mind. As I showed, despite Nietzsche’s intentions, the Eternal 
Return for Heidegger articulates a humanization and anthropologization of beings as a whole. Nietzsche, against 
both the vitalism and Darwinism of his time thinks this totality of beings as life, structurally securing the conditions 
for its preservation/enhancement according to the principle of the Will to Power. This principle of life, Derrida 
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explains, “consists in placing oneself at the principle, that is to say the commencement-commandment, the archè 
that means at once commencement and commandment (as principum)”; precisely as what I determined as the 
reciprocal immanence of the form and norm of life is thought from the Will to Power as the basis for the revaluation 
of all values. (L10, 4t) This value of commandment is for Heidegger related to a poeticizing: “if Nietzsche in fact 
returns everything to life, to the ‘biological,’ he so little thinks biologically, biologistically, he so little thinks life on 
the basis of biological (animal or vegetative life) that he determines the essence of the living being in the direction 
(Richtung) of the capacity-to-poetify (Befels – une Dichtungschaften)... It is from and in view of the human 
(perspective, horizon, commandment, Dichtung, representation of the being) that Nietzsche thinks the living being.” 
(L10, 4t) Nietzsche’s culmination of the delimitation of being as phusis consists in interpreting beings as a whole as 
life, human life, the essence of life being the Will to Power. Despite his own desire to see the Eternal Return as a 
thought of dehumanization, Nietzsche’s philosophy remains in metaphysics in correlating the question of the totality 
of beings with the question ‘what is man?’ I mentioned above, however, that for Derrida a dehiscence operates in 
Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche every time the question of the proper is raised. For Heidegger, the Eternal Return 
must be understood as operating according to a vulgar concept of time. In thinking beings as a whole as life, closed 
off to the question of Being, an authentic relation to death and letting beings be, it remains closed to the 
understanding of time as the transcendental horizon of the question. As Derrida writes, Nietzsche’s concept of chaos 
will determine whether, for Heidegger, he thinks time metaphysically, or as something else. In fact, he suggests, the 
entire problematic of Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche may hinge on this point. It is on the question of the instant in 
the Eternal Return that Derrida locates the site of Heidegger’s fort-da with Nietzsche, placing him on the one hand 
beyond metaphysics and on the other within it. (Derrida specifies, however, that he does not intend to argue that the 
Eternal Return is in no way traditional, “I believe it also has a profound relationship to the tradition, that it is a 
thought of the tradition, but the question remains of the novelty of the tradition and of the traditional relationship to 
the tradition (same thing for Heidegger).” (L9, 6t) Heidegger reads Nietzsche’s adaptation of Heraclitus’ Aiôn in 
terms of totality and of the authority of the present in its eternity and infinity. We will recall that for Heidegger, 
which Derrida cites again here, “viewed as a whole, Nietzsche’s meditations on time and space are quite meagre.” 
(GA 6.1, 310/2 90). If the question of infinity is so central to the thought of Return, how can Heidegger on the one 
hand thus attempt to save Nietzsche’s thought as the last great metaphysics all the while dismissing everything 
Nietzsche says about time? When Heidegger summarizes Nietzsche’s thought as the collective character of the 
world as chaos, he interprets chaos as the totality of beings. For Derrida, however, this rests on an implicit 
interpretive gesture in Heidegger; when Nietzsche uses the word Being, Heidegger “in such a crude manner it’s a 
little laughable” substitutes ‘the totality of beings,’ which he then uses to define chaos. (L9, 14t) However, Derrida 
writes, this does not take into account anything that Nietzsche says about chaos as a chain, as a yawning gap, 
everything that should prevent chaos from becoming a thought of totalization.     
173 L10, 13. 
174 Derrida will engage Heidegger’s Time and Being at length in the unpublished sections of his Donner le temps 
seminar, but also sporadically throughout La Chose.   
175 NII, 35. 
176 DE 93/74. 
177 DE, 21-2/10, 70n2/119n3. 
178 NII, 35. 
179 ADS, 173/126. 
180 Quasi-transcendental, he writes, because the ‘yes’ is irreducible to a “discourse on the conditions of an object – 
theoretical, practical, aesthetic – for a subject), (P2 247/239) quasi-ontological because irreducible to a “discourse 
on the being of a presence.” (P2 247/239) 
181 UG, 132/103. 
182 P2, 245-7/238-9. 
183 P2 245/238. Derrida fascinatingly recalls Ponge’s Fable here, “par le mot par commence ce texte,” which is also 
at the heart of his discussions of biological auto-hetero-affection, as well as the circulation of ‘life’ as a model in 
science, translation, etc. in the sixth session of La Vie la mort. 
184 HC, 84-5/94-5. 
185 P 25/14. The same, he says, holds for what I elaborated above as arche-writing, which can always necessarily be 
contaminated by writing in the narrow sense.  
186 P, 25/15. 
187 UG, 70/265. 
188 UG, 141/308. 
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189 “It is the weak, not the strong, that defies dialectics. Right is dialectical, justice is not-dialectical, justice is weak.” 
(TS 33) 
190 “Selection in favour of the stronger, better-constituted, and the progress of the species. Precisely the opposite is 
palpable: the elimination of the lucky strokes, the uselessness of the more highly developed types, the inevitable 
domination of the average, even the sub-average types.” (Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §364, cited in L3, 12). 
191 See also Derrida’s discussion in H.C. for Life relating his reading of Francois Jacob to “these problems of identity 
and sight, of double life [double vie] and double vision [double vue]” (HC, 54-5/58-9) 
192 ED, 45/32. 
193 PV, 69, 71. 
194 See particularly, in this respect, Derrida’s footnote in NG 268-9n14/32-3n15, as well as his discussion in Limited 
Inc, /148-9. In H.C. for Life, he builds on Hélène Cixous’s word ‘puissance’ [might] as one beyond any will-to-live, 
power-to-live, possibility or potentiality, testifying rather to impossibility, unpower, vulnerability and death. (Cf. HC 
21/17, 24/20, 94/107) One could read such a puiss-ance in ‘volonté de puissance’ precisely in the middle voice, the 
neutral beyond metaphysical activity and passivity in survivance, revenance, différance, etc. 
195 See NII, 35, and FL, 21/235; “I have always been uncomfortable with the word force even if I have often judged 
it indispensible.” §5.1 will take this up at length. 
196 NG, 268-9n. 14/32-3 n. 15.  
197 “Beyond all conceptual oppositions, Bemächtigung indeed situates one of the exchangers between the drive to 
dominate as the drive of the drive, and the ‘Will to Power.’” (CP 432/403) 
198 MP, 18-9/17. 
199 L3, 7. 
200 DB, 117/87. 
201 P, 151-3/132-4. 
202 Cf. DQ, 17/4-5. 
203 Even if Derrida goes on to say that “We must pass by here, we too, we must pass over in silence, as low as 
possible to the earth, the return of the animal: not the figure of the old mole (‘Well said, old Mole’)” (SM 154/117) 
I’m tempted to link this thought in relation to what Deleuze and Guattari call “the mole of the transcendent within 
immanence itself.” (QP 50/46) This note is dedicated to Jennifer Schade.  
204 Cf. BS2, 369-70/267-8. 
205 Cf. PA 323/290-1 for an approximate typology. 
206 Cf. Derrida’s interview in DN, 14, and also Parages on this. “‘But we are led through the teaching of Levinas 
before a radical experience. Autrui is entirely Other; the other is what exceeds me absolutely. The relation with the 
other that is autrui is a transcendent relation, which means that there is an infinite, and, in a sense, an impassable 
distance [dis-tance] between myself and the other, who belongs to the other shore [rive], who has no country 
[patrie] in common with me, and who cannot in any way assume equal rank in a same concept or a same whole.’ 
(BEI 74/52)... But can one, ought one to, must one land on [faut-il aborder] this other shore? Wouldn’t it 
immediately cease to be the other? Would the event still come about? Wouldn’t it be hit with an interdiction (not! ne 
pas!) on its very arrival, according to the double no/pace of the law, its double bond [lien], its circlelessly circular 
double knot that is on first approach crossed? “The circle of the law is this: there must be a crossing in order for 
there to be a limit, but only the limit, inasmuch as uncrossable, summons to cross, affirms the desire (the false step, 
the faux pas) that has already, through an unforeseeable moment, crossed the line.’ Just like death (‘always on the 
horizon of the law’...) ‘that prevents us from dying’ and from which is withdrawn ‘in advance from the benefit of an 
event.’” (P 66-7/54-5) 
207 This ‘without ground’ is taken up a little earlier, in a sense that, if I’ve been reading life death and survivance as 
saying more or less the same thing, truly testifies to the logic of the double cited in epigraph (doubly cited in 
epigraph, Blanchot citing Nietzsche in epigraph). “No, the survivance I am speaking of is something other than life 
death, but a groundless ground from which are detached, identified and opposed what we think we can identify 
under the name of death or dying (Tod, Sterben), like death properly s-called as opposed to some life properly so-
called. It [Ça] begins with survival.” (BS2 194/131e) One would have to engage this notion of ‘ground without 
ground’ with everything Deleuze says about foundation, fondement, and ungrounding in the syntheses of time in 
Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense.  
 
Notes to chapter five: Biopolitics and Double Affirmation v5.0: Step/nots beyond an Ecology of the Commons 
1 The first formulation of this chapter was for a comprehensive exam in the writing of this dissertation in September 
2013, the second given at the Derrida Today conference at Fordham University in New York City, June 2014, and 
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the third at a meeting of the Society for the Study of Biopolitical Futures at the Society for Literature, Science, and 
the Arts for its year’s theme “After Biopolitics,” at Rice University in Houston, Texas in November 2015. The 
fourth staked its argument a little differently over some 75 pages, and appears in a much-refined form here. 
2 Lawlor, The Implications of Immanence, 106.  
3 Mick Smith, Against Ecological Sovereignty: Ethics, Biopolitics, and Saving the Natural World (Minneapolis, 
University of Minnesota Press, 2011), xv-xvi. 
4 Ibid., 106. 
5 Cf. FL, 42/246-7, AS, 122/87, passim. 
6 Smith, Against Ecological Sovereignty, 45. 
7 The affirmative turn to life, which I think underlies much affirmative biopolitics, can be summarized in Elizabeth 
Grosz’s reading of Darwin; “this is perhaps the only ethics internal to life itself: to maximize action, to enable the 
proliferation of actions, movements,” also drawing from Nietzsche in opposing “the other-directedness of a reactive 
herd morality and the self-affirmation of an active or noble morality unconcerned with the other and its constraints, 
directed only to its own powers and to the fullest affirmation of its own forces.” Elizabeth Grosz, Becoming Undone 
(Durham, Duke University Press, 2011), 22, 61. One finds a similar argument in the work of Rosi Braidotti, who 
argues that “the emphasis on life itself can engender affirmative politics,” calling forth a “vitality, unconcerned by 
the clear-cut distinctions between living and dying, compos[ing] the notion of ‘zoe’ as a non-human yet affirmative 
life-force.” For Braidotti, “death is overrated,” the fixation on mortality and finitude at work in other biopolitical 
thought “produces a gloomy and pessimistic vision not only of power, but also of the technological developments 
that propel the regimes of bio-power.” Braidotti hopes to bring together Spinoza, Deleuze and Hardt and Negri into 
a “politics of life itself as a relentlessly generative force.” Rosi Braidotti, “Biopower and Necropolitics,” published 
as “Biomacht und nekro-Politik. Uberlegungen zu einer Ethik der Nachhaltigkeit” Singerin, Hefte fur 
Gegenwartskunst 8,2 (2007), 3, 6. A similar argument appears in Jane Bennett’s conclusion to Vibrant Matter, 
arguing for the necessity of going beyond the ecological-ethical maxim ‘tread lightly on the earth,’ in favour of 
“grander, more dramatic and violent expenditures of human energy.” Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter (Durham, Duke 
University Press, 2010), 122. 
8 Many have proposed similar arguments; Paul Harrison, for example, suggests the necessity of a ‘critique of 
immanentism,’ which would “rais[e] questions over the compatibility or otherwise of ethics with an ontology of 
power.” Paul Harrison, “‘How Shall I Say it?’ Relating the Nonrelational,” Environment and Planning A 39 (2007), 
592. Steve Hinchliffe is also suspicious of the attempt to “replace an ontology of division with one of force – a 
Nietzschean world where everything is in principle related to everything else.” Such an ontology of force 
dangerously calls forth a hybrid nature, “a seamless world in which it becomes almost impossible to envisage or 
enact anything at all.” Geographies of Nature: Societies, Environments, Ecologies (Los Angeles, Sage Publications, 
2007), 55. A non-appropriative relation to the environment, Michael Marder argues, must avoid “an undifferentiated 
flux of becoming, a vortex of immanence sweeping everything into its homogeneous mix.” Plant Thinking: A 
Philosophy of Vegetal Life (New York, Columbia University Press, 2013), 166. 
9 On ‘biopolitical sovereignty,’ see Amy Swiffen, Law, Ethics and the Biopolitical (New York, Routledge, 2011). 
10 Cf. AEL 93/49 and passim. Recall my discussion of the ‘underside’ [envers] of concepts in §1.3.2. Cf. FF, 11. I 
draw the term ‘impolitical’ from Roberto Esposito’s Categories of the Impolitical, and its use may seem a little 
jarring to readers of Derrida. In a late interview on Levinas, Derrida specifically cautions against the recuperation 
and de-politicization of Levinas’s work by way of a ‘right-thinking’ and self-congratulatory discourse of the other. 
Cf. AL, 5. 
11 While this biopolitics of double affirmation is undoubtedly Derridean and owes a debt to Bataille and Blanchot, 
I’d completely refuse determining affirmative biopolitics as Deleuzian. Many of its proponents, however, seem to 
draw from his work, for example from Negotiations, when Deleuze writes of Foucault’s ‘vitalism’ as engaging a 
‘subjectivation,’ which “amounts essentially to inventing new possibilities of life, as Nietzsche would say, to 
establishing what one may truly call styles of life: here it’s a vitalism rooted in aesthetics.” (PP 125/91) But I’d 
argue these readings offer a very selective interpretation of Deleuze’s work that seems to ignore everything he 
develops concerning the Outside, death, passivity and powerlessness, not to mention his own readings of Foucault 
and Blanchot I examined in §4.2.2 and §4.2.3. If I’d began by asking whether immanence was really the best way to 
think powerlessness, the term itself in Deleuze’s work was revealed as intimately bound to a notion of double 
affirmation, one much more complex than the affirmation of the Spinozist conatus, essentially bound to a notion of 
selection. 
12 DF, 238/255. 
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13 A third alternative is hinted at in the work of Donna Haraway, who expresses a dissatisfaction with the Derridean 
notion of the non-power at the heart of power, which she reads as “only part of the needed reformulation. There is an 
annameable being/becoming with in copresence... which is about suffering and expressive, relational vitality, in all 
the vulnerable mortality of both. I am (inadequately) calling that expressive, mortal, world-making vitality ‘play’ or 
‘work,’ not to designate a fixable capability in relation to which beings can be ranked, but to affirm a kind of ‘non-
power at the heart of power’ other than suffering. Maybe a usable word for this is joy. [Mortality] does not reside 
only in suffering, in my view... Capability (play) and incapability (suffering) are both all about mortality and 
finitude.” Donna J. Haraway, When Species Meet (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 310-1, n. 27. 
I will return to Haraway’s work in my next chapter. More recently, her conversation with Cary Wolfe at the end of 
Manifestly Haraway outlines important points in thinking together ecological thought, biopolitics and the notion of 
doubling. “CW: The question does not become just ‘killable but not murderable,’ and it does not become just ‘Thou 
shalt not kill,’ but it becomes, as you put it, ‘Thou shalt not make killable.’ It’s on that specific terrain that I think 
there is an opening that has yet to be fully worked through, a crossing between biopolitical thought and ecological 
thought, because part of what animates your work in light of that commitment is to say, ‘look, if the issue is “Thou 
shalt not make killable,” then it’s not about escaping killing or escaping death. It’s about what posture or what 
stance does one take toward life.’ DH: Toward this killing... CW: Toward this killing or this life in its specificity... 
DH: Toward this living and dying, this nurturing and killing...CW:... in its specificity... DH:... in its more-than-
doubleness....” Donna J. Haraway, Manifestly Haraway (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2016), 233. 
14 Smith, Against Ecological Sovereignty, 150. 
15 Wolfe, Before the Law, 59 
16 Smith, Against Ecological Sovereignty, 45. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Wolfe, Before the Law, 60. 
20 Cf. Ibid., 82. 
21 Smith, Against Ecological Sovereignty, 108. 
22 Roberto Esposito, “Interview,” Diacritics 36,2 (2006), 51-2. 
23 Cf. ED, 380n.1/437n.15. I’ll return to this text in §5.2.3. 
24 See my reading of Freud and Jacob in §1.1.1.  
25 An earlier version of this text was titled “Beyond the Power Principle,” and was recently translated by Elizabeth 
Rottenberg and published in The Undecidable Unconscious: A Journal of Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis 2 
(2015): 7-17.    
26 Cf. PP, 148/109. 
27 Derrida has no interest in outlining a specifically modern genesis to biopower either. As he writes in The Ear of 
the Other, “no, no... As for me, I’m no fan of modernity. I have no simple belief in the irreducible specificity of 
‘modernity.’ I even wonder if I have ever used that word. In any case, I am very mistrustful whenever people 
identify historical breaks or when they say, ‘This begins there.’ I have never done that, and I believe I have even set 
down here and there reservations with regard to this type of periodization and distribution.” (OA 115/84) 
28 PM2, 24, 113. 
29  “Just as well or just as badly than the economic and social machines (the market, the labour market, 
pauperization, international debt, etc.) which are so many techno-scientifico-capitalistic mechanisms having the 
property of distributing in a terribly inegalitarian way the right to life, longevity and which not only condemn to die 
prematurely an incalculable number of living beings, human and nonhuman.” (PM2 268t) Cf. also PC, 467. 
30 P1, 60/45. Derrida recalls here the line of Ponge’s fable I mentioned in chapter 4, note 183 in defining the 
mechanisms of life’s doubling and exteriorization in its relations to death and its environment; “Par le mot par 
commence ce texte.” (P1 18/7) Derrida is fascinated with the logic of iterability at play in this small sentence, which 
both cites and performs itself, as tantamount to what he calls invention; “the concept of invention distributes its two 
essential values between these two poles: the constative – discovering or unveiling, pointing out or saying what is – 
and the performative – producing, instituting, transforming.” (P1 23/12) In oscillating between describing and 
performing, the descriptive and the normative, indeed the ontological and the ethical, par le mot par produces an 
event that overflows the traditional opposition between these terms. “An invention of the other that would come, 
through the economy of the same, indeed, while miming or repeating it (‘Par le mot par ...’) to offer a place for the 
other, to let the other come.” (P1 60/45) This poem indeed appears in all of Derrida’s mid-to-late seventies seminars, 
La Vie la mort, La Chose, Théorie et pratique and Donner le temps. 
31 P1, 61/46, PC, 467. 
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32 And one could add along with it traditional dimensions of normativity and valuation, indeed the techno-capitalist 
logic intent on blurring the boundaries between the opposition of making and letting, all of which still presuppose 
too much of the classical definition of sovereign activity, power, and force. 
33 Cf. MH, 145. 
34 NII, 202. “If [these decisions] invoke freedom and responsibility, [they] must naturally take into account the 
scientific knowledge about the aforementioned norms,” but the decision itself, with respect to the norm, must at a 
certain moment “escape scientificity, they must escape a techno-scientific programming.” (NII 200) 
35 “Deconstruction, “is inventive or nothing at all... its process [démarche] invokes an affirmation, the latter being 
linked to the coming – the venire – in event, advent, invention... For a deconstructive operation, possibility is rather 
the danger, the danger of becoming an available set of rule-governed procedures, methods, available approaches. 
The interest of deconstruction... is a certain experience of the impossible: that is... of the other – the experience of 
the other as the invention of the impossible, in other words, as the only possible invention. (P1 35/23) 
36 P1, 53/39. As Derrida write in Echographies of Television, in a non-dialectical sense of course, “we are only ever 
opposed to those events that we think obstruct the future or bring death, to those events that put an end to the 
possibility of the event, to the affirmative opening for the coming of the other.” (ET 19/11) 
37 “Letting the other come is not inertia ready for anything whatever... one gets ready for it, one makes the step 
destined to let the other come, come in.” (P1 53/39) 
38 “Preserves something passive, even unconscious, as if the deciding one was free only by letting himself be 
affected by his own decision and as if it came to him from the other.” (FL 58/255) 
39 FL, 60/256. 
40 ‘Perhaps’ – one must [il faut] always say perhaps for justice. There is an avenir for justice and there is no justice 
except to the degree that some event is possible which, as event, exceeds calculation, rules, programs, anticipations, 
and so forth. Justice, as the experience of the absolute alterity, is unpresentable, but it is the chance of the event and 
the condition of history. (FL 61/257) 
41 MS, 78/254. Indeed the word force itself is inadequate for Derrida, as I showed in §4.4.1. 
42 VS, 187/142. 
43 BS1, 438/330. 
44 VS, 121-2/92-3. 
45 VS, 127/96, 177/135. 
46 IF, 214/240. 
47 VS, 179/136. 
48 VS, 179-80/136-7 
49 IF, 219/246. 
50 VS, 187-8, 142-3. 
51 IF, 225-6/253 
52 VS, 180/137. 
53 IF, 228-9/256. 
54 VS, 190-1/144-5. 
55 MC, 139/139. 
56 MC, 245/252, 286/298. 
57 I’d add that much in Derrida’s early work on Husserl attempts to weave these two strains together; recalling the 
importance of The Transcendence of the Ego both for Derrida and Deleuze in their development of the pre-
subjective transcendental field. See my chapters 2-4 above.  
58 MC, 235/252. 
59 MC, 259/267. 
60 DE4, 768-73/470-4. 
61 DE4, 774-5/476. 
62 MC, 136/132, 144-6/144-146. 
63 Another point of contrast between Derrida and Foucault would problematize this allegedly modern category of 
autopsy and visibility as thoroughly one of sovereignty, commenting on Louis’ autopsy of the elephant; “It is not 
original but it is not false, no doubt, to recall that the scene of knowledge, and especially of knowledge in the form 
of the objectivity of the ob-ject, of the knowledge that has what it knows or wants to know at its disposal in the form 
of an ob-ject disposed before it – [that this sence of autopsic/autoptic knowledge] supposes that one disposes, that 
one posese before oneself, and that one has taken power over the object of knowledge.” (BS1 375/279) Knowledge 
is a question of “wanting-to-be-able [vouloir-pouvoir] and first of all as wanting-to-see [vouloir voir] and wanting-
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to-have [vouloir-avoir].” (BS1 376/280) In the first volume of The Death Penalty, Derrida also expresses some 
hesitations before Foucault’s idea that the spectacular and theatrical, the seeing-punish [voir-punir] aspects of the 
death penalty begin to disappear at the beginning of the 19th Century. “I am not so sure of this, but perhaps there is 
here a technical, tele-technical, or even televisual complication of seeing, or even a virtualization of visual 
perception to which we will return.” (PM1 75/43) 
64 MC, 241-2/248-9, 252/259. 
65 NC, 174/122. 
66 NC, 9/xii. 
67  “The phenomena of partial or progressive death prejudge no future: they show a process fulfilling itself; after 
apoplexy, most of the animal functions are naturally suspended, and consequently death has already begun for them, 
whereas the organic functions continue their own life.” (NC 199/142) 
68 As I cited The Birth of the Clinic in epigraph, wondering if this small sentence gave its name to Derrida’s seminar.  
69 MC, 269/280. 
70 MC, 337-9/356-7. 
71 MC, 343/362. 
72 DE1, 520/148-9/ 523/151-2. 
73 VS, 185/141. 
74 “The adjustment of the accumulation of men to that of capital, the joining of the growth of human groups to the 
expansion of productive forces and the differential allocation of profit, were made possible in part by the exercise of 
bio-power in its many forms and modes of application. The investment of the living body, its valorization, and the 
distributive management of its forces were at the time indispensible.” (VS 186/141) 
75 MC, 268/279. 
76 MC, 269/279. 
77  MC, 269-71/280-2. In this radical finitude of the human, two possibilities for history open up: Ricardo’s 
pessimism and Marx’s revolutionary promise. In Ricardo’s case, history fulfills man’s originary finitude in a total 
superposition of finitude and production; “any additional agricultural labour would be useless; any excess 
population would perish. Life and death will fit exactly one against the other, surface to surface, both immobilized 
and as it were reinforced by their reciprocal antagonism.” (MC 272/283) On Foucault’s reading of Marx, however, 
history attains “a point of reversal at which it becomes fixed only insofar as it suppresses what it had always and 
continuously been beforehand.” (MC 272/283)... “History, by dispossessing man of his labour, causes the positive 
form of his finitude to spring into relief – his material truth is finally liberated.” (MC 273/284) But both Ricardo’s 
pessimism and Marx’s revolutionary promise are simply, it seems for Foucault, inverted mirror images of the 
relations between the temporal historicity of economic production, anthropological finitude, and the end of history. 
In Nietzsche, Foucault writes, these become refigured in the death of God, the overman, and the promise-threat of 
Eternal Return, setting them all ablaze “in a light that may be either – we do not yet know which – the reviving 
flame of the last great fire or an indication of the dawn... It was Nietzsche, in any case, who burned for us, even 
before we were born, the intermingled promises of the dialectic and anthropology.” (MC 275/286) 
78 Cf. Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy and Hardt’s foreword to the English translation of Deleuze’s 
Nietzsche and Philosophy. 
79 HD, xiii. 
80 Which, I must note again, is very different from the interpretation of Deleuze’s plane of immanence as the Outside 
as I illustrated in §4.2.2. 
81 Whereas arguably Deleuze reverses this relation in Difference and Repetition. “The Nietzschean synthesis, the 
eternal return, is a temporal synthesis that projects the Will to Power in time. Spinoza will show us, however, that 
the practice of joy takes place on the plane of society.” (HD 55) As Hardt writes, “the love of Ariadne for Dionysus 
is the affirmation of the eternal return it is a double affirmation, the raising of the being of becoming to its highest 
power. Dionysus is the god of affirmation, but it takes Ariadne to affirm affirmation itself... Aridane’s affirmation is 
a double affirmation (the ‘yes’ that responds to the ‘yes’)... Ariadne’s creation of pure being as is an ethical act, an 
act of love.” (HD 50) Even in Commonwealth, Hardt and Negri continue to develop a materialist philosophy 
bringing together Nietzsche’s critique of values and Spinoza’s ethics. Cf. HNC, 30. 
82 NP, n.a./x. 
83 HNC, 318. 
84 HNL, 20, 282-3. 
85 HNE, 73. 
86 HNE, 76. 
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87 HNE, 430n12. 
88 Bacon’s work is often critiqued in environmental ethics. See Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, 
Ecology and the Scientific Revolution (New York, HarperOne, 1990) 
89 Cf. PP, 240-7/177-182. 
90 HNE, 89, xv, 23. 
91 Cf. also NOB, 51. 
92 Although, of course, one could just as easily argue that the foreclosure of an outside itself manifests a much more 
profound desire for purity. 
93 HNE, 41. 
94 In the context of Empire, however, the authors are referring to nuclear war, although the ecological implications 
therein are quite palpable. Cf. on this subject Michael Naas’ “e-phemera: of deconstruction, biodegradability, and 
nuclear war” and Michael Peterson’s “Responsibility and the Non(bio)degradable” in Eco-Deconstruction: Derrida 
and Environmental Philosophy. The final pages of the Labour of Dionysus frame this argument in slightly different 
terms, recalling that the distinction between immanent, constituent power and transcendent, sovereign, constituted 
power cannot be dialectically reconciled; the two processes will continuously confront one another in a moment that 
will “threaten the entire world with a moment of destruction and death. There is no guarantee that this threat will be 
made powerless; and, in any case, the construction of democracy by the multitude develops in this shadow of death.” 
(HNL 311) Only a death threat, they write, stops revolution from being declared. “If there is a dialectic – the only 
dialectic possible – between the delusions of the power of the postmodern State and the construction of the 
democracy of the multitude, then it resides in this death threat.” (HNL 312) The biopolitical production of new 
subjectivities and the affective production of immaterial labour develop in the subject’s confrontation with death, 
where “it shows both its finitude and the insuppressible desire for life that animates it. The power of finitude is 
revealed therefore in this implacable struggle against death, against finitude itself.” (HNL 312) But this finitude, 
they add, is precisely there where the transcendent power of human finitude and the constituent power of absolute 
immanence coincide. Freedom, they conclude, “can be realized only by breaking apart the alternatives of modernity 
and choosing the mortal risk implied in this break.” (HNL 312) In fact, nothing seems to confirm better the precisely 
dialectical character of affirmative biopolitics.  
95 This distinction, however, has proven problematic to several interpretations of Spinoza and Deleuze see my note 
60 in chapter 4 above.  
96 HNL, 290-1. 
97 Deleuze, for his part, seems to argue precisely the opposite: Foucault “stumbles on the question; is there anything 
beyond power? Is he not getting trapped in a sort of impasse within power relations? He was, you might say, 
mesmerized by and trapped in something he hated.” (PP 148/109) 
98 HNL, 292. 
99 HNE, 388-9. 
100 NOB, 60. 
101 HNC, 56. 
102 NOB, 60. 
103 HNC, 5, 8, 29. 
104 The authors further target Agamben here: against his claim that “the only possibility of rupture resides in 
‘inoperative’ activity (inoperosità), a blank refusal that recalls Heidegger’s notion of Gelassenheit, completely 
incapable of constructing an alternative,”  ... “negat[ing] any constructive capacity of biopolitical resistance.” (HNC 
58) 
105 HNC, 178. 
106 NOB, 55. 
107 HD, 44, 47. 
108 HNE, 359. 
109 HNE, 269. 
110 EB, 141-2. See also E3, 8. “Nazism, by fulfilling and at the same time overturning the critique of the modern 
tradition, crushed the person into the individual and collective body that is its bearer... the elimination from human 
life of any transcendence with respect to its immediate biological given.”  
111 EC, 28. 
112 EC, 5. One can see here already the necessary and impossible, the ‘il faut’ structure of the gift operates in 
Esposito as I showed in Derrida.  
113 EC, 6. 
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114 ECI, xxviii. 
115 EC, 13. 
116 EB, 58, 46, 57. 
117 EI, 2, 7-8. “The immunitary logic is based more on a non-negation, on the negation of a negation, than on an 
affirmation. The negative not only survives its cure, it constitutes the condition of its effectiveness. It is as if it were 
doubled into two halves, one of which is required for the containment of the other: the lesser of two evils intended to 
block the greater evil, but in the same language.” (EI 8e)  
118 EI, 8-9. 
119 EI, 18, 33. 
120 “To assume the will to power as the fundamental vital impulse means affirming at the same time that life has a 
constitutively political dimension and that politics has no other object than the maintenance and expansion of life.” 
(EB 9) 
121 EB, 10. 
122 EI, 88. As Esposito cites Nietzsche, life in the ascetic ideal “wrestles in it and through it with death and against 
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